Seven Month Contractual Limitiations Period in a Benefits Plan is Reasonable and Enforceable Under ERISA
ABENA v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. (September 16, 2008)
Albert Abena worked as a dentist for American Dental Partners, Inc. (“ADP”). ADP provided long-term disability benefits to eligible employees through a plan administered by Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (“MetLife”). An employee seeking benefits had to file a “Proof of Disability” within three months of the end of an “Elimination Period” (a ninety day period from the date of disability during which benefits were not paid). The Plan provided that no legal action could be filed before the sixtieth day after the filing of the Proof of Disability or after three years from the date Proof of Disability had to be filed. Abena submitted a Proof of Disability on October 23, 2000. He asserted that his disability commenced on May 16, 2000. MetLife approved the claim in early 2001 and began paying benefits. After learning that Abena was again working as a dentist, MetLife reviewed his claim and notified him on August 8, 2002 that his benefits would be terminated. Abena took advantage of an internal appeals process. MetLife affirmed its decision on April 16, 2003. Abena filed suit on April 17, 2006 under ERISA against ADP and MetLife. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that the suit was not timely filed. Abena appeals.
In their opinion, Judges Manion, Rovner, and Evans affirmed. The Court agreed with the court below that the issue was controlled by the Court’s 1997 decision in Doe v. Blue Cross Blue Shield United of Wisconsin. In Doe, the Court noted that ERISA did not contain a Statute of Limitations and that the normal practice would be to borrow a limitations period from a closely analogous statute. It also held that a shorter contractual limitations period would be enforced if it was reasonable. Doe dealt with an employer-sponsored health plan. Like the ADP plan, the Doe plan provided that a claimant had to file for reimbursement within ninety days of the date of service and that the claimant could not initiate a suit after three years from the last day a claim could be filed. The plan also required a claimant to pursue an internal appeals process. The appeals process in Doe was concluded with seventeen months left in the three year limitations period. Particularly given that the claimant was represented by counsel, the Court held that the seventeen months was reasonable and enforceable. In applying Doe to Abena’s situation, the three year period expired in November of 2003. MetLife notified him of its affirmance of termination of benefits in April of 2003. Abena, therefore, had seven months to file suit. Abena argues that Doe was an initial claim case and his is a denial of previously granted benefits and therefore distinguishable. The Court agreed that the limitations provision may be better suited to an initial claim but did not see that as a reason to depart from Doe’s holding. The Court also agreed with Abena that a situation could arise in which benefits were paid for thirty nine months before termination, leaving no time to bring suit. Unfortunately for Abena, the Court’s view was that the possibility of that result did not invalidate the limitations period or make a seven month period unreasonable – it merely would have made the application of the provision in that case unreasonable. Abena, too, was represented by counsel. In those circumstances, the Court held that a seven month period was reasonable and enforceable.
Michael Rigney practices in the law offices of GVC Ltd. in Chicago. In this blog, he reports on select