Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Commentary : In Their Opinion : Lawyer & Attorney Michael E. Rigney : Kelley Drye & Warren Law Firm

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COLEMAN v. DONAHOE (January 6, 2012)

The United States Postal Service employed Denise Coleman, without incident, for over 20 years until 2005. That was the year her longtime supervisor retired and she was assigned to a new supervisor, William Berry. Coleman and Berry are African-American, the manager who appointed Berry is white. Coleman thought she was passed over because of her gender and she also believe that Berry was treating her poorly. She started making complaints. Over the next few months, she claims that Berry assigned her to disgusting tasks that were not part of her regular work, disciplined her unfairly, and ignored her medical restrictions after a surgery. Coleman entered a psychiatric unit. She complained of depression, anxiety, and insomnia. Her treating psychiatrist wrote that she had "homicidal ideations" when talking about Berry. Coleman was discharged after a few weeks much improved and in stable condition. On the same day she was discharged, however, her treating psychiatrist told Berry that Coleman had made threats on his life. The Postal Service immediately put Coleman on off duty status and, a few weeks later, notified the police. Coleman was fired in January of 2006 for violating the Postal Service's ban on "Violent and/or Threatening Behavior." An arbitrator ordered her reinstatement in late 2007. Coleman filed suit, alleging race and gender discrimination as well as retaliation. Judge Coar (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the defendant, concluding that Coleman: a) failed to identify similarly situated employees, b) offered no pretext evidence, and c) failed to carry her burden under the direct method. Coleman appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Wood, Tinder, and Hamilton reversed and remanded. The Court first addressed the discrimination claims. It did so only under the indirect method. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must show that she is a member of a protected class, that she met her employer's expectations, that she suffered an adverse job action, and that a similarly situated individual not in the class was more favorably treated. If she meets that test, the employer then has the burden to establish a nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct. If it can do so, the burden then shifts back for the plaintiff to establish that the stated nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext. The defendants conceded that Coleman met three of the four prima facie prongs -- challenging only the similarly situated prong. The Court noted that the similarly situated analysis is a flexible one and should take into account all factors -- but that a similarly situated employee must be comparable to the plaintiff in all material respects. That usually requires the same supervisor, the same conduct, and the same standards. Here, Coleman's comparators were two white male employees who held a knife to a black colleague’s throat. The two were suspended for seven days. The district court rejected them as comparators because they had different supervisors and different jobs. The Court disagreed with the district court's conclusion. Although the white males had different supervisors, the facility's maintenance operations manager was the decisionmaker in each case. Similarly, although the white males had different job duties, the decisions in this case had nothing to do with their duties. All three were subject to the same Postal Service policy with respect to violence in the workplace. Finally, they were each disciplined for violating the same rule. The Court concluded that the employees were similar enough to survive summary judgment. With respect to pretext, the Court rejected Coleman's request to give the arbitrator’s decision preclusive effect. Not only did the arbitrator not address the same question that the Court addresses, but arbitration decisions in general are not given preclusive effect. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that Coleman satisfied her burden on pretext. Given the arbitrator's conclusion, the context of Coleman's "threats," the decision to terminate her instead of have her undergo a fitness evaluation, and the very selective enforcement evidenced by the comparator analysis is sufficient to defeat summary judgment. The Court turned to the retaliation claims. In order to prevail, Coleman has to show that she engaged in protected activity, suffered an adverse employment action, and that there was a causal connection. Here, the only disputed element is the causal connection. The Court concluded that the combination of the suspicious timing of the Postal Service's conduct and the evidence of pretext were enough to survive summary judgment

Judge Wood wrote separately, concurring in the judgment. Interestingly, Judges Tinder and Hamilton joined in Judge Wood's concurrence. The opinion suggested that, now almost 40 years after McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court should simplify the approach that district courts take in addressing employment litigation at the summary judgment stage.