District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Refusing To Accept Late Response Filed Minutes Before Court's Grant Of Summary Judgment
KEETON v. MORNINGSTAR, INC.. (January 13, 2012)
Doris Keeton began working for Morningstar, Inc., an independent investment research company, in 2002. She was one of three Compliance Consultants. Keeton was African-American and the other two were white. As of April 2008, the three consultants all had salaries between $65-70,000. Keeton's salary was $68,000. After the 2010 salary increases, the salaries ranged from $70-73,000. Keeton made $70,000. Keeton filed an EEOC complaint, alleging that Morningstar discriminated with respect to salary on account of her race. She later filed suit alleging race discrimination and retaliation. When Keeton produced confidential and privileged documents during discovery, Morningstar conducted an investigation. Although Morningstar took no disciplinary action as a result of the investigation, Keeton added a retaliation count her complaint. The court set a briefing schedule on Morningstar's summary judgment motion. Keeton missed the original deadline for a response brief, missed a second date on which her attorney had promised a response, and still had filed nothing nine days after that. On the 10th day, Keeton moved to file her response instanter. Twenty-three minutes later, Judge St. Eve (N.D. Ill.) entered an order granting summary judgment to Morningstar. Later that day, the court denied Keeton's motion. Keeton appeals.
In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Manion, Rovner, and Tinder affirmed. The Court first addressed Keeton's argument that the district court erred in dismissing the case as moot. The district court did not dismiss the case as moot -- it dismissed the motion as moot. The Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. Other than citing a busy schedule and a broken arm, Keeton's attorney never adequately explained why he could not meet the court's deadlines or his own promised filing date, or even why he could not request an extension. On the merits, the Court noted that it would deem Morningstar's statement of uncontested facts admitted because of the lack of a response but would still view those facts in a light most favorable to Keeton. Applying the McDonnell Douglas indirect method, the Court concluded that Morningstar presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the salary differentials among its consultants. Their initial salaries were based on market forces and their increases were based on performance reviews. Keeton presented no evidence that these reasons were pretext. The Court examined her two retaliation claims under the indirect method and concluded that she was unable to establish a prima facie case for either. Her pre-suit retaliation claim fails because she never reported her discrimination complaints to her employer. Thus, she never engaged in any protected activity Her post-suit retaliation claim fails because Morningstar did not discipline her or otherwise cause her to suffer an adverse employment action.
Michael Rigney practices in the law offices of GVC Ltd. in Chicago. In this blog, he reports on select