Plaintiff Must Identify A Specific City Custom Or Practice That Deprived Him Of His Constitutional Rights In Order To Survive Summary Judgment
HOLLINS v. MILWAUKEE (July 31, 2009)
David Hollins is a freelance photographer. One June day in 2002, he was walking down a Milwaukee street. He came upon a scene where the Milwaukee Police were conducting a search of a home across the street. Hollins began taking pictures. A police officer noticed Hollins and asked him to move away from the area. Although he moved a short distance, Hollins eventually stopped and refused to move further. Police officers arrested Hollins and cited him for resisting an officer. The parties' versions of the events differ greatly with respect to the amount of force used by the officers and the attitude and language of the participants. Hollins was convicted and paid a fine. He later sued the city and the officers for violations of the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. He also brought a § 1983 claim against the City of Milwaukee for failure to train police officers properly. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the § 1983 claim and dismissed the free speech and due process claims as well. A jury found for the defendants on the unlawful arrest and excessive force claims. Hollins appeals.
In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Flaum and Evans affirmed. The Court first addressed the § 1983 claim for failure to properly train the police. The Court agreed that a failure to train police can lead to § 1983 liability if it amounts to a deliberate indifference of public rights. The Court further stated that Hollins had to present allegations of a specific pattern of incidents to prove that the constitutional deprivation resulted from an official policy or custom. Hollins, however, failed to offer any evidence that the city's failure to train amounted to the requisite deliberate indifference. The city, on the other hand, presented unrebutted evidence that it did offer significant training in the areas cited by Hollins. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the free-speech claims, concluding that Hollins' allegations that he was arrested for taking pictures totally unsupported. With respect to the alleged trial errors, the Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it: a) refused to ask a voir dire question on racial prejudice that had nothing to do with the law or facts, b) disallowed questioning on cross-examination that one of the defendants had been investigated for falsifying police reports when it had limited probative value, and c) refused to tender Hollins' jury instruction interpreting the ordinance under which he was cited when he offered no authority to support his interpretation and when the jury was not being asked to determine whether the ordinance had been violated.
