Specific Discriminatory Remarks, Without Other Evidence Of Intent, Are Insufficient To Establish a Prima Facie Case Of Race Discrimination
NAGLE v. VILLAGE OF CALUMET PARK (February 4, 2009)
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William Nagle, a white male in his fifties, is a police officer with the Village of Calumet Park and has been for almost thirst years. He has been active in union matters for most of that time. The Village hired a new Police Chief (Davis, a black male in his fifties) and Assistant Chief (Rockett, a white female in her forties) in 2002. Nagle claims that Davis discriminated against him on racial and age bases. The incidents he complains of include: a) Davis asked Nagle when he was going to retire, b) Davis referred to Nagle and his peer group on several occasions as “old white mother f*****s,” c) Davis selectively disciplined Nagle in comparison to younger officers, d) Davis said he might be getting “too old” for the job, e) Davis suspended Nagle for failing to assist another officer but did not discipline another officer for the same conduct, and f) Davis reassigned Nagle to duties that Nagle considered undesirable. Nagle also contends that Davis discriminated against him because of his speech. Nagle had spoken up publicly at a meeting in opposition to Davis’ manpower reduction plans. Davis later criticized him for doing so. A few days later, Nagle was suspended for violating a new sick-leave policy. Nagle filed charges with the EEOC. A few weeks later, Davis again suspended Nagle, this time for preparing a union grievance while on-duty. The suspension was overturned and Nagle was paid for the time. He nevertheless filed a second EEOC charge alleging that his suspension was on account of his age and race and in retaliation for the earlier EEOC charge. After being suspended again for violating the sick-leave policy, Nagle filed a third charge alleging that that suspension and an earlier reassignment were made due to his age and race and in retaliation for his complaints. Nagle brought an action, alleging age discrimination under ADEA and race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. He also brought a § 1983 action, alleging a violation of the First Amendment. The court granted summary judgment for defendants on all counts. Nagle appeals.
In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Evans and Williams affirmed. The Court first addressed Nagle’s race and age discrimination claims. The Court noted the lack of direct evidence of discriminatory intent. But the direct method of proof also allows a plaintiff to rely on circumstantial evidence. That evidence could include a) suspicious timing, b) ambiguous statements or conduct directed at the protected group, c) evidence of better treatment of those outside the group. or d) evidence that a qualified employee was passed over in favor of a person outside the group. The Court refused to disregard Davis’ race and age-based remarks simply because they were not close in time to the complained of discrimination. A determination must be made on all the facts. Here, Nagle tried to buttress his claim by showing that Davis generally hired non-white or non-male applicants and that he treated non-white and non-male officers better. The Court found that Nagle failed to produce enough evidence on either point. In addition, most of Nagle’s complaints did not refer to adverse employment actions. None of the reassignments he complained of changed the terms or conditions of his employment or affected his career prospects. The Court concluded that Davis’ comments were the only evidence under the direct method and insufficient to establish a prima facie case, given their lack of proximity to the complained-of conduct. The Court addressed Nagle’s claims under the indirect method. Under that method, among other things, a plaintiff must show adverse employment actions and that similarly situated individuals were treated better. The Court’s analysis of these same issues under the direct method show the lack of claim under the indirect method. The Court proceeded to address Nagle’s retaliation claim, again under a direct and indirect method. Nagle failed to carry the day on his retaliation claim because, on most, he failed to prove that he suffered materially adverse employment decisions and on one other, he failed to prove that Davis even knew of his EEOC charge when Davis suspended him. Finally, with respect to Nagle’s First Amendment claim, the Court found the record sparse with respect to the particulars of the speech. Without more information about content, form, and relationship of the speech to his job as a police officer and his role as a union representative, the Court was unable to determine whether his speech was protected.
