Removing Party's Request To Realign Co-Defendant As Plaintiff To Allow Removal Was Improper Under The Circuit's "Clearly Established" Law - Remand Order Should Have Considered A Fee Award

WOLF v. KENNELLY (July 23, 2009)

Ford Kennelly, an Indiana citizen, received a $1.3 million arbitration award, jointly and severally, against commodities brokers Rosenthal Collins Group ("RCG") and Ken Wolf. Wolf filed a petition to vacate in state court. He included a request for declaratory relief against RCG, alleging that RCG had made a demand for indemnity against him. Kennelly removed the petition to federal court and asked that RCG be realigned as a petitioner. RCG was an Illinois citizen. Its presence as a defendant prevented removal. Wolf moved to remand, opposing the realignment of RCG. Several months later, the parties discovered that one of RCG's limited partners was an Indiana citizen. Since Kennelly was also an Indiana citizen, diversity would be destroyed if RCG was realigned as a petitioner. The district court granted the motion to remand. The court then denied Wolf's request for attorneys' fees, concluding that the case was an exceptional one not warranting a fee award. Wolf appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Flaum and Kanne reversed and remanded. The Court first rejected Wolf's argument that the court's brief minute order, without much discussion or analysis, was an abuse of discretion. The Court noted that the issue had been fully briefed and the judge explained his rationale on the record, although not repeating it in the minute order. On the merits, the Court concluded that Wolf did not have an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. The "objectively reasonable basis" standard is similar to the qualified immunity doctrine. A district court may award fees if "clearly established" law prevents removal. At the time Kennelly sought removal, the long-standing precedent in the circuit was that realignment of a party was improper if an actual and substantial controversy existed between the plaintiff and that party. The fact that Wolf and RCG shared an interest in escaping liability altogether did not justify the realignment. The Court remanded for consideration of the fee petition.

Failure Of Plan Administrator To Explain Rationale For Benefits Denial Renders Denial Arbitrary

LOVE v. NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION WELFARE BENEFITS PLAN (July 23, 2009)

Nancy Love had worked at National City for over twenty years when she was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. After almost 3 years of receiving long-term disability benefits, the Plan told her she no longer fit their definition of "disabled." The controlling definition, after two years of long-term disability, is that a claimant must not be able to perform any job for which she is or could be qualified. The Plan's assessment concluded that, although she probably suffered from multiple sclerosis, she had never suffered an attack nor exhibited clinical signs. Love appealed the determination. She supported her appeal with several medical reports concluding that she had limited functional ability. The Plan denied her appeal, citing its doctor's conclusion that Love was able to do certain simple jobs. Love sued the Plan under ERISA. The district court granted summary judgment to the Plan. Love appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Evans and Sykes reversed and remanded. The court stated that ERISA requires a plan to set forth its specific reasons for any denial of benefits. Love's medical file and her appeal contained multiple medical reports questioning for functional capacity. In fact, each of Love's treating physicians concluded that she was unable to work for more than a few hours a day. The Court noted that neither the initial termination letter nor the letter denying her appeal explained the Plan's reasons for discrediting the reports. The Court concluded that the Plan acted arbitrarily by denying benefits without an adequate explanation. The Court declined, however, to order reinstatement of benefits. Instead, it remanded to the district court with instructions to remand to the Plan Administrator for further proceedings.

Speech, Though Tangentiallly Related To Abuse Of Public Resources, Is Not Protected Speech When It Was Spoken For Purely Personal Reasons

MILWAUKEE DEPUTY SHERIFF'S ASSOCIATION v. CLARKE, JR. (July 21, 2009)

In mid-2005, possibly in response to public criticism of his use of police officers as escorts, Milwaukee County Sheriff Clarke posted a message on the department bulletin board: "If you are afraid or have lost your courage, you may go home, otherwise you will ruin the morale of others." Michael Schuh, a veteran police officer, was offended. He submitted a statement to the union newsletter: "If you are afraid or you have lost your courage and need two deputies and a sergeant to escort you every time you fly in and out of the airport and patrol deputies to drive by your house when you're out of town you should resign and go home! Then you would lift the morale of this whole department (a.k.a. office)." A few days later, Sheriff Clarke assigned Schuh to a newly-created patrol in the most dangerous part of the town -- in full uniform, without a partner, and without a car. At about the same time, Sheriff Clarke issued a revised departmental confidentiality policy. The policy required employees to keep "official agency business" confidential and not to speak on behalf of the department. Officer Schuh and the union brought suit, alleging violations of state law as well as First Amendment retaliation under § 1983. The suit also challenged the confidentiality policy as an unlawful prior restraint. The district court granted summary judgment to Sheriff Clarke on the federal claims. Schuh and the union appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Rovner and Evans affirmed. The Court applied the three-step First Amendment retaliation analysis. The only step in dispute was whether Schuh's speech was constitutionally protected. To be protected, the speech must be of public concern. The Court considered the content, form and context of Schuh's statement. The Court noted that the form, a union newsletter, and the content, the Sheriff's abuse of department resources, could weigh in favor of constitutional protection. The context of the statement, however, led the Court in a different direction. The Court concluded that the context of the speech showed that it was a purely private matter. It did not focus on the fiscal repercussions of the Sheriff's conduct but rather on the personal impact of his original statement. Since the speech is not protected, Schuh's retaliation claim fails. With respect to the prior restraint claim, the Court first looked to whether the confidentiality policy applied to protected speech – i.e., the speech of a citizen on a matter of public concern. Since the policy on its face applied only to "official agency business," the Court concluded that it must apply only to speech related to an employee's professional duties. Since it did not regulate protected speech, it was not an unlawful prior restraint.

Court Finds No "Clearly Established" Constitutional Obligation Of Police Officers To Identify Themselves While Making A Public Arrest

CATLIN v. CITY OF WHEATON (July 21, 2009)

Police officers from the City of Wheaton and several neighboring jurisdictions conducted a major law enforcement operation targeting a drug conspiracy in August of 2003. Several Wheaton police officers were given the task of arresting Robert Ptak. Ptak was considered armed and dangerous and had a history of resisting arrest. The officers were dispatched to a local motel where Ptak was believed to be staying. They had a photograph and a physical description and had been told that he was seen riding a yellow sport motorcycle. The officers located an individual that met Ptak’s physical description on a yellow sport motorcycle in the vicinity of the motel. Unbeknownst to the officers, however, the individual was not Ptak. It was Jonathan Catlin. According to Catlin, the officers jumped out of their vehicle while they were stopped at a traffic light and ran toward him. They grabbed him, threw him down, and eventually handcuffed him. They did not identify themselves as police officers until after the arrest. They soon realized their mistake and released Catlin within 20 minutes. Catlin brought an action for false arrest and excessive force under § 1983. The district court found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and granted summary judgment. Catlin appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Posner and Kanne affirmed. The Court stated that Catlin had to show a violation of a constitutional right and that the right was clearly established at the time. With respect to the false arrest claim, the Court found no constitutional violation. The officers had a reasonable belief that the person they arrested was Ptak. The fact that they might have taken additional steps to be more certain does not affect the reasonableness of their belief. With respect to the excessive force claim, the Court stated that the reasonableness of force depends on the circumstances of the case. The Court conceded that summary judgment is frequently not appropriate in excessive force cases because of factual disputes. Here, given the absence of any factual dispute and the particular circumstances of who the police thought they were dealing with, the Court concluded that the presence of excessive force was a question of law. The Court was troubled by the officers' failure to identify themselves until after the arrest. Earlier identification might have reduced the need for the amount of force used. Even accepting it as a close question, however, the Court concluded that the right, if it existed, was not "clearly established." The Court was unaware of any court of appeals decision holding that police officers have a constitutional obligation to identify themselves when carrying out a public arrest. Qualified immunity therefore attached.

Evidence In The Record That The Promoted Employee Was Better Qualified Than Plaintiff Defeats Her Gender And Race Discrimination Claim

HOBBS v. CITY OF CHICAGO (July 21, 2009)

Kelly Hobbs was an African-American woman employed by the City of Chicago's Department of Transportation since 1989. She began her employment as a truck driver and was promoted to Lot Supervisor in 2000. She applied for a Foreman position in both 1997 and 2000and was rejected both times in favor of white males. She filed a charge of gender and race discrimination in January of 2005, shortly after she found out that another white male had been promoted to Acting Foreman. She complains that, after her discrimination charges were filed, she was disciplined on several occasions, her car was vandalized and her job duties were changed. In 2006, she brought suit against the City, alleging race and gender discrimination and retaliation claims against the City under Title VII, race discrimination and retaliation claims against the individual defendants under § 1981, and a hostile work environment claim against the City. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. Hobbs appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Kanne and Williams affirmed. The Court considered the Title VII and § 1981 race and gender discrimination claims together. Under the indirect method of proof, the Court concluded that Hobbs failed to establish she was passed over in favor of a person similarly or less qualified than she. The record showed that the male was more qualified, at least with respect to those skills that were part of the job qualifications. Hobbs also failed to show that the City's reasons for promoting him were pretextual. The Court admitted that the process by which he was promoted was somewhat questionable and may suggest favoritism, but did not prove discrimination. Her retaliation claims failed as well. She failed to show a materially adverse job action and she failed to establish a causal connection between her charges and the discipline imposed on her. The Court was troubled by her charge of automobile vandalism and the City's failure to investigate it, but concluded that the mere fact that it occurred after she filed charges was not enough to survive summary judgment. Finally, the Court concluded that the same facts upon which she based her retaliation claim were similarly insufficient to rise to the "severe or pervasive" threshold of hostile work environment.

Direct Appeal From Bankruptcy Court Is Allowed When Court Clerk, Rather Than Petitioner, Transmitted The Documents

IN RE: TURNER (July 20, 2009)

Joel Turner had monthly mortgage payments of $1500 when he filed a Chapter 13 petition for bankruptcy. In computing his "projected disposable income" under the bankruptcy law, he deducted the mortgage payments. He stated in his plan, however, that he intended to stop making his mortgage payments and turn his home over to the mortgagee. The trustee objected. The $1500 monthly deduction from Turner’s disposable income would make that much unavailable to the unsecured creditors. The bankruptcy court rejected the trustee’s objection. The trustee appealed under a since superseded process for direct appeal to the court of appeals. The process required: a) the trustee to file a notice of appeal in the bankruptcy court within 30 days, b) the bankruptcy court to certify that the ruling satisfied certain statutory criteria, and c) the trustee had to petition the court of appeals for leave to appeal within 10 days of the certification. The trustee filed his notice of appeal and the court certified. The trustee never filed a petition -- but the clerk of the court transmitted the request for certification and the certification order. The Court docketed the appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Sykes (dissenting) and Van Bokkelen (concurring in part and concurring in judgment) accepted the appeal and reversed. Each of the three judges had a different approach to the jurisdictional issue. Judge Posner emphasized that the clerk of the court transmitted to the appellate court everything that a petition for review would have contained. Therefore, the filing was complete and timely. Its only possible defect was that it was transmitted by the clerk rather than by the appellant. Because it served all the purposes behind the procedural requirements, Judge Posner concluded that it fell within the "functional equivalent" test. Alternatively, Judge Posner allowed the appeal pursuant to Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which allows the Court to suspend appellate rules for good cause. On the merits, the Court concluded that considering what the debtor's projected income will be at the time of plan approval was more consistent with the statutory language than considering it at the time of filing. The Court emphasized that it was not approving an exercise in speculation about the future income of the debtor -- it was considering only a fixed debt that all agreed would disappear.

Judge Van Bokkelen agreed that the Court could hear the appeal, but based his decision on Judge Posner's alternative Rule 2 holding, and concurred on the merits.

Judge Sykes dissented. She concluded that the petition was a statutory jurisdictional requirement. Since the trustee never filed a petition, she would dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Bankruptcy Court Properly Denied Proof Of Claim For Slander Of Title When Record Established Good Faith Of Debtor And Lack Of Actual Malice

IN RE: GALLO (July 20, 2009)

In 2004, a state court entered a dissolution order in the divorce proceedings of Frank Gallo and Gillian Emery. Gallo had a bankruptcy proceeding pending at the time. The divorce court awarded a Sanibel Island, Florida property to Emery but required her to pay $125,000 to the bankruptcy trustee. Gallo transferred his interest in the Sanibel Island property to Emery but Emery made no payments to the trustee. Gallo filed a lis pendens against the Sanibel Island property. Several months later, Emery obtained an order quieting title and sold the property for $490,000. In a subsequent Gallo bankruptcy proceeding, Emery filed a proof of claim for slander of title, alleging that she lost an opportunity to sell the Sanibel Island property because of the lis pendens notice. The bankruptcy court denied Emery's proof of claim and issued an order directing her to pay the amount of the state court dissolution order. Emery appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Ripple and Wood affirmed. The issues presented on appeal were whether Emery had a valid slander of title claim and whether the bankruptcy court erred in not considering her inability to pay. In order to establish slander of title under Florida law, one must establish a falsehood. A lis pendens is proper if there is a connection between an equitable interest in the property and a lawsuit. The Court did find that Gallo had an equitable interest in the property because the same order granted the property to Emery and required her to pay the trustee. It was less certain that Gallo could meet the litigation requirement of Florida law, since there was only a possibility of future litigation. The Court did not decide the issue, however, because it found the record established a good faith affirmative defense and absence of actual malice on the part of Gallo. The Court also rejected Emery's argument that the bankruptcy court should have considered her ability to pay. The bankruptcy court had no obligation to ensure her ability to pay before issuing its order, which was based on the final order of the state court. If later proceedings attempt to hold Emery in contempt for failure to pay, she may then present evidence of her financial situation.

Transmission Of A Proof Of Claim By Facsimile Was Improper When The Notice Clearly Stated That An Original Was Required And That It Could Be Submitted By Hand Or Mail

IN RE: MARCHFIRST (July 17, 2009)

When MarchFIRST filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, it sent a notice to its creditors. The notice stated that the original of a proof of claim had to be received by 4 p.m. on October 11. It also provided that the proof of claim could be submitted by hand or by mail. Avnet, a MarchFIRST creditor, faxed its proof of claim. The claims agent received the fax at 4:43 p.m. on October 11. The original of the claim was delivered the following morning. The trustee treated the original as the claim and objected to it on the grounds that it was not received until October 12. The bankruptcy court sustained the trustee's objection -- the district court affirmed. Avnet appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Evans and Sykes affirmed. The Court concluded: a) transmission of a proof of claim by facsimile is improper when the notice clearly states that the original must be submitted and that submissions can be made by hand or mail, b) Rule 5005 (c) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure applies only when a document is sent to the wrong recipient, not when it is sent by the wrong method, and c) in any event, the facsimile itself was untimely.

Specific Evidence That A Party Secured A Business Benefit Is Required To Establish Contract Performance - Speculation Is Not Enough

TRADE FINANCE PARTNERS, LLC v. AAR CORP. (July 16, 2009)

Trade Finance Partners ("TFP") is, in essence, a broker that arranges business relationships for its clients. It charges a fee on any business it secures. AAR, an aviation support company, was a TFP client. The companies began working together in late 2004, and entered into a contract in January 2005. The contract allowed TFP to secure business from any "target accounts" which were identified by AAR in a written Request for Information ("RFI"). Just prior to and separate from its relationship with TFP, AAR responded to a Northwest Airlines Request for Proposal for an aircraft maintenance and repair contract. TFP alleges that AAR identified Northwest as a target account, even though they did not complete an RFI. Northwest and TFP did communicate in early 2005. In February, Northwest reissued its Request for Proposal and AAR updated its submission, all without the knowledge or involvement of TFP. Northwest selected AAR for the maintenance contract. TFP filed suit, alleging that its efforts caused Northwest to award the contract to AAR. The district court granted summary judgment to AAR. TFP appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Wood and Sykes affirmed. The Court rejected each link in TFP's argument chain: a) the initial overtures between TFP and Northwest related only to a landing gear proposal and are not relevant to the maintenance contract inquiry, b) the record does not support TFP's assertion that there was a “barrier” of some sort between Northwest and AAR before its intervention, c) the record evidence does support the conclusion that Northwest rejected TFP's business model and independently awarded the maintenance contract to AAR, and d) the record does not support TFP's claims that it was responsible for Northwest's visit to AAR's facility or that the visit was relevant to the award of the contract. The Court conceded that it must construe the evidence and its inferences in TFP's favor -- but it found nothing but speculation. The Court also rejected TFP's claims that AAR's failure to complete an RFI was a breach of the contract, that AAR's intention not to fulfill its promise constituted fraud, or that it could recover in quantum meruit.

A Party's Failure To File A Post-Verdict Rule 50(b) Motion Forfeits An Insufficiency Of The Evidence Claim

CONSUMER PRODUCTS RESEARCH & DESIGN v. JENSEN (July 16, 2009)

Consumer Products Research & Design ("CPRD") holds a patent for a wireless smoke detector. CPRD entered into contracts with two companies owned, respectively, by a father and his son. One company, owned by the father, agreed to develop and market the product. The other, owned by the son, was responsible for its manufacturing. Unhappy with of the relationship, CPRD filed a complaint alleging fraudulent inducement and breach of contract. A jury awarded over $700,000 in damages. Defendants appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Flaum and Rovner affirmed. The Court rejected the defendants’ first argument, that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, because none of the defendants filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law after the verdict. The defendants did move for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 (a) after the liability phase of the bifurcated trial. The Court held, however, that a party's failure to comply with Rule 50 (b) after the verdict forfeits any claim on appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The Court also rejected defendants’ jury instruction argument. The defendants accepted the jury instructions without complaint in the court below and forfeited their objection. 

The District Court May Consider Evidence Outside The Complaint In Resolving A Factual Challenge To Standing

APEX DIGITAL, INC. V. SEARS, ROEBUCK & COMPANY (July 16, 2009)

Apex brought a breach of contract claim against Sears, alleging Sears owed it in excess of $80 million. Sears moved to dismiss for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It asserted that Apex lacked standing because it had assigned away its rights in the Sears receivables. Sears attached to its motion a letter from Apex attesting to that fact. When Apex offered no response, the district court granted Sears' motion. Apex appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Ripple and Kanne affirmed. The plaintiff, said the Court, bears the burden of establishing standing, an essential component of any case. The Court agreed with Apex that a sufficient standing allegation is enough to overcome a facial challenge. With respect to a factual challenge, however, where the challenger accepts the sufficiency but challenges the truth of the allegation, the district court is permitted to look beyond the complaint and view any evidence submitted. Because Apex failed to proffer any evidence to rebut its own statement in the letter offered by Sears, the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint.

District Court's Decision Not To Strike Expert Testimony For A Rule 26 Disclosure Violation Was Not An Abuse Of Discretion, In The Absence Of Any Prejudice

GICLA v. UNITED STATES (July 15, 2009)

David Gicla fractured his right ankle in a motorcycle accident when he was 20. Twenty years later, experiencing pain and swelling, he went to the Westside VA Medical Center in Chicago for treatment. He had ankle implant surgery. Unfortunately, the surgery was not successful. More unfortunately, additional treatment and surgeries were also unsuccessful and doctors had to amputate Gicla's right leg below the knee. Gicla brought this malpractice action under the Federal Tort Claims Act. After a bench trial, the court found in favor of the United States. Gicla appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Posner and Rovner affirmed. Gicla's principal argument was that the court should have stricken the testimony of the government's medical expert for a Rule 26 disclosure violation. The expert had testified at his deposition that he had not reviewed a series of x-rays in reaching his opinion. On the day of his testimony, however, he did review the x-rays. Gicla's counsel did not learn of that fact until the he cross-examined the expert. The Court agreed with Gicla that Rule 26 requires disclosure of any information considered by an expert in forming an opinion, and requires a party to supplement that disclosure. The Court also agreed that Rule 37 provides for the exclusion of expert testimony in the case of a disclosure violation. But the Court also noted that Rule 37 provides that exclusion is not appropriate if the failure to disclose was harmless. Here, the only real impact of the violation was that Gicla could no longer cross examine him on his failure to examine the x-rays. The court allowed Gicla's counsel a recess to reassess his cross-examination, or to contact his own expert, or to demonstrate actual prejudice to the court. The Court concluded that the lower court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the violation was harmless. 

Parental Notice Bypass Procedure In Abortion Notice Statute Passes Facial Constitutional Challenge

ZBARAZ v. MADIGAN (July 14, 2009)

A lawsuit was filed in 1984 challenging an Illinois statute requiring parental notice of an abortion of a minor. The Court affirmed a district court order that held the act unconstitutional because it failed to provide for anonymity and an expedited appeal. The district court later concluded that an Illinois Supreme Court Rule did not cure the defect and continued an injunction in force. In 1995, the Illinois General Assembly repealed the act and replaced it with the Illinois Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995 (the "Act"). The Act requires a doctor to provide 48 hours notice to an adult family member of his or her intention to perform an abortion on a minor or incompetent person. In a judicial bypass procedure, a court can order notice waived if it determines by a preponderance of the evidence that a) the petitioner is sufficiently mature to intelligently decide whether to have an abortion, or b) that notification would not be in the best interest of the petitioner. The parties agreed to continue the injunction until the Supreme Court promulgated rules relating to the Act’s bypass procedure. The Supreme Court did so -- 10 years later, in 2006. On the defendants’ motion to dissolve the injunction, the district court concluded that the Act was unconstitutional because the bypass procedure failed to provide a mechanism for consent for a petitioner who failed to establish the requisite maturity level but who successfully established that it was in her best interest to waive notice. The defendants appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Kanne and Tinder reversed and dissolved the injunction. The Court began by noting that the applicable legal framework was not in dispute. It is that: a) minors have a right to an abortion, b) the Supreme Court has upheld certain limitations on that right, including with respect to parental involvement, and c) parental consent requirements must have an alternative for sufficiently mature minors and for those whose interests are not best served by requiring consent. Applying those principles to this facial challenge to the Act, the Court found it to be constitutional. It rejected for several reasons the district court's conclusion that the Act authorized a court to waive parental notice in a "best interest" situation but lacked language authorizing a method of consent. The lower court reasoned that a bypass court would only reach the best interest issue if it found the minor too immature to make the decision. Even if it found for the minor on the best interest inquiry, its order would include a finding of immaturity. At that point, concluded the court, the "immature" minor would be legally prohibited from giving her consent to an abortion. The Court rejected the argument and held: a) the Act did contain an implicit provision authorizing consent, b) the Act does not require a bypass court to consider maturity before best interests, c) the Act does not require findings on both maturity and best interests, d) even without the explicit power, a bypass court has the inherent power to issue an order authorizing consent as an order in aid of its judgment, and e) the lower court's interpretation of the Act cannot stand when it leads to the absurd result of disallowing best interest abortions, when one of the purposes of the Act is to provide a mechanism to allow them. Finally, the Court emphasized that it was ruling on a facial challenge and expressed no view with respect to any future "as-applied" challenge by a minor who finds the actual proceedings deficient.

Clear Contract Language Is Nevertheless Ambiguous And Must Be Interpreted With The Help Of Extrinsic Evidence When Application Of The Clear Language Would Produce An Absurd Result

BKCAP, LLC v. CAPTEC FINANCIAL TRUST 2000-1 (July 13, 2009)

Quality Dining, Inc. has several subsidiaries (the "Borrowers") that own franchise restaurants, including Burger Kings, in several states. In 1999, as part of a significant refinancing initiative, the Borrowers obtain $49 million in financing in a total of 34 separate loans. One lender’s form agreement included a penalty for prepayment. At Borrowers’ insistence, the lenders modified the notes to allow a prepayment without penalty after 10 years. The notes included a formula for computing the new penalty. Eight years later, Borrowers prepaid 21 of the notes held by two of the lenders. The parties calculated the prepayment penalty as the difference between a stream of monthly payments through year 10 at the U.S. treasury rate versus at the actual rate. The Borrowers provided notice of prepayment with respect to the remaining notes, which were held by a third lender. Their notice was contingent on the lender accepting the same prepayment penalty formula. When the lender refused to so, the Borrowers filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that their interpretation of the penalty provision was correct. The district court granted the lender's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the contract language was unambiguous and supported the lender's interpretation. The Borrowers appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Sykes and Tinder reversed and remanded. The Court looked to state law to provide the substantive rules for resolving the contract dispute. Here, the contracts were governed by the laws of Michigan, Indiana and Pennsylvania. The Court first applied general rules of contract interpretation consistent in all the jurisdictions. The Court first looked at the plain meaning of the contract language with the goal of determining the intent of the parties. If the language is unambiguous, it would not consider extrinsic evidence. On the other hand, if the language is ambiguous, a trier of fact must examine extrinsic evidence to determine intent. Here. although the Court found the contract language clear, it also found that applying the clear language would produce absurd results. It concluded that the prepayment premium would always be negative, a result obviously not contemplated by these rational business entities. Even clear language can be ambiguous, said the Court, if it does not make economic sense. Both the lender and the Borrowers proposed interpretations that made economic sense. The Court rejected each, however, concluding that neither found support in the actual contract language. The Court concluded that the meaning of the formula is a question of fact to be determined after consideration of extrinsic evidence.

Record Did Not Establish Minimally Reasonable Justification Necessary For Wisconsin To Burden Interstate Commerce With Its "Diploma Privilege"

WIESMUELLER v. KOSOBUCKI (July 9, 2009)

The State of Wisconsin hosts two law schools, at Marquette University and at the University of Wisconsin. Graduates of these schools have a “diploma privilege.” That is, they are admitted to practice law in the State of Wisconsin without taking the bar exam. A graduate of any other law school in the United States must take the bar exam before being admitted to practice in Wisconsin. A group of those out-of-state graduates sued the Wisconsin Board of Bar Examiners and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, alleging a violation of the Commerce Clause. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The class appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Ripple and Wood reversed and remanded. The Court first addressed defendants' argument that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they challenged only that part of the Supreme Court Rule granting admission to graduates of state law schools without contending that they met a second requirement of the rule that their law school credits primarily focused on Wisconsin law. The Court concluded that the rule did not impose the latter requirement and that every class member could meet the actual requirements of the rule, as it read it. The Court next addressed the standing argument that Wisconsin could comply with an injunction by requiring all law school graduates to take the bar. This would certainly correct the problem but it would provide no relief to plaintiffs. But the Court reasoned that that was not the only outcome of such an injunction. There were numerous outcomes that would provide relief to the plaintiffs. Since the Court was unable to say that the plaintiffs have nothing to gain, they recognized their standing. On the merits, the Court conceded a state's right to regulate admission to its bar, even if the result impedes commerce. When it does, however, the regulation must be minimally reasonable. Here, the Court concluded that the record did not support any justification. It allowed the plaintiffs an opportunity on remand to establish the absence of a minimally reasonable justification.

Report Qualifies As A Party Admission If It Meets The Requirements Even If It Is Inherently Unreliable

MISTER v. NORTHEAST ILLINOIS COMMUTER RAILROAD CORP. (July 9, 2009)

Gary Mister, an employee of Northeast Illinois Commuter Railroad Corp. ("Metra"), was returning to his parked car on a January day in 2005 when he slipped on the ice and fell. Kirk Kroner, Metra's Safety Officer, investigated the accident. At the hospital, he discussed it with two of Mister's supervisors. According to his written report, a similar incident had occurred at the same location a week prior. At trial, the court excluded the report and all related testimony. After a jury found for Metra, Mister appealed.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Ripple and Wood affirmed. The Court first addressed the hearsay issue. The Court recognized the party admission exception to the hearsay rule that applies if the statement is made by a party's agent, during the period of agency, and within the subject matter of the agency. The Court found that the report met the party admission exception requirements. Here, the district court excluded the report because she found the statement inherently unreliable. Disagreeing with the district court, the Court noted that reliability was not required for the report to be an admission. Finding a party admission did not end the Court’s inquiry. Under Rule 403, a court may balance the probative value of evidence with its prejudicial effect. Here, although the report was not hearsay, it was based on multiple layers of hearsay and there was no basis to conclude that the accidents did in fact occur in the same place. The Court concluded that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the report under Rule 403.

City's Project Manager Has No Authority To Orally Modify Written Contract

U.S. NEUROSURGICAL, INC. V. CITY OF CHICAGO (July 9, 2009)

The City of Chicago entered into a contract with Global Health Systems, Inc. ("Global"), the predecessor to U. S. Neurosurgical, Inc. Global agreed to design, install and manage a computer information system. The purpose of the system was to implement case management and billing for the City’s Department of Health. At the time of the contract, the system only processed hand-entered data. Global represented, however, that its system was capable of processing scanned data. The contract provided that Global would assist the City in assessing the scanning function and modify the hardware and software if the City so desired. The City did decide to include a scanning function. The implementation turned out to be much more difficult and costly than anticipated. Global billed the City for the extra work, even though it did not follow the correct contract procedures. When the City refused to pay, U.S. Neurosurgical sued. After a bench trial, the court concluded that the work was required by the contract and denied relief. Alternatively, the court concluded that the extra work was not properly authorized, was not in writing, and did not comply with the contract procedures. U.S. Neurosurgical appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Evans and Williams affirmed. The Court stated that any party doing business with a government entity is presumed to know a contract cannot be enforced unless it meets statutory requirements and is authorized by an appropriate official. Here, the City's procurement officer was the only person authorized to approve the contract. The Court rejected the argument that the City delegated such authority to the project manager. In addition, the Court stated that both the contract and a statute prohibited an oral modification. Although the Court conceded that a written contract can be modified orally notwithstanding a contractual prohibition, the same is not true for a statutory prohibition. The Court also rejected U.S. Neurosurgical's claims for relief based on equitable estoppel and account stated.

Defendants Are Not Entitled To Qualified Immunity For Claim That They Recorded Telephone Conversations Of Village Employees For Six Years Without Notice

NARDUCCI v. MOORE (July 9, 2009)

Many years ago, the Bellwood, Illinois comptroller became concerned that some finance department employees were making personal phone calls on village time and also were subjected to harassing phone calls from irate village residents. The village approved a proposal to begin recording department phone calls. Nicholas Narducci took over as controller several years later. When he learned about the recording, he advised village trustees that it was illegal, he alerted the FBI and he directed the Chief of Police to discontinue the activity. In 2001, he brought an action against the village, the mayor, and the police chief on behalf of a class of finance department employees whose calls were recorded. He brought a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 and an illegal wiretapping claim under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as well as state law claims. The mayor and the police chief moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court denied the motion with respect to the § 1983 claims and some of the Title III claims. The mayor and the police chief appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Williams and Lawrence affirmed. The issue on appeal, whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, required the Court to examine whether there had been a violation of a constitutional right and, if so, whether it was "well-established." With respect to the Fourth Amendment violation, the Court looked to the totality of the circumstances. It first found, drawing all reasonable inferences in Narducci's favor, that he had demonstrated a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court next concluded that Narducci presented enough evidence to survive summary judgment, given that the recording lasted more than six years with no notice to the employees. Although the Court realized that no Supreme Court or prior Seventh Circuit decision squarely addressed the issue, it concluded based on decisions of other circuits that the right was sufficiently clear to preclude qualified immunity. Lastly, the Court rejected the defendants' qualified immunity defense to the Title III claims. The Court concluded that the lower court did not err in holding that defendants waived the argument by not presenting it in their opening brief. 

Fact That Some Class Members May Not Have Suffered Injury Does Not Make Class Certification Inappropriate

HERSHEY v. PACIFIC INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT CO. (JULY 7, 2009)

A number of investors sold 10-year U.S. Treasury notes short and, between May 9 and June 30, 2005, bought futures contracts in settlement of their obligations. These investors brought a class action against Pacific Investment Management Co. (PIMCO), alleging that PIMCO violated the Commodity Exchange Act by cornering the market in certain Treasury notes. The class alleges that PIMCO increased its ownership of the notes to the point where it created a monopoly price, resulting in losses to the class of more than $600 million. PIMCO challenged the class definition. It pointed out that many class members did not lose money because of the net effects of multiple trades. The district court certified the class. PIMCO appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Evans and Tinder affirmed. The Court rejected PIMCO's argument that a district court had to determine which class members suffered damages before certifying a class. The standing requirement is satisfied as long as one member of the class has a plausible damage claim. The fact that a class member ultimately is shown to have not been injured does not preclude class certification. The Court cautioned, however, that a class should not be certified if it appears that many class members have suffered no injury. Although the Court did not believe that to be the case, it invited PIMCO, on remand, to find out through a random sample of depositions. The Court also rejected PIMCO's argument that a conflict of interest existed among class members because they purchased the notes at different times. The conflict was only hypothetical and may never materialize.

Insurer Did Not Breach A Duty To Defend When Duty Arose Only When Other Policy Limits Were Exhausted Or When No Other Coverage Existed - And Neither Was The Case

CASTRONOVO v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY (July 6, 2009)

Sandra Castronovo died the day after her car was struck by a truck driven by Kenneth Lively. At the time of the accident, Lively was employed by and driving a truck owned by Doug Lavery, Ltd. He was hauling a trailer owned by GE Capital Corp. and leased to Greif Brothers Corp., who loaned it to Lavery. Lavery and Lively were named insureds under a $1 million policy issued by Owners Insurance. Travelers Property Casualty Company issued a $2 million policy to Greif. National Union issued a $25 million umbrella policy to Grief which covered permissive users of vehicles owned by Grief. The National Union policy provided excess coverage to the Travelers policy and provided primary coverage for covered risks that were not covered at all by any other insurance. Sandra’s husband John sued Lively, Lavery, GE and Greif. Owners provided a defense to Lively and Lavery but eventually tendered its $1 million policy limit to the court. Travelers defended GE and Greif under the Greif policy. Travelers refused to defend Lavery and made no decision with respect to Lively. In early 2005, Greif and Travelers both spoke with National Union about the case. And National Union continued to follow the developments. In September the court approved a consent judgment against Lively and Lavery in the amount of $6 million. They assigned their rights of coverage to Castronovo in return for a covenant not to execute on their personal assets. National Union learned of the consent judgment only after it was entered. In October, Travelers determined that Lively and Lavery were both insureds and paid their $2 million policy limit to Castronovo. Castronovo sued National Union to recover the approximate $3 million balance. The court granted summary judgment to National Union, holding that Lively and Lavery breached the policy by not notifying National Union of the consent judgment. Castronovo appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Bauer and Flaum affirmed. The only issue on appeal was whether National Union breached its duty to defend under the umbrella policy. The policy required National Union to defend in two circumstances: a) when all underlying policy limits were exhausted, or b) when the National Union policy provides the only coverage. Castronovo conceded that the former did not apply because the policy limits of the other policies were not exhausted until after the consent judgment was entered. The Court rejected the argument that a duty to defend arose under the “only coverage” clause once Owners tendered its policy limit and Travelers was disputing coverage. The Court ruled that the clauses were mutually exclusive. The first always applies when there is other coverage and the second only applies when there is no other coverage. The Court concluded that National Union had no duty to defend under either clause. The Court also concluded that National Union had no duty to defend because Lively and Lavery never actually requested a defense, a requirement under Ohio law.

The Adam Walsh Child Protection And Safety Act of 2006 Does Not Apply To Persons In The Physical, But Not Legal, Custody Of The Bureau Of Prisons

UNITED STATES v. HERNANDEZ-ARENADO (July 6, 2009)

Pablo Hernandez-Arenado (Hernandez) was awarded immigration parole when he came to the United States from Cuba as part of the Mariel Boatlift. Four years later, Hernandez pled guilty to the sexual assault of a young boy and was sentenced to five years in state prison. He admitted to several hundred similar episodes. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) revoked his parole and placed him in a Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) facility after his release from state prison, pending deportation. Hernandez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after 20 years in custody, after the Supreme Court ruled that the statute under which Hernandez was being held only allowed a reasonable period of custody pending removal. The petition was granted and his release was ordered. Before Hernandez was released, the government sought to civilly commit him as a sexually dangerous person pursuant to the Adam Walsh Act. The district court denied the petition, holding that the Adam Walsh Act applied only to individuals "in the custody of" the BOP and that Hernandez was in fact in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), the successor agency to INS. The government appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Rovner and Evans affirmed. The Court stated that the Supreme Court has recognized different meanings for the word "custody" in different contexts. Here, for example, the BOP has physical custody of Hernandez but the ICE has legal custody. The Court went on to say that the Bureau of Persons has physical custody of many persons for whom it does not have legal custody and, in fact, has legal custody of many persons over whom it does not have physical custody. The Court did not believe that the applicability of the Act should turn on a factor, like physical custody, that is random and manipulable. Even the government refused to suggest a standard test for determining custody, and does not believe that every person in its physical custody is subject to the Act. The Court insisted on giving the term a meaning that applied beyond the narrow facts of the case. It rejected a physical custody trigger and instead adopted the interpretation that the Act applied to all federal offenders, whether they were in the physical custody of the Bureau of Prisons or not, but not to persons in the physical control of the BOP simply as a service to another agency.

Court Adopts Majority Position That "Based Upon" Language In The Qui Tam Jurisdictional Bar Is Satisfied When The Relator's Allegations Are Substantially Similar To The Publicly Disclosed Allegations

GLASER v. WOUND CARE CONSULTANTS, INC. (July 2, 2009)
 

Carol Glaser is a Medicaid recipient with some serious medical problems. She started receiving care at Wound Care Consultants, Inc. in 2002. At some point, an attorney contacted her and advised her that Wound Care may have submitted improper billing to Medicaid. Glaser filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act in April of 2005. However, several months before she filed, a routine audit led the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services ("CMS") to begin an investigation of Wound Care. Glaser and her attorney stated that they were unaware of the CMS investigation. Nevertheless, the district court dismissed the action on the ground that it was based upon a public disclosure and that Glaser was not an “original source.” Glaser appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Kanne and Sykes affirmed. The Court described the essence of the False Claims Act. The Act prohibits false payment claims to the government. It allows private citizens to file actions on the government’s behalf and receive a substantial share of the recovery, if successful. Qui tam actions, as they are called, are barred if the action is “based upon the public disclosure” of allegations unless the person is an “original source.” This jurisdictional bar necessitates a three-part inquiry: a) whether the allegations have been publicly disclosed, b) if so, whether the action is based upon the disclosure, and c) if so, whether the person is an original source. The Court applied the test to the facts. Public disclosure is satisfied when, as here, the very agency responsible for investigating claims of abuse has started an investigation before the action was filed. The fact of the investigation need not be widely known. With respect to the second prong, the Court noted its earlier precedent that held that “based upon” meant that the allegations actually depended on and were derived from the publicly disclosed information. However, the Court recognized that eight other circuits apply a different test -- an allegation is "based upon" publicly disclosed information when the allegations are substantially similar. The Court conceded the merits of the majority position. Although its construction of the statute is consistent with the plain language doctrine, the Court recognized that its position made the third prong of the test -- original source -- superfluous. In doing so, the Court overruled Bank of Farmington and Caremark. Applying their new standard, the Court concluded that Glaser's allegations were not only substantially similar, but were nearly identical, to those of CMS. Finally, with respect to the third prong of the test, the Court held that Glaser was not an "original source" of the information contained in her action. The Court principally relied on the fact that Glaser knew of the fraudulent conduct only through her attorney but asserted the attorney-client privilege to prevent disclosure of how she learned the information. Thus, she did not meet the burden of proving that she had independent knowledge of the fraud.

Prior To The Amendments Of 2006, ERISA Allowed A Defined-Benefit Pension Plan To Select Its Own Operative "Normal Retirement Age"

FRY v. EXELON CORPORATION CASH BALANCE PENSION PLAN (July 2, 2009)
 

Exelon Corporation created a defined-benefit pension plan in 2002. In order to be able to distribute the balance of employee's account as if the Plan were a defined-contribution plan, Exelon defined "normal retirement age" to be five years after commencement of employment. Exelon was thus able to avoid what it considered to be a problem with ERISA's treatment of defined-benefit plans (Congress fixed the problem in ERISA in 2006). Thomas Fry retired from Exelon in 2003 at age 55. Fry sued the Plan when it turned over only his account balance rather than his balance plus investment credits through age 65. The lower court held that the Plan satisfied ERISA. Fry appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Evans and Sykes affirmed. The Court examined the statute. ERISA defines "normal retirement age" as either a) when an employee attains normal retirement age under the plan, or b) the later of i) age 65 or ii) the employee’s fifth anniversary in the Plan. The Court agreed with Exelon that its approach was allowable under the first prong of the definition. It concluded that ERISA did not require a retirement age to be actuarially accurate. Under the statute, an age is a "normal retirement age" if the plan says it is.

Auditor's Report That Simply Quantified Amounts Owed Under Certain Assumptions Was Admissable

TRUSTEES OF THE CHICAGO PLASTERING INSTITUTE PENSION TRUST v. CORK PLASTERING COMPANY (July 1, 2009)

G&J Plastering Company is a plastering contractor in the Greater Chicago area. Between 1993 and 2002, three different labor unions represented the plastering employees of G&J, including Local 5 of the Journeymen Plasterers' Protective and Benevolent Society of Chicago. The collective bargaining agreements of each union required G&J to make contributions to various union trust funds. Local 5 required the company to contribute based on an employee’s union, regardless of where the work was performed. One of the other unions required the company to make contributions based on work location, not the employee’s union. A union election conducted in 2002 resulted in the termination of Local 5’s representation of the company. In an exit audit, the company disclosed that it had been making contributions based on union membership rather than work location and had no records showing where work was performed. Given this absence of data, Local 5 instructed its auditors to compute the amount owed based on a set of assumptions and a review of the company’s payroll records. The auditors concluded that the company owed in excess of $800,000. Local 5 filed suit. After a three-day bench trial, the court awarded $1.1 million for unpaid contributions plus interest but disallowed the union's request to recover $45,000 in audit costs. Both sides appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Rovner and Evans affirmed. The Court considered three issues on appeal: a) the admissibility of the audit report, b) the admissibility of testimony about the report by one of the auditors, and c) the court's refusal to award audit costs. The Court first upheld the admissibility of the audit report. The report itself was not hearsay -- it was merely a summary of the company's payroll data. The assumptions the auditors applied to the data were not secret, were required because of the company's failure to keep records, and were considered by the lower court and accepted in part and rejected in part. The Court also found that the testimony in support of the report proper. The witness, although he was not a field auditor, was in regular contact with them, reviewed their work, and reviewed the final report. His testimony was not an audit opinion and he did not have to be qualified as an expert. Finally, with respect to the audit costs, the Court concluded that the lower court was within its discretion to deny the request when the union failed to provide sufficient supporting documentation (hours spent, individuals performing the work, qualifications of individuals, hourly rates, etc.).

The Resolution Of An Employee's Personal Employment Suit Does Not Preclude A Later Qui Tam Action

UNITED STATES v. ROLLS-ROYCE CORPORATION (June 30, 2009)

Curtis Lusby was an engineer at Rolls-Royce Corp. He became suspicious that the company was falsely certifying that one of its aircraft engines met government specifications so he informed his superiors. He claims that the company fired him for doing so. He brought suit under the False Claims Act, alleging that the company punished him for preparing to bring an action under the statute. The parties jointly dismissed the suit in 2003. However, two months earlier, Lusby had filed a qui tam action under seal. The court dismissed the action for failure to plead fraud with particularity and because of the claim preclusion effect of the earlier lawsuit. Lusby appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Posner and Wood affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court first addressed claim preclusion. It noted its 2007 decision in Cole. In Cole, the Court held that a person who did not prevail on a Title VII claim cannot later bring both a personal and qui tam claim under the False Claims Act. Here, however, Lusby disputes one of the elements of claim preclusion -- that the cases involve the same parties (Cole conceded the issue). The Court noted that the United States is not an actual party to a qui tam suit unless it intervenes. It is, however, the real party in interest. In addition, the Court identified several procedural requirements for qui tam litigation that would make it very difficult to bring a personal claim in the same suit. The Court concluded that the resolution of an employee's personal suit does not preclude a later qui tam suit. With respect to the particularity issue, the Court stated that the complaint contained quite specific allegations of fraud. It rejected Rolls-Royce's argument that a specific allegation of the details of the invoices was required. The Court did affirmed the lower court with respect to Lusby's allegations that Rolls-Royce committed fraud during the earlier settlement negotiations.

Force That Resulted In Injury To Arrestee Was Reasonable When It Would Not Have Led To Injury In Typical Arrestee And Officers Were Unaware Of His Sensitivity

STAINBACK v. DIXON (June 30, 2009)

Several police officers, after a report of his involvement in a minor disturbance, arrested Charles Stainback. They asked Stainback to put his hands behind his back. Instead of doing so, he asked that he not be handcuffed. All he said was that he thought it would hurt. The officers handcuffed him anyway. Stainback was handcuffed in a police vehicle for approximately 20 minutes. During that time, he complained that the handcuffs were hurting him and asked for them to be removed. Stainback alleges that he required medical treatment as a result of the episode. He sued the officers, alleging the use of excessive force. The lower court concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because the amount of force was reasonable under the circumstances. The court granted summary judgment to the police officers. Stainback appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Ripple and Sykes affirmed. The Court stated that whether force is reasonable depends on the circumstances surrounding the arrest. The circumstances must be viewed as they would have been by a reasonable officer on the scene. Here, the officers used an amount of force that would not have harmed a typical arrestee. Given that the officers were not aware that Stainback suffered from any particular condition or injury, the Court concluded that their actions were reasonable.

District Court Properly Disallowed Lay Opinion Testimony On Lost Profits When Witness Had No Particularized Personal Knowledge On the Subject

GERHARD VON DER RUHR v. IMMTECH INTERNATIONAL, INC. (June 30, 2009)

Gerhard Von der Ruhr founded Immtech and Septech, both medical technology companies. Immtech patented a human protein product. Septech claims it has a worldwide license and a right to purchase the product from Immtech. Septech claims that Immtech breached the agreement, resulting in lost profits. Septech offered the lay opinion testimony of Von der Ruhr that, had Immtech not breached: a) Septech would have partnered with a major, undetermined pharmaceutical company, b) the pharmaceutical company would have developed and received FDA clearance of the product at its cost, c) the product would have immediately captured half of the target market, and d) Septech would have received 5% of sales proceeds. He would have testified that Septech’s lost sales amount to $42 million. The district court did not allow the testimony and precluded the lost profits claim. Septech appeals.

Von der Ruhr had an option to purchase 24,390 shares of Immtech stock at $.34 a share, exercisable in whole or in part by May 1, 2001. He attempted to exercise the options in April of that year and sent a check in an amount equal to the number of shares times $.34. The company never issued the shares. Instead, relying on the fact that the option price was really $. 3409594, returned the check. A jury found that Immtech breached the contract and also found that three individual officers were guilty of tortious interference with the contract. The individuals appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Flaum and Wood affirmed. With respect to the lay opinion testimony, the Court recognized that lay opinion testimony is permissible in limited situations when the witness has particularized, personal knowledge. Von der Ruhr had no such knowledge – he never entered into the kind of licensing agreement he described, he never brought a pharmaceutical to market, he never even made a profit in the business, and he had no knowledge of the market. The Court found no abuse of discretion in disallowing the testimony.

With respect to the tortious interference, the Court conceded that there was evidence to support the defendants’ assertions of innocence. However, a jury found otherwise and the Court concluded that their decision was not irrational based on other evidence -- Von der Ruhr was treated differently, they originally authorized the share transfer, only $23.40 was at stake, there was a history of tension and strife, etc.

City's Failure To Promote (Four Times) Is Not Actionable Where Interview Process Was Reasonable And Fair

STEPHENS v. ERICKSON (June 30, 2009)

Lesley Stephens, an African American, has worked for the City of Chicago since 1979, except for a disability leave from 1988-1993. He has been a truck driver, an acting foreman, and an accident adjuster, all within the Department of Fleet Management. He filed a lawsuit against the City in 1997, alleging that it engaged in racially discriminatory hiring and promotion practices. Shortly after he settled the lawsuit in 2004, Stephens applied for four promotions. He was passed over each time. He again brought suit, alleging violations of § 1981 and Title VII. He claims that the City retaliated against him for his earlier lawsuit and his complaints of discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to the City. Stephens appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Wood and Sykes affirmed. The Court stated that it would apply the same elements to the claims under § 1981 and Title VII. Stephens chose to establish his retaliation claim under the direct method of proof. The principal issue on appeal was the causal connection between Stephens' protected activity and the City's failure to promote him. The Court set out the promotion procedure in detail – and stated that Stephens produced no evidence that any of the several employees who interviewed him for the promotions even knew of the earlier lawsuit or his prior complaints of discrimination. The Court noted that in each case, the City interviewed several applicants, rated the applicants on the same criteria, and recommended the applicant with the highest score. The Court also rejected Stephens' argument that the head of the department retaliated against him by pre-selecting his preferred candidate by choosing him for an "acting" position, leading the interviewers to a predetermined selection. Nothing in the record linked the department head to any of the interviews or any of the interviewers. The Court concluded that Stephens simply had not produced evidence sufficient to create an inference of retaliation. The Court also concluded that the retaliation allegations other than failure to promote (menial job assignments, intimidation, segregation, etc.) would not dissuade a reasonable employee from making a charge of discrimination and were therefore not "materially adverse" and actionable.

Order Was Not Final And Appealable When Court Was Willing To Consider Reducing The Amount Of Judgment

KERR - MCGEE CHEMICAL CORPORATION v. LEFTON IRON & METAL COMPANY (June 30, 2009)

Kerr-McGee received a $4.8 million judgment in 1996 against Lefton Iron & Metal Company for its costs in cleaning up contaminated property. Kerr-McGee continued to expend funds on the cleanup post-judgment. The district court increased the judgment to $9.5 million in 2003. In response to Lefton’s argument that it should receive credit for Kerr-McGee's receipt of insurance proceeds, the court invited Lefton to address the issue in a separate motion Instead, Lefton appealed.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Evans and Sykes dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Court noted that the lower court entered a money judgment but was prepared to consider a reduction. If the lower court simply neglected to consider the issue, the Court stated that the order would have been final. Of course, it would then have remanded the case for consideration of the issue. Here, however, the court did not neglect to consider the issue -- it invited a motion. Therefore, the decision is not final and the Court lacks jurisdiction.

An Attorneys' Fee Award Should Not Be Reduced Just Because The Plaintiff's Recovery Is Small Compared To The Amount Requested, As Long As The Recovery Is Not Nominal

ESTATE OF ANGELA ENOCH v. TIENOR (June 29, 2009)

Angela Enoch committed suicide while a prisoner in a Wisconsin state prison. Her estate brought a lawsuit alleging violations of her rights. The plaintiffs accepted the defendants' $635,000 offer of judgment. The offer of judgment did not include attorneys’ fees. On the plaintiffs' request for fees in excess of $300,000, the court awarded only $100,000. The court's rationale was that the plaintiffs recovered only a small fraction of the $10 million sought in their complaint. The Estate appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Bauer and Evans reversed and remanded. The Court held that the lower court erred in relying on the Supreme Court’s Farrar decision. Farrar deals with fee awards for plaintiffs who prevail but receive only nominal damages (Farrar asked for $17 million and received $1). Here, although the Court believed the $10 million sought was absurdly high, it concluded that a recovery of $635,000 in prison litigation is significant. A fee award need not be proportional to the recovery or to the amount recovered versus the amount requested. The Court remanded for a recalculation of the award using the lodestar as a starting point and also considering the result obtained, any claims on which plaintiffs did not prevail, the adequacy of the documentation, and any social benefits obtained.

County's Release Of A Mentally Ill Man, After Confimenent Without Medication, Was Not The Proximate Cause Of His Later Killing Of Another

BUCHANAN-MOORE v. COUNTY OF MILWAUKEE (June 29, 2009)

Sidney Gray, a mentally ill man, was well known to the Milwaukee Police Department. In the 10 years preceding July of 2006, he was arrested at least 35 times. Many of those arrests stemmed from violent episodes. He was also committed to the county's mental-health facilities on several occasions. County doctors understood that certain medications reduced Gray's violent episodes. In a five-week episode in June and July of 2006, Gray was arrested, committed, released from commitment, arrested for home invasion, held without medication, released by mistake, arrested again for home invasion, held again without his medication, and again released without charges being filed. Shortly thereafter, Gray shot and killed Frank Moore after breaking into the house next door to Moore's. Moore's survivors brought a section 1983 suit against the County, alleging that Gray’s release after a 72- hour confinement in a county facility without his medication was a violation of Moore’s civil rights. The court entered judgment for the County. The survivors appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Kanne and Sykes affirmed. The Court noted that the 14th Amendment generally does not impose on the state a duty to protect against harm by private individuals. An exception exists to not place one in a position of danger that otherwise would not have existed. Under this exception, the Court noted that the state must affirmatively create or increase the danger and the state's actions must be the proximate cause of the injury. Here, the Court held that the County's conduct was not proximate cause of Moore's death in that Moore was not a foreseeable victim of the County's actions. Gray was not known to carry a weapon, he did not pose a threat to any definable population, and any danger he posed was not of finite duration. The Court concluded that Moore's death was too remote a consequence to hold the County liable under section 1983.

Without Evidence Of Pretext, Employer's Firing Is Non-Discriminatory When Employee Admits To The Conduct At Issue

FARR v. ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CENTERS (June 29, 2009)

David Farr was a respiratory therapist at St. Francis Hospital. In 2000, he was the only male among the seven respiratory therapists in his department. There was a single computer in the department for the use of all the therapists. Although the hospital policy was for each therapist to log on with a unique password before each use, the practice was quite different. Typically, the first user of the day logged on with his or her password and all later users piggybacked on that login. When one of the therapists discovered inappropriate material on the computer, the hospital conducted an investigation. It found that: a) pornographic and hacking sites were accessed at the computer, b) Farr was logged on to the computer at the time the sites were accessed, and c) that Farr was the only one working on one particular day when a substantial amount of the activity took place. Farr eventually admitted that he was responsible for visiting some of the sites and that the others may have been generated by a computer virus during his use of the computer. The hospital terminated Farr's employment. Farr sued the hospital, alleging gender discrimination and a breach of implied covenant of fair dealing based on the employee handbook. The court granted summary judgment to the hospital. Farr appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Bauer and Evans affirmed. Although Farr asserted that he could prove his claim by both the direct and indirect methods, the Court disagreed. Neither test resulted in a conclusion that Farr was the victim of gender discrimination. In fact, the Court stated, the hospital's investigation convinced it that he was the one responsible. He even admitted he accessed the inappropriate sites. Nothing in the record showed that the hospital's reasons were pretextual. The Court also affirmed with respect to the state law claims. Farr's covenant of fair dealing claim is inconsistent with Indiana law. His defamation claim fails because the hospital's report was privileged, in that it was used during the grievance proceedings that he himself initiated. 

An Employer's Retaliation For An Employee's Wholly Verbal Complaints Is Not Actionable Under The Fair Labor Standards Act

KASTEN v. SAINT-GOBAIN PERFORMANCE PLASTIC CORP. (June 29, 2009)

Kevin Kasten worked at one of Saint-Gobain's facilities in Wisconsin. In 2006, Kasten received three warnings regarding his use of the on-site time clock. The third warning included a statement that it was the last step of the disciplinary process and that another violation could result in further discipline, up to termination. Kasten alleges, and Saint-Gobain denies, that he verbally complained about the legality of the time clock’s location about the same time he received the third warning. He alleges that his complaints consisted of a) telling his supervisor, b) telling a human resources representative, c) telling a lead operator and d) telling the lead operator he was considering a lawsuit. Saint-Gobain suspended Kasten after his fourth violation and later terminated his employment. Kasten alleges, and Saint-Gobain denies, that he also complained about the legality of the clock’s placement at a meeting regarding his suspension. Kasten brought an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, alleging that he was terminated in retaliation for his complaints. The court granted summary judgment to Saint-Gobain. Kasten appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Flaum and Kapala affirmed. Kasten alleges that Saint-Gobain violated the FLSA when it terminated him after he "filed any complaint." The Court focused on two issues: whether the FLSA's use of the term "complaint" includes informal, intra-company complaints not formally filed with any body and whether it includes wholly verbal complaints. The district court had answered the first question yes but the second question no. With respect to the intra-company complaint issue, the Court relied on the plain language of the statute and the majority of other appellate courts to conclude that "any complaint" includes internal complaints. If then decided, however, that purely verbal complaints are not protected. The Court relied again on the plain language of the statute and the use of the word "file," which connotes the use of a writing, and the fact that Congress used broader language (i.e., “opposed any practice”) in analogous provisions of other statutes.