Federal Court Must Apply Illinois' Summary Judgment Framework to Workers' Compensation Retaliatory Discharge Claim
GACEK v. AMERICAN AIRLINES (July 15, 2010)
John Gacek was a baggage handler for American Airlines. In December of 2005, he suffered a severe sprain to a finger on his left hand. The doctor advised him to wear a splint and to avoid lifting anything with that hand. Gacek called in sick on December 29, 30, and 31. He failed to answer or return a phone call from American on the 29th. Its suspicions aroused because of the inability to reach Gacek and the holiday timing, American hired a detective to conduct surveillance. Gacek was videotaped running errands and generally using his hands to lift and carry objects. Gacek first told American that he had the flu -- he later changed his story and asserted that he called in sick because his finger was bothering him. American fired him. He brought an action under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act for retaliatory discharge. Judge Conlon (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to American. Gacek appeals.
In their opinion, Judges Posner, Wood, and Hamilton affirmed. Although the Court quickly concluded that no reasonable jury could decide that the reason for American's action was the opening of the claim file as opposed to lying about having the flu and disobeying doctor's orders, it decided to address a recurring issue that it had previously ducked. That issue is whether the summary judgment framework in this case is provided by Illinois law or by federal law (that is, McDonnell Douglas). In the 1998 Clemons case, the Illinois Supreme Court specifically rejected McDonnell Douglas in the context of a state workers' compensation retaliatory discharge claim. It's stated rationale was that it did not want to reduce the plaintiff’s burden of proving its case. The Court noted that the application of the Illinois test could result in a different outcome. Illinois requires proof of causation, whereas a McDonnell Douglas plaintiff could potentially prevail without such proof. The Court then addressed whether, under Erie, the Illinois test is a substantive or procedural rule in order to determine whether it should be applied in a diversity case. Although recognizing that the rule was ostensibly procedural, the Court concluded that it was nevertheless substantive under Erie and should be applied in the case. It based its conclusion on the fact that the test applies to a discrete area of substantive law and was motivated by substantive concerns. Illinois simply chose not to provide the McDonnell Douglas advantage to state retaliatory discharge plaintiffs -- the federal courts must honor that policy choice and apply it in diversity cases. Here, Gacek is unable to establish causation since he presented no credible evidence that American's stated reasons for firing him were not credible.
