The Plain Language And Structure Of Indiana's Statutory Indemnification Of Public Employees Does Not Support Its Retroactive Application
ESTATE OF MORELAND v. DIETER (August 11, 2009)
Christopher Moreland was arrested on a drunk driving charge in 1997. While in jail, he was beaten to death. His estate filed suit, pursuant to § 1983, against three jail officers. In May of 2002, a jury returned a verdict against two of the officers for $29 million in compensatory and $27.5 million in punitive damages. The jury deadlocked in the case against the third officer. A defense verdict was returned after a September 2003 retrial. In July of 2003, Indiana amended its statute governing the indemnification of government employees. Prior to the amendment, indemnification was discretionary. After the amendment, indemnification for non-punitive damages became mandatory. In 2007, Moreland's estate filed a motion for a writ of execution to collect the award of compensatory damages from St. Joseph County. The district court denied the motion. The Estate appeals.
In their opinion, Judges Posner, Sykes and Dow affirmed. The Court looked to the statutory amendment. It noted two particularly noteworthy features: discretionary indemnification became mandatory in certain circumstances, and discretionary indemnification remained for punitive damages and settlements. In order for the Estate to benefit from the amendment, however, it must be retroactive. That Court stated the general Indiana rule that statutes apply prospectively only unless they contain explicitly retroactive language. An exception exists for certain remedial statutes. The Court rejected each of the Estate's arguments: a) the fact that there was no final judgment until after the amendment took effect does not allow for prospective application of the amendment to the earlier verdict, b) the plain language does not unambiguously support a legislative intent to apply the statute retroactively, and c) even if the statute is remedial and could fit within the exception, the Estate's interpretation would frustrate, rather than carry out the statute's purpose.
