Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Commentary : In Their Opinion : Lawyer & Attorney Michael E. Rigney : Kelley Drye & Warren Law Firm

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CAMP v. TNT LOGISTICS CORPORATION (January 14, 2009)

Lola Camp was a truck driver in the employ of Transport Leasing Company (“TLC”). TLC in turn provided her services to DeKeyser Express (“DeKeyser”), a transport company. One of DeKeyser’s customers was TNT Logistics Corporation (“TNT”). TNT provided transportation logistics services to shippers. In January 2003, TNT directed DeKeyser to pick up a shipment of automobile parts from Trelleborg YSH, Inc. (“Trelleborg”) for delivery to a Mitsubishi automobile plant. DeKeyser assigned the job to Camp. When Camp arrived and surveyed the shipment, consisting of three pallets of parts, she concluded that the only way to fit them onto the truck was to stack one of the pallets on top of one of the others. She was concerned that such a load might not be safe. She advised Trelleborg, DeKeyser and TNT of her concern. TNT personnel advised DeKeyser and Camp that it understood the risk. TNT advised Camp to go ahead with the shipment. TNT released Trelleborg and Camp of any liability for cargo damage. When Camp arrived at her destination, she opened the truck door. The pallet started to fall – she injured herself while trying to prevent the fall. Camp brought an action against TNT and Trelleborg for negligence. The court granted summary judgment to TNT and Trelleborg. Camp appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Manion and Sykes affirmed. The Court started with the elements of a negligence claim in Illinois – duty, breach of the duty, and an injury proximately caused by the breach. The Court found it necessary to discuss only the duty requirement. It understood Camp’s claim to be one for common-law negligence based on two alternate theories of duty – statutory and common-law. Camp alleged that the statutory duty claim arose from TNT’s and Trelleborg’s violation of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (“FMCSR”). The Court disagreed. It noted that the regulations applied only to “motor carriers.” It held that TNT was not a motor carrier (Camp conceded that Trelleborg was not.) The Court distinguished between a “motor carrier,” defined as a “person engaged in the transportation of goods,” and a “broker,” defined as one who “provid[es] . . . or arrang[es]” for transportation by motor carriers. Even though “transportation” includes “services related to” the movement of property, the Court determined that TNT’s activities were that of a broker and did not rise to the level of providing services relating to the transportation. Also with respect to the statutory duty claim, the Court held that Camp could not recover from TNT or Trelleborg for aiding and abetting the violation of FMCSR. Camp herself violated the FMCSR. Illinois law does not allow a plaintiff to recover from a defendant for adding or abetting the plaintiff’s own tortious conduct.

With respect to the common-law duty claim, the Court identified the factors under Illinois law that courts consider to determine the existence of a duty: a) reasonable foreseeability of an injury, b) likelihood of an injury, c) magnitude of the burden of protecting against the injury and d) the consequences of placing this burden on the defendant. The Court concluded that neither TNT nor Trelleborg owed a duty of care to Camp -- Camp was aware of the risk, a reasonable person would have avoided the danger, TNT and Trelleborg knew of no particular reason why Camp would be compelled to act otherwise, Camp was in a better position to avoid the injury, it would be a burden to impose the obligation to avoid the injury on TNT or Trelleborg, and placing the burden on TNT and Trelleborg would result in significant resources devoted to preventing the injury. Having found no duty, Camp cannot establish negligence.