School Principal Is Not Required To Conduct An Investigation Before He Swears Out A Criminal Complaint

STOKES v. BOARD OF EDUCATION (March 19, 2010)

Nyokia Stokes has four children who attend the same elementary school in Chicago. One of her children, a third-grade daughter, had a problem with a classmate. Ebony Scott, the classmate's mother, paid a visit to Stokes' home one night and allegedly threatened her. Stokes and her mother, Carnelita Stokes, met with the police and the school principal, Johnny Banks, the next morning. Banks agreed to host a meeting between Stokes and Scott. When Stokes and her mother returned to the school that very afternoon to pick up Stokes' kindergarten daughter, they encountered Ebony Scott and her cousin in the school office. The factual accounts of what happened next vary. What is clear is that Scott, Scott’s cousin, and Stokes were involved in a lengthy physical and verbal altercation. Most accounts agree that Scott was the aggressor and Stokes was the victim. Approximately thirty kindergarten students entered the office during the altercation and became extremely upset. Banks arrived in the office as the altercation was ending. He instructed Scott and her cousin to go into his office and instructed Stokes and her mother to go to another room. Stokes' mother refused to leave and continued yelling at Banks. Banks swore out criminal complaints against all four women and they were arrested. They were released several hours later and the charges against them were dismissed. The Stokes sued Banks and the school district under § 1983, alleging a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The Stokes appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Manion, and Hamilton affirmed. The gist of the Stokes' complaint is that Banks lacked probable cause to swear out the criminal complaints. The existence of probable cause, therefore, is an absolute bar to recovery. Because the case was decided on summary judgment, the Court examined the record to see if there was a genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the existence of probable cause. A complaining witness is not expected to determine whether a person's behavior satisfies the essential elements of a crime. To the contrary, probable cause involves the exercise of judgment and depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. Here, even resolving factual disputes in the Stokes' favor, the record shows that Banks entered the room and found Stokes involved in a violent and loud altercation. Many young school children were in the same room and visibly upset. Those undisputed facts provide probable cause for Banks to sign a criminal complaint against Stokes. Although Stokes' mother was not actually involved in a physical altercation, she was in the same room and Banks knew that she was Stokes' mother. Her yelling and refusal to comply with Banks' request to leave contributed to the chaos. Thus, Banks had probable cause to sign the complaint against Carnelita . The facts that were developed after the incident supported the Stokes' position that they were the victims of the altercation and that they did nothing to incite it nor did they retaliate. Nevertheless, the Court noted that Banks was not required to conduct an investigation. He was responsible for maintaining order and had to do so quickly. He exercised the judgment of a reasonable person in taking the action that he did.

Summons and Prosecution Without Probable Cause Does Not Violate The Constitution

TULLY v. BARADA (March 17, 2010)

One night a resident of Rush County, Indiana, saw automobile headlights and another light near a bridge several hundred yards from his home. When he heard a shot coming from the same direction, he called the sheriff. He called the sheriff a second time when he heard a second shot. In responding to the report, Sheriff Chandler stopped a vehicle occupied by Michael Tully and a friend. There was a spotlight, a rifle, and a dead raccoon in the car. Both boys responded "yes" when Sheriff Chandler asked if they knew that shooting from a roadway is wrong. The county prosecutor, Paul Barada, charged both boys as juveniles with "shooting on or across a public highway." A trial court adjudicated Tully as a delinquent -- the appellate court reversed. Tully brought an action under § 1983 against Barada and the probation officer upon whose report his complaint was based. He alleged a constitutional right not to be summoned into court and prosecuted without probable cause. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that there is no such right. Tully appeals.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Bauer and Wood and District Judge Kennelly affirmed. The Court first noted that the Supreme Court has not spoken on the possibility of a right not to be prosecuted without probable cause. The Courts of Appeals that have spoken have taken various approaches. In fact, the issue is infrequently presented because prosecutors generally claim absolute immunity. Here, the Court noted that defendants waived not only their affirmative defense of absolute immunity, but also the affirmative defenses of the existence of probable cause and res judicata. Having been required to reached the merits, the Court concluded that there is no federal constitutional right under either the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment not to be summoned into court and prosecuted without probable cause. Being summoned into court is not a "seizure" of Tully under the Fourth Amendment -- his state court vindication was due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Evidence That Supports An Inference Of Principal's Intentional Discrimination Is Sufficient To Establish A Constitutional Violation And Defeat Qualified Immunity

SANDRA T.E. v. GRINDLE (March 17, 2010)

Three female elementary school classmates at Pershing Elementary School attended a seminar on "inappropriate touching" at their school in May of 2001. After the seminar, they wrote a short letter to the presenter stating that they were uncomfortable with the conduct of their band teacher. The presenter shared the note with Karen Grindle, Pershing's principal. Although Grindle met with the band teacher, the students, some parents, and the school's social worker, the accounts of their meetings varied. The allegations are that Grindle downplayed the significance and the seriousness of the accusations. Additional incidents surfaced in January and April of the following year. Again, Grindle is alleged to have minimized the significance of the incidents. One of the students who wrote the original letter in 2001 revealed to her mother, in 2005, her version of what happened. Her mother informed the police, a criminal investigation was launched, other victims came forward, and the band teacher pleaded guilty to multiple counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Several of the children and their parents filed an action pursuant to section 1983, alleging a violation of their equal protection and substantive due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment on the section 1983 claim to all defendants except Grindle and the band teacher. Grindle appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Rovner, and Hamilton affirmed. The basis of Grindle's appeal is her claim to qualified immunity. The Court recited the familiar two-part test: whether a constitutional right was violated, and whether the right was "clearly established" at the time of the conduct. With respect to the equal protection claim, the Court concluded that well-developed law at the time of Grindle's conduct held that a supervisor could be liable for deliberately ignoring an equal protection violation of her subordinate. In addition, the sexual harassment by the subordinate was a well-established equal protection violation. The Court concluded that plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that Grindle intentionally discriminated against the girls to withstand summary judgment. With respect to the substantive due process claim, Grindle argued that she had no duty to protect the students from the abuse at the hands of the band teacher. The Court agreed that state officials do not generally have an obligation to protect citizens from violence, but noted the "special relationship" exception to that rule. Although the Court agreed that it had once rejected the "special relationship" theory in the student context, it also noted that the Third Circuit held otherwise in Stoneking. The Stoneking decision has been recognized in the circuit as one that is viable and, in fact, has been followed on several occasions in the district courts of the circuit. The Court concluded that a reasonable elementary school principal should have concluded that she could be liable for ignoring, or even covering up, a teacher's sexual abuse of a student. Finally, the Court noted that the plaintiffs allege that Grindle's own actions establish the constitutional violation, and not just her mere failure to act or prevent. Thus, they meet the test of Iqbal.

Survey Flaws Lead To Summary Judgment In FDCPA Cases

DEKOVEN v. PLAZA ASSOCIATES (March 17, 2010)

Plaza Associates is a well-known debt collection agency. It sent two collection letters to DeKoven stating that it had the authority to offer a lump-sum settlement but that the offer would only be "valid for a period of thirty-five (35) days." In a different letter to a plaintiff in a related suit, Plaza Associates included the DeKoven statement and also stated that a recipient who disputed the validity of the debt with "satisfactory proof" should provide that information to Plaza. The plaintiffs filed suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. They complained about the "35 day" language and the "satisfactory proof" language. The former, they complain, might be construed by some as a final offer -- when in fact it is not. The latter, they complain, might be construed by some that a recipient must have "proof" to dispute the validity of the debt. Both plaintiffs retained the same survey expert. The expert conducted a survey but the judges in both cases considered it inadmissible. In both cases, the court below entered summary judgment for Plaza Associates. In both cases, the plaintiff appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Flaum, and Williams affirmed. The Court reviewed the circumstances of the survey. The expert surveyed 160 people in a shopping mall near Chicago. One half of the people were given the letter with both challenged clauses -- the others (the “control group”) were shown a letter with neither clause. The survey respondents were then asked a series of questions about the letters. The Court agreed with the district court in finding numerous flaws in the survey: the composition of the response group, the content of the original oral questions, and the content of the "control group" letter, among others. The Court noted that many Fair Debt Collection Practices Act cases fail because of survey flaws. It suggested that district courts consider exercising their authority to use a court-appointed expert in FDCPA cases.

Full Faith And Credit Clause Does Not Empower One State To Interfere With The Police Power Of Another

ROSIN v. MONKEN (March 17, 2010)

In 2003, Mitchell Rosin pleaded guilty in New York to a charge of sexual abuse in the third degree, a Class B misdemeanor. The prosecutor agreed to strike from the standard plea agreement a paragraph that would require Rosin to register as a sex offender and otherwise comply with the Sex Offender Registration Act. At the time of the plea agreement, Rosin was actually a resident of Oak Park, Illinois. In 2008, the Oak Park police insisted that he move from the area and register as a sex offender in Illinois. Rosin filed suit against the public officials who are responsible for enforcing the registration obligations. He alleged, under §1983, that the defendants' actions violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. Rosin appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Manion, and Williams affirmed. The Court first the reasonableness of Rosin’s position that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires Illinois to recognize a New York probation order. Unfortunately for Rosin, however, the Court noted that the order actually contained no language relieving him of an obligation to register. As part of the plea agreement, a paragraph was simply excised from the standard form. It was not replaced with any affirmative language. Therefore, held the Court, there was no order to recognize. Even if the elimination of the paragraph is treated as an affirmative act on the part of New York to relieve Rosin of his registration requirement, the Court concluded that it could not prevail. The Full Faith and Credit Clause grants national force to the judgment of one state. The Clause cannot, however, allow one state to interfere with the affairs of another. New York has no authority to interfere with the police power of the state of Illinois and dictate its approach to sex offenders.

Common-Law Proximate Cause Is Not A Requirement In An FELA Suit

McBRIDE v. CSX TRANSPORTATION (March 16, 2010)

Robert McBride was a locomotive engineer for CSX Transportation. After several years as a long-distance engineer, McBride expressed an interest to transfer to a job where he would work more regular hours with fewer nights away from home. In April 2004, he went on a qualifying run with a supervising engineer. Much of the ten-hour shaft involved switching, the process of adding and dropping individual cars from the locomotive. The switching process requires heavy use of the manual brakes. Toward the end of his shift, while operating the brakes, McBride experienced extreme pain in his hand. He has since undergone two surgeries and physical therapy but still experiences pain and numbness. He filed an action for negligence under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. At trial, McBride offered an instruction on causation that would instruct the jury that defendant’s negligence had to play "a part - no matter how small" in bringing about the injury. CSX offered an instruction that included a requirement that defendant’s negligence be a "proximate cause" of the injury. The court used the McBride instruction. The jury found in McBride's favor. CSX appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Rovner, and Sykes affirmed. The Court first noted that courts have "grappled" with the proper causation standard under FELA since the Act was passed. The Act provides that the injury must result "in whole or in part" from the employer's negligence. The Court noted that early cases did not conclude that the "in whole or in part of" language eliminated the common-law proximate cause requirement. Later cases, however, including the Supreme Court's decision in Rogers, suggested that a less stringent standard of causation should apply under FELA. Many courts of appeals interpreted Rogers as relaxing the standard of causation. The Supreme Court addressed the question again in Sorrell. Although the majority skirted the question, Justice Souter's concurring opinion stated that Rogers did not eliminate the proximate cause requirement. Justice Ginsburg's opinion, concurring in the judgment, stated her view that the causation standard in FELA cases is more relaxed than in tort litigation generally. Although the Court concluded that Justice Souter's position is a plausible one, it declined to adopt it. It noted that the majority in Sorrell did not even address the question, other statements of the Supreme Court have suggested a broader reading, and all other circuit courts that have addressed the issue have concluded that Rogers adopted a relaxed standard of probable cause. Finally, the Court noted that Congress is well aware of the decisions adopting a relaxed standard of causation and could clarify the FELA. It therefore found no error in the lower court's instruction.

Illinois Consumer Fraud And Deceptive Business Practices Act Requires Proof Of Actual Loss In Private Action

KIM v. CARTER'S INC. (March 15, 2010)

Su Yeun Kim and Gina Polubinski purchased children's clothing at several different Carter's stores in Illinois over a period of time. Articles of clothing in the stores had individual price tags. Frequently, however, Carter's displayed signs announcing discounts off individual prices. Kim and Polubinski each filed separate class actions, alleging that any savings were fictitious because the prices listed were artificially inflated . The complaints alleged breach of contract and a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The district court granted Carter’s motion to dismiss the complaints. Kim and Polubinski appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Kanne, and Tinder affirmed. With respect to the breach of contract count, the Court concluded that Carter's fulfilled its contractual obligations. It provided articles of clothing to the plaintiffs at an agreed upon price. The Court rejected plaintiffs' interpretation that the sales contract required Carter's to apply the discount to an undisclosed, fair price instead of the tag price. With respect to the statutory claim, however, the Court found that the allegations of the complaints did sufficiently allege a violation. However, the Act requires a private party to show "actual damage." Here, the plaintiffs agreed to pay a certain price for the clothing. They have not alleged that the clothing is actually worth less than what they paid or that they could have purchased it elsewhere for less. Having concluded that the plaintiffs suffered no actual pecuniary harm, the Court held that they could not state a claim under the Act.

Mixed-Motive Liability Theory Is Improper Under The LMRDA

SERAFINN v. LOCAL 722 (March 12, 2010)

Mark Serafinn is a member of Local 722 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. In fact, he served three terms as its president. Serafinn is also a member of the Teamsters for a Democratic Union ("TDU"), a large and active dissident group opposed to the current international leadership. Serafinn alleges that the presidents of the union and the joint council, which is a group of leaders from locals in the same region, colluded to have internal disciplinary charges brought against him. The joint council suspended Serafinn and ordered restitution. Serafinn brought an action against both the local union and the joint council under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. He alleged that the actions taken against him were taken without due process in retaliation for his exercise of free speech and assembly rights, all in violation of the Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the joint council. The claim against the local union proceeded to a jury trial, where Serafinn was awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages and $55,000 in punitive damages. After trial, the court denied a motion by Serafinn for relief from the summary judgment granted to the joint council on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. The court also awarded attorneys fees to Serafinn, but in a lesser amount than requested. The union local appeals. Serafinn cross appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Evans, and Tinder affirmed. The Court first addressed the local's contention that the district court should have given a mixed-motive instruction. The district court had instructed the jury that Serafinn's exercise of free speech had to be a "but for" cause, not just a motivating factor. In that situation, the Court stated, a mixed-motive instruction would be inappropriate. The Court noted that some courts have approved of mixed-motive liability theories in cases under the Act but that the Supreme Court's decision in Gross overruled that approach. The Court then addressed the local's challenge to a limiting instruction with respect to a witness’ misdemeanor convictions. Although the convictions may be admissible for some purposes, Rule 609 prohibits their admission to attack general character for truthfulness. Here, the lower court properly allowed the convictions into evidence for some purposes but erred when it allowed the jury to consider them for improper impeachment purposes. Nevertheless, the Court found no prejudice from the error and declined to order a new trial. Addressing Serafinn's cross-appeal, the Court concluded that his "new evidence" was simply cumulative. Finally, the Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's consideration and decision with respect to the award of attorney's fees.

Title VII Reverse Race Discrimination Claim Fails In Face Of Fire Chief's Honest Belief That Plaintiffs Were Ill-Suited For Promotion

STOCKWELL v. CITY OF HARVEY (March 12, 2010)

Jason Bell, Harvey's fire chief, decided to hire a Deputy Chief and three Assistant Chiefs. Chief Bell wrote down traits that he considered desirable (competence, loyalty, dedication, and confidence) and unacceptable (selfishness, complaining, dishonesty, and undermining authority). Anyone with ten years of service on the Fire Department could apply and a sign-up sheet was posted. Nine members of the department indicated an interest in the Assistant Chief position -- eight of the nine also indicated an interest in the Deputy Chief position. Three of the nine were African-American (Buie, Tyler, and Patterson). Before any interviews, Chief Bell offered the Deputy Chief position to a white fireman who had not applied - he declined. Each of the nine candidates was then interviewed and evaluated in several categories. Chief Bell ranked the candidates based on several factors, including the interview evaluation scores. The three African-Americans all scored in the top four. The fourth candidate withdrew his name from consideration. The African-Americans all received promotions. The next highest scorer was Rich Stockwell. Chief Bell did not offer Stockwell a promotion, based on his belief that Stockwell was nearing retirement. The fourth promotion was given to a white candidate who had not applied for the position. Rich Stockwell and three other white firemen brought an action under Title VII against the City of Harvey for race discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to the City. The firemen appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Williams, and Tinder affirmed. The Court described the prima facie case and burden shifting analyses under the McDonnell Douglas indirect method of proof. It then proceeded to decide the case under the pretext requirement, assuming a prima facie case. In order to prevail, the Court stated, a plaintiff must establish that the non-discriminatory reason given by an employer was dishonest and that the real reason reflected a discriminatory intent. Even an unreasonable decision is not actionable if the decision-maker believed it. The Court reviewed the record with respect to each plaintiff and found legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons not to promote each: a) Bell testified that DeYoung had a reputation for being negative and Chief Bell had a belief that he might undermine management, b) Bell testified that he thought Ciecierski was dishonest and not trustworthy, c) Bell testified that Gary Stockwell did a lot of complaining and would not support the department, and d) Bell testified that he believed that Rich Stockwell was nearing retirement and not committed to the department for a long term. In light of Chief Bell's testimony, the Court concluded that none of the plaintiffs could establish a genuine issue of fact with respect to pretext.

Without Clear And Convincing Evidence Of A Prior Agreement, Reformation Of An Insurance Policy Is Denied

MILWAUKEE METROPOLITAN SEWERAGE DISTRICT v. AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL SPECIALTY LINES INSURANCE CO. (March 10, 2010)

The Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District ("District") provides wastewater treatment services and performs flood control work in the Milwaukee area. As part of its flood control responsibilities, the District developed a plan to control flooding on the Lincoln Creek. Execution of the plan required the District to purchase a nineteen-acre parcel of land along the Creek. The District decided to procure environmental liability insurance before purchasing the property. The District met in late 1998 with its insurance broker, Sedgwick of Illinois. The District discussed obtaining insurance for property it referred to as "Lincoln Creek" but provided very little information about the actual parcel. Sedgwick contacted Crump Insurance Services of Illinois, a wholesale broker, and inquired about coverage. In February of 1999, the District authorized Sedgwick to obtain insurance for five separate properties, including Lincoln Creek. Each of the properties other than Lincoln Creek was identified with a specific address. Lincoln Creek was not. Crump forwarded the order of insurance to AISLIC. Although AISLIC confirmed that it had bound coverage, it listed only the four properties that had specific addresses. When Crump noticed the absence of Lincoln Creek, it added the parcel to the binder and forwarded it to both Sedgwick and AISLIC. AISLIC objected to the inclusion and stated that it was not including Lincoln Creek as an insured property. After its receipt of the formal application, which included Lincoln Creek, AISLIC again stated that it was not willing to include Lincoln Creek. Crump informed Sedgwick that AISLIC was not including Lincoln Creek both because of the absence of an actual address and because the property was not then owned by the District. AISLIC eventually issued a policy for the four identified properties and a fifth added property. Although the District noticed the absence of Lincoln Creek, Sedgwick told the District that the fifth property was actually a reference to Lincoln Creek. The District proceeded with its purchase and discovered significant environmental contamination. It submitted a claim to AISLIC for over $700,000 for its cleanup of the contamination. AISLIC denied the claim. The District sued AISLIC for reformation of the contract. AISLIC brought a third-party indemnification action against Crump. After a bench trial, the district court granted reformation of the contract, concluding that Crump was AISLIC’s agent and that it was Crump’s failure to obtain necessary that led to the parcel being excluded from coverage. The court entered judgment for the District against AISLIC and for AISLIC against Crump. AISLIC and Crump appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Manion, and Wood reversed and remanded the judgment against AISLIC and vacated the judgment against Crump. Applying Wisconsin law, the Court stated that an insurance policy can be reformed to reflect a prior agreement if: a) there is clear and convincing proof of a prior meeting of the minds, and b) the failure of the agreement to reflect the prior agreement results from either a mutual mistake or a mistake by the party seeking reformation combined with some inequitable conduct by the other. Here, the Court found both elements absent. The clearest description of the parcel ever given to AISLIC was its name and that it was located somewhere along several miles of the Creek. The Court found that evidence insufficient to identify the property for which the District sought coverage and that the evidence as a whole failed to amount to clear and convincing evidence of a prior agreement. In addition, the Court found that the evidence supported the proposition that the District knew the parcel was never covered. The District’s agent was well aware that AISLIC required an address before including the parcel and, in fact, refused to include the parcel because it was not owned by the District. Therefore, the District could not satisfy that it was operating under a mistake.

Otherwise Lawful Conduct Can Be Enjoined If Necessary To Protect Plaintiff's Rights

RUSSIAN MEDIA GROUP v. CABLE AMERICA (March 10, 2010)

Russian Media Group (RMG) sells Russian language television programming to residential customers. It charges a monthly fee to its subscribers and, in return, obtains programming and maintains transmission hardware. RMG filed suit against Cable America, alleging that Cable America unfairly competed with it by obtaining similar programming by fraud. The district court found that Cable America distributed programming at twenty different multi-family residential properties by pirating an individual subscriber's satellite signal and distributing the signal to other residents of the properties for a fee. RMG moved for a preliminary injunction on its claim under the Illinois Cable Piracy Act. The district court granted the injunction and ordered Cable America to stop distributing the Russian language programming at the twenty properties and to disconnect any of its receivers. Cable America appealed that order but did not comply with the injunction. It was held in contempt for its conduct. Months later, Cable America filed an "emergency motion” to modify the injunction. The motion was denied on the grounds that it was not timely, it was not a real emergency, and that the district court lacked jurisdiction to modify an injunction that was on appeal. Cable America appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Rovner and Hamilton affirmed. The Court first rejected Cable America's challenge to the breadth of the injunction. A district court has wide discretion in defining the parameters of an injunction, particularly where there is a record of unlawful conduct. The injunction may even prohibit otherwise lawful conduct when that is necessary to ensure appropriate relief to the plaintiff. The Court noted a pattern of deception and misconduct on the part of Cable America in the district court in concluding that the court did not abuse its discretion. The Court then refused to even consider the argument that the injunction was invalid because the Illinois Cable Piracy Act was preempted by federal copyright law. Defendants never raised that argument at the district court level. Finally, the Court rejected Cable America’s res judicata defense. Although the parties did settle a prior lawsuit that arose from a set of similar facts, the facts alleged and proved in the case before the Court occurred after the prior settlement and the injunction was based on a violation of a law that did not even exist at the time of the prior settlement.

Administrative Claimant Who Failed To Appear And Object To Bankruptcy Court Dismissal Order Lacked Standing To Appeal

IN RE: RAY (March 8, 2010)

Mark Ray and Berwick Black Cattle Company bought, sold, and raised cattle until involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions were filed against them. A committee was formed to represent their creditors. The Committee retained Becker & Poliakoff (“Becker”) as litigation counsel. Even after most of their assets were liquidated, unsecured claims remained. Becker represented the Committee in adversary complaints seeking recovery of preferences and fraudulent transfers. Becker filed an interim fee application in September of 2008. The next month, the Becker lawyer responsible for representing the Committee left the firm and his new firm substituted for Becker as Committee counsel. In December of 2008, the bankruptcy court conducted a hearing to consider a number of pending motions, including a motion to dismiss filed by the debtors. Becker neither appeared at the hearing nor responded to any motions. In January 2009, the court dismissed the case. Becker filed two emergency motions seeking reconsideration of the court's ruling, which were denied. The firm appealed to the district court. Although the district court concluded that Becker had standing, it affirmed the dismissal order. Becker appeals.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Ripple and Rovner in District Judge St. Eve vacated the judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of standing. Before reaching the merits of the dismissal, the Court had to determine if Becker had standing. Before it reached the merits of standing, it had to determine if the lack of a cross-appeal resulted in a waiver. Unlike Article III standing, bankruptcy (or "prudential") standing may be waived by a failure to raise the issue. Even if waived, however, a court may raise bankruptcy standing on its own -- and the Court chose to do so here. On the merits of the standing issue, the Court stated that bankruptcy standing lies only with one who is affected pecuniarily by a court order and has attended and objected at a court proceeding. Becker concedes that it did not appear and object until it filed its motion to reconsider. Nevertheless, it claims that it met this requirement either because Committee counsel represented its interest at the hearing directly, or because it actually qualified as an administrative claimant and was therefore represented by Committee counsel at the hearing, or because of its motions to reconsider. The Court found no evidence of the first or second and rejected the third as a matter of law.

ADA Claim Fails Where Claimant Is Unable To Perform The Essential Functions Of His Job

BUDDE v. KANE COUNTY FOREST PRESERVE (March 4, 2010)

Charles Budde enjoyed several glasses of wine at the Moose Lodge one night. He decided to drive home anyway and caused an accident that sent two people to the hospital. His blood-alcohol level at the time was nearly three times the legal limit. Budde was also the police chief for the Kane County Forest Preserve District. The district fired him, giving three reasons: errors in judgment, an inability to perform his duties, and engaging in below-standard conduct. Budde sued the District, alleging his termination violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant, concluding both that he could not recover because he was terminated for misconduct, not a disability, and that he was not a "qualified individual with a disability" because he violated a District rule. Budde appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Manion, and Tinder affirmed. One of the prerequisites for an ADA claim, noted the Court, is that the plaintiff can perform the "essential functions" of his job. The Court concluded that Budde could not meet that prerequisite for two reasons: he violated a workplace rule and he was unable to operate a motor vehicle. With respect to the former, the Court found sufficient evidence that Budde violated the rules that prohibited public intoxication and prohibited the violation of public laws. The Court noted that the District need not wait for the outcome of any criminal charges. With respect to the latter, the Court rejected Budde’s distinction between the ability to operate a motor vehicle and the ability to operate a motor vehicle legally (i.e., in possession of a valid drivers license). The essential function of the job is the ability to operate a motor vehicle legally -- which Budde is unable to do.

No Serious Error Results In Denial Of Petition For Writ Of Mandamus

IN RE: WHIRLPOOL CORP. (March 3, 2010)

LG Electronics brought suit against Whirlpool Corp., alleging that it infringed a trademark in a dryer. During the course of the litigation, LG requested the production of communications between Whirlpool lawyers and Whirlpool's outside advertising agencies. Whirlpool objected on two grounds: because the communications were privileged, asserting that the advertising agency employees were de facto employees of the company, and because the company and the agencies shared a common legal interest. Whirlpool appealed and filed a writ of mandamus.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Wood and Evans dismissed the appeal and denied the writ. Whirlpool alternatively appealed and filed for mandamus because the issue of the appealability of orders dealing with the attorney-client privilege was pending before the Supreme Court in Mohawk Industries. The Supreme Court has now ruled -- and concluded that such orders are not appealable as collateral orders. The Court thus dismissed the appeal. On a petition for a writ of mandamus, the Court stated that Whirlpool must show that the order will not be reviewable at the end of the case and is patently wrong. The Court noted that the district court gave the Whirlpool's arguments careful consideration and issued a "lengthy and thoughtful" decision. The Court found nothing in Whirlpool's petition that convinced it that the district court made a serious error.

Automobile's Negative Equity Is Included In The Purchase Money Security Interest And Not Subject To Cramdown in Chapter 13

IN RE: HOWARD (March 1, 2010)

Aubrey Howard purchased a $30,000 car. He made a down payment of $4,500 and traded in his old car. Although his old car was worth $14,500, he still owed $22,500. He therefore financed $35,500 (the purchase price minus the down payment plus the $8,000 in negative equity plus $2,000 in taxes and fees). Later (within 910 days), he filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. An issue presented to the bankruptcy court was whether the $8,000 in negative equity was subject to the court's cramdown power. The bankruptcy court ruled that negative equity is included in a purchase money security interest and is therefore not subject to the court's cramdown power. Howard appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Flaum, and Williams affirmed. The Court began its opinion with a short lesson on bankruptcy. "Cramdown" refers to the bankruptcy court practice of determining the value of secured collateral, allowing the debtor to force the creditor to accept a payment schedule equal to the determined value, and converting any excess loan balance to an unsecured claim. Cramdown favors the debtor to the disadvantage of the creditor. In addition, cramdown creates another payment obligation and exposes the creditor to a possible second default. In response to creditors' complaints, Congress amended the bankruptcy law. The law now prohibits a cramdown in Chapter 13 cases to reduce a purchase money security interest in an automobile acquired for personal use, if the debt was incurred within 910 days of the bankruptcy filing. The Court looked to state law for the definition of a purchase money security interest. As defined in the UCC, a purchase money security interest includes the price of an item and also "obligations for expenses incurred" in connection with the acquisition of the item. For example, the Court noted that a loan could provide for the payment of attorney's fees in the event of default. In that case, the fees would be included in the purchase money security interest. The Court also cited to the Illinois Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act which, although it does not purport to prescribe what is or is not included in a purchase money security interest, does define "amount financed" as including negative equity. The inclusion of negative equity in "amount financed" was evidence to the Court that negative equity was common in automobile purchases. Finally, the Court considered what effect including negative equity in purchase money security interests would have on other creditors. Concluding that purchase money security interests need not be narrowly defined to protect other creditors and that including negative equity in purchase money security interest was important to the automobile sales market, the Court held that negative equity is not subject to cramdown power.

Exception To Waiver Of Sovereign Immunity Results In Dismissal On The Merits - Not For Lack Of Jurisdiction

WILLIAMS v. FLEMING (February 26, 2010)

Jessie Williams had several million dollars of loans from Family Bank & Trust Company. As of late 2005, Williams' loans were in good standing -- he had never even been late with a payment. The FDIC conducted a routine examination of Family Bank in late 2005. Jerry Fleming was the Associate Examiner in charge. Williams alleges that Fleming made racially disparaging remarks about him, the city of Harvey, and the Bank's practice of lending to African-Americans. Williams also alleges that Fleming instructed the Bank not to lend to him anymore. Williams brought a Fifth Amendment claim against Family Bank, an Illinois Human Rights Act claim against the Bank and the United States, and a Fifth Amendment Bivens claim against Fleming. The district court: dismissed Family Bank because it is not a state actor, dismissed the United States on sovereign immunity grounds and because the FDIC did not act as a financial institution (an element of the Illinois Human Rights Act claim), and dismissed Fleming pursuant to the Federal Tort Claim Act's judgment bar. Williams appeals only the dismissal of Fleming.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Rovner, and Williams affirmed. The general rule, noted the Court, is that one may not sue the United States for torts committed by it or its agents. The Federal Tort Claims Act was enacted to allow suits against the United States under certain circumstances and with certain limitations. One of the limitations is the judgment bar, which provides that a judgment in one action bars a claim arising from the same subject matter against the government employee allegedly responsible for the tortious act. The issue here was whether the dismissal of the United States was such a judgment that barred the action against Fleming. Although the district court labeled its dismissal as one for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, thereby raising the issue of whether a judgment must be on the merits to trigger the judgment bar, the Court disagreed. Although it recognized that its view was the minority position, the Court reiterated its approach to the statutory exceptions to waiver. The Federal Tort Claims Act authorizes federal courts to hear tort claims against the United States. If the tort claim falls within one of the exceptions to the Act's waiver of sovereign immunity, the claim is dismissed because the United States has a defense -- not because the court is deprived of jurisdiction. The dismissal below was therefore on the merits, and the judgment bar applies.

Acceptance of Offer of Judgment From One Defendant Did Not Moot Other Claims

MINIX v. CANARECCI (February 26, 2010)

While on leave from a mental hospital where he was a patient, Gregory Zick was arrested and incarcerated in the St. Joseph County Jail. The jail provided medical and mental health services through contracts with third-party vendors Memorial Home Care and Madison Center. Jail personnel became aware during Zick's booking that he had attempted suicide in the past and was taking medications to treat his suicidal thoughts. Zick was originally put in medical segregation and on suicide watch. He was transferred into the general population, however, a few days later after he denied having suicidal thoughts. About a month later, he was placed back in medical segregation after he refused to take his medication and a jail officer noticed a razor blade missing. Again, after a few days, he was released from medical segregation because he was alert and denied thoughts of suicide. Later that night, he hanged himself with a bed sheet. Cathy Minix, his personal representative, brought an action pursuant to § 1983 against the Sheriff, the medical providers, and several jail employees. She alleged violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments based on the defendants' display of deliberate indifference. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants except the Sheriff. Minix then accepted an offer of judgment from the Sheriff. She appeals the summary judgment rulings in favor of Memorial Home Care and its employee Dr. David, Madison Center and its employee Christine Lonz, and the supervisor of the nursing staff, Jeanne James.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Kanne, and Tinder affirmed. The Court first addressed its jurisdiction, in light of the offer of judgment and its acceptance. Since the claim against the Sheriff was against him in his official capacity, and therefore could not have included punitive damages under § 1983, the punitive damage claims against the other defendants present a live controversy, even if the acceptance of the offer of judgment limits additional compensatory damages. On the merits, the Court first identified the two elements of an inadequate medical care claim under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment: a substantial risk to one's safety because of an objectively serious harm, and deliberate indifference to that risk. A jail suicide case automatically satisfies the first element. The second element requires that each defendant know that there is a substantial risk of suicide -- and intentionally disregard it. The Court addressed each defendant under that standard and found summary judgment proper in each case: a) Lonz was unaware of Zick’s suicidal history or thoughts, b) there was no evidence that Madison Center adopted or condoned any unconstitutional policy and there was no causal link between any Madison Center practice and the suicide, c) Zick's behavior in segregation did not provide Nurse James with actual knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide, d) Dr. David was not directly involved in Zick's treatment, and e) there was a lack of evidence that Memorial Home condoned or adopted an unconstitutional practice.

Investigator Who Withholds Innocent Explanation Entitled To Qualified Immunity Where It Was Not Material To Probable Cause

WHITLOCK v. BROWN (February 24, 2010)

The Whitlocks were camping with their daughter at the Indiana Dunes State Park in July of 2005. They came across some personal property at what appeared to be a deserted camp site. They put the items in their vehicle and told a neighboring camper that they would turn it in to park rangers. Instead of turning it in immediately, however, they left the park and went shopping. Upon their return, they left a voicemail for the property owner (having obtained his number from information found in the property) advising him that they had his property and were going to leave it with the park ranger. The owner of the property had already reported it missing and park authorities were investigating. When the Whitlocks eventually turned in the property, they were accused of theft. The investigation confirmed the Whitlocks' explanation. State investigator Brown prepared a case report and an "Affidavit for Probable Clause." He sent the affidavit to the local county prosecutor's office, and there is a dispute over whether he attached his case report to it. The Whitlocks were charged with conversion and an arrest warrant was issued. When they were stopped for a traffic violation a month later, they were arrested and held in jail for four days before the prosecutor dropped the charges. The Whitlocks sued Brown under § 1983, specifically alleging that he withheld their explanation for why they held the property for so long from his case report or application for a warrant. The district court concluded that Brown did violate their Fourth Amendment rights by withholding the exculpatory information but also concluded that he was entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable officer could have believed that probable cause to arrest the Whitlocks existed. The Whitlocks appeal.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Posner and Sykes and District Judge Dow affirmed. Qualified immunity, stated the Court, involves two inquiries: whether there is a constitutional violation and whether a reasonable officer, considering clearly established law, would have known his actions were unconstitutional. Here, the claim is that Brown intentionally or recklessly withheld exculpatory information from the prosecutor, which could overcome the general presumption of the validity of the warrant. The information omitted, however, must be material to the existence of probable cause. The Court first addressed the alleged withholding of the case report itself. The district court had concluded that Brown withheld the report, inferring so from its absence from the prosecutor's file. The Court disagreed. Brown testified that he had submitted the case report. Although self-serving, the testimony was not speculation and was based on Brown's personal knowledge. In contrast, the Whitlocks presented no evidence or reasonable inference that the report was not sent. Although therefore concluding that the report itself was not withheld, the Court also considered an omission in the report -- Brown's failure to include the Whitlock's innocent explanation for why they did not turn in the property immediately. The Court turned to the materiality of that missing information. The statute upon which the warrant was based prohibits "unauthorized control over property" of another. It does not require an intent to permanently deprive. Although the Court hypothesized a situation in which the explanation could be material under a theory of implied consent from the owner of lost property, it found no such theory recognized under Indiana law. The Court concluded that a reasonable officer would not have known if the innocent explanation was material to probable cause and that Brown was therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

Drug Manufacturer Fails To Meet The Levine "Clear Evidence" Preemption Test

MASON v. SMITHKLINE BEECHAM (February 23, 2010)

Two days after twenty-three year old Tricia Mason began taking an antidepressant drug manufactured by defendant, she committed suicide. Mason's parents sued the manufacturer, alleging that it was negligent for not warning of an increased suicide risk. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding that the claims were preempted by federal law. The Masons appeal.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Evans and Sykes and District Judge Simon reversed and remanded. The Court noted that conflict preemption was the type of preemption at issue in the case. The Supreme Court addressed conflict preemption in Levine, which was decided a year after the district court granted summary judgment. In Levine, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that state law failure-to-warn claims were generally preempted as a result of the FDA's drug labeling responsibilities. The Supreme Court stated that preemption could exist if a drug manufacturer presented "clear evidence" that the FDA would have rejected the proposed warning in the label but held that preemption did not exist in Levine. Since the Supreme Court did not clarify what it meant by "clear evidence," the Court simply compared the administrative history of the defendant's drug with the drug at issue in Levine. After that comparison, the Court concluded that the defendant had not met the burden established by Levine.

Middleton Factors Support Conclusion That Statutory Amendment Is Clarifying

MILLER v. LASALLE BANK (February 19, 2010)

In 2001, individuals entered into a mortgage on an Indiana property with LaSalle Bank's predecessor. The mortgage was recorded -- but the acknowledgment had a technical defect. In 2007, the individuals petitioned for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The Trustee initiated an adversary proceeding against La Salle to avoid the mortgage. Indiana law provides that a "properly acknowledged" mortgage is constructive notice of the mortgage to later bona fide purchasers (BFPs). Prior to 2007, Indiana courts held that a mortgage with a technical defect in the acknowledgment did not amount to constructive notice. The Indiana legislature amended the statute in 2007 to overrule the case law and allow constructive notice even with certain technical defects. The legislature amended the statute again in 2008 to provide that the statute applied to all mortgages, regardless of the date of recording. The dispute in the adversary proceeding centered on whether, prior to the 2008 amendment, the 2007 amendment applied to mortgages recorded prior to 2007. The bankruptcy court concluded that the 2007 amendment applied only to mortgages recorded after its effective date. The district court reversed. The Trustee appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Wood, and Evans affirmed. The Court began with the statute and the Indiana rules of statutory construction. Concluding that both parties' constructions of the language of the statute were reasonable, the Court held that the statute was ambiguous and proceeded to apply rules of interpretation. One such rule is the presumption that an amendment to a statute is intended to change the meaning of the statute unless it is clear that the legislature intended to clarify its original intent. The Court applied the factors set forth in Middleton (intheiropinion.com post) to determine whether the 2008 amendment amended or clarified the 2007 amendment. It concluded that the 2008 amendment was a clarifying amendment under Middleton because: a) they were enacted in the same legislative session and sponsored by many of the same legislators, b) the 2007 amendment was ambiguous, and c) the bankruptcy trustees were actively seeking to avoid mortgages on technical grounds after the 2007 amendment.

A "Substantially Justified" Position Has A Reasonable Basis In Fact And Law

UNITED STATES v. THOUVENOT, WADE & MOERSCHEN (February 18, 2010)

The Equal Access to Justice Act allows a party that prevails against the United States in litigation to recover its attorneys' fees unless the position of the United States is found to be "substantially justified." Three cases before the Court allowed it to address that standard. In the first, the United States charged an apartment complex site engineer with violating the Federal Housing Act. The trial court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment and its motions for judgment as a matter of law. After the jury returned a defense verdict, however, the court awarded fees to the defendant. Because the defendant's insurer paid for much of its defense, the insurer would receive much of the award. The United States appeals. In the second case, the court affirmed the denial of a Social Security claimant's application for benefits. After the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that a crucial consultant's opinion was entitled to no weight, the court denied an award of fees. The claimant appeals. In the third case, the district court reversed the administrative denial of Social Security benefits but denied the claimant's application for fees. The basis for the reversal was the administrative law judge's possible mischaracterization of some testimony and failure to fully explain the connection between the claimant's condition and his ability to work. The claimant appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Flaum, and Sykes reversed, reversed, and affirmed. The Court first noted that "substantially justified" was not defined in the statute nor, in their view, was its meaning self-evident. Relying on the title of the statute and its limited application only to persons of lesser means, the Court concluded that the government's position need not be frivolous to justify an award of fees. The Court identified a threshold between frivolous and meritorious, at which a case has a reasonable basis in law and fact, that the United States must meet to be "substantially justified." Applying that standard to the first case, the Court held that there was a presumption that the United States’ position is substantially justified if it survives summary judgment. Just because the jury ultimately decided in favor of the defendant does not mean that the government fell short of its threshold. Although the Court reversed the award of fees, it decided to provide guidance to the lower courts on the additional issue of the impact of a liability insurer on an award of fees. In its view, the Act should not be applied differently if a party otherwise entitled to a fee award his had some of its fees paid by its insuror. In the second case, the Court concluded that the lower court was wrong in denying a fee award. Even though the lower court was originally convinced of the merits of the government's position, the court must be guided by the appellate opinion. If an appellate court reverses in a case it considers a close call, the fact that the lower court was convinced of the merits may support a substantial justification finding. Here, however, the Court made it clear in its earlier opinion that the government's position was not justified. Finally, in the third case, the district court had reversed an administrative denial of benefits but refused to award fees. Like the prior case's "close call" reference, the Court concluded that the lower court was well within its discretion to reverse a denial of benefits but to conclude that the position taken was "substantially justified."

Defendant's Offer Of Judgment In Excess Of Maximum Recovery Renders Case Moot

THOROGOOD v. SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO. (February 12, 2010)

Stephen Thorogood filed a state court class-action on behalf of the purchasers of stainless steel dryers in multiple states. He alleged that the defendant’s representation that the dryers were made of stainless steel violated the consumer protection acts of those states. The defendant removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Although the district court certified a class, the Seventh Circuit reversed and ordered the class decertified (intheiropinion.com post). The Court thought the case was not only a weak candidate for class certification, but also flimsy on its own merits. On remand, the defendant made an offer of judgment, inclusive of attorneys fees, of $20,000. Finding that that offer exceeded plaintiff's maximum recovery under state law of $3,000 and therefore the amount in controversy, the district court dismissed the case as moot. Thorogood appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Kanne, and Evans affirmed. The Court first rejected plaintiff's argument that the case should have been remanded upon class decertification, relying upon its decision in Cunningham Charter (intheiropinion.com post) just three weeks earlier. Then, the Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the case was not moot because of his entitlement to significant attorneys’ fees. First, an award of fees for value conferred beyond the relief obtained must generally be relief ordered by the court. Second, the court was within its discretion in deciding that no fees were warranted. Finally, the Court noted that most of the fees were incurred pursuing the failed class action, not the $3,000 individual action.

Money Damages Are Available Against The United States For A Fair Credit Reporting Act Violation

TALLEY v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (February 12, 2010)

Wayne Talley used to have a loan from the United States Department of Agriculture. Although he repaid it, the Department reported to a credit bureau that he was delinquent. Four times he complained to the credit bureau -- four times the credit bureau investigated -- four times the Department reported that the loan was repaid – four times the credit bureau fixed his credit report. Each time, however, the Department followed up with the another report of delinquency. Tally brought an action under the Fair Credit Reporting Act for damages for the Department's inaccurate reporting. The Department did not deny that it violated the Act but contended that sovereign immunity precluded any monetary relief. The district court awarded $10,000 in compensatory damages and $20,000 in attorney's fees. The Department appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Rovner and Tinder affirmed. The Court first addressed jurisdictional issues, both at the district court and appellate court level. The Tucker Act has provisions allocating jurisdiction both at the lower court level (between the district court and the Court of Federal Claims) and at the appellate level (between regional circuits and the Federal Circuit). In order to determine the impact of the Tucker Act, the Court fleshed out the specific argument of the Department. On appeal, the Department conceded an argument that it had made at the lower court that the Department was not a "person" under the Act. It argued simply that the Fair Credit Reporting Act did not expressly authorize monetary relief against the United States. The Court concluded, however, that the Tucker Act waived sovereign immunity generally and authorized money damages for a statutory claim. Although that resolved the merits, the Court now had to circle back to see if there was jurisdiction. The Tucker Act provides that the case should be brought in the Court of Federal Claims if the plaintiff seeks in excess of $10,000. The Court concluded that the $20,000 in attorney's fees should be classified as costs under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and not counted toward the $10,000 threshold. Therefore, the district court had jurisdiction. With respect to appellate jurisdiction, the Tucker Act sends a case to the Federal Circuit if jurisdiction in the district court depended "in whole or in part" on the Tucker Act. The Court concluded that, although the Tucker Act could be a basis for jurisdiction, Talley did not invoke it as such. Because he relied on section 1331 and on the Fair Credit Reporting Act's jurisdictional provisions, appellate jurisdiction was present.

Plan Administrator's Interpretation That Contravenes Plain Language Of Plan Is Arbitrary And Capricious

GREEN v. THE UPS HEALTH AND WELFARE PACKAGE (February 10, 2010)

UPS negotiates collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) covering its employees who are members of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“IBT”). It actually negotiates with the international union and also directly and separately negotiates with some large locals, including Local 705. Under the 2002-2008 CBA with Local 705, UPS agreed to provide health care to Local 705 retirees. The benefit was outlined in the Summary Plan Description (SPD), which applied to all IBT retirees. The SPD set a monthly contribution for each retiree and provided that, if the cost of coverage exceeded a certain threshold, each retiree would share in the excess cost “by making an additional contribution.” It also stated that additional contributions would not be implemented until after the “current” CBA expired. The cost threshold was exceeded in 2006. In October 2007, UPS issued a Summary of Material Modification (SMM) advising all IBT retirees of that fact and imposing an additional contribution for each retiree effective January 1, 2008. Before implementing the additional contribution, however, UPS agreed with both the international and local unions to delay implementation until their respective CBAs expired. UPS sent a revised SMM to Local 705 retirees in December 2007 advising that increased contributions “well be effective” after the expiration of the “current” CBA. After the Local 705 CBA expired in mid-2008, UPS notified Local 705 retirees that it would implement an additional contribution effective February 2009. Local 705 retirees brought a class action, alleging that the collection of additional contributions violated the Plan and ERISA because a) the retirees were not sharing equally since the international retirees were not yet contributing, and b) the SPD stated that contributions would not be implemented until the expiration of the “current” plan and the Local 705 current plan now expired in 2013. The district court agreed with Local 705 on the first argument but agreed with the Plan on the second – and enjoined further collection of contributions until further order of the court. The retirees and the Plan appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Wood, and Evans affirmed. The Court agreed with the district court that the collection of contributions from Local 705 retirees only controverted the plain language of the Plan and was, therefore, arbitrary and capricious. The Court rejected UPS’ contrary interpretation of the “share equally” language and rejected its plea to consider extrinsic evidence under the doctrine of extrinsic ambiguity. Although the Court was more receptive to the use of the extrinsic ambiguity doctrine with respect to the meaning of “current” in the SPD, it concluded that it need not. Instead, it held that the December 2007 revised SMM modified the SPD and made it clear that the “current” CBA referred to was the 2002 CBA.

Telecommunications Act's "In Writing" Requirement Is Satisfied By An Explanation That Allows For Meaningful Review

HELCHER v. DEARBORN COUNTY (February 9, 2010)

Cincinnati Bell Wireless provides wireless services to, among others, the people of Dearborn County, Indiana. In order to improve signal coverage in the area, Cincinnati Bell decided it needed a new cell phone tower. It selected a piece of agriculturally zoned property for the tower and applied for a conditional use permit. The company worked with two consultants to the local Zoning Board in completing its application. The consultants recommended that the granting of the permit, although it was the first time they had recommended the construction of a new tower over the co-location of transmitters onto existing structures. The Board met and heard from the consultants, Bell, and a number of local landowners who opposed the tower. The Board denied the application. At a later meeting, the Board denied Bell's request to reconsider the denial and approved the minutes of the earlier meeting. Bell sued the Board, alleging several violations of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Specifically, Bell alleged that the decision was not based on substantial evidence, that the Board minutes did not constitute a sufficient written decision, that the Board unreasonably discriminated against Bell, and that the decision effectively denied wireless services. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Bell appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Rovner, and Wood affirmed. Bell raised the same four arguments. The Court started with the "in writing" requirement of the Telecommunications Act, a question of first impression in the Seventh Circuit. Other circuits' holdings range from allowing a "Denied" stamp on an application to demanding detailed conclusions linked to specific evidence. Noting that the purpose of the requirement is to ensure meaningful judicial review, the Court joined several other circuits in concluding that the requirement is met if there is a sufficient explanation of the Board's reasons to allow a court to evaluate the supporting evidence. Here, the "writing" is the seventeen pages of minutes. The Court concluded that they were sufficient under the Act. They described the issues, the evidence presented by both sides, the concerns of the Board, and the specific Ordinance provisions on which the Board based its denial. On the Court’s review of Bell’s argument that the denial was not supported by substantial evidence, it considered each of the three Ordinance provisions separately. Although the Court found the evidence in support of one of the Ordinance violations thin, it concluded that the other two were supported by substantial evidence. Finally, the Court rejected the “effectively prohibit” and “unreasonably discriminates” arguments. On the former, Bell failed to show that alternatives did not exist. On the latter, Bell presented no evidence of another carrier that was treated more favorably.

Circumstances Warrant Recognizing Next Friend's Pro Se Motion

ELUSTRA v. MINEO (February 9, 2010)

Three sisters and their friends were enjoying a night at Buffalo Wild Wings restaurant in the summer of 2007. A dispute arose over the girls' bill. The police were called and the girls were arrested on charges of disorderly conduct. The charges were dropped. The sisters brought an action against the restaurant, its owner, and the responding police officer. The girls' mother, Christine Lopez, appeared as next friend of the two minor girls. The magistrate held a settlement conference, attended by the plaintiffs, Lopez, their attorney, and the defendants' attorneys. Although the conference was off the record, the magistrate judge reported that the parties agreed to a $6000 settlement. The girls' father, a nonparty, argued with the girls' attorney and declared that he would find new representation. At that point, the family left, although their attorney remained. The Magistrate Judge entered a recommendation to the district court to dismiss the case with prejudice in accordance with the settlement agreement. At a hearing a short time later before the district court, the girls' attorney appeared again and advised the district court that the girls' recollection was that was no agreement. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice. Ten business days later, Lopez filed a handwritten pro se “Motion to vacate and Reinstate.” Newly retained counsel supplemented the motion nine days later. The district court did not recognize the pro se filing as a Rule 59(e) motion and treated counsel’s motion as a Rule 60(b) motion and denied it. The girls appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Wood and Sykes affirmed. The Court first considered its scope of review. If Lopez' handwritten motion is considered as a timely Rule 59(e) motion, then the time to appeal the underlying judgment did not begin to run until that motion was denied and the Court can consider the merits. If not, the Court can only review the denial of the motion to reconsider. The problem with the first motion is that it was brought pro se by Christine Lopez. Normally, next friends and other representative parties may not appear pro se. Although the Court determined that federal law controlled whether Lopez’ filing should be allowed, it found guidance within Illinois state law. The Court cited several Illinois cases where the court applied a flexible rule, particularly where the filing simply preserved a party's right to go forward, as opposed to a more general prosecution of a suit. The Court also emphasized that the purpose of the rule is to protect the rights of the represented party. The Court concluded that the circumstances of the case -- where the parties had counsel through judgment, where the parties retained counsel to litigate the Rule 59(e) and later proceedings, where the parties were only unrepresented for a short time, but where the next friend filed a pro se motion during that time to preserve their appellate rights -- warranted a recognition of the motion. The Court also concluded that the motion met the requirements of Rule 7(b)(1), notwithstanding its brevity. It was in writing, it stated the grounds for seeking the order, and it stated the relief sought. Having reached the merits, however, the Court rejected the girls' position. An oral settlement agreement is valid if there is an offer, acceptance, and meeting of the minds. Here, the only contemporaneous evidence is the magistrate judge’s statement on the record that the parties understood the consequences of their agreement and reached a settlement. That is enough to conclude that there was a meeting of the minds.

Acts Of Harassment Occuring Outside The Limitations Period Should Be Considered In A Hostile Workplace Claim If Any Act Falls Within The Period

TURNER v. THE SALOON (February 8, 2010)

Paul Turner was a waiter at The Saloon restaurant. After working there for several years, Turner and one of his supervisors carried on a sexual relationship that lasted for about nine months. According to Turner, the supervisor retaliated against him after she ended the relationship. He alleges that she changed his table assignments, disciplined him without cause, and sexually harassed him on a number of specific occasions. Turner also alleges that he was discriminated against because of his psoriasis. He wears no underwear as a result of that condition and therefore occasionally exposes himself while changing clothes. He claims that his supervisors failed to accommodate his condition. Instead, he was forced to change in a “vile” men’s room. One day, in the middle of a shift and with no other waiters on duty, Turner left the restaurant to run an errand. When he returned, he was fired. Turner sued the restaurant and several managers for gender and disability discrimination under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act. He also made a claim for overtime. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Turner appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Rovner, and Sykes reversed and remanded in part in affirmed in part. The Court first addressed the Title VII sexual harassment claim. It concluded that the district court erred in not considering most of the alleged acts of harassment because they occurred outside the limitations period. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Morgan, whether an alleged act of harassment is considered by a court depends on whether the claim is for employment discrimination or for hostile work environment. In an employment discrimination claim, discrete acts outside the limitations period should not be considered. However, in a hostile work environment claim, all acts can be considered as long as one act contributing to the hostile environment took place during the limitations period. Taking all the alleged acts into account, the Court had little difficulty in finding that they were sufficient to survive summary judgment. The Court noted the presence of at least five discrete acts, three of which were aggressively physical. Since the district court did not reach the issue of employer liability, the Court left the issue for remand. The court next addressed Turner's claim that his termination was in retaliation for his complaints about the harassment. The Court concluded that Turner was unable to establish a prima facie case under either the direct or indirect method. It noted a series of at least ten serious reprimands in the eight or nine months preceding his termination as well as the fact that he left his job in the middle of the shift. The serious performance problems as well as the passage of time since his harassment complaint belie a causal connection between the complaint and his termination. The Court summarily rejected Turner's ADA discrimination claim -- his psoriasis is not a disability under the Act since it does not limit any major life activity. The fact that he is not disabled does not preclude his ADA retaliation claim. Since he did raise such a claim with his employer, his employer is not allowed to retaliate. He does not prevail on that claim, however, for the same reasons he could not prevail on his Title VII retaliation claim. Finally, the Court rejected Turner's wage claims as wholly unsupported by the evidence presented.

Class-Of-One Equal Protection Claim Fails Without Evidence Of Similarly Situated Person

REGET v. LA CROSSE (February 8, 2010)

John Reget has operated an auto restoration and body shop business in La Crosse, Wisconsin for several decades. For almost as long, he and the City have been at odds. In 1980, the City condemned his building and gave him the funds to relocate and remodel his current building. In the early 1990s, the City cited Reget a number of times for ordinance violations pertaining to junk dealers. All the citations were ultimately dismissed. In the mid-1990s, the City threatened to rezone the area of Reget's current building. The move would have forced Reget to relocate yet again. The City backed down -- but only after Reget promised to comply with the ordinances, build a fence, and limit his nighttime operations. Both sides claim the other failed to live up to its bargain. Reget filed a lawsuit alleging a violation of his Equal Protection rights as a result of the City's selective enforcement of its ordinances. The district court granted summary judgment to the City. Reget appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Williams and Sykes affirmed. The Court noted that Reget's Equal Protection claim was of the class-of-one variety. For such a claim to prevail, a plaintiff must prove that he or she has been treated differently than others similarly situated and that no rational basis exists for such differentiation. The Court concluded that he failed to identify a similarly situated business with respect to any of his claims of discriminatory treatment.