Circumstances Warrant Recognizing Next Friend's Pro Se Motion
ELUSTRA v. MINEO (February 9, 2010)
Three sisters and their friends were enjoying a night at Buffalo Wild Wings restaurant in the summer of 2007. A dispute arose over the girls' bill. The police were called and the girls were arrested on charges of disorderly conduct. The charges were dropped. The sisters brought an action against the restaurant, its owner, and the responding police officer. The girls' mother, Christine Lopez, appeared as next friend of the two minor girls. The magistrate held a settlement conference, attended by the plaintiffs, Lopez, their attorney, and the defendants' attorneys. Although the conference was off the record, the magistrate judge reported that the parties agreed to a $6000 settlement. The girls' father, a nonparty, argued with the girls' attorney and declared that he would find new representation. At that point, the family left, although their attorney remained. The Magistrate Judge entered a recommendation to the district court to dismiss the case with prejudice in accordance with the settlement agreement. At a hearing a short time later before the district court, the girls' attorney appeared again and advised the district court that the girls' recollection was that was no agreement. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice. Ten business days later, Lopez filed a handwritten pro se “Motion to vacate and Reinstate.” Newly retained counsel supplemented the motion nine days later. The district court did not recognize the pro se filing as a Rule 59(e) motion and treated counsel’s motion as a Rule 60(b) motion and denied it. The girls appeal.
In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Wood and Sykes affirmed. The Court first considered its scope of review. If Lopez' handwritten motion is considered as a timely Rule 59(e) motion, then the time to appeal the underlying judgment did not begin to run until that motion was denied and the Court can consider the merits. If not, the Court can only review the denial of the motion to reconsider. The problem with the first motion is that it was brought pro se by Christine Lopez. Normally, next friends and other representative parties may not appear pro se. Although the Court determined that federal law controlled whether Lopez’ filing should be allowed, it found guidance within Illinois state law. The Court cited several Illinois cases where the court applied a flexible rule, particularly where the filing simply preserved a party's right to go forward, as opposed to a more general prosecution of a suit. The Court also emphasized that the purpose of the rule is to protect the rights of the represented party. The Court concluded that the circumstances of the case -- where the parties had counsel through judgment, where the parties retained counsel to litigate the Rule 59(e) and later proceedings, where the parties were only unrepresented for a short time, but where the next friend filed a pro se motion during that time to preserve their appellate rights -- warranted a recognition of the motion. The Court also concluded that the motion met the requirements of Rule 7(b)(1), notwithstanding its brevity. It was in writing, it stated the grounds for seeking the order, and it stated the relief sought. Having reached the merits, however, the Court rejected the girls' position. An oral settlement agreement is valid if there is an offer, acceptance, and meeting of the minds. Here, the only contemporaneous evidence is the magistrate judge’s statement on the record that the parties understood the consequences of their agreement and reached a settlement. That is enough to conclude that there was a meeting of the minds.
Sandra Bergquist owed money to the bank that issued her a credit card. The bank retained the law firm of Mann Bracken to collect the debt. The firm arbitrated the dispute before the National Arbitration Forum, as provided in the credit card agreement. The bank prevailed at the arbitration and a state court entered judgment enforcing the arbitration award. Bergquist was suspicious of the connection between Mann Bracken and the National Arbitration Forum. She asked the state court to set aside its judgment enforcing the award. It did so and dismissed the case with prejudice. She also filed a class-action on behalf of all persons who were pursued by Mann Bracken and had their claims arbitrated before the National Arbitration Forum. The defendants removed the case to federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The district court remanded, concluding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded federal jurisdiction of the claim. Defendants appeal.
Cunningham Charter Corp. brought a breach of warranty and products liability class action against Learjet in state court. Learjet removed the case to federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). After the district court denied class certification for failure to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23, it remanded the case to state court. The district court concluded that the denial of certification deprived the court of federal jurisdiction under CAFA. Learjet sought leave to appeal.
Reger Development is an Illinois real estate development company. In 2007, the company opened a $750,000 line of credit with National City Bank. The company signed a promissory note and provided the personal guarantee of its principal, Kevin Reger. In several places, the note makes reference to the fact that it is payable "on demand." The company made its payments in a timely manner for the first year. Nevertheless, the bank asked it to pay down $125,000 of principal. Reger did so. A month later, the bank advised Reger that it was reducing the amount of the line of credit and also wanted to restructure some of the principal and secure it with a mortgage. The bank told Reger that it was possible that they would demand payment of the entire amount if he did not agree to the modifications. Reger brought suit, alleging breach of contract and fraud. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. Reger appeals.
Rex Carr was a lawyer in southern Illinois. He and his partners had several agreements concerning the allocation of fees earned by the firm. The agreements continued in effect after the dissolution of the firm in 2003. Significant disputes arose, and a host of lawsuits were filed, with respect to those fees. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was agreed to in 2004. It was meant to control the distribution of all fees, past and future, among the partners. Notwithstanding an agreement to dismiss all pending cases, Carr actually amended a counterclaim in one of the pending actions to assert that he had been fraudulently induced to enter into the MOU. The claim was eventually dismissed and the dismissal was affirmed. While the appeal was pending, Carr brought four separate suits in state court, then brought this federal case, and then voluntarily dismissed the state cases. He brought the federal case under RICO, repeating many of the allegations of the earlier suits, including the fraudulent inducement claim. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. Carr appeals. The defendants cross-appeal from the court's denial of their motion for sanctions.
Lisa Coffey and James Patterson were both employees in the editorial department of
Diane Bond filed a § 1983 action against the City of Chicago and several police officers in 2004. The parties settled. The court entered an agreed order of dismissal on March 23, 2007. About a week earlier, however, journalist Jamie Kalven filed a petition to intervene. Kalven sought to modify a protective order in the case and to obtain access to documents produced during discovery. The City opposed access -- Bond did not substantively respond to the petition. The court granted the motion to intervene and rescinded the protective order. The City appeals.
Safeco Insurance Co. of America ("SICA") and Safeco Insurance Co. Of Illinois ("SICI") are subsidiaries of Safeco Corp. and provide automobile insurance. Although SICI adjusts its own claims only, SICA adjusts its claims and the claims of several other companies owned by Safeco. In 2005, Dr. F. Ryan Bemis, a chiropractor, filed a class action in Illinois state court against SICI and SICA. The complaint included causes of action based on breach of contract, consumer fraud statutes and unjust enrichment. It alleged a scheme by SICA and SICI to reduce medical payments coverage through its use of particular audit software. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”) became effective seven days after the complaint was filed. Bemis later dismissed the statutory and unjust enrichment counts and amended the breach of contract count. In 2009, the state court granted class certification to a class consisting of all persons insured by Safeco insurance companies in 14 different states who had their claims adjusted by the specific software in question. Safeco removed the case to federal court, asserting that the class definition amounted to the commencement of a new action for CAFA purposes. The district court remanded, concluding that the class definition related back to the original complaint. Safeco sought leave to appeal.
Guidant Corporation is a worldwide manufacturer of medical devices, including pacemakers and implantable cardioverter defibrillators ("ICDs"). In the 1990s, Guidant released a new ICD model. Within a few years, it discovered a design flaw. Although it corrected the flaw in new production runs, it never recalled the flawed units nor did it advise doctors or the public of the flaw. In 2004 and 2005, Guidant and J&J were involved in merger negotiations. Guidant issued several press statements and filed several SEC forms without mentioning its potential liability arising from the flawed devices. After a young man died and the New York Times prepared to report on the flaws, Guidant disclosed the problems in a letter to physicians. Shortly thereafter, the FDA issued a national recall. Guidant's stock price fell and J&J reconsidered its merger intentions. Eventually, Boston Scientific agreed to buy Guidant. Guidant's share price fluctuated between $63 and $80 during this time period. A number of class-action suits were filed, beginning in 2005. Some were voluntarily dismissed -- a second set was consolidated in the district court. Almost a year after the first complaints were filed, plaintiffs in the consolidated cases filed a consolidated complaint. A few days later, plaintiffs filed an amended consolidated complaint. Almost two years later, the court dismissed the complaint on the ground that it failed to meet the stringent scienter pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. The court also denied plaintiffs leave to amend and denied a rule 59(e) motion to set aside the judgment and allow for an amended complaint. Plaintiffs appeal.
Jason Walsh was diagnosed with autism early in his life. His parents took him to Dr. Michael Chez for treatment. Chez prescribed a daily dosage of 50 mg of prednisone. One side-effect of prednisone is its negative impact on the body's ability to fight infection. A short time after the beginning of his prednisone treatment, Jason developed pneumonia. Dr. Chez reduced the prednisone treatment from 50 mg per day to 50 mg twice a week. A few months later, Jason died. Jason's parents brought a medical malpractice case against Dr. Chez. The Walshes submitted expert reports supporting their theory that the abrupt dosage reduction was the cause of their son's death. The district court excluded the reports on the ground that they failed to articulate a standard of care. The court dismissed the case. The Walshes appeal.
Ibrihim Kiswani was arrested for, and later acquitted of, an unlawful use of weapon charge. He filed an action against several police officers and the Phoenix Security Agency, alleging unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution, as well as other counts. Most of the counts were resolved prior to trial. Two counts against one individual officer were resolved at trial -- one on a motion for judgment as a matter of law and one by the jury. Judgment was entered on June 16, 2008. On June 24, Kiswani filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and a Rule 59 motion for a new trial. The magistrate judge denied the motions on August 20. On September 12, Kiswani moved for reconsideration of those motions. That motion was denied on September 24. Kiswani appeals (on September 29).
Deborah Cooney and her husband were divorced in 1998. The court granted her custody of their two sons. Her ex-husband later petitioned for a transfer of custody. The court appointed a lawyer to act as the children's representative. Cooney alleges that the representative arranged to have a psychiatrist appointed and then suggested to the psychiatrist that she suffered a particular mental illness. The psychiatrist's report did conclude that she suffered from the mental illness. Cooney alleges that her ex-husband received a copy of that report but that she did not. Based on the report, the court granted temporary custody to the ex-husband. She brought suit against the judge, the representative, the psychiatrist, the children's therapist and the ex-husband's lawyer. The court dismissed her complaint. Cooney appeals.
The Chicago Teachers Union fired Earl Prince from his job. Prince filed an administrative discrimination charge. He then brought an action pro se for employment discrimination under Title VII before he received any response from the Illinois Department of Human Rights or the EEOC. The district court dismissed the complaint because Prince had not yet received a right-to-sue letter. Several months later, after Prince had received the letter, the district court granted his motion to reopen the case. The court vacated the order, however, a few days later at Prince's request. Months later, on the last day to sue, Prince again moved to reopen the case. This time, the judge turned him down -- and it was too late to file a new complaint. Prince appeals.
Websolv sent an unsolicited fax to the dental office of Guy Bibbs. The fax was an advertisement for a healthcare seminar. Bibbs sued Websolv in state court. Websolv tendered its defense to Auto-Owners Insurance Co. Auto-Owners filed an action in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend. Although the parties stipulated to the application of Iowa law, the court applied Illinois law and granted Websolv’s motion for summary judgment. Auto-Owners appeals.
Kevin Trudeau is an author and a marketer, particularly in the medium of infomercials. In that capacity, he has dueled with the FTC for years. The parties entered into a Consent Order in 2004. The order, in part, prohibited Trudeau from using infomercials to advertise a product. An exception to the prohibition was that Trudeau could market publications as long as the infomercial did not misrepresent the content of the publication. The Consent Order bought a few years of peace, until 2007. That all changed with the publication of his book, Weight Loss Cure. The weight-loss program contained in the book prescribes, in part: organic six meals/day diet, enema-like procedures performed by specialists, daily hormone injections, avoidance of any medications and a host of other dietary and lifestyle restrictions. Trudeau began appearing in infomercials touting the book. He called the program “easy,” “simple,” and said that it could be completed in the home. He failed to mention many of the restrictions. The FTC sought a contempt finding against Trudeau for violating the Consent Order. The district court agreed. The FTC sought a sanction of $46 million to reimburse the purchasers of the book and a modification of the Consent Order to require a performance bond before any further infomercials. The court instead required Trudeau to disgorge $5 million in profits and banned him completely from infomercials for three years. On an FTC motion to correct a mathematical error, the court increased the monetary sanction to $37 million. Trudeau appeals.
Rhonda Salmeron was fired by Enterprise Recovery Systems ("ERS"). Thereafter, she brought a qui tam action, alleging that ERS engaged in fraud related to its student loan debt collection practices. Jorge Sanchez represented Salmeron. During the three years the suit was pending in district court, Sanchez missed numerous deadlines, failed to appear in court and repeatedly failed to live up to his promises. Sanchez' conduct ultimately led the trial court to dismiss the case. On Sanchez' motion, the court reopened the case -- but warned Sanchez that it was "the final warning." Within weeks, confidential documents produced by the defendants in the case appeared on the Internet. Although no confidentiality order was in place at the time, the defendants emphasized to Sanchez that they intended the documents to be confidential and the parties agreed to keep them so. The principal reason the confidentiality agreement was not in place was because Sanchez never provided any comments or changes. Sanchez admitted leaking the document to numerous outside sources. The court dismissed the case with prejudice, finding that Sanchez violated the agreement with defendants' counsel to keep the documents confidential. Salmeron appeals.
Victor Brooks served on the Illinois Prison Review Board ("PRB"). One of the functions of the PRB is to make certain parole decisions. In 2002, the parole request of inmate Harry Aleman came before the PRB. The hearing was unusual both because of Aleman's notoriety for murder and bribery and because a Department of Corrections employee provided a statement in support of his parole. Brooks cast the only vote in support of parole. Because of the high profile of the situation, the department began an investigation. The investigation resulted in several reports, some of which accused Brooks of accepting bribes to vote in favor of parole. Eventually, Brooks and the department employee were indicted for their conduct -- and later acquitted. Brooks filed suit under § 1983 and state law against numerous state officials, alleging claims of deprivation of due process, malicious prosecution, conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. Brooks appeals.
A Wisconsin statute prohibits a gasoline retailer from selling its product below cost plus a defined markup. The statute contains both state and private remedies of both an injunctive and damages nature. Flying J is such a gasoline retailer. It sued the state, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the statute on the grounds that it was preempted by the Sherman Act. The district court granted the injunction. During the time period for taking an appeal, the state decided not to appeal. An association of gasoline retailers asked the district court for leave to intervene both as of right under Rule 24(a)(2) and as permissive under Rule 24(b)(1)(B). The court denied the intervention on the grounds that it was untimely and that the association's members lacked the requisite interest. The association appeals.
Michelle Eskridge died of pneumonia after having been treated at Access Community Health Network (Access) and Stroger Hospital. Access was a U. S. Public Health Service facility and Stroger was a Cook County facility. Michelle's parents sued Access and Cook County in state court. The United States removed the case to federal court, where the case against the U.S. was dismissed for failure to exhaust Federal Tort Claims Act remedies. The court remanded the case against Cook County to state court. The Eskridges exhausted their remedies and filed a second suit in federal court against the county and the United States and dismissed the earlier suit. Later, having decided to pursue only Cook County, the Eskridges filed yet a third lawsuit, in state court, against Cook County and moved to dismiss the federal suit. Their motion was granted. Meanwhile, in state court, Cook County moved to dismiss the suit on procedural grounds. Upon realizing the merits of the County’s defense, the Eskridges filed a motion in federal court for relief from their own voluntary dismissal, claiming they intended only to dismiss the United States. The court denied the motion. They then moved for reconsideration, a motion which was considered a second Rule 60(b) motion, which was also denied. The Eskridges appeal.
Pamela Hoppe, an Illinois citizen, joined a weight loss program at her local L.A. Weight Loss Center ("Center"). After just several months of diet and nutritional supplements, Hoppe died of acute liver hepatitis. Her estate filed suit in state court against the Center alleging a variety of state law claims. The Center removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds, where the parties conducted discovery for just over one year. The estate then amended its complaint, adding claims against two Center employees, both Illinois residents. The estate then moved to remand the case to state court because of the new lack of diversity. On the Center's motion, the court struck the amended complaint on the grounds that the new defendants were fraudulently joined. Later, the court granted summary judgment to the Center. The estate appeals.
Brian French and his siblings (“French”) are the beneficiaries of the trust set up by their father. Wachovia Bank (the “Bank”) is the trustee of the French Trust. French sued the bank, alleging in Count I that the Bank breached its duties and in Count II that the bank provided false information with respect to life insurance policies. On the Bank's motion to compel arbitration, the court determined that only Count II was subject to arbitration. The court ordered the parties to arbitrate Count II and stayed proceedings with respect to Count I. French moved to amend the complaint to dismiss Count II and to lift the stay with respect to Count I. The court granted the motion on October 23. However, in response to an inquiry from the Bank, French denied that they had abandoned the Count II claims. On December 21, the Bank reasserted its request to compel arbitration on Count II and to stay Count I. The court denied the motion. The Bank appeals.
Gabbenelli Accordions & Imports ("American Gabbenelli") used to be the American distributor for a predecessor of defendant Ditta Gabbenelli Ubaldo Di Elio Gabbenelli ("Italian Gabbenelli"). Disputes arose between the two companies in the 1990s. In 1999, the two companies entered into an agreement under which American Gabbenelli retained the exclusive right to use the Gabbenelli mark in North America and Italian Gabbenelli retained the exclusive right to use it in Italy. The parties further agreed that future disputes would be resolved by arbitration. Notwithstanding the arbitration agreement, Italian Gabbenelli sued American Gabbenelli in an Italian court and American Gabbenelli filed this suit in the United States. American Gabbenelli charged Italian Gabbenelli with trademark infringement. The district court first rejected Italian Gabbenelli's contention that the arbitration agreement deprived the court of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the court stayed proceedings pending the outcome of the Italian litigation. When no decision was rendered within a few years, the court lifted the stay. American Gabbenelli served Italian Gabbenelli with requests for admissions in May of 2005. Italian Gabbenelli finally appeared through counsel in October of 2005 but did not respond to the requests for admissions. Italian Gabbenelli filed an opposition to American Gabbenelli's motion for summary judgment in June of 2007, and also asked for leave to deny the requests for admissions, which had since been deemed admitted. The court denied that request and granted American Gabbenelli's motion for summary judgment. Italian Gabbenelli appeals.
Consumer Products Research & Design ("CPRD") holds a patent for a wireless smoke detector. CPRD entered into contracts with two companies owned, respectively, by a father and his son. One company, owned by the father, agreed to develop and market the product. The other, owned by the son, was responsible for its manufacturing. Unhappy with of the relationship, CPRD filed a complaint alleging fraudulent inducement and breach of contract. A jury awarded over $700,000 in damages. Defendants appeal.
Curtis Lusby was an engineer at Rolls-Royce Corp. He became suspicious that the company was falsely certifying that one of its aircraft engines met government specifications so he informed his superiors. He claims that the company fired him for doing so. He brought suit under the False Claims Act, alleging that the company punished him for preparing to bring an action under the statute. The parties jointly dismissed the suit in 2003. However, two months earlier, Lusby had filed a qui tam action under seal. The court dismissed the action for failure to plead fraud with particularity and because of the claim preclusion effect of the earlier lawsuit. Lusby appeals.
Bakery Machinery & Fabrication (BMF) retained attorney James Hinterlong to pursue Traditional Baking, Inc. (TBI) in a contract action in an Illinois court. TBI removed the action to federal court. Hinterlong failed to file an appearance, neglected to file Rule 26 disclosures on time, failed to respond to TBI's amended counterclaim, did not provide a copy of a sanctions order to his client as ordered by the court, and never answered a request for admission. The court ordered Hinterlong to file his appearance, pay a sanction, and pay past sanctions. The court warned Hinterlong that it would strike BMF's pleadings if he did not comply. He did not comply. The court struck BMF's pleadings, granted TBI's motion for default and entered judgment against BMF for $582,000. Some months later, BMF moved to substitute counsel and stay the proceedings. The court denied substitute counsel's motion to vacate the judgment. BMF appeals.
Freedom Mortgage Corp. loaned money to property purchasers arranged by broker Burnham Mortgage, Inc. After the purchasers defaulted, Freedom purchased the properties with credit bids at auction, was awarded default judgments for the difference between the purchase prices and the outstanding debts, and later resold the properties for less than their purchase price. Freedom claims (in its complaint, taken as true) that Burnham conducted a scam whereby it arranged to over-appraise properties, sponsor sham sales, and have Freedom lend money on its inflated understanding of the properties’ purchase prices. Title insurers indemnified Freedom for damages caused by a failure to close according to Freedom's specifications. Freedom sued Burnham and the insurers for fraud and under RICO. The court first ruled that, under Illinois law, Freedom was not able to recover from a third party any damages on the theory that the property was worth less than it had been purchased for at the foreclosure sale. The court later ruled that Freedom's claim was barred by claim preclusion and by the
The State of Indiana has a Medicaid for the Disabled program that provides medical benefits to persons who suffer from disabilities. A consent decree resulting from earlier litigation required the State to follow certain procedures in collecting and evaluating applications. It must obtain complete medical histories for twelve months, it must get additional medical information when necessary, and it must ensure that the medical records are complete before an eligibility determination. Plaintiffs filed a petition to hold the defendants in civil contempt for violating these requirements of the consent decree. In discovery, the State produced a representative sample of benefit applications, consisting of 26 files. The district court reviewed the files and concluded 17 were complete, five contained only a summary form of medical history, and four were “less complete” than the five that contained the form. The court denied the contempt motion, however, because neither party presented evidence of what should be considered a "complete" history. In fact, the court invited the plaintiffs to refile their motion and introduce testimony on that issue. Instead, plaintiffs appeal.
Carl Askew alleges that he was the victim of excessive force at the hands of Officer Lopez while a pretrial detainee in the Cook County Jail. He filed a lawsuit naming Lopez and the Sheriff. He included two theories of relief under a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 -- that Lopez used excessive force and that Lopez was deliberately indifferent to his safety. The district court dismissed his complaint on the grounds that he failed to name Cook County as a defendant. Askew appeals.
In one case, several hundred Argentine hemophiliacs brought a class action against Bayer Corporation and others, alleging that they were infected with AIDS as a result of the defendants’ negligence. In another case, Argentina plaintiffs brought suit against U.S. companies arising out of an automobile accident. Plaintiffs allege that defendants were negligent in the design and manufacture of the vehicle and its tires. Both cases were filed in federal district courts against American defendants by foreign plaintiffs for injuries sustained in Argentina. After significant discovery, the judge in each case dismissed the case based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The plaintiffs appealed.
Suit was filed in state court against a defendant class of companies. The defendant class consisted of H&R Block Tax Services, Inc. ("TSI") and its affiliates or franchisees. The suit, brought on behalf of a plaintiff class, alleged violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. The state court certified the defendant class and originally three plaintiff classes, including people in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. On TSI's motion, the court decertified the defendant class but refused to decertify the plaintiff class, although it did narrow it to residents of only 13 states. TSI removed the case pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), on the theory that the decertification of the defendant class occurred after CAFA’s effective date and increased TSI’s potential liability. The district court remanded the case to state court. TSI requested leave to appeal, which the Court granted.
Ronald Smart’s non-union electrical company was awarded a contract to perform electrical work at a sports complex. He claims that Local 702 threatened the owner of the sports complex and coerced him to replace Smart’s company with union electricians. Smart brought an action against the local under the Illinois Antitrust Act. He also brought state law unwarranted prosecution and malpractice claims against the union’s lawyers (claims arising from earlier legal actions against Smart by the union). The district court dismissed the antitrust claim, concluding that it was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. It also dismissed the state law claims, holding that the malpractice claim could not be brought against a lawyer who had never represented Smart and that the unwarranted prosecution claim required that he prevailed in the underlying litigation (he did not). Smart appeals
Star Insurance Company ("Star") and its co-plaintiffs registered a $2.4 million judgment in the Northern District of Illinois and began proceedings to collect it. Star also brought a separate action to pierce the corporate veil of defendants Risk Marketing and Cebcor Service Corp. In the collection proceedings, Star sought to set aside fraudulent transfers, to enjoin the disposition of assets, to appoint a receiver and to dissolve the corporate defendants. Instead of responding to Star’s requests, the defendants moved to consolidate the enforcement proceedings with the action to pierce the corporate veil. On August 31, 2007, the court enjoined the disposition of transferred assets and ordered the individual defendants to turn over certain assets in their possession. It also denied their motion to consolidate. On October 19, the court granted Star’s motion for judicial dissolution and the appointment of a receiver. On January 23, 2008 the court entered judgment for $2.4 million against the individual defendants. The defendants appeal the lower court's orders of August 31 and January 23.
For Your Ease Only ("FYEO") sells jewelry boxes on the Home Shopping Network (“HSN”). Several years ago, FYEO obtained a default judgment in excess of $2 million against Mark Schneider and his wholly owned company Product Concepts Company ("PCC"). At the time of the judgment, PCC's principal assets were a relationship with and the right to payments from the HSN. In order to collect the judgment, FYEO began searching for assets. Schneider had since moved to Costa Rica. It noticed the deposition of Doug Fournier, Schneider’s brother-in-law. The subpoena advised Fournier of the lawsuit and the judgment. When Fournier got the subpoena, he met Schneider in Costa Rica. There, Schneider transferred his company's rights under the HSN agreement to a company that Fournier would create when he returned to the United States (Anewco). FYEO served HSN with a third-party citation prohibiting them from transferring any property or money to the judgment debtors. Notwithstanding the citation, HSN paid almost $400,000 to Anewco. FYEO requested an order for the turnover of all payments made by HSN. The district court denied the request, concluding that Fournier had acted in good faith and the transfer was not voidable under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA). FYEO appeals.
Federal agents seized thousands of cans of powdered baby formula from a warehouse. They suspected that the cans had been stolen from retail stores. Many of the cans had altered labels - some of the cans were even past their
A. Bauer Mechanical, Inc. ("Bauer") and Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union 130 ("Union") were parties to a collective bargaining agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, the Joint Arbitration Board of the Plumbing Contractors' Association and Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union ("Board") has the authority to resolve their disputes. In 2005, the Board found that Bauer had failed to make some required contributions and ordered it to pay over $54,000. Bauer filed a complaint in state court to vacate the award. The Union removed the case to federal court and filed a motion for leave to file instanter an answer to Bauer's complaint and a counterclaim to enforce the arbitration award. The answer and counterclaim were attached to the motion. The district court granted the motion. Bauer did not respond. At a hearing on the Union's motion for entry of judgment, Bauer argued that the pleadings were not properly filed. The court explicitly recognized the pleadings and gave Bauer 14 days to respond to the counterclaim. Bauer filed a response but, again, challenged the propriety of the pleadings and did not address the merits. The court entered judgment on the Union's counterclaim. Bauer filed a timely notice of appeal. A few months later, on the Union's motion, the court dismissed Bauer's complaint and declared all judgments final and appealable. Bauer did not file a timely appeal of that order.
Gordon Beeler disappeared in January of 1998, leaving behind a wife of 30 years, four children, a business partner and $2.6 million in life insurance policies. A trust was the beneficiary of the policies. The insurance companies denied benefits in 2003, and again in 2005, citing evidence that Beeler may have been alive. The beneficiaries brought suit against the insurance companies, seeking death benefits and punitive damages. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurance companies on the punitive damages claim. The breach of contract claim was tried to a jury. The trustee presented evidence that Beeler had been missing since the date of his disappearance, that the family had conducted numerous investigations into his disappearance, and that he had not been in communication with his family or friends since the day of his disappearance. The insurance companies presented evidence of a troubled family situation, a strained marriage, and witnesses who claimed to have seen Beeler after the date of his disappearance. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. The district court denied the trustee’s Motion for a New Trial. The trustee appeals.
James Koenig was the Chief Financial Officer of Waste Management, Inc. In the early 1990s, after years of acceptable growth, the company’s financial performance began to suffer. Koenig devised several accounting strategies that made the company appear more profitable than it was. Koenig resigned in January of 1997. In October of 1997, the company disclosed in a press release that its financial statements were inaccurate and unreliable. The SEC filed a complaint against Koenig in March of 2002. At trial, the jury found that his accounting strategies were fraudulent. The court imposed a $2.1 million civil penalty, ordered the disgorgement of almost $1 million in bonuses, imposed $1.2 million in pretax interest, and enjoined Koenig from serving as a director of a public company. Koenig appeals.
The losers is in a contested union election sued the winners. The defendants prevailed on all counts. As discovery proceeded during the case, it became apparent that plaintiffs could not support some of their claims. Defendants demanded that some claims be withdrawn, to no avail. Defendants asked for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. §1927 and FRCP 11. The court ordered plaintiffs’ attorney, James Banks, to pay $80,000 in sanctions. Banks appeals.
Golden Years Homestead, Inc. (“Golden Years”) operates a nursing facility in Fort Wayne, Indiana. In early 2000, the Indiana Department of Health (“IDH”) conducted an annual certification inspection, as required by Golden Years’ participation in the Medicaid program. The inspection took place over a span of ten days. At some point during the inspection, the inspection team became upset with the conduct of the Golden Years’ team. From then on, the inspection team became loud, overly critical, hostile and accusatory. The team left information favorable to Golden Years out of its report. Golden Years was cited for seventeen violations. After a six-day evidentiary hearing and administrative appeals, all but one of the citations was reversed. Golden Years brought a lawsuit against the inspectors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations and state law claims for abuse of process and malicious prosecution. The district court granted summary judgment for the inspectors. Golden Years appeals the dismissal of the state law claims.
Margaret Collins has had a long-running dispute with the State of Illinois over her employment with the Illinois State Library. This is her third lawsuit, which the Seventh Circuit remanded to the district court for consideration of some of her claims. The road got a little bumpy after remand. The court ordered her to amend her complaint on four different occasions and forced her to respond to discovery. The parties finally arrived at an agreeable date for her deposition. Although she did appear, she refused to submit to interrogation with parties present. She was told they had a right to be there. One of the lawyers offered to call the magistrate to resolve the issue. Collins left. The defendants moved for dismissal of her complaint for discovery abuse and for their fees for preparing for the deposition. The court dismissed the complaint, stating that her refusal was “willful and egregious.” He also concluded that complaints she had about the court reporter and police officers in the vicinity were baseless. He also ordered Collins to pay the defendants’ fees and costs. Collins appeals.
Eugene Fischer is in prison. In a proceeding in the district court, the Government moved to renew a forfeiture judgment against him. The court granted the Government’s request by an order entered on November 5, 2008. Fischer asserts that he never was served with a copy of the order and only discovered its existence when he received a copy of the docket sheet in January 2009. His time for appeal having long ago run, Fischer filed a petition for mandamus seeking permission to file a notice of appeal from the November order.
Jack Katz brought this action on behalf of a class of persons who contributed real property to a real estate investment trust (“REIT”). In exchange, they received an interest in the REIT. The REIT merged into a new entity in 2007. The interest-holders were offered either cash or an interest in the new entity. Katz took the cash but filed suit in state court, alleging that the offer violated the terms of their original agreement with the REIT. He based the action on the Securities Act of 1933 ( “’33 Act”). Defendants removed the suit to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”). The district court concluded that removal was not allowed by the ’33 Act. The defendants petition for appeal.
Doss refinanced his home. First Franklin Financial Corporation (“Franklin”) loaned him $135,000 on the condition that he obtain title insurance. He did so. At closing, the itemization of costs indicated that he paid $500 for the title insurance. In fact, he paid almost $1500. Doss filed suit against Franklin and others, alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act. The court entered a default judgment against Franklin, which Franklin moved to set aside. Other defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, alleging that Doss sold his home before filing suit. Although Doss disputed this fact in the district court, the court nevertheless granted the motion and dismissed the TILA count. The court then exercised its discretion to dismiss the state law claims as well. It also struck “as moot” all pending motions, including Franklin’s motion to set aside the default. Doss appeals.
LimitNone, a software development company, was pitching an e-mail application to Google. Before a March 2007 meeting, the parties signed confidentiality agreements that included a forum-selection clause naming a California county as the exclusive venue for disputes. Both agreements limited modifications to writings signed by both parties. LimitNone claims that a Google employee later “accepted” an agreement that provided for exclusive jurisdiction in Illinois by clicking on the “Accept” button for the LimitNone License Agreement. After Google developed its own application, LimitNone brought an action in Illinois state court. It alleged violations of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (“ITSA”) and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act. Google removed to federal court, asserting that the ITSA was preempted by the federal Copyright Act. LimitNone sought a remand. On Google’s motion, the district court transferred the case to the Northern District of California under § 1406(a), holding that the California forum-selection clause applied and venue was improper in Illinois. LimitNone petitions for a writ of mandamus.
Jim Aaron and Susan Scott (f/k/a/ Mahl) were cohabiting lovers in the 1990s until Aaron left Scott. At about the same time that Aaron left, Scott was sued by her former law firm for embezzlement. The firm obtained a judgment of more than a million dollars against Scott that they then assigned to Aaron. Aaron has been attempting to collect the judgment for years, following Scott from California to Indiana to South Carolina. Aaron found some assets in Indiana in a Merrill Lynch account. A state court ordered Merrill Lynch not to transfer or dispose of the assets. Aaron nevertheless obtained a writ of execution, with which Merrill Lynch refused to comply. Scott moved to quash the writ. Aaron filed suit in district court to enforce the writ and require Merrill Lynch to turn over the funds. Merrill Lynch counterclaimed and also filed for interpleader against Aaron and Scott. At Scott’s request, the court stayed the suit pending the state court’s consideration of her motion to quash the writ. The state court quashed the writ, an order upheld on appeal. The district court lifted the stay and granted Merrill Lynch summary judgment on its interpleader claims, entered final judgment pursuant to FRCP 54(b), and awarded attorney’s fees from the interpleader stake. Scott appeals from both the grant of interpleader and the award of attorney fees.
Experienced appellate practitioners need not read further.
Marvin Ross-Tousey and his wife Deborah (the “debtors”) filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Because their household income was above the median income level, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”) subjected their petition to a means test. The means test is used to distinguish those debtors who can repay a portion of their debts from those who cannot. A debtor who has enough disposable income to pay at least $166.67 per month to his creditors is expected to file under Chapter 13. A Chapter 7 filing is presumptively abusive in that circumstance. The debtors claimed a vehicle ownership expense allowance of over $800, although they had no debt or lease payments. With that deduction, they had no disposable income and met the means test. The United States Trustee (“UST”) moved to dismiss their petition for abuse. The UST first asserted abuse based on a totality of the circumstances. The UST later amended the motion to include presumptive abuse on the grounds that they should not have taken the vehicle ownership allowance. The bankruptcy court denied the motion. The district court reversed, holding that a debtor cannot claim a vehicle ownership allowance for vehicles he owns outright. The district court remanded for proceedings to determine whether the debtors could rebut the presumption. The debtors appealed. The UST moved to dismiss for absence of finality because the bankruptcy court had not ruled on whether the presumption could be rebutted. The debtors conceded that they could not rebut the presumption.
Flying J develops and operates travel plazas for truck drivers and other travelers. It purchased 50+ acres in New Haven, Indiana (the “City”) to develop a new travel plaza. The City opposed the development and took the position that it was not allowed under the then-current zoning. Flying J ultimately prevailed in the Indiana state courts on its challenge to the City’s position. Undaunted, the City amended its zoning ordinance to limit developments of this type to two acres. The Flying J development was the only parcel affected by this limitation. The City held several public meetings on the amendment but never gave Flying J specific notice of them. In August of 2007, the City advised Flying J that its development must comply with the two acre rule. Flying J filed suit in September, alleging violations of its rights under the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. Flying J appeals.
Virgean Houskins was an employee of the Cook County Department of Corrections. One September morning in 2001, she found herself sitting in her car in the parking lot of her place of employment, waiting for a parking space to open up. Correctional Officer Keith entered the lot and took what Houskins believed was her space. Houskins uttered some profanities about Keith (which he heard) and proceeded to park in another space. A verbal confrontation between the two ended with Keith striking Houskins in the face. Correctional Officer Calderone arrived a few moments later but did nothing. Houskins reported to work, filed an incident report, and also reported the incident to her supervisor, Tolbert. Tolbert took Houskins and Bowers to the Internal Affairs Division (“IAD”) to make out a complaint. Houskins also filed a police report. The IAD dismissed the charges against Keith and Calderone as not conclusive but upheld an obscene language charge against Houskins. Upon further department review, the finding against Houskins was upheld but the dismissal of the complaint against Keith and Calderone was reversed. Houskins filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Sheriff and Cook County, alleging a) that the Sheriff retaliated against her for filing the complaints and charges against Keith, b) that a “code of silence” policy existed for correctional officers and those who violated it were subject to retaliation, and c) that the Sheriff employed a disciplinary system in which certain officers with clout were exempted from discipline. Houskins also brought pendant state court claims of assault and battery against Keith. At trial, the jury returned a verdict against the Sheriff and Keith. It awarded $240,000 against the Sheriff and $10,000 in compensatory and $50,000 in punitive damages against Keith. The Sheriff and Keith appeal.
Lawrence Ligas owed the government over $300,000 in taxes, penalties, and interest. Federal tax liens attached to his property. The United States brought an action in February 2004, just prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Ligas received a copy of the summons and complaint by mail but did not waive personal service. Between February of 2004 and February of 2005, the government failed to serve Ligas properly. In March, the court granted the government’s fourth request for an extension and permitted service by posting the summons and complaint on the door of Ligas’ home, by mailing copies to his home by certified mail, and by faxing copies to a fax number listed on Ligas’ pro se appearance form. On Ligas’ motion, the district court vacated its March order and dismissed the complaint for failure to serve Ligas. The court determined that the government had not been diligent in its service attempts and was not entitled to the fourth extension. The court relied on two facts – that Ligas’ co-defendant (the bank holding a mortgage on his property) had successfully served Ligas and that the government could not provide evidence of its pre-2005 attempts to serve Ligas. On the same day, Ligas sought to have the tax liens quashed. The government responded by asking for reconsideration of the court’s dismissal, arguing that Ligas had submitted to personal jurisdiction and waived objection to service by appearing to quash the liens. The court agreed. It reinstated the complaint and eventually granted summary judgment to the government. Ligas appeals.
William Atkins was a passenger in a car driven by his brother Adam in October, 2003. A Chicago police officer stopped the car and arrested William on a parole violation warrant with his name. William professed his innocence. He continued to insist he was the “wrong man” but never asked to see a lawyer or took any legal action. He was released – thirty seven days later. He brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the arresting officers and prison guards, among others. He alleged that his arrest was unlawful, that he was mistreated in prison, and that the Department of Corrections lacked procedures for identifying cases of mistaken identity. Adam joined in the suit as far as it complained of the arrest. Both Atkins brothers were represented by the same lawyer. In December of 2006, the lawyer filed a document captioned a “Motion to Substitute” that alerted the court to the untimely death of William. The lawyer stated that he was going to open an estate so that William’s wife Brandie could continue the lawsuit. The district court denied the motion. There was no one yet with proper status to substitute. After 90 days, the defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that no substitution had been made within 90 days of a “suggestion of death.” The court allowed an additional month for a proper substitution. The day before the new deadline, Atkins’ lawyer filed a motion to substitute Mrs. Atkins, but she was still not yet named as his personal representative. The district court dismissed William’s case. An Illinois probate court appointed Mrs. Atkins as personal representative of William’s estate about ten days later. Mrs. Atkins appeals the district court’s dismissal.
Jerome Maher, a
U.S.O. Corp. (“USO”) is incorporated in Delaware but is the wholly-owned subsidiary of a Japanese company. Its headquarters are in Japan. USO invested in a limited partnership. Like USO, the partnership was incorporated in Delaware. It also had its principal place of business in Japan and the partners all had addresses in Japan. The partnership invested in another partnership, which acquired a
Steve Thorogood bought a dryer at
Gail Kay taught in the Chicago public school system. After she retired in 1994, she brought a § 1983 action against the Board of Education (“Board”). She alleged that the Board penalized her on account of her speech. The parties settled the litigation in 1996 and her case was dismissed. In the settlement, the Board offered to rehire Kay into an available future position. In 1997, she was offered an opportunity to return to her former
Alejandro Dominguez was fifteen when a neighbor accused him of sexual assault. He was convicted of home invasion and sexual assault and spent four years in prison before he was paroled. Dominguez always maintained his innocence. He eventually proved his innocence through DNA testing. Not only did he succeed in getting his conviction vacated, the Governor pardoned him. Dominguez brought this action against an investigating police officer and the City of Waukegan under 42 U.S.C. §1983. He alleged that the officer (a) withheld exculpatory material from the prosecutor and defense, (b) conducted an improper and prejudicial identification, and (c) fabricated evidence. At trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Dominguez in excess of $9 million. Hendley and the City appeal.