Bivens Action For Damages For Seized Property Is Not The Equivalent Of A Motion For The Return Of The Property
STUART v. RECH (May 5, 2010)
Federal officers executed a search warrant at a company owned by James Stuart. Stuart filed a pro se motion seeking the return of property seized during the execution of the warrant. The matter was assigned to the magistrate judge who issued the warrant. The judge denied the motion, which he had treated as a Rule 41(g) motion for the return of property. A few months later, Stuart filed a second pleading naming only the agent who had applied for the warrant. In that pleading, Stuart sought damages for what he alleged was the unconstitutional seizure of chemical formulas worth millions of dollars. The district court denied the request on the ground that it was the equivalent of the earlier pleading. Stuart appeals.
In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Posner, and Evans affirmed. The Court began, as an aside, by noting that the magistrate judge who denied the original pleading likely had no authority to do so. The appeal, however, related only to the denial of the second pleading. The Court concluded that the district court erred in treating that pleading as an equivalent to the 41(g) motion. The second pleading is nothing more or less than a common law action for damages against a federal officer who is alleged to have violated the Constitution -- more commonly known as a Bivens action. The complaint should not have been dismissed on res judicata grounds. Notwithstanding the lower court’s mistake, the Court affirmed the dismissal on other grounds. The only basis for Stuart’s claim of unconstitutionality is the “frivolous squared” theory that the federal government has no authority outside of federal property. It has no possible merit.
