Replacement Of Lamp With Virtually Identical Product Results In No Damages

NIGHTINGALE HOME HEALTHCARE v. ANODYNE THERAPY (December 21, 2009)

Anodyne Therapy manufactures and sells infrared lamps designed to improve circulation. The FDA approved it for that purpose. But Anodyne allegedly marketed the lamps as a treatment for peripheral neuropathy, which the FDA never approved. Nightingale purchased several of the lamps. The FDA sent Anodyne a warning letter about their marketing claims. Several months later, Nightingale stopped using the lamps, returned them to Anodyne with a demand for a refund, but then replaced them with almost identical devices. Nightingale brought a fraud case in state court. Anodyne removed the case to federal court on diversity jurisdiction grounds. Nightingale then added a federal Lanham Act claim. The court granted summary judgment to Anodyne on the Lanham Act claim, and later granted summary judgment to Anodyne on the fraud claim. The court relied on a contractual disclaimer of warranties as well as Nightingale’s failure to establish proof of damages. Nightingale appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Kanne and Rovner affirmed. On the merits, the Court disagreed with the warranty holding. It concluded that the only contractual limitation of liability related to a breach of warranty claim – not, as here, a fraud claim. The Court agreed with the district court, however, on the damages holding. Nightingale replaced the lamps with a virtually identical product. Both products served the same purpose, performed comparably and carried similar FDA approvals. The replacement of the lamps did not result in any damage to Nightingale.

The lack of any damage not only doomed the case on the merits – it showed that the jurisdictional threshold for diversity jurisdiction was not met. Ordinarily, the Court concluded, the lack of a good faith basis for meeting the threshold would result in a case being dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, even at a late stage of the case. Here, however, the fact that Nightingale added a federal claim after removal brought the case within the court’s federal question jurisdiction. The state claims were covered by supplemental jurisdiction. Even though the federal claim was later dismissed, the court had discretion to retain the state claims.

Evidence Of Expected Benefit Is Required To Support Probabilistic Injury Theory

MILAM v. DOMINICK'S FINER FOODS (December 7, 2009)

Ahmad Milam is one of several African-American produce clerks at a Chicago Dominick's grocery store. Each week, Dominick's posts the produce clerks’ schedule of hours for the upcoming week. A more-senior produce clerk is allowed to "claim" the hours of a less-senior clerk. Milam and five other African-American produce clerks filed suit against Dominick's, claiming that it was guilty of race discrimination when it classified two more junior white women as produce clerks but did not include them on the schedule. The court granted summary judgment to Dominick's on the ground that plaintiffs had no evidence of damages. Plaintiffs appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Kanne and Rovner affirmed. The Court was quite critical of the district court's handling of the case. It noted that one of the women at issue was actually never a produce clerk. Although she had been offered and accepted a promotion to produce clerk, she changed her mind and never was scheduled to work as one. Dominick's presented evidence years ago that the failure to list the second woman on the produce clerk schedule was an innocent mistake. Plaintiffs never challenged the evidence as pretextual. The court should have granted summary judgment to Dominick's. With respect to the eventual order of the district court, the Court agreed that the plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence of either actual or probabilistic injury. The Court conceded that the plaintiffs' probabilistic injury theory was a proper damages theory. It requires, however, evidence of the expected benefit – which was never presented. In the end, the Court termed the case frivolous.

Monell Requires Causal Link Between Unconstitutional Act and Harm

THOMAS v. COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT (December 1, 2009)

Norman Smith was arrested by the Chicago police on April 23, 2004. He was delivered to the Cook County Jail on April 24, where he was scheduled to remain until his trial date. An intake medical examination showed elevated blood pressure but no other medical problems. Smith showed symptoms of something more serious, however, from that first day. He was dizzy and vomiting. His symptoms became more serious over the next several days. Despite repeated requests by Smith and by other detainees on his behalf for medical assistance, he received none. On April 30, his cellmate discovered Smith convulsing on the floor. The cellmate reported it immediately to the officer on duty. There was a significant delay before Smith received any treatment. He died that morning of pneumococcal meningitis. His mother, Marlita Thomas, brought a § 1983 case against a number of individual correctional officers, the Cook County Sheriff and Cook County. A jury awarded Thomas $4,450,000 against the County, the Sheriff and three correctional officers. The jury then allocated the damages amongst the defendants. The court denied the defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. The defendants appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Wood and Williams affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The Court first addressed the verdict against the individual officers. In order to prevail, the Court stated that a plaintiff must demonstrate that a medical condition is objectively serious, that the defendant has subjective knowledge of the health risk and the defendant disregarded the risk. The Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the record to allow a jury to conclude that the individual officers knew about Smith's health risk and ignored it. Thus, the verdict is affirmed. The Court next addressed the verdict against the County. The County can be liable only if the unconstitutional act is the result of an official policy or a widespread practice or custom or is caused by an official with policy-making authority. The Court refused to adopt a bright-line test on how widespread a policy need be, but noted that it must be more than a random event. The Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence of a widespread policy: a failure to review medical requests, a failure to collect medical requests, keeping request forms in a locked box, etc. Thus, the verdict against the County was affirmed. The Court next addressed the verdict against the Sheriff. The basis for imposing liability under Monell against the Sheriff was his policy of severely understaffing the jail. In order to sustain the verdict, there must be a causal link between the policy and the unconstitutional act. Here, the individual officers were found liable based on their deliberate indifference to Smith's medical needs. The Court found no relationship between the officers' conduct and the understaffing. The Court concluded that the understaffing theory was too remote to support the verdict. Thus, the Court reversed for entry of judgment in the Sheriff's favor. After rejecting several evidentiary arguments of the defendants, the Court addressed the verdict. On the verdict form, the jury entered $150,000 against the officers, $3 million against the County, and $1 million against the Sheriff. This allocation was improper, in that the defendants were jointly and severally liable for one indivisible injury. It raised the question of whether the total damages is the sum of all of the damage awards, or the highest single assessment. The Court presumed that the jury followed instructions to not award duplicate damages and concluded that adding the damage awards would be proper. Under that analysis, the award against the Sheriff ($1 million) remains as part of the verdict against the County and individual officers, notwithstanding the reversal of the verdict against the Sheriff. Finally, the Court rejected the defendants' argument that the award was excessive.

Lanham Act Allows Statutory Damages Only For Violations On Which Compensatory Damages Are Not Awarded

GABBANELLI ACCORDIONS & IMPORTS, L. L. C. v. DITTA GABBANELLI UBALDO DI ELIO GABBANELLI (July 30, 2009)

Gabbenelli Accordions & Imports ("American Gabbenelli") used to be the American distributor for a predecessor of defendant Ditta Gabbenelli Ubaldo Di Elio Gabbenelli ("Italian Gabbenelli"). Disputes arose between the two companies in the 1990s. In 1999, the two companies entered into an agreement under which American Gabbenelli retained the exclusive right to use the Gabbenelli mark in North America and Italian Gabbenelli retained the exclusive right to use it in Italy. The parties further agreed that future disputes would be resolved by arbitration. Notwithstanding the arbitration agreement, Italian Gabbenelli sued American Gabbenelli in an Italian court and American Gabbenelli filed this suit in the United States. American Gabbenelli charged Italian Gabbenelli with trademark infringement. The district court first rejected Italian Gabbenelli's contention that the arbitration agreement deprived the court of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the court stayed proceedings pending the outcome of the Italian litigation. When no decision was rendered within a few years, the court lifted the stay. American Gabbenelli served Italian Gabbenelli with requests for admissions in May of 2005. Italian Gabbenelli finally appeared through counsel in October of 2005 but did not respond to the requests for admissions. Italian Gabbenelli filed an opposition to American Gabbenelli's motion for summary judgment in June of 2007, and also asked for leave to deny the requests for admissions, which had since been deemed admitted. The court denied that request and granted American Gabbenelli's motion for summary judgment. Italian Gabbenelli appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Flaum and Wood affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The Court rejected Italian Gabbenelli's appeal on liability. First, it agreed with the district court that the arbitration agreement did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Second, it concluded that the Italian judgment (since rendered) was irrelevant because it was rendered after the district court judgment. Third, the Court concluded that the district court was within its rights in not allowing Italian Gabbenelli to reopen the requests for admissions after ignoring them for several years. The Court did reverse, however, with respect to damages. The district court awarded damages for lost profits plus statutory damages of $500 for each infringing accordion. The Lanham Act allows statutory damages only for violations on which compensatory damages are not awarded. The district court's award of lost profits and statutory damages with respect to the same accordions was improper. The Court also criticized the district court for awarding statutory damages on each individual item sold. The Act allows statutory damages on each "type of goods," not on individual goods. The Court remanded for a redetermination of damages.

Statements Susceptible Of Innocent Construction, Given Natural Meaning of Words in Their Context, Are Not Actionable As Defamation Per Se

LOTT v. LEVITT (February 11, 2009)

Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner authored the off-beat and best-selling Freakonomics. In it, the authors used economic theory to address many “freakish curiosities,’ such as the similarities between nylon stockings and crack cocaine. In one chapter, they addressed the drop in the crime rate in the 1990s. They rejected several theories before concluding that the legalization of abortion accounted for the drop. In one paragraph in that chapter, they commented on John Lott’s theory that allowing more guns into the hands of law-abiding citizens led to the reduction in crime. In addition to noting a “troubling allegation” that Lott fabricated survey data, the authors stated that other scholars tried to “replicate” his results without success. Lott brought a defamation action against Levitt, alleging that “replicate” has a specific meaning within the academic community. Applying that meaning, the statement really means Lott fabricated his results. Lott amended his complaint to add a count of defamation based on an e-mail sent by Levitt. The district court dismissed the count based on the book, holding that it could reasonably be read as not an accusation of dishonesty. Several months later, the parties settled the count based on the e-mail and Lott moved to reconsider the earlier dismissal, claiming that Virginia instead of Illinois law should have been applied. The district court concluded that Lott waived the choice-of-law argument. Lott appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Evans and Sykes affirmed. The Court first addressed the choice-of-law issue and held that Lott waived it. The Court rejected Lott’s argument that he agreed only that Illinois’ choice-of-law principles, not substantive law, applied. Lott relied on Illinois law throughout the proceedings below – he doesn’t get a mulligan. Moving on to the substantive Illinois law of defamation, the Court noted that even statements that amount to per se defamation are not necessarily actionable. A statement is not actionable if, giving the words their natural meaning, it is reasonably capable of an innocent construction. The fact that a court must accept as true the facts alleged in plaintiff’s complaint does not alter the analysis. The determination of the meaning of a statement and whether it is susceptible of an innocent construction is a question of law. Here, although Lott makes out a case for a defamatory meaning by giving “replicate” an academic definition, the Court looked at the context of the statement and a natural definition of replicate in finding that an innocent construction was reasonable. Finally, the Court rejected Lott’s argument that he had a claim for per quod defamation, that is, defamation in which damages must be alleged and proved. Lott failed to allege special damages with enough specificity in either his original or amended complaint.