Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Commentary : In Their Opinion : Lawyer & Attorney Michael E. Rigney : Kelley Drye & Warren Law Firm

BROADDUS v. SHIELDS (December 21, 2011)

As of 2001, Bret Broaddus and Kevin Shields were partners in Will Partners, LLC. Broaddus was in a bad car accident in November of that year. Between February and September 2002, a legal guardian conducted Broaddus' affairs. In early 2003, Shields purchased Broaddus’ interest in Will Partners for $600,000. In May 2008, Broaddus brought suit against Shields for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging that Shields lied to him about the company’s financial health. The suit was filed five years and two months after the sale. Shields moved for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds. Judge St. Eve (N.D. Ill.) granted the motion, rejecting Broaddus’ invocation of the discovery rule. The court also granted summary judgment to Shields on his counterclaims for contractual indemnification and fee shifting. The court awarded approximately $800,000 in attorneys fees. Broaddus appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Flaum and Manion and District Judge Magnus-Stinson affirmed. The Court first concluded that Broaddus waived his legal disability argument in that he raised it for the first time on appeal. The Court also concluded that Broaddus waived his discovery rule argument. Although he raised and argued it in the district court, he did not raise it in his opening brief on appeal. The Court also rejected the discovery rule argument on its merits. Broaddus had the burden of proving the date of discovery. His evidence on that point was generally inadmissible and unreliable. Turning to the counterclaims, the Court noted that Broaddus’ sole argument was that his agreements to indemnify Shields only applied to third party claims. Relying on the contractual language, the general definition of indemnify, and Delaware law, the Court agreed with the district court that the indemnification provisions were enforceable. Finally, the Court found Broaddus’ challenges to the fee award without merit.

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PICKETT v. SHERIDAN HEALTH CARE CENTER (December 15, 2011)

Danielle Pickett’s retaliation claim against her former employer, Sheridan Health Care Center, was tried to a jury. The jury awarded her $15,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed (opinion and intheiropinion). Pickett had agreed to pay her attorney a $7,500 flat fee and a 1/3 contingent fee. She also agreed to assign to him any statutory fee. Her attorney sought statutory fees of approximately $130,000. Judge Pallmeyer (N.D. Ill.) rejected the attorney's claimed $592/hour market rate. Relying on the CPI and the Laffey Matrix (neither of which had been mentioned or relied on by the parties) and the fact that the attorney was entitled to the flat fee and the contingent fee on top of the statutory fee, she set a market rate of $400. Based on that rate, she awarded $70,000 in fees. Although she originally awarded almost $10,000 to the law firm that prepared the fee petition, she later reversed herself and denied those fees on the grounds that Pickett's lawyer had not be prepaid them. Plaintiff appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Flaum, Kanne, and Wood vacated and remanded with respect to the principal fee award and reinstated the fees to the firm that prepared the fee petition. Under Title VII, the prevailing party can recover attorney's fees. Fees are generally calculated by multiplying the time reasonably incurred by a reasonable rate. When the attorney seeking fees has no set hourly rate because he typically works on a contingent basis, courts should determine the rate based upon what similarly experienced attorneys charge. Here, the Court concluded that the district court was influenced by the fact that Pickett's attorney was receiving the flat, contingent, and statutory fees. It was error for her to do so. The Supreme Court has adopted the lodestar approach (hours times rate) notwithstanding its shortcomings and has recognized that lawyers can receive both contractual and statutory fees. The district court is not allowed to reduce the statutory fee recovery simply because the client also agreed to a contingent fee (and, for that matter, a flat fee). Since the Court was not sure how much the contingent fee agreement contributed to the hourly rate reduction, it remanded for further consideration. The Court did agree that the evidence supporting the almost $600 an hour rate was lacking. However, the district court erred in disregarding the rates offered in affidavits of other practicing attorneys on the ground that they did not perform contingent work -- and erred when it reduced the award because of a lack of evidence of prior fee awards in contested cases. With respect to the district court's use of the consumer price index and the Laffey Matrix, the Court did not consider the use of either to be a problem. However, the district court should have given the parties an opportunity to address the use of those matters. Ultimately, the Court emphasized that it was not rejecting the $400 rate approved by the district court. It was just unsure how the court reached that number. Finally, the Court reinstated the fee award to the firm that prepared the fee petition. The only reason the district court gave for reversing its prior award was that the firm had not been prepaid. There is no such requirement. Particularly since the district court approved the award in the first instance, it does not appear that the court had any issue with the reasonableness of the fee.

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WILLIAMS v. ROHN AND HAAS PENSION PLAN (September 2, 2011)

In 2002, Gary Williams filed a class action against the Rohm and Haas Pension Plan, alleging that his lump-sum distribution should include cost-of-living adjustments. The district court granted summary judgment to the class. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and remanded for a damages calculation. On remand, the Plan took the position that class members who took early retirement were entitled to no damages. The parties reached a settlement before the issue was adjudicated. One group of class members objected to the settlement on the ground that it discriminated against early retirees, who (they maintained) should have been given separate counsel. The group also objected to the amount of fees awarded. Another objector claimed that the settlement released his unrelated claims and that he should have been allowed to opt out. Judge Barker (S.D. Ind.) approved the settlement. The objectors appeal.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Bauer, Kanne, and Evans (who, as a result of his death, took no part in the decision) affirmed. First, the Court affirmed the district court's fairness finding with respect to the early retirees. The Court noted that the early retirees received $60 million as part of the settlement on a claim that rested on unsettled law. The district court had already heard arguments on the issue and was well positioned to assess the settlement's fairness. Her decision was not clearly erroneous. Likewise, her decision not to create a separately represented subclass was not an abuse of discretion. With respect to the individual objector, the Court concluded that the settlement only released pension plan related claims. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his opt out. Finally, with respect to the fee award, the Court stated that, given the district court's application of the correct methodology and intimate familiarity with the litigation, it did not abuse its discretion in the fee award.

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MICROMETL CORP. v. TRANZACT TECHNOLOGIES (August 24, 2011)

Micrometl and Tranzact were parties to a services agreement that went sour. Micrometl brought suit in state court, alleging that Tranzact had over-billed it by more than $100,000. Tranzact removed the case to federal court. In discovery, Tranzact learned that Micrometl had received funds from third parties that reduced Tranzact's liability to less than $40,000. It also learned that Micrometl received those funds prior to the time it filed suit. Although Tranzact knew that this information brought diversity jurisdiction into question because of the amount in controversy requirement, it did nothing. Discovery closed five months later and the parties participated in a settlement conference five months after that. It was only after the unsuccessful settlement conference that Tranzact moved to remand the case to state court. Magistrate Judge Nolan (N.D. Ill.) concluded that the plaintiff could not meet the amount in controversy requirement and remanded the case to state court. She denied, however, Tranzact's motions for fees and costs. Transact appeals from the order denying fees.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Flaum, Wood, and Tinder affirmed. The Court noted that the removal statute allows a district court to award fees and costs when a case is improperly removed. Usually, it is a plaintiff who seeks a fee award against a defend who improperly removed. Here, it is the defendant seeking fees. Although the Court noted the unusual situation, it concluded that there is no barrier to awarding fees to a defendant under the statute. The Court also concluded, however, that the district court did not err in refusing to award fees. The district court correctly concluded that Micrometl knew or should have known that it could not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement and should have alerted the court at the time of the removal petition. Equally troubling to the district court, however, was Tranzact's conduct. It waited 10 months after it discovered the truth to alert the district court to the situation. The Court rejected Tranzact’s nonsensical argument that it could not alert the court because of an order to participate in mediation. It also rejected the argument that the fact that a case can be remanded "any time" means that its delay in informing the court should not be considered. Tranzact's conduct wasted judicial resources and imposed costs on both parties. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award fees under § 1447(c). Tranzact also sought fees under § 1927. But § 1927 is a sanctions statute that requires a finding of bad faith. The Court deferred to the magistrate judge's finding of no bad-faith. It pointed out, for example, that Micrometl did not exaggerate its damages in order to get into federal court. It originally filed in state court and had no jurisdictional reason to overstate its damages.

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SIERRA CLUB v. KHANJEE HOLDING (US) (August 24, 2011)

Franklin County Power wanted to build a coal power plant in southern Illinois. It applied to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency for a permit in 2000. The EPA issued the permit. By its terms, the permit would become invalid if construction was not commenced within 18 months. Khanjee Holding became lead developer for the project in 2002. The project was delayed due to collateral disputes. In late 2004, the EPA determined, at least on a preliminary basis, that the permit had expired. Sierra Club filed suit to prevent construction of the power plant. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment and enjoined construction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed (opinion and intheiropinion), concluding that Sierra Club had standing to sue, that the defendants failed to commence construction within the required 18 months, and that the permit had expired. Sierra Club sought penalties and fees in the district court. Judge Gilbert (S.D. Ill.) imposed a $100,000 statutory penalty and awarded attorneys fees and costs. Khanjee appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Bauer, Ripple, and Williams affirmed. The Court first addressed Khanjee's challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under the Clean Air Act. It noted that it had decided the jurisdictional issue in the first appeal and that it had become the law of the case. It rejected Khanjee's argument that the doctrine did not appy to subject matter jurisdiction, although it recognized some earlier precedents that suggested as much. On the merits, the Court concluded that Khanjee had waived its constitutional violation claims and was left only with its claim that its relationship with the other original defendants was insufficient to support a penalty. The Court rejected that argument both on the law of the case doctrine and, alternatively, on the merits. Even if, as Khanjee argues, the Claim Air Act citizen suit provision allows an action only against an owner or operator, Khanjee exercised enough control over the project that it can be considered an owner or operator. With respect to the size of the penalty, the Court concluded that the district court considered all the appropriate factors and imposed a reasonable penalty. Finally, the Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees and costs. It rejected Khanjee’s argument that a court should not award fees to "well-funded" parties.

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FRIZZELL v. SZABO (July 27, 2011)

Thomas Frizzell was on his way to work one November afternoon in Springfield, Illinois when Sangamon County Sheriff’s Deputy Carl Szabo noticed (he asserts) that Frizzell was not wearing a seatbelt. Szabo followed Frizzell for several minutes, until Frizzell arrived in the parking lot of his place of employment. Their accounts of what happened next differ substantially. Deputy Szabo testified that Frizzell ignored his instructions to return to his car, ran toward the door of the building, and attempted to enter the building. Frizzell asserts that he was in a hurry because he was late for work, that he did not originally realize that Szabo was talking to him, and that he wanted to clock in before talking so as not to be late. In any event, Szabo used his taser on Frizzell. When Frizzell continued to ignore orders to stay down, Szabo tased him several more times. Finally, Szabo used pepper spray and physically subdued Frizzell. Frizzell lost his job and claims that he felt weak and tired for several weeks following the incident. He did not, however, seek medical treatment. Frizzell brought suit against Szabo pursuant to §§ 1983 and 1988 for excessive force and false arrest. Szabo brought a counterclaim for battery, seeking $75,000. After trial, Judge Scott (C.D. Ill.) refused to give a nominal damages instruction. She changed her mind and gave such an instruction, however, after the jury sent back a note asking if they had to award damages if they found in plaintiff's favor. The jury found against Frizzell on the false arrest claim, found against Szabo on the counterclaim, and found in Frizzell's favor on the excessive force claim but awarded nominal damages. Chief Judge McCuskey (C.D. Ill.) denied a motion to alter the award and also denied attorney's fees. Frizzell appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Kanne and Evans and District Judge Clevert affirmed. The Court noted that a nominal damages instruction can be appropriate where: a) an officer uses both justifiable and excessive force but any injury relates to the justifiable force, b) where a jury might conclude that the evidence of injury is not credible, or c) where the degree of the injury itself does not support greater damages. The Court found two of those situations in this case. First, the jury could have concluded that the use of the taser was justifiable but the pepper spray afterwards was not -- but that Frizzell's injuries related only to the use of the taser. Second, Frizzell produced very little evidence of injury related to the pepper spray. The district court did not err in giving the instruction or in denying the motion to alter the judgment. The Court turned to the motion for attorney's fees. On that issue, the district court properly considered the difference between the amount plaintiffs sought and the actual award, the significance of the legal issue at stake, and the litigation's public purpose. The Court agreed that those factors weighed against any award of fees. First, although Frizzell never requested a specific award at trial, he did refer to Szabo's $75,000 counterclaim request as a starting point. The difference between $1.00 and anything near $75,000 is significant. Second, Szabo did not prevail on his false arrest claim and prevailed without measurable damages on his excessive force claim. He cannot claim that he prevailed on any significant legal issue. Finally, there was no public purpose served by the litigation. It was simply a private injury.

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PAKOVICH v. VERIZON LTD PLAN (July 22, 2011)

Lisa Pakovich became disabled during her employment with Verizon. Verizon denied her request for long-term disability benefits under its ERISA plan. Although the district court affirmed the denial, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded to the plan administrator for a new determination. Pakovich heard nothing from the administrator for almost 5 months so she filed another suit. Shortly thereafter, the Plan agreed to pay all the benefits she requested and moved to dismiss her suit as moot. Judge Reagan (S.D. Ill.) denied the motion, entered judgment for Pakovich in the amount the Plan agreed to pay, but denied Pakovich's fee motion.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Flaum, Evans, and Tinder vacated in part and affirmed in part. The Court first agreed with the Plan that Pakovich's case was moot. The Plan agreed to pay everything she asked for in her claim for benefits. Her fee request did not prevent her case from being moot. The Court next considered whether the district court even had jurisdiction of her fee claim. Relying on its FOIA jurisprudence, the Court concluded that a district court retains equitable jurisdiction to address a fee claim. Addressing the merits of the fee claim, the Court noted that a fee award under ERISA has two elements. First, the claimant must show "some degree of success on the merits." Second, the defendant's position must be not substantially justified. The Court ultimately determined that it did not need to decide either of those elements. Here, the district court denied her fee request because of inadequate documentation and support for either the hourly rate or the time spent. It was her burden to adequately support her request. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied fees.

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NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA v. CITY OF CHICAGO (June 2, 2011)

The District of Columbia, the City of Chicago, and the Village of Oak Park all had similar handgun ban ordinances in 2008. That was the year that the Supreme Court decided, in Heller, that the District of Columbia ban violated the Second Amendment. Chicago and Oak Park retained their bans, relying on the fact that the District of Columbia is a federal enclave. The bans were challenged. The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit and concluded that the Second Amendment applied to states and municipalities and struck down the bans. It entered its judgment on June 28, 2010. Within weeks, both Chicago and Oak Park repealed their ordinances. The Seventh Circuit directed the district court to dismiss the cases as moot. The plaintiffs requested attorneys’ fees. Judge Shadur (N.D. Ill.) rejected the request on Buckhannon and Zessar grounds -- that being a catalyst for change is not enough, a party must have a judicial order changing the legal status to sustain a fee award. Plaintiffs appeal.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Bauer and Posner reversed and remanded. In Buckhannon, defendants voluntarily changed the law before the district court rendered its decision. In Zessar, defendants voluntarily changed the law after the district court's decision but before its judgment. In both cases, fees were disallowed because there was no judicial order changing the parties’ legal status. But here, the plaintiffs do have a judicial order. They have a judgment of the Supreme Court that altered the party's legal relationship. The fact that the district court would have entered an injunction had the case not become moot does not alter that fact. The plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.

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JACKMAN FINANCIAL CORP. V. HUMANA INSURANCE CO. (May 31, 2011)

Kunta Torrence participated in his employer's benefits plan that included a $15,000 life insurance policy issued by Humana Insurance. Torrence named his brother as beneficiary. The policy included a "facility-of-payment" clause. That clause covered the situation in which the named beneficiary is not alive at the time of the insured's death. It gave Humana the option to pay the proceeds of the policy to the insured's spouse, children, parents, siblings, or estate. Sadly, Torrence and his brother were both killed in the same car accident. Their mother, Nancy Kelly, borrowed $10,000 from Jackman Financial in order to pay for the funerals. She assigned a portion of the life insurance proceeds to Jackman to secure the loan. Two days later, she was appointed administrator of her son's estate. She completed a beneficiary form for Humana identifying herself as the beneficiary. At Humana's request, Kelley also completed an affidavit identifying Torrence's family members. Humana later advised Kelly that it had decided to turn over the proceeds to Torrence’s minor children. Jackman filed suit for denial of benefits under ERISA. Judge Norgle (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to Humana. Jackman appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Rovner, Williams, and Hamilton affirmed. A facility-of-payment clause gives an insurer broad discretion in distributing the policy proceeds. Humana has an absolute right to choose from the list of possible recipients. Even though Humana knew that Kelly had already assigned much of the proceeds to Jackman, it was under no obligation to turn over the proceeds to Kelly or the estate. The Court then considered Humana's request for fees. Under ERISA, a prevailing party has a modest but rebuttable presumption in favor of fees. The Court applied the "substantially justified" test in denying fees to Humana. It considered that the case was filed in good faith, that neither Kelly nor Jackman new of the facility-of-payment clause at the time of the assignment, and that Jackman gave notice of its claim long before Humana paid out the proceeds. The Court did warn that it might decide differently if future litigants continue to challenge facility-of-payment clauses.

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DIGITECH COMPUTER v. TRANS-CARE, INC. (May 20, 2011)

When Trans-Care, a medical transportation company, decided to update its software, it approached Digitech. Digitech's first proposal contained a “satisfaction guarantee” – a provision that allowed Trans-Care to walk away from the contract in the first 90 days without paying any licensing fees. Several months later, after much negotiation, Digitech submitted a final agreement, which Trans-Care signed. The final agreement did not include the guarantee, although Trans-Care return the signed agreement with its own purchase order that purported to incorporate earlier proposals and promises. The final agreement also provided that: a) monthly licensing payments began 90 days after installation, b) Digitech could suspend services if payments became 60 days delinquent, c) Digitech could recover attorney's fees incurred in collecting unpaid balances, and d) both parties had to provide notice and an opportunity to cure prior to termination. Digitech completed the software installation on January 1, 2007. Trans-Care experienced substantial problems with the software and gave notice on March 1 that it invoking the 90-day guarantee. Digitech refused to honor the notice and eventually locked the system on April 3 for Trans-Care's payment delinquency. Digitech brought suit for breach of contract -- Trans-Care counterclaimed for fraud. Magistrate Judge Hussmann (S.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to Digitech on the fraud claim and, at trial, found for Digitech also on its breach of contract claim. The court awarded damages based in part on its view that the contract had 33 months remaining. It also awarded Digitech its attorneys' fees for prosecuting the breach of contract case, but not for defending the counterclaim. Both sides appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Wood, Williams, and Tinder affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. The Court first affirmed the dismissal of Trans-Care's claim that Digitech committed fraud when it refused to honor the 90-day provision. The Court focused on the negotiation history. It pointed out that the provision existed in early draft proposals but dropped out during negotiations. The fact that it did not even appear in the final agreement was enough for the Court to conclude there was no fraud. The Court turned to Digitech's breach of contract claim. It concluded that Trans-Care breached the contract when it attempted to walk away from the deal without providing notice and an opportunity to cure. The Court rejected the notion that Trans-Care’s purchase order brought the guarantee back into the contract. The Court did part ways with the magistrate judge on damages, however. The magistrate judge calculated damages based on the remaining contractual term. But the Court noted that Digitech chose to terminate the contract on April 3. Since Trans-Care's licensing fee obligation did not begin until the 90-day period expired on March 31, Digitech is only entitled to licensing fees for the three days in April. With respect to attorneys' fees, the Court agreed that Digitech was not entitled to its fees for defending against the counterclaim since those fees were not incurred in connection with collecting an unpaid balance. Finally, the Court noted that the amount of fees awarded on the breach of contract claim should be reassessed in light of its significant reduction in damages.

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HUSS v. IBM MEDICAL AND DENTAL PLAN (April 13, 2011)

Eileen Huss was an IBM employee and participated in the IBM Medical and Dental Plan. Huss’ son Joseph had a mental disability and was entirely dependent on Huss and her husband for his support. In 2005, Joseph was 24 years old and enrolled in his father's medical plan. But Huss wanted him enrolled in her plan at the time of her anticipated retirement at the end of 2006. Plan representatives told her that her son would be eligible to enroll at that time and that she need not take any additional steps until her retirement. In January of 2007, a month after her retirement, a Plan representative told her that Joseph was ineligible because she had not submitted a written application years earlier (60 days before he turned 23). Huss requested a summary of the plan and any relevant material. A plan representative responded that the 2006 Summary Plan Description (SPD), which Huss already had, was the only relevant document. Huss specifically requested plan language that was in effect in 2004, the year Joseph turned 23. Huss retained a lawyer who asked for reconsideration and again requested plan language and documents from the earlier years. Plan administrator R. A. Barnes denied relief based on language from the 2006 SPD. Barnes did provide some of the earlier language. Huss made her final appeal based on the 2004 SPD language, which did not require a written request. Barnes again denied eligibility. Huss brought suit pursuant to ERISA against both the Plan and Barnes. She sought benefits and statutory damages for failure to provide documents. Judge Zagel (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to Huss on both counts, assessed statutory penalties of over $15,000, and awarded fees and expenses of over $86,000. Defendants appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Williams and Tinder vacated and remanded on the claim for benefits, affirmed in part and reversed in part on the statutory penalties, and vacated and remanded the award of fees and expenses. The Court began with the eligibility issue. Since the administrator has discretion under the Plan’s language, Barnes' decision is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard. The Court recognized Hackett's "sweeping language" to the effect that the plan in effect at the time a claim is denied is the plan that controls. But the Court noted that the type of dispute in Hackett was quite different and concluded that the nature of the dispute dictates whether earlier language might control. Here, where the Plan's denial is based on failure to satisfy a condition precedent, the controlling plan language must be that which was in effect when the claimant's ability to satisfy the condition precedent expired. In this case, that is the language in effect in 2004. Barnes' exclusive reliance on the 2006 SPD makes her actions arbitrary and capricious. With respect to eligibility under the earlier language, the Court found the earlier language ambiguous regarding the need for a parent's request for coverage continuation. Because of the ambiguity and the a plan administrator’s broad discretion, the Court concluded that Barnes’ interpretation -- that an employee had to make a request within 60 days of the dependent’s 23rd birthday -- was not unreasonable. A genuine issue of fact existed, however, with respect to whether Huss actually made that request. The Court remanded to the administrator for further development of the record and other proceedings. The Court next addressed the statutory penalty award. It affirmed the penalties associated with the Plan's original failure to send Huss the 2003 plan documents. The Court had already determined that this was the controlling document and the Plan did not produce it within the statutory time period. The district court’s second statutory penalty, however, related to defendant’s failure to produce a number of SPDs published between 2004 and 2007. Although the Court conceded that these documents would show the evolution of the condition precedent language and may have been helpful to Huss, it concluded that they did not fall within the category of documents that ERISA required defendants to produce. The district court therefore abused its discretion in awarding those penalties. Finally, the Court turned to the fee award. It noted that the Supreme Court had recently concluded, contrary to prior Seventh Circuit jurisprudence, that an ERISA plaintiff may still be awarded fees if her case is remanded to the administrator if she shows "some degree of success." The Court expressed its disagreement with some of the district court's findings but ultimately decided simply to vacate the award, given its treatment of the merits. The district court will have another opportunity to consider a fee award after remand.

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BUSSON-SOKOLIK v. MILWAUKEE SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING (February 10, 2011)

Dustin Busson-Sokolik attended the Milwaukee School of Engineering. In 1999, he signed a promissory note with the school in the amount of $3000. In the note, he promised to repay the money and to pay all reasonable collection costs. The School sued Busson-Sokolik in 2005 to recover the unpaid amount and obtained a default judgment of almost $6000. Busson-Sokolik filed for bankruptcy shortly thereafter. An adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court determined that the debt was non-dischargeable. The School obtained a judgment of over $16,000 that included costs and fees. Busson-Sokolik appealed the decision to the district court, where the proceedings became rather contentious. Busson-Sokolik accused the School of false statements. The School moved to strike a portion of Busson-Sokolik's reply brief because it raised arguments not raised in the bankruptcy court or in his opening brief. Chief Judge Clevert (E.D. Wis.) denied Busson-Sokolik's motion for sanctions, granted the School's motion to strike portions of the brief and motion for costs and fees, and affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment on the merits. He awarded over $80,000. Busson-Sokolik and his attorney appeal.

In their opinion Judges Power, Flaum, and Hamilton affirmed in all respects except that it reduced the sanction portion of the award by half. The Court noted that bankruptcy proceedings generally discharge all of a debtor's financial obligations. There are exceptions, however. One exception is for an educational loan under § 523(a)(8)(A). The Court rejected Smith's argument that the $3000 was not a loan. In order for there to be a loan, there must be a) a contract, b) the transfer of money, and c) a promise to repay the money at a later date. Those three elements are all present here. The Court also rejected Smith's argument that the loan was not educational. The Court acknowledged that some courts apply a "use" test while others apply a "purpose" test. It adopted the "purpose" test as being more consistent with the statutory language in the broader statutory goals. Here, the purpose test was satisfied because Smith was a student, he had to be a student to qualify for the loan, the money was deposited into his student account, and the loan was part of a total financial assistance package. The purpose of the loan was educational and the district court was correct in concluding that the loan was not discharged. The Court also affirmed the award of fees and costs. Although fees and costs are normally not awarded in American litigation, they are where there is a statute or a contract, unless otherwise prohibited. The promissory note contained Busson-Sokolik’s promise to pay these costs. That promise is enforceable. The Court did not consider Busson-Sokolik's arguments that fees and costs were improper under the merger doctrine. Smith did not raise that argument in either the bankruptcy court or in his initial district court brief. Thus, he has waived it twice and no exceptional circumstances exist that would compel the Court to overlook the waivers. The Court found no error in the denial of Busson-Sokolik's motion for sanctions, in that he failed to honor the safe harbor provision of Rule 9011. The Court also found ample evidence in support of the district court’s award of sanctions against Busson-Sokolik and his attorney. They ignored deadlines, filed baseless pleadings, ignored procedural requirements, and made duplicative filings. But they did not necessarily act in bad faith and the appeal was not necessarily frivolous. The merits of the merger argument was never considered because of waiver and it does have some basis in law. In light of all that and also considering Busson-Sokolik’s status as a student who has filed for bankruptcy, the Court exercised its discretion to reduce the sanctions by half.
 

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HYPERQUEST v. N'SITE SOLUTIONS (January 19, 2011)

Safelite Group owns the copyright for a claims processing software program. Its predecessor granted a non-exclusive license to N’Site Solutions in 2001 limited to in-facility use only. A dispute arose between the parties in late 2003 regarding agreement terms and fees. Attempts to renegotiate the agreement in early 2004 were unsuccessful. At about the same time, Safelite entered into a licensing agreement with HyperQuest. The HyperQuest agreement granted significantly greater rights than the N’Site agreement did. However, Safelite retained certain rights and the agreement recognized the then-ongoing renegotiation efforts with N’Site. HyperQuest filed a Copyright Act suit against N’Site and Unitrin Direct Insurance Company. It alleged that N’Site infringed its copyright by using the software outside of its own facilities, by modifying and creating derivative works, and by selling the software or derivative works to Unitrin. Judge Shadur (N.D. Ill.) dismissed the case with prejudice, concluding that HyperQuest lacked standing to sue. The court also awarded fees and costs to N’Site. HyperQuest appeals both the merits and the fee award -- Unitrin cross-appeals the reduction of its requested fees.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Flaum, Wood, and Evans affirmed. Under the Copyright Act, only a person with enforceable rights may bring an action. That person must be a "legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right." The Act lists six exclusive rights - the right to: a) reproduce the work, b) prepare derivative works, c) distribute copies, d) perform the work publicly, e) display the work, and, f) perform the work digitally. The Court noted that a copyright owner could convey various rights to different parties and that HyperQuest need only show its ownership of one of the exclusive rights. HyperQuest claims to own three of the six identified rights -- the rights to reproduce, prepare derivative works, and distribute copies. The Court turned to the language of the license agreements and the rights held by each of the parties to resolve the claim. It noted that N’Site had a limited right to use the software in its own facilities and no rights to reproduce, prepare derivative works, or distribute copies. But HyperQuest's license was not only subject to N’Site actual rights but was also subject to any rights that would have been granted to N’Site in the renegotiated license. In addition, Safelite itself retained substantial rights with respect to derivative works. The Court concluded that the lines of ownership were "blurry at best" and that HyperQuest failed to meet its burden of showing ownership of an exclusive right. Turning to the fee award, the Court first addressed a jurisdictional issue. The original judgment on the fee award ran in favor of Unitrin only. Two days later, the district court on its own motion amended the judgment to add N’Site. Unitrin's notice of appeal is timely only if the amended judgment started anew the period within which to appeal. The Court concluded that the change was not a clerical error correctable under Rule 60(a) but that it was akin to a new trial order under Rule 59(d) and that the notice of appeal was timely. The Court found no abuse of discretion in either the award of fees or the reduction in the amount requested.

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IN RE: TRANS UNION CORP. PRIVACY LITIGATION (January 14, 2011)

A number of Fair Credit Reporting Act class actions against Trans Union were consolidated in the Northern District of Illinois. Lawyers for some of the plaintiffs ("MDL Counsel") agreed with Trans Union in 2006 to settle the case for $40 million (including $20 million cash). Dawn Wheelahan was counsel for another set of plaintiffs. She and counsel for yet a third set of plaintiffs ("Texas Counsel") opposed the settlement and persuaded the district court to reverse its earlier approval of the settlement. A few years later, the case settled for $110 million (including $75 million cash). The settlement agreement capped lawyers' fees at $18.75 million (17% of the settlement amount), which the lawyers asked for. Judge Gettleman (N.D. Ill.) reduced the fees to $10.83 million but then referred the matter to a special master and approved the special master's recommendation of a $13 million award, allocated 63% to MDL counsel, 22% to Wheelahan, and 15% to Texas counsel. Wheelahan appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Kanne, and Wood modified and remanded. The Court noted that the special master relied on four things in quantifying the amount of his recommended award: a) an academic study that found an average fee award of 17.6-19.5% in settlements between $79-$190 million, b) a group of securities cases (that have higher discovery costs and therefore should allow for higher fees) from which he extrapolated a fee award of 3.8-23.2% in a settlement this size, c) the fact that the settlement contained $35 million in non-cash value (which he viewed as having less value than cash and on which he awarded only a 5% fee), and d) the risk of losing. The Court found that the special master erred in at least three ways. He did not resolve the wide range of fees in the securities cases or quantify a reduction for the reduced cost of discovery. His reduction of the fee award for the non-cash component of the settlement was arbitrary and unwarranted. His analysis of the risk of losing was weak and inconclusive. The Court noted that simply eliminating the discount on the non-cash value brought the fee award back up to $16.5 million. But it ultimately concluded, because of the combination of errors, that the master’s rationale for reducing the $18.75 million originally requested was not persuasive. Turning to the allocation recommendation, the Court stated that the special master gave MDL Counsel full credit for the $40 million component and 50% credit for the additional $70 million component. The master also noted that MDL Counsel's investment in the case was valued at 4.3 times Wheelahan's investment. The Court noted that this ratio is considerably higher than the fee recommendation and ultimately concluded that the special master's allocation recommendations were appropriate. Against the backdrop of an appropriate allocation but an unsupported reduction in total award, the Court turned to Wheelahan's request. It concluded (applying “rough justice”) that she was entitled to her allocation recommended by the master (22%) but that she was entitled to that percentage of the amount originally requested. Therefore, the Court ordered that she be awarded an additional $1.425 million.

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NIGHTINGALE HOME HEALTHCARE v. ANODYNE THERAPY (November 23, 2010)

Late last year, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Anodyne Therapy and against Nightingale Home Healthcare (opinion and intheiropinion). The case involved Nightingale's purchase and later return of infrared lamps purchased from Anodyne. The Court affirmed on the grounds that Nightingale suffered no damages. After the affirmance, Judge Barker (S.D. Ind.) awarded $72,000 in attorneys' fees pursuant the Lanham Act’s allowance of such awards in "exceptional cases." Nightingale appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Posner, Kanne, and Rovner affirmed. The Court first described the surprisingly varied definitions courts apply to "exceptional cases." It found at least seven different interpretations in the different circuits, although it admitted that a closer analysis of the facts of individual cases would be required to determine if the different interpretations resulted in different outcomes. In the face of these different approaches, the Court looked to for the principle behind this exception to the general rule against awards of attorneys' fees. It concluded that the purpose of the exception was to prevent plaintiffs and defendants from using the Act for strategic purposes, especially when the other party was economically disadvantaged. The Court adopted an "abuse of process" test (i.e., the use of the legal system to accomplish a goal for which it was not designed) to reflect the concerns addressed by the Act. Applying that test in the procedural context of a fee motion, the Court concluded that an "exceptional case" is one in which a claim or defense was objectively unreasonable. Here, the Court had no difficulty finding that Nightingale met the test. The claim was not only without merit but was made for the specific purpose of getting a price concession from Anodyne. In addition to affirming the award below, the Court awarded fees for the appeal.

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FEDNAV INTERNATIONAL v. CONTINENTAL INSURANCE CO. (November 1, 2010)

Three shipments of steel made their way across the Atlantic Ocean in 2001 and were delivered at Burns Harbor, Indiana. Each of the shipments was allegedly arrived damaged. Continental Insurance, the steel owner’s subrogee, brought suits against the carrier, Fednav, under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. The carrier agreement had a forum selection clause designating the federal district court with jurisdiction at the port of discharge (i.e., Burns Harbor) as the only available forum. Notwithstanding the forum selection clause, Continental filed the three suits in Illinois federal court. The court dismissed for improper venue. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. By that time, the statute of limitations had run and the cases were not refiled. Several years later, Fednav brought suit against Continental on a breach of contract theory. It alleged that Continentals’ breach of the forum selection clause allowed it to recover the costs and attorneys' fees it incurred in the earlier litigation. Judge Darrah (N.D. Ill.) dismissed the complaint as an impermissible attempt to recover attorneys' fees. Fednav appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook, Circuit Judge Hamilton, and District Judge Springmann affirmed. The Court first discussed choice of law. As a diversity case, state law governs substantive issues -- federal law governs procedural issues. Fednav's claim of entitlement to fees is a substantive issue and is therefore governed by state law. Since neither party raised a conflict of law issue, the Court applied the law of Illinois as the law of the state in which it sat. Illinois law generally adheres to the American Rule, under which a litigant bears her own fees and costs unless otherwise provided for by a contract or statute. The Court stated that Fednav cited no such contractual or statutory provision. Therefore, Fednav is not entitled to recover those fees in a breach of contract case. The Court also addressed Fednav’s argument that federal common law permitted recovery of attorneys' fees. It rejected the argument, both because Fednav waived it and because federal common law also recognizes the American Rule.

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WICKENS v. SHELL OIL CO. (August 31, 2010)

Daniel and Pamela Wickens owned a small parcel of land in central Indiana that had previously been the site of a Shell gasoline station. During preparations for the sale of the parcel, they discovered that the soils were contaminated. Their attorney, Mark Shere, began negotiations with Shell -- under the Indiana Underground Storage Tank Act (the “Act”), a person who takes steps to remedy soil contamination caused by an underground storage tank may be reimbursed by the owner and may recover his attorneys' fees if he brings a successful suit. When a neighbor's property (also the site of a former gasoline station -- but not owned by Shell) was also found to be contaminated, the parties fought over the source and responsibility for the contamination. The Wickenses brought suit in early 2005. The district court denied Shell's summary judgment motion, concluding that it probably bore full responsibility for the contamination. Although the Wickenses continued to control the investigation and rack up remediation costs and attorneys' fees, the parties could not seem to reach a settlement. The court adopted a three month freeze on the parties' liability for each other's fees and costs in early 2007 in an attempt to foster a resolution. She also instructed the parties to select and retain an independent consultant to investigate the properties. Notwithstanding the court's order, the parties continued to incur substantial fees and costs during and after the freeze. The parties finally reached an agreement -- Shell purchased the property, made a payment for property damages, and agreed that the Wickenses were entitled to their costs and fees. They left the calculation up to the court. Judge Barker (S.D. Ind.) awarded all of the Wickenses' costs and fees up to the point of her freeze order, after which she disallowed all costs (with the exception of some corrective action costs pursuant to a state work plan) and fees. On post-judgment motions, the court a) deducted the amount of fees billed as attorney services by Shere’s wife, a non-attorney, and b) admonished Shere for concealing the fact that his fees were largely paid by an insurance company throughout the litigation but granted Shell no relief. Shell appeals. Shere (after being allowed to appear as a real party in interest) cross-appeals.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Bauer and Wood and District Judge Kennelly affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The only issues on appeal relates to the award of expert costs and attorneys' fees. The Court first concluded that the lower court correctly applied a statutory purpose test for calculating a fee award under the Act. Second, the Court ruled that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the statutory purpose was satisfied as of January 2007. The Court rejected Shell's suggestions that an earlier date was appropriate and the Wickenses's suggestions that a later date was required. Next, the Court upheld (with a small clerical error reversed and remanded) the deduction for fees incurred by Shere’s wife. There was nothing wrong with the her time entries. They could have been billed as non-attorney time -- but were improperly billed as attorney time. Finally, the Court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in its award of expert costs after January 2007. On Shere’s cross-appeal, the Court a) found no abuse of discretion in denying prejudgment interest, b) concluded that Shell suffered no prejudice from Shere’s insurance concealment and found no error in the court's denial of relief, and c) refused to consider Shere’s complaint that the district court was unduly critical of his litigation conduct.

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HAYES LEMMERZ INTERNATIONAL v. ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE CO. (August 31, 2010)

An explosion at a plant owned by Hayes Lemmerz International-Huntington (LMIH) , a subsidiary of Hayes Lemmerz International (HLI), injured one employee and killed another. The injured employee and the widow of the deceased employee filed workers' compensation claims against both HLI and HLIH as employers and recovered. They then brought a tort suit against the same two companies. The suit did not identify either defendant as an employer. Rather, it alleged that the defendants owned and operated the plant and failed to exercise reasonable care. Apparently, they did not identify the defendants as employers because the exclusive remedy against an employer for a workplace injury is a workers’ compensation claim. HLI notified ACE American Insurance Co., its employer liability policy carrier. ACE declined to take over the defense and offered to pay only half the combined litigation expenses. HLI incurred over $250,000 in defense costs attempting to convince the state court that it was not the employer -- and therefore not liable. Ironically, it eventually discovered that Indiana, by statute, treats a parent and its subsidiaries as joint employers, for workers' compensation purposes, of each other's employees. The suit against HLI was therefore dismissed with prejudice because of the workers' compensation bar. HLI brought an action against ACE for recovery of its attorneys' fees. Chief Judge Simon (N.D. Ind.) dismissed the complaint. HLI appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Posner, and Flaum affirmed. Under Indiana law, the duty to defend is determined by the nature of the complaint. The "nature of the complaint" includes not only the specific allegations contained therein but also facts readily ascertainable by the insurer. Here, although neither HLI nor HLIH were identified as employers in the complaint, the Indiana statute made their status as such readily ascertainable. The fact that the complaint lacked merit is irrelevant -- an insured deserves a defense to meritless complaints as well as meritorious ones. A duty to defend (or reimburse) therefore existed. However, that duty requires reimbursement only of reasonable costs of defense. HLI's failure to appreciate the existence and significance of the Indiana statute (HLI has filed a malpractice action against its lawyers) led the Court to conclude that the defense costs were unreasonable and unrecoverable. The Court also rejected HLI's argument that ACE's duty to defend included a duty to advise it about the existence of the statute. ACE had no duty to provide legal advice.

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METAVANTE CORP. v. EMIGRANT SAVINGS BANK (August 30, 2010)

Emigrant Savings Bank wanted to expand its operations by launching an on-line bank. In early 2004, Emigrant met with Metavante Corp. The Metavante team presented its system, emphasizing its ability to service a great number of accounts. The Emigrant team knew that certain capabilities were still being developed and that the system lacked some desired traits. Nevertheless, Metavante submitted a proposal referencing existing clients and indicated that its product was in current use. It even identified Capital One as a client reference. The parties negotiated an agreement over the next several months and signed it in August. Under the agreement, Metavante was to provide electronic banking and funds transfer services. Metavante warranted that it would provide those services in a "commercially reasonable manner." Certain services were exempt from the warranty because they contained their own service-level target measurements. Finally, the agreement allowed termination for cause (but with broad cure rights), termination for convenience (for a fee), and termination for convenience and migrating the process to an in-house solution (with a lower termination fee). The program went live in early 2005. It had many flaws – for example, it could not ensure that a customer had sufficient funds to make a particular transfer, it generated error messages, it could not complete online applications, and it failed to process some transactions. On the other hand, Emigrant landed 250,000 new accounts and over $6 billion in deposits. It advertised its bank as "the most successful" bank of its type. Metavante brought suit against Emigrant in September 2005 and gave notice of termination for non-payment. Emigrant objected but made the payments. Several months later, Metavante again gave notice of termination for nonpayment. Emigrant countered that it was terminating for cause for Metavante 's "flawed and inadequate" performance. Metavante amended its complaint to add breach of contract claims. Emigrant counterclaimed for fraud in the inducement. After a bench trial, Judge Stadtmueller (E.D. Wis.) ruled that Metavante had not materially breached the contract but awarded the lower termination fee, finding that Emigrant had migrated the system to an in-house solution. The court also awarded approximately $10 million in attorneys' fees to Metavante. Emigrant appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Manion, and Tinder affirmed. First, although criticizing the district court for its oral decision and verbatim adoption of many of Metavante 's proposed findings of fact, the Court declined Emigrant's invitation to apply a less deferential standard of review. Second, although criticizing the district court for its inadequate reliability determination with respect to Metavante's expert, its de novo review led it to conclude that the testimony was relevant and reliable. Third, with respect to whether Metavante breached its "commercially reasonable" warranty, the Court concluded that the district court did not err in considering the venture's success as probative evidence. Although a venture's success may not conclusively establish the commercial reasonableness of a party's performance, a court is certainly entitled to consider it. Here, the district court considered it as one factor, albeit a significant one, of many. Fourth, the Court found no clear error in the district court's finding of commercial reasonableness. The Court specifically cited the working relationship between the parties, the fact that both parties understood they were dealing with a new technology, and the fact that Metavante undertook diligent efforts to correct problems when they occurred. Fifth, the Court concluded that the record supported the district court's conclusion that there was no breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Sixth, with respect to Emigrant's fraud claims, the Court found that Emigrant failed to prove reliance or falsity. The Court concluded that it was unreasonable for Emigrant to rely on any of the early "sales pitch" statements, given that these two sophisticated businesses proceeded to negotiate over several months a complex arms-length transaction. The negotiation process and the contract itself made the expectations and capabilities of the parties very clear -- Emigrant may not rely on any earlier inconsistent statements. With respect to falsity, the Court concluded that the district court did not err in its finding that none of the representations at issue amounted to fraud. Finally, the Court turned to the fee award. Several issues were presented related to the fee award. The fee shifting provision in the contract provided that the "prevailing party" is entitled to fees. The Court concluded that Emigrant's partial success in the court's awarding of the $3.8 million lower termination fee instead of the $20.7 million higher termination fee did not make it a prevailing party on that issue and entitle it to fees. The Court also concluded that the submission of redacted bills was sufficient under Medcom. Although a request for fees must be reasonable under a fee shifting provision, the Court noted that market considerations normally render unnecessary line by line scrutiny of individual time entries. The district court acted within its discretion in awarding the fees.

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REXAM BEVERAGE CAN CO. v. BOLGER (August 24, 2010)

Almost 50 years ago, David Bolger constructed a warehouse near Rockford, Illinois and leased it to Rexam Beverage Can Company. In 2005, Rexam attempted to renew the lease for another five-year term, but failed to give the requisite notice. Bolger advised Rexam that it would have to vacate the premises at the expiration of the lease in March of 2006. Bolger also requested that certain repairs be made. Rexam did not vacate the premises. Instead, it filed a declaratory judgment action. It also continued to pay all utilities and rent, although Bolger returned the rent checks. Eventually, Rexam found a new home, made some repairs to the Rockford warehouse, and returned possession to Bolger at the end of August, 2007. Although Rexam made significant repairs to the warehouse, it did not replace the roof as Bolger had requested. The roof repair estimate was approximately $400,000. Bolger sold the property within several months without replacing the roof. Shortly before Rexam vacated the warehouse, Judge Ashman (N.D. Ill.) ruled on the declaratory judgment action. He concluded that Rexam did not meet the lease's renewal notice requirements and that its continued occupation of the warehouse was "willful" under Illinois' Holdover Statute. After a bench trial, the court found for Bolger and awarded $1.1 million for the holdover, $400,000 for the roof replacement, $20,000 for other repairs, and over $800,000 in attorneys' fees. Rexam appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Manion and Tinder affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. The Court first addressed Rexam's liability for roof repairs under the lease. Under Illinois law, the lease is like any other contract and, if unambiguous, will be applied according to its terms. Using that analysis, the Court concluded that the lease language ("Lessor shall have no obligation with respect to the maintenance and repair . . .” and "Lessee shall be solely responsible . . . for keeping all of the [buildings] in good condition, order and repair, including all structural and extraordinary changes . . .") was unambiguous and placed the contractual burden of roof repairs on Rexam. With respect to damages for the roof, which the district court fixed at the estimated repair costs, the Court noted that Illinois law limits damages in such a situation to the diminution in property value. If the repair cost exceeds diminution in value, only the latter is awarded. The district court was presented with conflicting evidence on this issue and determined that the two measurements of damages were equal. The Court found no clear error. The Court turned to the award of damages under the Holdover Statute. It first concluded that there was no clear error in the district court's factual finding that the holdover was willful. Although the statute does not define willful, the Court relied on an intermediate Illinois case that rejected a "bad faith" test and instead adopted a test that excuses a tenant who remains in possession for a "colorably justifiable" reason. The Court agreed with the district court's conclusion that Rexam's holdover was not justifiable. With respect to damages, the statute assesses a penalty of "double the yearly value of the lands." The district court based its award on expert testimony establishing the monthly gross rental rate of the warehouse. The Court concluded that the use of the gross rental rate to measure damages was incorrect. Relying on the plain language of the statute, the intent of the legislation, and the dictionary definitions of "annual value" and "land," the Court concluded that holdover damages should be based on net rental value instead of gross rental value. The Court remanded for a determination of net rental value. Finally, the Court turned to the award of attorneys’ fees. Litigants in Illinois are generally responsible for their own attorneys' fees unless a statute or contract provides otherwise. The Court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the lease in question provided a basis for Bolger to recover fees associated with the repair issues but not the holdover issue. Fees for the holdover issue were not covered because the fee provision was limited to claims arising during the lease term. By its very nature, the holdover claim did not arise during of the lease term. The Court next rejected Rexam's argument that Bolger should be limited to recovering fees on those repair claims on which he was successful. The language of the lease's fee provision did not require success. With respect to the district court's efforts to disentangle fees associated with the repair issues and the holdover issues, the Court found no abuse of discretion although it did not endorse the district court's rather superficial approach.

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SOTTORIVA v. CLAPS (August 17, 2010)

Joseph Sottoriva was a State of Illinois employee and a member of the United States Army Reserve. He was on leave from the State for approximately 17 months in 2003 and 2004. The State's policy was to retain reservists on the payroll and continue to compensate them at their regular rate of pay, minus their military income. The State consistently overcompensated Sottoriva, despite its best efforts to calculate the proper amounts. Shortly before Sottoriva's return, the State calculated that he owed approximately $18,000 in excess compensation. He filed a union grievance, which the union (apparently without his consent) resolved with the State by agreeing to repay the $18,000 under a payment plan. While still negotiating the payment plan, the State recalculated the excess compensation as $24,000. Sottoriva was given several repayment options. When he selected none of them, the State notified him that it would begin involuntary withholding. Sottoriva brought a three count complaint against the department's director and the State Comptroller: a) Count I sought to enjoin any wage reduction, alleging due process violations with respect both to the original union grievance procedure and the State's failure to conduct any hearing with respect to the recalculation, b) Count II sought monetary damages for Sottoriva’s tax losses, and c) Count III sought to remove the director from office for an alleged violation of the State Finance Act. On Count I, Judge Scott (C.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the defendants with respect to the $18,000 calculation but granted summary judgment to Sottoriva on any amount above the $18,000 figure, concluding that the State had not provided a meaningful hearing. Sottoriva withdrew Count II. The court held that Count III was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Sottoriva sought an award of attorney's fees. The court carefully calculated a "lodestar" figure and reduced it by 67%. Sottoriva appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Kanne, and Sykes vacated and remanded. The Court noted that § 1988(b) allows the district court, in its discretion, to award attorney's fees to a prevailing party. Although the Court grants great latitude in setting a fee award, a district court must justify its award. The Court applied a two-part test to the district court's reduction of the "lodestar." The first question was whether a downward reduction was appropriate. The second question was whether the amount of the reduction was reasonable. Here, the Court answered the first question affirmatively. Although Sottoriva prevailed on one portion of his due process claim, he also failed on a significant part of his request for relief. With respect to the amount of the reduction, however, the Court vacated. Although it expressed no opinion on the reasonableness of the 67% reduction, it concluded that the district court did not sufficiently explain its rationale for imposing that reduction. In particular, the Court was concerned that the lower court was engaged in unacceptable "claim counting" and simply awarded one third of the fees incurred because Sottoriva prevailed on one of the three counts asserted. The lack of explanation amounted to an abuse of discretion.

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ROBINSON v. CITY OF HARVEY (August 6, 2010)

In 2002, Archie Robinson prevailed in his claim against the City of Harvey and police officer Manuel Escalante. A jury awarded him $25,000 in compensatory damages (jointly and severally) and $250,000 in punitive damages against Escalante. Two years later, the district court ordered the defendants to pay approximately $500,000 in attorneys' fees. Escalante settled. After the Seventh Circuit affirmed the fee award, the City paid the compensatory damages and the attorneys’ fees. Almost a year later, Robinson sought additional fees for: a) defending against Escalante's post-verdict motions, b) defending against Escalante's attempts to stay enforcement of the judgment, c) prosecuting the original motion for fees, and d) prosecuting the appeal. Judge Lefkow (N.D. Ill.) awarded an additional $277,000. The City appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Bauer and Tinder reversed. The Court identified two distinct problems with the district court's award. First, the first two items related to effort undertaken by Robinson with respect to the punitive damage award against Escalante. The City is not, and never was, liable for that award. The City is therefore not responsible for any of those fees incurred. The second problem with the award is its timing. The first appeal, from the 2004 fee award, presumed that the $500,000 fee award was complete and final. In fact, if it was not, the Court would not have had jurisdiction to consider it and would have dismissed the appeal. Robinson represented at the time that the fee award was final. He cannot have it otherwise. The Court did note that the last item, fees incurred in defending the 2004 fee award on appeal, could constitute a separate request not affected by the finality of the district court's ruling. But a party has only 90 days within which to seek such an award. Robinson waited much longer without good reason and without seeking an extension. Although the district court accepted his untimely request, the Court concluded that it had no good reason to do so.

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FUSION CAPITAL FUND II v. HAM (August 2, 2010)

In 2004, Sutura, Inc. was a privately-held medical device manufacturer in search of new equity capital. Millenium Holding Group was an insolvent publicly-held company with no business and few assets. The companies entered into a merger agreement under which Sutura was to merge into the Millenium shell followed by a name change of the shell back to Sutura (known as "going public by the back door"). Fusion Capital Fund II agreed to provide equity capital for the new enterprise. Fusion agreed with Millennium to invest $15 million, conditioned on the consummation of the merger. When the merger was not consummated by October of 2004, Fusion withdrew. Sutura terminated the merger agreement. Millennium brought suit against Fusion in Nevada for tortious interference with the merger agreement. Fusion prevailed. Fusion then brought suit in Illinois for its attorney's fees in defending the Nevada suit. Fusion added as defendants Richard Ham and Carla Aufdenkamp, Millennium's sole board members and majority shareholders. Judge Shadur (N.D. Ill.) found for Fusion and awarded $1.2 million. He also found the shareholders personally liable. Ham and Aufdenkamp appeal.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Posner and Kanne reversed. Under Nevada law, a shareholder or director is not liable for a debt of the corporation unless it acts as its alter ego. The statutory alter ego test has three parts: a) the person must influence and govern the corporation (Ham and Aufdenkamp concede this point), b) there must be a unity of interest (the Court found this point amply supported), and c) adherence to the corporate fiction would "sanction fraud or promote a manifest injustice." It is on this third point that the Court found error in the district court's analysis. There was no fraud. As the Court put it, Fusion always knew that Millennium was a "husk without any corn inside." In fact, it was Millennium's financial position that made the merger attractive. The more advisable course of action for Fusion would have been to get a personal guarantee from the shareholders -- and they did not even ask for one. The district court relied on the questionable financial maneuverings between Millennium and Ham and Aufdenkamp. But none of that made any difference to Fusion.

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FM INDUSTRIES v. CITICORP CREDIT SERVICES (July 22, 2010)

FM Industries brought a copyright infringement suit against Citicorp Credit Services. Judge Conlon (N.D. Ill.) found material disputes with respect to FM’s prospective relief and Citicorp’s ongoing infringement and set the case for trial. FM's lawyer, Wayne Rhine, was late in his obligation to prepare a draft pretrial order. When he did so, it was "egregiously noncompliant." Despite extensions of time and cooperation from the defendants, Rhine never fixed the problem. Eventually, the court dismissed the case for want of prosecution. The district court awarded approximately $750,000 in attorneys’ fees to the defendants under the copyright statute. The court also found that Rhine and his co-counsel William McGrath had vexatiously multiplied the proceedings under § 1927 and imposed a joint and several sanction of $35,000. FM, Rhine, and McGrath appeal.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Wood and Tinder affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court first noted that any argument on the merits was irrelevant. The only reason the case did not go to trial was the dismissal sanction. On that issue, the Court had no difficulty in finding it proper. The non-compliant pretrial order with was, in the Court's words, the "straw that broke the camel's back." The Court recited the delays, the warnings, the absurd damage demands, the missed time limits, the overreaching discovery demands -- the list went on. The dismissal sanctioned was permissible under Rule 16 and was proportionate to the conduct. With respect to the statutory award of fees, the Court stated that a prevailing defendant is presumed entitled to fees under the statute and FM presented no reason to reverse that presumption. Finally, with respect to § 1927 sanctions, the Court concluded that Rhine's litigation behavior was vexatious and deserving of sanctions. McGrath, however, presented a different story. Although he did file an appearance and signed five pleadings, he was not accused of any direct misdeeds. He cannot be sanctioned under § 1927 for the misdeeds of his co-counsel or even for his failure to prevent them. The Court reversed the award of sanctions against McGrath.

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IN RE: SOLIS (July 9, 2010)

Luis Solis hired an attorney to bring a workers' compensation claim after he suffered serious spinal injuries on the job. The attorney settled the claim. Solis was to receive almost $110,000. Unfortunately, the attorney's assistant stole the settlement money (as well as over $1 million in other clients' finds). She later sent him a check for $62,000, representing to him that it was a partial settlement payment. Solis hired a second attorney to recover the unpaid settlement amount. He entered into a contingent fee agreement with the attorney under which he agreed to pay 40% of "any gross amount recovered." The attorney filed suit in state court seeking damages for the unpaid settlement amount as well as a declaration that Solis was entitled to keep the $62,000 he already had. The case settled -- the defendants paid $60,000 and relinquished all claims to the $62,000. Solis filed a bankruptcy petition before the settlement was consummated. The trustee in bankruptcy recovered the settlement amount. Solis’ attorney filed a claim for 40% of both the $60,000 and $62,000. The trustee objected. The bankruptcy court allowed the claim but only with respect to the $60,000 in new money. Judge Reinhard (N.D. Ill.) affirmed. The attorney appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Williams, and Hamilton affirmed. The Court interpreted the fee agreement under Illinois contract law, which construes contingent fee agreements strictly in favor of the client. The plain language of the contract obligates Solis to pay a contingent fee on any money "recovered." The Court had little difficulty in concluding that the $60,000 was the only money "recovered" by the attorney. Although the attorney may have conferred a benefit on Solis by clarifying his right to keep the $62,000, the contingent fee agreement does not address that situation. The Court assumed that the attorney could have drafted an agreement (in clear and explicit language) that provided a contingent fee for a successful resolution of any claims on the $62,000 -- it simply refused to stretch the definition of "recovered" under the existing agreement.

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GOLDEN v. HELEN SIGMAN & ASSOCIATES (July 2, 2010)

Bruce Golden and his wife were involved in a bitter and hostile divorce. The dispute centered principally on the division of their assets and the custody of their only child. Golden added a battlefield when he brought suit in federal court. The defendants included his child’s court appointed representative and his wife’s attorneys, close friend and neighbor, and two business associates. His claims were based on federal copyright law, RICO, and § 1983 as well as several state law theories. He accused the lawyers of defamation, the lawyers and business associates of copyright infringement, the representative of defamation and failing to maintain neutrality, and the neighbor of a false 911 report. Judge Gottschall (N.D. Ill.) stayed the copyright infringement claim pending completion of the state court divorce proceedings and dismissed all other claims -- the RICO claim for failure to plead sufficiently the predicate acts and pattern of racketeering activity, the § 1983 claim because the representative had not acted under color of state law and enjoyed absolute immunity, and the state law claims by choosing not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. The lawyers, the representative, and the friend all sought sanctions under Rule 11. The district court concluded that some of the claims did violate Rule 11 and ordered Golden to pay the defendants' attorneys' fees for the offending claims. Golden settled with the attorneys and appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Wood, and Sykes affirmed. The Court first noted that the only merits decision challenged on appeal was the § 1983 claim against the representative. It identified a potentially thorny issue with respect to absolute immunity. Although a child representative is entitled to absolute immunity when carrying out its court appointed duties, it may not be when it functions in a role closer to that of the child's attorney. The complaint did allege acts relating to that role. The Court declined to resolve that issue, however, instead identifying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as a jurisdictional bar. Under that doctrine, a party may not seek redress in a lower federal court for an injury caused by a state court judgment. Here, the Court determined that the only injury Golden complained of arose directly from the state court custody orders. The Court therefore affirmed the dismissal of the § 1983 claim. With respect to sanctions, the Court first rejected Golden's argument that the Rule 11 motions were not timely -- both because he failed to raise it in the district court and because the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing them. On the fees themselves, the Court concluded that the district court was well within its discretion in identifying counts on which to impose a sanction and in its method of calculating the amount of the sanction. Finally, the Court declined to impose sanctions on Golden for the appeal. Although he raised several frivolous arguments, he did advance some positions that could not be dismissed summarily.

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CW CAPITAL ASSET MANAGEMENT v. CHICAGO PROPERTIES (June 29, 2010)

Blockbuster, the movie rental company, has been hurt by increasing competition and changing business models. As a result, it has abandoned some of its stores. One of those stores was leased from Chicago Properties, a commercial landlord. Blockbuster settled the ensuing breach of lease lawsuit for $161,000, although it owed Chicago Properties future rents of $471,000. The mortgage on the property was held in trust as part of a mortgage-backed security. Bank of America is the trustee and CW Capital Asset Management is the servicer. CW Capital has been granted comprehensive power and authority with respect to the management of the trust’s assets. It brought suit under the parties' "Subordination, Non-Disturbance and Attornment Agreement" (the “Agreement”) for the $471,000. Judge Zagel (N.D. Ill) found for the defendants after a bench trial but then dismissed the suit on the grounds that CW Capital, as servicer, was not the real party in interest. CW Capital appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Posner and Evans reversed with directions (still finding for the defendants but on the merits). The Court first addressed the real party in interest issue. It concluded, based on its review of the law and the documents, that the trust held legal title to the claim but delegated equitable ownership to CW Capital. That was enough to be a real party in interest. Alternatively, even if CW Capital is not a real party in interest, the Court noted that the case should proceed under Rule 17(a)(3) since the trustee ratified CW Capital's suit in the district court. On the merits, the court noted that the Agreement defines the rights of the parties in the event of a default. Here, notwithstanding Blockbuster's breach, Chicago Properties has not defaulted. Since it continues to meet its monthly obligations, the terms of the Agreement relied on by CW Capital have not been triggered. With respect to the claims based on the mortgage itself and the owners' guaranty, the Court concluded that the settlement with Blockbuster was not a violation. Finally, the Court upheld the district court's award of attorney's fees to Blockbuster under a "prevailing party" term of the Agreement. The Court concluded that the fact that Blockbuster did not prevail on an "unimportant" counterclaim did not change its status as a prevailing party under the Agreement. Although the defendants had prevailed in the district court (on the real party in interest dismissal), the Court reversed that dismissal with directions to enter judgment on the merits for the defendants.

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UNITED STATES v. THOUVENOT, WADE & MOERSCHEN (February 18, 2010)

The Equal Access to Justice Act allows a party that prevails against the United States in litigation to recover its attorneys' fees unless the position of the United States is found to be "substantially justified." Three cases before the Court allowed it to address that standard. In the first, the United States charged an apartment complex site engineer with violating the Federal Housing Act. The trial court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment and its motions for judgment as a matter of law. After the jury returned a defense verdict, however, the court awarded fees to the defendant. Because the defendant's insurer paid for much of its defense, the insurer would receive much of the award. The United States appeals. In the second case, the court affirmed the denial of a Social Security claimant's application for benefits. After the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, concluding that a crucial consultant's opinion was entitled to no weight, the court denied an award of fees. The claimant appeals. In the third case, the district court reversed the administrative denial of Social Security benefits but denied the claimant's application for fees. The basis for the reversal was the administrative law judge's possible mischaracterization of some testimony and failure to fully explain the connection between the claimant's condition and his ability to work. The claimant appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Flaum, and Sykes reversed, reversed, and affirmed. The Court first noted that "substantially justified" was not defined in the statute nor, in their view, was its meaning self-evident. Relying on the title of the statute and its limited application only to persons of lesser means, the Court concluded that the government's position need not be frivolous to justify an award of fees. The Court identified a threshold between frivolous and meritorious, at which a case has a reasonable basis in law and fact, that the United States must meet to be "substantially justified." Applying that standard to the first case, the Court held that there was a presumption that the United States’ position is substantially justified if it survives summary judgment. Just because the jury ultimately decided in favor of the defendant does not mean that the government fell short of its threshold. Although the Court reversed the award of fees, it decided to provide guidance to the lower courts on the additional issue of the impact of a liability insurer on an award of fees. In its view, the Act should not be applied differently if a party otherwise entitled to a fee award his had some of its fees paid by its insuror. In the second case, the Court concluded that the lower court was wrong in denying a fee award. Even though the lower court was originally convinced of the merits of the government's position, the court must be guided by the appellate opinion. If an appellate court reverses in a case it considers a close call, the fact that the lower court was convinced of the merits may support a substantial justification finding. Here, however, the Court made it clear in its earlier opinion that the government's position was not justified. Finally, in the third case, the district court had reversed an administrative denial of benefits but refused to award fees. Like the prior case's "close call" reference, the Court concluded that the lower court was well within its discretion to reverse a denial of benefits but to conclude that the position taken was "substantially justified."

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THOROGOOD v. SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO. (February 12, 2010)

Stephen Thorogood filed a state court class-action on behalf of the purchasers of stainless steel dryers in multiple states. He alleged that the defendant’s representation that the dryers were made of stainless steel violated the consumer protection acts of those states. The defendant removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Although the district court certified a class, the Seventh Circuit reversed and ordered the class decertified (intheiropinion.com post). The Court thought the case was not only a weak candidate for class certification, but also flimsy on its own merits. On remand, the defendant made an offer of judgment, inclusive of attorneys fees, of $20,000. Finding that that offer exceeded plaintiff's maximum recovery under state law of $3,000 and therefore the amount in controversy, the district court dismissed the case as moot. Thorogood appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Kanne, and Evans affirmed. The Court first rejected plaintiff's argument that the case should have been remanded upon class decertification, relying upon its decision in Cunningham Charter (intheiropinion.com post) just three weeks earlier. Then, the Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the case was not moot because of his entitlement to significant attorneys’ fees. First, an award of fees for value conferred beyond the relief obtained must generally be relief ordered by the court. Second, the court was within its discretion in deciding that no fees were warranted. Finally, the Court noted that most of the fees were incurred pursuing the failed class action, not the $3,000 individual action.

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GASTINEAU v. WRIGHT (January 19, 2010)

James and Christy Gastineau were plaintiffs in a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) case. They were represented by Robert Duff. Although Duff was not their original counsel and did not become so until about three years into the case, he did negotiate the settlement of the case on the first day of trial. He asked for attorney's fees of approximately $140,000. The district court judge awarded approximately $50,000, reducing both the number of hours and the hourly rate in setting that amount. Duff appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne and Tinder and District Judge Griesbach affirmed. The Court first noted that an award of attorney's fees is reviewed on a "highly deferential" version of the already deferential abuse of discretion standard. The district court concluded that Duff’s hours were excessive. He noted that Duff was inexperienced in FDCPA cases and became involved fairly late in the case, after most of the discovery and motion practice had been completed. Much of the time spent was learning the law. The court also concluded that Duff’s rate was excessive for the subject matter. He relied on an affidavit of an experienced lawyer in the area who believed that to be so. The Court found no impediment to the combined reduction of both hours and rate. Having found no abuse of discretion, the Court affirmed.

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MACH v. WILL COUNTY SHERIFF (September 1, 2009)

Michael Mach was a Will County Deputy Sheriff assigned to the traffic division. For years, he maintained a satisfactory performance record. That changed after 2003. Because of budget pressure, the department notified the deputies in the traffic division that they could be temporarily assigned to the patrol division. Mach and other deputies were not happy. He started acting out, failing to follow directives, disregarding instructions, and neglecting his duties. After reprimands and warnings, he was permanently transferred to the patrol division. Mach brought an action pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). In addition to his transfer, he stated five other grounds for his claim. In response to the defendants’ opening briefing on summary judgment, he abandoned all five of those other grounds. The court granted summary judgment to the Sheriff and also awarded fees of 5/6 of the costs of preparing the summary judgment motion, reflecting effort that went into attacking the "worthless" claims. Mach appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Flaum and Kanne affirmed. On the merits, Mach relied on the direct method of proof, which required him to produce evidence that he was transferred because of his age. The Court noted an absolute lack of evidence in the record supporting any such inference. His poor job performance was well documented by the department. The only circumstantial evidence of age discrimination was one stray comment made by an individual who had no influence on the transfer decision. Mach's ADEA claim fails. With respect to the fee award, the Court noted a prior holding that ADEA does not preclude an award of fees to a prevailing defendant if a plaintiff litigates in bad faith. Here, the Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Mach litigated the five claims in bad faith. The Court noted its belief that such sanctions would be rare -- here the district court explicitly held that the five claims were "worthless."

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ANDERSON v. AB PAINTING AND SANDBLASTING (August 20, 2009)

Under its collective bargaining agreement, AB Painting and Sandblasting was required to make contributions to several union benefit plans. The trustee of the plans brought an action under ERISA to collect overdue contributions. The court granted summary judgment to the fund for the entire amount claimed ($6,500). The court awarded attorneys’ fees of only $10,000, however, on a request in excess of $50,000. The amount claimed, stated the district court, was “disproportionate” to the amount at stake. The trustee appealed.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Manion and Sykes reversed and remanded. The Court noted that ERISA requires an award of “reasonable” attorneys’ fees in a successful action to recover overdue contributions. The district court should begin with the “lodestar” (hours times a reasonable rate)and adjust it upon consideration of a number of factors, including the amount at stake and the results obtained. The Court cited its own jurisprudence, however, where it has rejected any requirement of proportionality between the result and the fee award. In fact, one of the policy reasons behind fee-shifting statutes is the promotion of meritorious claims that would not be brought otherwise. In a situation where Congress has spoken by including a fee-shifting provision in a statute, a court should only look at whether the time expended was a reasonable approach to the desired end. Here, the lower court did not opine on the reasonableness of the hours spent achieving the outcome. The Court remanded for such a recalculation.

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SCHLACHER v. LAW OFFICES OF PHILLIP J. ROTCHE AND ASSOCIATES (August 3, 2009)

Jean Schlacher got a root canal but fell behind in payments to her dentist. Her dentist obtained a judgment against her. Again, Schlacher fell behind on her payments on the judgment. The debt-collection law firm representing the dentist became quite abusive and threatening. Jean sought legal advice. Unfortunately, due to various lawyers' schedules and skill sets, she ended up with four different lawyers assisting her in her Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") suit against the law firm. Fortunately, the suit was resolved in a short time, before any discovery, for a total of $6,500. Unfortunately, the parties were unable to agree on a fee award. The plaintiff petitioned for fees in excess of $12,000. The defendants objected to the attorneys’ hours and rates. The court awarded $6,500 in fees. Schlacher appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Rovner, Wood and Williams affirmed. The Court first rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the district court abused its discretion in awarding an amount in fees equal to the amount of the judgment. The Court explained that the district court reduced the requested amount because of its view that the work of the four attorneys was duplicative and excessive. The fact that the court noticed a coincidence that the amount of the fee equaled the amount of the judgment is irrelevant. The Court also rejected the argument that the lower court's fee award was an abuse of discretion because of its lack of specific findings and calculations. When a fee award is substantial, the Court cautioned that a district court must be precise in its calculations. Here, when the amount is not substantial, less precision is required. The court questioned the hourly rates for several of the attorneys because of their lack of experience in FDCPA cases, noted the lack of complexity in the case, and believed that one attorney would have been sufficient. That explanation is sufficient to sustain the award.

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WOLF v. KENNELLY (July 23, 2009)

Ford Kennelly, an Indiana citizen, received a $1.3 million arbitration award, jointly and severally, against commodities brokers Rosenthal Collins Group ("RCG") and Ken Wolf. Wolf filed a petition to vacate in state court. He included a request for declaratory relief against RCG, alleging that RCG had made a demand for indemnity against him. Kennelly removed the petition to federal court and asked that RCG be realigned as a petitioner. RCG was an Illinois citizen. Its presence as a defendant prevented removal. Wolf moved to remand, opposing the realignment of RCG. Several months later, the parties discovered that one of RCG's limited partners was an Indiana citizen. Since Kennelly was also an Indiana citizen, diversity would be destroyed if RCG was realigned as a petitioner. The district court granted the motion to remand. The court then denied Wolf's request for attorneys' fees, concluding that the case was an exceptional one not warranting a fee award. Wolf appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Flaum and Kanne reversed and remanded. The Court first rejected Wolf's argument that the court's brief minute order, without much discussion or analysis, was an abuse of discretion. The Court noted that the issue had been fully briefed and the judge explained his rationale on the record, although not repeating it in the minute order. On the merits, the Court concluded that Wolf did not have an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. The "objectively reasonable basis" standard is similar to the qualified immunity doctrine. A district court may award fees if "clearly established" law prevents removal. At the time Kennelly sought removal, the long-standing precedent in the circuit was that realignment of a party was improper if an actual and substantial controversy existed between the plaintiff and that party. The fact that Wolf and RCG shared an interest in escaping liability altogether did not justify the realignment. The Court remanded for consideration of the fee petition.

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ESTATE OF ANGELA ENOCH v. TIENOR (June 29, 2009)

Angela Enoch committed suicide while a prisoner in a Wisconsin state prison. Her estate brought a lawsuit alleging violations of her rights. The plaintiffs accepted the defendants' $635,000 offer of judgment. The offer of judgment did not include attorneys’ fees. On the plaintiffs' request for fees in excess of $300,000, the court awarded only $100,000. The court's rationale was that the plaintiffs recovered only a small fraction of the $10 million sought in their complaint. The Estate appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Bauer and Evans reversed and remanded. The Court held that the lower court erred in relying on the Supreme Court’s Farrar decision. Farrar deals with fee awards for plaintiffs who prevail but receive only nominal damages (Farrar asked for $17 million and received $1). Here, although the Court believed the $10 million sought was absurdly high, it concluded that a recovery of $635,000 in prison litigation is significant. A fee award need not be proportional to the recovery or to the amount recovered versus the amount requested. The Court remanded for a recalculation of the award using the lodestar as a starting point and also considering the result obtained, any claims on which plaintiffs did not prevail, the adequacy of the documentation, and any social benefits obtained.

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 WALKER v. CALUMET CITY (May 15, 2009)

Calumet City passed an ordinance under which real property had to pass an inspection and be in compliance with city codes before it could be sold. Ayanna Walker sued the City. She alleged that the ordinance unreasonably restrained her ability to sell her property, that the ordinance violated procedural due process, and that the ordinance prevented her from selling her “non-conforming" property. While the complaint was pending, the property was inspected under a different city ordinance. Once the property was certified as in compliance, the City moved to dismiss the case as moot. The district court dismissed the case as moot and also awarded Walker her attorney fees. The City appeals the award of fees.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Manning and Rovner reversed. The Court recognized the prior rule that a court may award attorney fees if a defendant voluntarily provides the relief sought by the plaintiff. In Buckhannon, however, the Supreme Court held that courts may not award fees unless there is a "material alteration" in the relationship of the parties. The Supreme Court gave two examples: a) when the plaintiff has a judgment on the merits, and b) when the plaintiff obtains a consent decree from the court. The Court first noted that Walker's case did not fit within the "judgment on the merits" prong of Buckhannon. With respect to the second prong, the Court, citing its own precedent, concluded that it may allow an award in the case of a settlement agreement if: a) it was mandatory, b) it was captioned "Order", c) it was signed by a judge, and d) it provided for judicial enforcement. Although Walker attempted to fit her award into this framework, she failed to do so and was not entitled to a fee award.

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THE CORNUCOPIA INSTITUTE v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (March 26, 2009)

The Cornucopia Institute submitted three separate FOIA requests to the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA"). When the USDA failed to respond within the required time period, Cornucopia filed suit for injunctive relief, a writ of mandamus and attorneys fees. While the suit was pending, the USDA produced the responsive documents. The court dismissed the case as moot. The court also denied the request for fees on the grounds that Cornucopia had not "substantially prevailed." Cornucopia appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Kanne and Kendall affirmed. First, the Court rejected Cornucopia's argument that the lower court’s ability to still grant declaratory relief renders the case not moot. Declaratory relief is appropriate only when the ruling would have an impact on the parties. Cornucopia has failed to make such a showing. The Court concluded that a case must be dismissed when it is impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief – as is the case here.

With respect to attorneys’ fees, the district court concluded that Cornucopia was not a prevailing party under Buckhannon because it obtained no judicial relief. The Court pointed out that Buckhannon’s requirement of judicial relief was eliminated in the OPEN Government Act of 2007 (enacted while the appeal was pending). Because Cornucopia waived any argument that the Act applies retroactively, however, the Court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in denying the request for fees.

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MIRFASIHI v. FLEET MORTGAGE (December 30, 2008)

This suit was originally brought years ago on behalf of 1.6 million people whose mortgages were owned by Fleet Mortgage Corporation (“Fleet”). The allegations of the class action complaint are that Fleet shared personal information from the class members’ mortgage files with telemarketers, in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and various state laws. The class was divided into a very large class of persons whose information was shared but who purchased nothing as a result (the “non-purchasers”) and a small (~190,000) class of people who did make purchases (the “purchasers”). The court certified the class and approved a settlement in 2002. The settlement provided nothing to the non-purchasers. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, at the request of two intervening objectors. On remand, the court again approved a settlement. Again, the non-purchasers received no direct benefit. The court concluded that their claims were of no value. Fleet was required, in addition to the payment to the purchasers, to make a payment of at least $243,000 to organizations concerned with consumer privacy issues. The Seventh Circuit again reversed on the grounds that the court’s valuation of the non-purchasers’ claims was inadequate. On remand, the court conducted a more thorough survey of the state consumer protection laws and, once again, concluded that the non-purchasers’ claims had no value. The court awarded class counsel $750,000 and objectors’ counsel $18,750 in fees. The objectors appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Posner and Williams affirmed. The Court first noted that no member of the non-purchasers class suffered actual harm. Although nineteen states and the District of Columbia allow individual (not class) actions with statutory penalties ranging from $25-$10,000, the parties failed to identify one person who would bring such an action. Although the Court noted that the state law limitations on class actions may not be binding in federal court, it held that the objectors waived any right to raise that issue. The Court also held that the objectors forfeited any claim that FCRA provided a statutory penalty remedy for the non-purchasers, adding, however, that such a claim would be frivolous. Concluding that the non-purchasers’ claims were indeed worthless, the Court approved the $243,000 settlement.

The Court used objectors’ counsel’s request for additional fees to again express its frustration with the inherent conflicts in class actions. (For another recent expression of Judge Posner's frustration, see his opinion in Thorogood here and my summary here.) One of those conflicts resulted in objectors’ counsel exaggerating the value of the non-purchasers’ claims in order to be entitled to an award of fees. Here, objectors’ counsel asked that the $750,00 awarded to class counsel instead be awarded to him. The Court conceded that objectors do frequently assist the class action settlement process, but an award of fees must be balanced by their degree of success. Here, the objectors extended the litigation by years. They improved to some degree the value of the purchasers’ settlement but did not do much to improve the settlement for the non-purchasers. They did not participate constructively in the litigation – in fact, they conducted themselves irresponsibly. The Court approved as “barely justified” the fee awarded below.

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AARON v. MAHL (December 18, 2008)

Jim Aaron and Susan Scott (f/k/a/ Mahl) were cohabiting lovers in the 1990s until Aaron left Scott. At about the same time that Aaron left, Scott was sued by her former law firm for embezzlement. The firm obtained a judgment of more than a million dollars against Scott that they then assigned to Aaron. Aaron has been attempting to collect the judgment for years, following Scott from California to Indiana to South Carolina. Aaron found some assets in Indiana in a Merrill Lynch account. A state court ordered Merrill Lynch not to transfer or dispose of the assets. Aaron nevertheless obtained a writ of execution, with which Merrill Lynch refused to comply. Scott moved to quash the writ. Aaron filed suit in district court to enforce the writ and require Merrill Lynch to turn over the funds. Merrill Lynch counterclaimed and also filed for interpleader against Aaron and Scott. At Scott’s request, the court stayed the suit pending the state court’s consideration of her motion to quash the writ. The state court quashed the writ, an order upheld on appeal. The district court lifted the stay and granted Merrill Lynch summary judgment on its interpleader claims, entered final judgment pursuant to FRCP 54(b), and awarded attorney’s fees from the interpleader stake. Scott appeals from both the grant of interpleader and the award of attorney fees.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Wood and Tinder affirmed. Interpleader, said the Court, is used when a stakeholder is exposed to double liability or must litigate conflicting claims. The stakeholder must have a “real and reasonable” fear. Scott raise two arguments in support of her assertion that Merrill Lynch’s fear was not real: 1) that res judicata bars Aaron’s claims because of the state court rulings, and 2) that Aaron’s federal complaint was frivolous. The Court found Scott’s position incredible, noting that Merrill Lynch had been embroiled for five years in what was at its core a dispute between Aaron and Scott over Scott’s assets. Merrill Lynch had been sued or threatened with suit by both of them. The Court concluded that: 1) Scott was simply wrong in her interpretation of the res judicata effects of the state court judgments, and 2) the fact that Scott proceeded under a different legal theory after the stay was lifted than before did not make the claim frivolous. Merrill Lynch had a real and reasonable fear of competing claims and was properly granted interpleader.

On the issue of attorney fees, the Court rejected Scott’s argument that the fees should not have been awarded out of the stake while she was appealing the very order granting interpleader. Its decision on that issue rendered her argument moot. As for her claim that fees should have been charged against Aaron, the Court stated that the trial court had discretion to order that attorney’s fees be paid to a disinterested stakeholder out of the stake itself.

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BINGHAM v. NEW BERLIN SCHOOL DISTRICT (December 4, 2008)

Sam Bingham was a Wisconsin high school student. His parents petitioned their school district to provide special education services for him. The district did not do so. Sam transferred to a private school. After Sam graduated, his parents filed a request for a hearing with the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction. They alleged that the school district had failed to comply with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). They asked for reimbursement of their private school tuition costs. Before a hearing was held, the district reimbursed the Binghams for the full amount they requested. The administrative law judge dismissed the petition as moot. The Binghams asked for a declaration that they had “prevailed” for purposes of seeking attorneys’ fees under IDEA. The administrative law judge refused. The Binghams appealed to the district court. The court concluded that the Binghams were not prevailing parties and denied their motion for attorneys’ fees. The Binghams appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Rovner and Williams affirmed. In fact, the Court very quickly and easily resolved the sole issue presented by the appeal – whether the Binghams were entitled to attorneys’ fees under IDEA – against the Binghams. In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court in 2001 held that a voluntary monetary settlement by a defendant does not entitle a plaintiff to “prevailing party” status. The Court further noted that every circuit that has considered the issue has applied Buckhannon to IDEA cases.

The Court went on because it was troubled by the plaintiffs’ conduct. The plaintiffs and their counsel were well aware of Buckhannon and yet did not even cite it in their papers. The Court emphasized that it was not the fact that they appealed which was disturbing. Buckhannon has been the target of much criticism, especially when applied to IDEA. The Court allowed for the possibility that the Binghams could have elected to appeal solely for the purpose of preserving an argument for the Supreme Court. Having decided instead to ignore binding precedent, the Court ordered the Binghams and their counsel to show cause why they should not be ordered to pay the defendant’s costs and fees of the appeal. 

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KELLEY v. MED-1 SOLUTIONS  (November 25, 2008)

Brian Kelley received medical treatment at St. Vincent Carmel Hospital (“St. Vincent”). When Kelley failed to pay for the services, St. Vincent hired Med-1 Solutions, LLC (“Med-1”) to collect the amounts due. Although St. Vincent always owned the debt, it gave Med-1 the right to collect it. Med-1 sued Kelley in an Indiana small claims court. It attached documents to the small claims court form which indicated that the debt was owed to St. Vincent. Med-1 also attached Kelley’s financial responsibility form he had signed prior to receiving medical treatment. That form provided for payment of “reasonable attorney fees” if the debt was assigned to a collection agency. St. Vincent paid Med-1’s fees and costs and a percentage of the amount collected. Med-1’s in-house attorneys received a percentage of the attorney fees collected by Med-1. Med-1 obtained a judgment against Kelley for $892.09. Kelley and several others in a similar situation brought suit against Med-1, its owner, and its in-house attorneys. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), claiming that Med-1 was not entitled to attorney fees and that its claims that it was were false and deceptive. The district court dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Flaum and Williams affirmed. The issue before the Court was whether the case was controlled by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That doctrine, taken from two Supreme Court decisions, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, prohibits a lower federal court review of a decision of a state court. Plaintiffs attempted to avoid the application of Rooker-Feldman by characterizing their complaint as one attacking defendants’ representations and requests for attorneys fees, not the actual state court judgment awarding the fees. The Court did not accept the distinction. It concluded that if it found that defendants were not entitled to fees and therefore violated the FDCPA, it was also determining that the state court judgments were in error. The Court next addressed the “reasonable opportunity” exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiffs contended that they were unable to raise their FDCPA claims in the Indiana small claims venue. The Court disagreed. The plaintiffs could have transferred their case out of the small claims venue and litigated their FDCPA claims. The Court concluded that plaintiffs had a “reasonable opportunity” to litigate their claims and their complaint was properly dismissed. In addition, the Court questioned the continued viability of the “reasonable opportunity” exception since the Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries.

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LEISTER v. DOVETAIL, INC.  (October 23, 2008)

Sandra Leister and Michelle and Evan Peterson worked together at a company that provided employee assistance programs to employers. In 1997, the Petersons purchased some of their employer’s program contracts and formed Dovetail to administer those contracts. They hired Leister, a psychologist, to work for Dovetail. As one of the benefits of employment, they agreed to deposit a percentage of her salary into a 401(k) account. They complied with their promise for about a year and then began diverting Leister’s money to their own benefit. They also refused to provide Leister with documentation of her rights under the plan. Leister brought this action under ERISA to recover the contributions that Dovetail was obligated to make to her account and for statutory penalties. The district court found a willful breach of the defendants’ fiduciary duties and awarded Leister $82,741 for the contributions not made. The court declined to impose statutory penalties for the Peterson’s failure to provide plan documents, relying on their dire financial circumstances. The defendants and Leister each appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Posner, and Williams affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Court first addressed two preliminary matters – whether there was enough of a writing to satisfy ERISA and the impact of Leister’s failure to name the plan as a defendant – and resolved each of them in Leister’s favor. It then proceeded to the statute of limitations issue. ERISA complaints are governed by two limitations provisions. Complaints for breach of a fiduciary duty under sections 1101 to 1114 must be brought within the shorter of six years from the breach or three years from the date when the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the breach. Complaints for benefits due under the plan pursuant to section 1132(a)(1)(b) are governed by the most analogous state limitations period, in this case Illinois’ ten-year statute for breach of a written contract. Leister sought relief under both sections 1104 and 1132(a)(1)(b), but the district court based its judgment only on section 1104. Since Leister’s complaint was filed more than six years after the defendants’ first breach, her recovery would be limited under 1104. The Court found that a) she was entitled to relief under both sections, b) she was entitled to more relief under section 1132(a)(1)(b), and c) she met the ten-year statute of limitations. Under 1132(a)(1)(b), Leister was entitled to the unpaid contributions as well as a reasonable estimate of their investment growth over time. The Court accepted Leister’s cross-appeal argument that the district court erred in not considering the tax-free status of the contributions. It directed the court to recalculate the benefits on remand.

Leister also “shoehorn[ed]” a claim for sales commissions into her ERISA claim. The Court found that the district court erred in treating it as an ERISA claim even though Leister alleged that she would have deposited the commissions into her 401(k) account. Nevertheless, the Court noted that the claim was also pleaded as a state law claim and would be considered in that context on remand. The Court offered guidance to the district court on the state law claim: a) it has a shorter limitations period than the ERISA claims because it is not a written contract, b) Leister cannot recover tax benefits as if she would have deposited the money into her 401(k), and c) an Illinois statute may allow for an award of attorneys’ fees. Lastly, the Court addressed Leister’s argument that the court erred in not awarding statutory penalties. The Court observed that penalties, in whatever form, are meant to deter. Although deterrence can be achieved with smaller awards against poorer defendants, an award of no penalties against a solvent defendant who commits a willful breach is unreasonable. The district court’s decision was an abuse of discretion.

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ORTH v. WISCONSIN STATE EMPLOYEES UNION  (October 22, 2008)

Ron Orth retired in 1998. The collective bargaining agreement covering his employment required his employer to provide health insurance to retirees. It also required the employer to pay 90% of the premium. Finally, it stated that the monetary value of an employee’s unused sick leave upon retirement, if any, would be used to pay the employee’s share of the premium. Notwithstanding these provisions, the benefits plan of Orth’s former employer deducted all of the premium amounts from Orth’s sick leave account, using it up in eight years. Orth brought this action, with his wife, against his former employer and its benefits plan, alleging that they violated ERISA. The defendants admitted that the terms of the written plan were as alleged by the Orths but maintained that the plan had been modified through the conduct of the parties over time. The district court granted summary judgment to the Orths and awarded attorneys’ fees. The defendants appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Posner, and Williams affirmed. The Court observed the general rule that a contract can be modified by the subsequent dealings of the parties. ERISA, however, requires that plans be in writing. The Court held that amendments to plans must be in writing as well. The ERISA plan, therefore, could not be amended by conduct. The Court went on to consider whether the fact that the plan was a creature of a collective bargaining agreement made a difference. Collective bargaining agreements are often modified orally or by subsequent dealings. Employees are not even parties to the agreements. A collective bargaining agreement can be modified without an employee’s consent, as it was here. The union does owe a fiduciary duty to its members, but the Orths do not complain of a breach of the union’s fiduciary duty. But, the Court went on, the welfare plan also owes a fiduciary duty to its participants. Although the plan can be changed without the consent of the participants, the change in this case was made without notice to the participants. That, said the Court, is a violation of the plan manager’s fiduciary duty to the participants (as well as a violation of law).

The defendants also quarrel with the award of damages and fees. The Court agreed that ERISA does not allow consequential damages, but it declined defendants’ invitation to characterize the award of premiums the Orths paid to maintain coverage after their sick leave account was drained as consequential damages. The Court roundly rejected defendants’ argument that the district court erred when it awarded fees on a finding of “no substantial justification” for their position. To the contrary, the Court said, it questioned whether the district court was even correct in its opinion that the defendants acted in good faith. Finally, the Court found no merit in defendants’ argument that the $41,000 fee award was excessive given that the damages awarded to the Orths was about the same. The Court found no error, remarking that one reason fee awards exist is to allow people with small losses the ability to recover those losses.

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DEICHER v. CITY OF EVANSVILLE, WISCONSIN (September 19, 2008)

Mary Mezera divorced Jimmy Reiners after years of alleged physical and psychological abuse. She remarried and moved from Evansville, Wisconsin into a new community, keeping her location secret from Reiners. In February 2006, Reiners phoned the Evansville Police and asked for Mezera’s current address, claiming he needed to contact her in relation to past due mortgage payments. The police obtained her address from the state motor vehicle records and gave it to Reiners. He began to contact Mezera, putting her and her husband in fear of their safety. Mezera and her husband sent a Notice of Claim to the Police Department on April 22. They filed suit on June 30, alleging a violation of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”). During damages deliberations at trial, the jury asked for the date of the filing of the complaint, a date which was not in the record. The plaintiffs asked that instead they be given the Notice of Claim, which was a trial exhibit. The trial judge gave the jury the date of the complaint and refused to provide the Notice of Claim. The jury awarded $25,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. The district court granted plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees under DPPA but reduced the amount from almost $200,000 to $25,000 on the ground that the fee award should not exceed the damage award. Then he reduced their request for fees in preparing the fee petition by an equal percentage on the ground that that was the degree to which their petition was successful. Plaintiffs appeal.

in their opinion, Judges Posner, Rovner, and Williams reversed and remanded for a new trial on damages. The Court considered whether the lower court erred in providing the date of the complaint to the jury or erred in not providing the Notice of Claim. First, the Court held that the date of the filing of the complaint is a public record, not extrinsic evidence, and therefore the court did not err. Next, the Court observed that it is generally within the trial court’s discretion to determine which exhibits are provided to the jury. Thus, a trial court’s decision is reviewed under a clear abuse of discretion standard. Nevertheless, the court found a clear abuse of discretion here. At trial, the plaintiffs argued that the police officer who gave the address to Reiners had fabricated his report in order to come within an exception to DPPA liability. The date on which the police first learned of the claim (i.e., the date of the Notice) was a key part of this argument. The plaintiffs argued to the trial court that the real target of the jury’s inquiry during their deliberations was the date of the Notice, not the date of the complaint (which had not even been discussed at trial). The Court emphasized that the error was not in failing to provide the Notice but the possible prejudice in providing the date of the complaint without providing the Notice, thus possibly creating confusion in the eyes of the jury.
Although the Court did not rule on the plaintiffs’ objections to the district court’s fee decisions because of the remand, it did note that the automatic reduction of trial fees to the amount of the damage award and the automatic reduction of the fee petition fee in the same ratio were “likely unreasonable.”
 

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TATE V. LONG-TERM DISABILITY PLAN FOR SALARIED EMPLOYEES OF CHAMPION INT’L CORP. #506 (September 19, 2008)

in 1988, Jo Ann Tate left her job with Nationwide Papers as a sales representative because of problems with anxiety and depression. Her employer’s benefits plan (the “Plan”), governed by ERISA, gave her the right to short-term and long-term disability benefits. The long-term disability program was divided into two stages. A person could receive up to two years of long-term disability on a showing that she was unable to perform the duties of her job. After two years, a person had to show that she was unable to perform the duties of any job for which she was or could be qualified. Tate received short-term disability benefits for six months and applied for and was granted long-term disability benefits in 1999. In 2003, the Plan notified Tate that she was no longer eligible for benefits because she did not meet the second stage (i.e., any job) test. The Plan based its decision terminating her benefits on the report of a physician who had not examined Tate but had access to her file. Tate appealed the denial. A second physician reviewed her file and came to the same conclusion. She based her conclusion on the facts that Tate kept her home, complied with her treatment schedule, and experienced some benefit from medication. Tate challenged the determination in district court. On cross motions for summary judgment, the court found that the Plan’s decision to terminate her benefits was arbitrary and capricious in that it consisted only of conclusory statements unsupported by fact. The court specifically noted the absence of any employability review or identification of jobs available to Tate. The Plan appeals. In addition, the court remanded in order for the Plan to make a proper determination of benefits and denied Tate’s request for attorneys’ fees. Tate appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Kanne, and Williams affirmed all aspects of the district court’s decision. On the Plan’s appeal, the Court noted its de novo review of the district court’s decision and the highly deferential, “arbitrary and capricious,” standard of review of the denial of benefits. Nevertheless, the panel found that it was arbitrary and capricious because neither physician’s report was based on any explanation or reasoning. The first physician apparently did not even review her employment file. The second physician reviewed her employment file but did not tie the conclusion that Tate was unable to work to anything that was relevant to that issue. ERISA requires the Plan to assess her qualifications to work and relate those to jobs she might be able to perform.

Tate’s appeal argued that reinstatement, not remand, was appropriate because the Plan terminated previously awarded benefits, and did not simply deny benefits. Tate relied on the fact that the Plan provided benefits for two years after the “any job” standard took effect. The Court was puzzled by the Plan’s continued payments of benefits after two years without any determination but still found no such determination and held that a remand was proper. The panel also agreed with the district court’s conclusion that obtaining a remand in an ERISA case is not equivalent to “prevailing” for purposes of attorneys’ fees awards. 

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