"Mosaic" of Circumstantial Evidence is Enough Under Direct Method of Proof to Survive Summary Judgment

HASAN v. FOLEY & LARDNER (December 15, 2008)

Zafar Hasan is a Muslim of Indian descent. In 2000, he joined the law firm of Foley & Lardner (“Foley”) as an associate. (The following are facts construed in a light most favorable to Hasan.) During his first year at the firm, he received mostly positive reviews and maintained high billable hours. The events of September 11, 2001 changed Hasan’s standing in the firm. Hasan’s billable hours dropped considerably and he received much less positive reviews. At a meeting in October of 2002, Foley decided to fire Hasan. The firm notified Hasan in December that he was being terminated. He filed suit in 2004, alleging that Foley violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted Foley’s motion for summary judgment. Hasan appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Coffey, Ripple and Manion reversed and remanded. The Court noted that Hasan proceeded under the “direct method” of proving discrimination. Under the direct method, a plaintiff must present evidence, direct or circumstantial, that points to a discriminatory reason for the action of the employer. Courts accept three types of circumstantial evidence in a direct method case. Hasan relies on two types: a) suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, or comments directed at others in the same group, and b) evidence that the employer’s stated reasons for its conduct is not worthy of belief. Hasan’s evidence included: a partner’s anti-Muslim comments, suspicious timing in Hasan’s downturn in billable hours, the financial health of the firm, Foley’s treatment of other Muslim associates, and a changing justification for Foley’s conduct once it located Hasan’s performance reviews. The Court disagreed with the district court’s treatment of some of the evidence. It concluded, for example, that: a) evidence of an anti-Muslim comment by a partner who was not Hasan’s supervisor was valid nonetheless because the partner attended the meeting at which Foley decided to terminate Hasan (and, in fact, may have instigated the decision), b) evidence of an anti-Muslim remark made a year before the decision to terminate may nonetheless be valid circumstantial evidence when it was made at about the time when Foley began to assign work elsewhere, which in turn became a stated reason for his termination, and c) evidence regarding Foley’s treatment of other Muslims is not per se irrelevant but may be relevant depending on how closely tied it is to Hasan’s circumstances. The Court rejected Foley’s argument that Hasan failed to produce evidence of its treatment of similarly situated employees. The direct method of proof does not require such evidence. Finally, the Court noted that Foley initially claimed that it fired Hasan for poor performance but changed its stance when early, positive performance reviews were discovered and produced. They then claimed that Hasan was fired because the firm did not have enough work to keep all associates busy. The Court held that a reasonable jury could have believed both reasons to be pretext. The Court held that the totality of the evidence and possible inferences precluded summary judgment for Foley and remanded to the district court.

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