Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Commentary : In Their Opinion : Lawyer & Attorney Michael E. Rigney : Kelley Drye & Warren Law Firm

FREDA v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE (August 26, 2011)

In 1985, Pizza Hut wanted to switch to a sausage made under a process developed by C&F. Since C&F could not satisfy Pizza Hut’s purchase needs, C&F disclosed its process to Pizza Hut under a confidentiality agreement and also licensed its process to several of Pizza Hut's other suppliers. C&F brought suit against Pizza Hut and IBP in 1993, alleging that Pizza Hut shared the sausage process with IBP without a license agreement and started buying its sausage from IBP. It alleged that Pizza Hut misappropriated and disclosed trade secrets and that it suffered lost profits and lost opportunities. The district court dismissed the claims against Pizza Hut but assessed over $10 million in damages against IBP. After an appellate court affirmed the damages award, IBP paid the judgment. C&F treated $2.86 million of the judgment as ordinary income on its determination that that reflected its lost profits. It treated the rest as capital gains. The appellate court also reversed the dismissal of Pizza Hut and remanded the case. The parties settled that claim for $15 million. C&F characterized the $6 million it realized from the settlement as a trade secret sale and reported it as long-term capital gain. Its shareholders did the same. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued notices of deficiency to the shareholders, asserting that the $6 million should be treated as ordinary income. After a one-day trial, Judge Chiechi (U.S. Tax Ct.) sustained the Commissioner’s determination. The court rejected the arguments that the settlement proceeds were for damage to a capital asset (C&F's trade secrets) and that the settlement proceeds reflected the sale of a capital asset.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Flaum, Manion (dissenting), and Tinder affirmed. Although the Court conceded that the "origin of the claim" doctrine was not directly applicable, it concluded that its underlying principles were. Under that doctrine, settlement proceeds are to be classified based on the nature of the action settled. The Court concluded that the Tax Court's finding of fact that the settlement was for lost profits, lost opportunities, operating losses, and expenditures was not clearly erroneous. Under that finding, the shareholders' argument that the settlement was for damages to a capital asset was rejected. The shareholders had the burden of demonstrating that the settlement proceeds were for something other than that. That they failed to do. The Court also rejected the sale of a capital asset argument. It found no support in the record for such a conclusion.

Judge Manion dissented. Although he concurred with the panel's treatment of the asset sale argument, he believed that the settlement proceeds should be treated as a recovery of value lost when a trade secret was misappropriated. Under his understanding, the Tax Court misread the complaint. Although the complaint did seek lost profits, Judge Manion pointed out that the complaint was filed against both Pizza Hut and IBP. The claim against IBP was for lost profits. The claim remaining after the IBP settlement was a trade secret misappropriation claim. The Pizza Hut settlement was compensation for its diminished value and should have been treated as capital gains.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

BLOOMFIELD STATE BANK v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (May 11, 2011)

Bloomfield State Bank made a mortgage loan secured by real estate and all rents directly or indirectly related to the real estate. A few years later, the mortgagor defaulted and the IRS filed a tax lien against the real property. A court-appointed receiver rented some of the property the following year. The IRS filed for a declaratory judgment that its tax lien had priority over the Bank's lien with respect to the rental income. Judge McKinney (S.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to the IRS. The Bank appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Wood, and Tinder reversed and remanded. The federal tax law gives a security interest priority over a tax lien only when the secured property is in existence at the time of the lien. The IRS argues that the "property" referred to in the statute is the rent itself -- which was not in existence at the time of the tax lien. The Bank argues that the "property" referred to in the statute is the real estate -- which was in existence at the time of the tax lien. The Court noted that there were no reported appellate decisions on the issue and inconsistent lower court rulings. The Court concluded that the statute was clear and the government was wrong. The statute's reference to property is a reference to the property that is the source of the value to repay the loan, not the proceeds from that value. Here, the source of the value is the real property. The real property existed when the mortgage was issued, long before the tax lien was filed. The rental income belongs to the Bank.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

COLE v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE (March 28, 2011)

Scott Cole is a licensed attorney in Indiana, specializing in business law and tax consulting. Beginning in the 1990s, Scott and his brother, also an attorney, created what the court referred to as a "web of corporate and partnership entities serving dubious purposes." In 2001, Scott's law practice had a banner year. He received $1.2 million that year from one client alone. But when Scott and his wife Jennifer filed their joint tax return for 2001, they reported only about $100,000 total income. The IRS conducted an audit. The Coles kept very few records, requiring the IRS to reconstruct their earnings indirectly. They used both the "specific items" and "bank deposits" methods. The former looks for specific amounts of unreported income and the latter assumes that money in a taxpayer's account is income. The IRS ultimately concluded that the Coles underreported their income by over $2.5 million. They assessed a deficiency of over $500,000 and imposed a fraud penalty of over $400,000. The Coles petitioned the Tax Court for relief. The Tax Court found against the Coles and assessed the same deficiency and fraud penalty calculated by the IRS. The court found that: a) the IRS was justified in its indirect income reconstruction because of the Coles’ failure to maintain adequate records, b) the indirect reconstruction was reasonable, and c) there was "clear and convincing" evidence of fraud. The Coles appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Tinder, and Hamilton affirmed. The Court first noted that the Coles waived most of the issues they raised in their 71-page brief because they failed to adequately develop the arguments. The Court identified two issues (of 15 total) that the Coles adequately developed -- whether the Tax Court was wrong in a finding that they omitted income and whether the Tax Court was wrong in finding fraud. On the first issue, the Coles have a heavy burden. An IRS deficiency assessment is entitled to a presumption of correctness and the Court's review of the Tax Court's findings of fact is under a clearly erroneous standard. The Court concluded that the Coles failed to overcome the presumption and failed to show any clear error. On the fraud issue, the Coles have a somewhat lighter burden. Although the clearly erroneous standard still governs the Court's review, there is no presumption of fraud. Instead, the IRS must prove fraud by "clear and convincing evidence." In order to meet that burden, the IRS must show that the taxpayer had specific intent to evade the tax. The IRS can show that intent with circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court and other courts have identified certain "badges of fraud" that can be used in making a circumstantial case: a double set of books, false entries, destruction of records, covering up income, understatement, failure to file, filing late, co-mingling assets, and failing to keep adequate records. Courts also are allowed to consider a taxpayer's education and intelligence. Here, the Tax Court relied on the Coles’ education and intelligence (Scott is a lawyer, Jennifer is an accountant), their income understatement, their elaborate corporate structures, their failure to maintain adequate records, the co-mingling of business and personal assets, and their concealing of assets. The Court found no clear error in the Tax Court's fraud finding.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

CAVOTO v. HAYES (February 28, 2011)

When Susan and Robert Cavoto were experiencing financial difficulties, they turned to Susan’s mother, Mary Hayes. Hayes allowed the couple to accumulate $30,000 in debt on her American Express credit card. Although the couple later separated, Cavoto told Hayes that he would repay her -- but he didn't. Hayes made unsuccessful attempts to recover the debt. So she took a bad debt deduction on her 2006 tax return and filed a 1099-C form, which identified the amount of the discharged debt and the debtor. The IRS notified Cavoto that he could be liable for additional taxes because of the discharged debt. Cavoto brought suit against Hayes under § 7434, which creates a cause of action against a person who "willfully files a fraudulent information return." Cavoto argued both that Hayes’ information return was fraudulent because the information was not accurate and because, even if the information was accurate, she was not required to file the form. Hayes counterclaimed for the $30,000. Judge Coar (N.D. Ill.) rejected the latter argument. Even if Hayes was not required to file the form, doing so accurately was not fraudulent. After a bench trial, the court found for Hayes on both the complaint and her counterclaim. Cavoto appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Rovner, and Sykes affirmed -- but on different grounds. Section 7434 creates a cause of action for the filing of some, but not all, fraudulent information returns. The statute lists nine types of returns that are covered -- cancellation of indebtedness is not one of them. The court should have dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. With respect to the counterclaim, the Court found no clear error in the district court's decision.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

BEARD v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE (January 26, 2011)

In 2000, the IRS invalidated Son-of-BOSS transactions. Simply put, a Son-of-BOSS transaction is one in which the taxpayer reduces his tax liability by inflating the basis in a partnership before he sells his interest. For example, a taxpayer can achieve the inflated basis by contributing the proceeds of and obligation to consummate a short sale to the partnership. He then increases the basis by the amount of the proceeds without reducing the basis to account for the liability to close. In 1999, Kenneth Beard allegedly engaged in such a transaction. He participated in a short sale involving treasury notes, used the proceeds to buy treasury notes, and transferred both the notes and the obligation to close the short sale to two companies he owned. He then sold his interest in the companies. On their 1999 tax return, Beard and his wife reported long-term capital gains on the sale of the companies but used the inflated basis (increased by the amount of short sale proceeds contributed) to calculate their tax liability. Almost 6 years later, the IRS challenged the return and reduced the amount of the basis by the amount of the short sale proceeds. The Beards contested the recalculation. Instead of challenging the factual basis for the recalculation, however, the Beards raised a statute of limitations defense on the alleged facts. They argued that the alleged overstatement of basis does not trigger the longer six-year statute of limitations for an omission from gross income. The tax court granted summary judgment to the Beards. The Commissioner appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Rovner, Evans, and Williams reversed. The Court began with the Supreme Court's decision in Colony, on which the tax court relied. In Colony, the Supreme Court held that an overstatement of basis was not an omission from gross income and did not trigger the longer statute of limitations. The Supreme Court was interpreting the predecessor to the current statute of limitations section in the Code, but the current Code uses much the same language. Since the Code revision, some federal courts have concluded that a basis overstatement can be an omission from income notwithstanding Colony. Other courts have followed Colony. The Court decided that Colony was not controlling both because of its unique facts and the added language in the Code revisions suggesting that the purpose of the extension was to give the IRS additional time when the taxpayer's return provided no clue to the additional income. Without Supreme Court authority, the Court turned to the language of the Code. Relying on the Code’s definition of "gross income" and general rules of statutory construction, the Court concluded that an inflation of basis is an omission of gross income in that it leaves out an amount that could be included in the return's gross income. In its plain meaning approach, the Court specifically rejected the "underwater archaeology" (i.e., a deep dive into legislative history) engaged in by the Federal and Ninth Circuits in arriving at a contrary conclusion.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

IN RE: MEYERS (August 2, 2010)

Andrea Meyers filed a Chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy relief on September 25, 2007. Months later, she received federal and state tax refunds for the 2007 tax year totaling $3,538. The bankruptcy Trustee moved for the turnover of the pre-petition share of the refunds. Since September 25 was 73.42% into the year as a whole, the Trustee asked for 73.42% of the refunds (or $2597.60). After a reduction related to Illinois' wild-card exemption, the Trustee sought $973.60. Meyers objected. The bankruptcy court sided with the Trustee and the district court affirmed. Meyers appeals.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Flaum and Wood and District Judge St. Eve affirmed. Allocation of assets and liabilities is generally fairly simple in a bankruptcy context. Pre-petition assets satisfy pre-petition debts. Post-petition assets are generally not at risk and post-petition liabilities are not discharged. Tax refunds, however, do not fit neatly into this generalization. Courts have long recognized that tax refunds can be pre-petition assets. The sometimes difficult question can be how to allocate a single tax refund into pre-and post-petition shares. The Court recognized that reasonable people can identify any number of methods to do so. Here, the Trustee proposed the pro-rata approach -- 73.42% of the year had passed when Meyers filed her petition so 73.42% of the refund belongs to the bankruptcy estate. Meyers, on the other hand, proposed a formula under which the Trustee received a portion of the refund but only to the extent that the taxes withheld before the petition was filed exceeded the entire year's tax liability (a formula that was adopted by a bankruptcy court in Texas in 2006). In order to select from the competing proposals, the Court turned its attention to the Trustee's burden. It adopted the approach that had been used under the old Bankruptcy Act. The Trustee first has the burden of a prima facie case. Assuming a prima facie case, the debtor has the opportunity to challenge that case. The ultimate burden of persuasion rests with the Trustee. Applying that approach to the facts of the case, the Court concluded that the Trustee had made its prima facie showing. It identified the refund, the established that Meyer's income and withholding grew relatively steadily throughout the year without any spikes, and properly calculated the estate's pro-rata share. Turning to Meyer's challenge, the Court found it wanting. She offered no evidence that suggested a pro-rata approach was unreasonable. All she did was propose an approach that had been used once before -- and used in a case where the debtors' income and withholding did not grow steadily throughout the year. The Court conceded that the pro-rata approach might not be appropriate in every case, but concluded that it was reasonable in Meyer’s case.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments (1)
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

KOVACS v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (July 29, 2010)

Nancy Kovacs accumulated some federal income tax liability in the early 1990s. She entered into an agreement with the IRS in 1996 to resolve those liabilities. The agreement required her to pay her tax liabilities on time for the ensuing five years. She was unable to do so. The IRS terminated the agreement and reinstated the tax liability in 2001. Several months later, Kovacs filed for bankruptcy. In late 2001, she received a bankruptcy discharge. The discharge included her tax liabilities. Notwithstanding the discharge, the IRS continued to demand payment. It even applied some overpaid taxes to the obligation. Kovacs' attorney originally misunderstood the impact of the discharge, thought she still owed taxes, and attempted to reach another agreement with the IRS. The IRS continued to demand payment until August of 2003, when it informed Kovacs’ attorneys that the tax liability had indeed been discharged. Remarkably, the IRS sent two more letters -- in September of 2003 -- indicating that the taxes were still owed. Kovacs brought an adversary complaint in bankruptcy seeking damages for the attorneys’ fees she incurred. The bankruptcy court denied the IRS' motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds and the case was tried. The bankruptcy court awarded $25,000 in damages. The district court remanded for a determination of the timeliness of the suit under § 7433 of the Internal Revenue Code, which has a two year statute of limitations. It did not address the bankruptcy court's alternative holding that it had authority under §§ 105 and 106 of the bankruptcy code, which has no limitations period. On remand, the bankruptcy court concluded that the cause of action accrued in July 2002 and dismissed her claim for failure to bring it within the two year statute of limitations. Judge Stadtmueller (E.D. Wis.) affirmed. Kovacs appeals.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Flaum and Wood and District Judge St. Eve affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court conceded that § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code has no statute of limitations and grants broad power to a bankruptcy court, including the power to issue any order necessary to carry out the provisions of the code. Nevertheless, § 7433 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that "notwithstanding [§ 105]", it "shall be the exclusive remedy for recovering damages" resulting from the IRS' willful violation of a discharge injunction. The Court concluded that the language of § 7433 was "exceedingly clear" and was thus the only section under which Kovacs could proceed. The Court therefore applied to the section's two year statute of limitations to Kovacs' claims. Her claims accrued when she had a reasonable opportunity to discover the elements of her claim. The Court agreed with the bankruptcy court that Kovacs had that opportunity when she received six notices of intent to levy in July of 2002. The result does not change because of the mistake of her counsel. The Court therefore affirmed the dismissal of the claims based on the July communications. There were two other communications, however, that did occur within the limitations period. The Court found that each of the September letters was a discreet violation of the discharge injunction. They both stated that Kovacs still owed the full amount of her discharged tax liabilities. The Court rejected Kovacs' continuing violation theory because the September letters were not part of a series of acts that resulted in an injury -- they were discrete acts themselves. Kovacs' claims based on those two September letters are not time barred.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

LANTZ v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE (June 8, 2010)

Kathy Lantz was married to a dentist with whom she filed joint federal tax returns. Unfortunately, she was also married to a dentist who was convicted of Medicare fraud and who the IRS accused of understating their joint tax liability. When she received a notice of tax levy and information from the IRS regarding innocent spouse relief, she allowed her then estranged husband to respond. Although he requested a due process hearing and application for such relief, he died before taking any other action. In 2006, the tax obligation exceeded $1 million. The IRS applied Lantz’ 2005 income tax refund of $3200 to her tax liability. Unemployed and poor, she applied for innocent spouse relief. The IRS rejected her application because she had failed to apply within two years from the notice of intent to levy. The Tax Court invalidated the two-year deadline. The Commissioner appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Flaum, and Williams reversed and remanded. Section 6015 of the Internal Revenue Code provides several avenues of relief to innocent spouses. Subsection (b) relief requires that the spouse have had no reason to know of the understatement. Subsection (c) relief requires that the spouse no longer be married to the person with whom he or she filed. Both subsections (b) and (c) contain a statutory two-year limitations period. Subsection (f), under which Lantz applied, contains no statutory limitations period. It provides that the IRS may grant innocent spouse relief when it is not available under either subsection (b) or (c) and is otherwise equitable under all the facts and circumstances. The Treasury Department, by regulation, imposed a two-year deadline on subsection (f). The Court found nothing improper with the Department's action. First of all, the fact that Congress did not include a limitations period does not mean that it intended the statute not have one. The Court noted that borrowing a statute of limitations from another statute is a common judicial practice – so common, in fact, that Congress can be assumed to endorse it. Second, the subsection does not even require the IRS to grant relief. Since it can deny relief altogether, it can decide to deny relief to late claimants. Finally, the subsection itself begins with the phrase "under procedures prescribed" by the Treasury Department. That congressional delegation of authority to the Department certainly allows it to set a deadline for an application.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

AMERICAN BOAT COMPANY v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (October 1, 2009)

David Jump is a wealthy, St. Louis businessman with a variety of business interests. In 1996, he consulted with a Chicago attorney to develop an estate plan. The attorney created a family trust and reorganized many of Jump's businesses into limited partnerships. He also recommended a tax shelter, and provided the firm's opinion of its validity. A few years later, one of Jump’s towboats caused an accident that almost resulted in damages that could have exceeded his insurance coverage. He again sought advice from his Chicago lawyer, this time on how to limit his liability. The lawyer again designed and executed a restructuring of his companies. He again also recommended a series of tax shelter transactions. Beginning in 1999, Jump claimed substantial tax benefits. Over time, other lawyers and accountants became familiar with these transactions and raised no objections. The IRS eventually caught wind of these shelters and determined them to be illegal. It discovered the involvement of one of Jump's partnerships during its investigation and determined that the shelter was invalid. It issued a Notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment, adjusting the partnership's basis of its towboats, and imposed an accuracy-related penalty of forty percent. On judicial review, the court agreed with the IRS that the transactions were invalid but held that the penalty should not have been imposed. The penalty can only be imposed if the partnership had no reasonable cause for its underpayment. The court found reasonable cause. The United States appeals the latter ruling.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Flaum and Kanne affirmed. The Court first addressed the issue of the district court's jurisdiction, because of a recent decision in the Court of Federal Claims holding that the reasonable cause exception relied on by the district court cannot be considered during a partnership-level proceeding, which that was. Although agreeing with the fundamental premise that a partner may not raise a partner-level defense at a partnership-level proceeding, the Court concluded that a partnership can raise reasonable cause on behalf of the partnership. Thus, the Court found that the district court had jurisdiction to consider the partnership's claims that it had reasonable cause for its position. On the merits, the Court stated that reasonable cause depends on all the facts and circumstances, including the taxpayer's efforts to properly assess its liability. The Court first rejected the government's position that it is always unreasonable to rely exclusively on a financial advisor who incorporates a tax shelter into a plan for restructuring. Considering the facts and circumstances, the Court concluded that the district court did not clearly err in finding reasonable cause: Jump sought advice from a reputable (at the time) attorney, he had no reason to believe the advice was wrong, the tax shelters were component parts of larger corporate restructurings, two reputable accounting firms raised no objections, and he had engaged in a similar transaction a few years earlier without IRS objection. Calling it a "close case," the Court found no clear error.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

HOOSIER ENERGY RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE v. JOHN HANCOCK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (September 17, 2009)

Hoosier Energy Rural Electric Cooperative and John Hancock Life Insurance Company entered into a lease-leaseback of a Power Plant in order to take advantage of excess depreciation deductions held by Hoosier. Because the transaction exposed John Hancock to substantial financial risks, Hoosier arranged with Ambac Assurance Corporation to pay to Hancock $120 million upon the occurrence of certain events. One of those events was a reduction in Ambac’s credit rating. If that occurred, Hoosier had 60 days to replace the surety. It did occur. Even with an extension, Hoosier did not replace the surety. John Hancock demanded performance. Ambac was ready and able to perform but Hoosier filed suit and obtained a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. Ambac’s performance would require Hoosier to cover the payment, which would drive Hoosier into bankruptcy. John Hancock appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Kanne and Wood affirmed. The Court began with the requirements for equitable relief: irreparable injury, a plausible claim on the merits and the balance of equities. The Court accepted the district court’s finding of irreparable injury and proceeded to address the merits. The district court had found merit in two Hoosier arguments: that the transaction was illegal and must be unwound and that Hoosier is at least temporarily excused under the doctrine of "temporary commercial impracticability." The Court disagreed with respect to the first prong. Whether or not the IRS allows the parties to take advantage of the intended tax consequences, the Court believed that the parties were still bound by their contractual obligations. With respect to the second prong, the Court noted that New York courts do not recognize "temporary commercial impracticability." Although they do recognize the defense of impossibility, they take a dim view of it and do not excuse performance when the "impossibility" is the result of financial hardship. If, as Hancock claims, Hoosier had the option to replace the surety, the Court did not believe that an impossibility defense would stand. If, however, as Hoosier claims, it had a duty to replace the surety, an impossibility defense might prevail. The Court found enough uncertainty in the contract and the facts surrounding Hoosier's ability or inability to replace the surety that it concluded that the district court was correct with respect to Hoosier's prospect of prevailing. Finally, the Court required the district court to re-examine the amount of the injunction bonds to protect John Hancock and urged the district court to allow Hancock to realize its surety if Hoosier is not able to replace the surety within a few months.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

VALERO ENERGY CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (June 17, 2009)

Valero Energy Corp., a large U.S. refiner, acquired Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Corporation ("UDS”) in 2001. Prior to the transaction, Valero received relevant tax advice from Arthur Andersen. With Arthur Andersen's help, Valero initiated a complex set of transactions that resulted in tax deductible losses in excess of $100 million. The size of the deduction caught the eye of the IRS, which issued a summons to Arthur Andersen seeking documents relating to its tax analysis for Valero or UDS. Valero moved to quash the summons, in part based on the tax practitioner-client privilege. The government argued that the tax practitioner-client privilege did not apply because of the statutory exception for documents made in connection with the promotion of a tax shelter. The district court originally upheld Valero’s claim of privilege, concluding that the government failed to meet its burden. On a second round of document production, however, the government again challenged the privilege and supported its challenge with a detailed affidavit. This time the district court concluded the government met its burden with respect to some documents and ordered them produced. Valero appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Rovner, Evans and Tinder affirmed. The Court noted that Congress created the tax practitioner-client privilege in 1998 as a limited shield of confidentiality. It is no broader than the attorney-client privilege and does not protect general accounting advice, even if provided by an attorney. The Court first rejected Valero’s arguments that the bulk of the documents were even covered by the privilege. Although some of the documents contained legal analysis, the Court concluded they were not privileged because they contained the type of information generally collected in the process of preparing a return. With respect to the small group of documents that the district court found were protected, the Court agreed with the government that they fell within the exception for communications in connection with the promotion of a tax shelter. Under the statute, a "tax shelter" includes any plan or arrangement a "significant purpose" of which is the avoidance of income tax. Because the privilege is an exception to the broad summons power of the IRS, the Court declined to broaden the privilege through a narrow interpretation of the exception. Given that the Valero documents addressed the structure of the transactions that resulted in a large tax deduction, the Court concluded that they fit within the exception and were not covered by the privilege.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. FLETCHER (April 10 , 2009)

Cap Gemini purchased a consulting business from Ernst & Young in 2000. The Ernst & Young partners received shares in the new business in exchange for their partnership shares. The partners preferred to treat the receipt of shares as income in 2000. The company wanted to put some restrictions on the shares to ensure that the partners would remain with the new organization. They all agreed on a methodology that they thought would serve both purposes. The shares were all transferred and fully taxable in 2000 but were restricted for almost five years. One of the partners, Cynthia Fletcher, received shares with a market value of approximately $2.5 million. She reported this as ordinary income in 2000. Fletcher left the organization and collected the shares remaining in her account. Because the market price of the stock plummeted after the acquisition, it turns out that the partners would have been better off not taking the income in the first year. Fletcher filed an amended tax return for 2000 and took the position that her only income in 2000 was the $650,000 that was actually distributed from her account. Although the Internal Revenue Service processed the refund, the United States filed suit to recover. The district court granted summary judgment to the United States and ordered Fletcher to refund the refund. Fletcher appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Ripple and Tinder affirmed. The Court first made it clear that Fletcher was not attempting to change the form of the transaction. Instead, she argued that the actual terms of the original transaction had tax consequences that are different than originally reported. The Court disagreed with the substance of her argument, however. Although the stock was restricted, the partners bore the economic risk and were the beneficial owners as of 2000. Even though the partners did not have cash in hand, the economic value of the stock was within their control. Therefore, the income was constructively received in the year 2000 and properly reported as such originally.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

BILTHOUSE v. UNITED STATES (January 15, 2009)

Alan and Patricia Bilthouse bought $500,000 worth of stock in S&E Contractors (“S&E”), a heavy construction contractor in Florida. S&E’s principal business was public works projects, for which it needed to be bonded. S&E came upon hard times beginning in early 1994. It suffered severe losses from cost overruns on a large project, eventually defaulting on the bonds in 1995. Without bonding, S&E had to discontinue its public works projects. It did file a lawsuit in late 1995 to recover its losses from the project. The lawsuit was settled in 1997 with S&E receiving no money. The confluence of the IRS regulations and the Bilthouse personal situation made the S&E losses much more valuable to them if their loss occurred in 1997 rather than 1995. The Bilthouses sought a refund from the IRS from their 1997 tax payment, asserting that their interest in S&E became worthless in 1997 and their shares were, therefore, “disposed of” in that year. The IRS denied their claim. The Bilthouses sued in district court. The court granted summary judgment to the United States. The Bilthouses appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Kanne and Williams affirmed. The principal question before the Court was whether the stock became worthless in 1995 or 1997. The parties agreed that, for loss computation purposes, the stock is considered “disposed of” the year it became worthless. The Court noted that “worthless” is not defined by the IRS but is a fact question, taking into account both the liquidating value and the potential for value. It is the Bilthouse’s burden, however, to establish the facts supporting the worthlessness in 1997. The Bilthouses rely on two facts: a) the lawsuit was expected to result in an award in excess of $15 million and b) S&E continued its construction activity on small, private projects through 1997. The Court rejected first basis. Although the plaintiffs presented evidence of the subjective belief of many that the lawsuit would succeed, the Court stated that the proper inquiry requires objective evidence of the reasonableness of those beliefs. The Bilthouses presented no such evidence – nor did they present evidence of the basis for the calculation of damages in the event of success. The Court viewed the continued projects as a closer question. Continued operations of a company can establish the potential for value. The plaintiffs again, however, were unable to demonstrate a sufficient evidentiary basis for their claim. The record was silent on the amount of private work S&E was engaged in, its future prospects, and whether the private projects would have eventually been sufficient to revive the company. The Court concluded that the Bilthouses failed to carry their burden.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

GREENE-THAPEDI v. UNITED STATES December 3, 2008

In 1996, Llwellyn Greene-Thapedi filed a tax return for tax year (“TY”) 1992. The government challenged her reported tax liability. Ultimately, the U.S. Tax Court determined that she owed an additional ≈$10,000. In December 1997, the IRS assessed a deficiency for the amounts owed plus interest and asserts that it sent Green-Thapedi a notice of deficiency. Green-Thapedi claims that she never received the notice. When the U.S. threatened to levy assets, Green-Thapedi paid the ≈$10,000 and interest through December 1997 but refused to pay the additional interest on the ground that she did not receive the notice. She also brought suit in tax court to recover a ≈$10,000 overpayment on her tax for TY1999. While her suit was pending, the government applied the TY1999 overpayment to the claimed TY1992 deficiency. Green-Thapedi brought an action in federal district court to recover the TY1999 overpayment. The district court stayed the action pending the outcome in the tax court. The tax court held that her TY1999 claim was moot because the government had credited her claimed overpayment to TY1992. The government moved to dismiss in the district court for Green-Thapedi’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies in that she never made a refund claim with the IRS. The district court denied the motion. It held that Green-Thapedi’s petition in the tax court constituted an informal claim for refund. Green-Thapedi then amended her complaint to add a claim for a refund of ≈$10,000 for TY1992. The court below found that the government properly calculated Green-Thapedi’s taxes and penalties and found that Green-Thapedi did not present sufficient evidence to rebut the government’s position on the notice. Green-Thapedi appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Wood and Tinder vacated and remanded. The Court did not address the tax computation and notice issues decided below. Instead, it found that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Once the government applied Green-Thapedi’s TY1999 overpayment to TY1992, the case became about TY1992. `The Court disagreed with the district court that the informal claim doctrine conferred subject matter jurisdiction. It held that the informal claim doctrine excuses non-compliance with certain formal administrative requirements only when those deficiencies are later corrected. Here, Green-Thapedi never filed an administrative claim for TY1992. The Court vacated and remanded with instructions to the district court to dismiss the complaint.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

KAHN v. UNITED STATES (November 20, 2008)

Shahid Khan was a partner in several investment entities. The IRS was investigating Kahn and his wife because of its belief that the Kahns had sheltered hundreds of millions of dollars from income taxes. The IRS agent assigned to the case issued summonses to Robert Greisman, an accountant and tax shelter expert with whom Khan and his wife had met on several occasions. The Kahns had paid Greisman over $8 million dollars but, according to an IRS affidavit, they could not identify what services he provided. The Kahns filed petitions to quash the subpoenas on a number of grounds. The IRS opposed the petitions and also filed a motion to enforce the summonses. The agent’s affidavit accompanying the motion stated that the purpose of the summonses was to quantify the Kahns’ tax liability. The Kahns opposed the motion on the ground that 26 U.S.C. § 7602(d)(1) prohibited the summons because the IRS did not disclose whether the IRS had referred Greisman to the Justice Department. The district court agreed, and quashed the summons. The IRS appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Rovner, and Wood reversed. The Court first recognized the broad power of the IRS to issue summonses. Section 7602(d)(1) provides, however, that “[n]o summons may be issued . . . with respect to any person if a Justice Department referral is in effect with respect to such person.” The Kahns argued that the summonses were issued "with respect to" Greisman and were therefore not allowed if Greisman had been referred to the Justice Department.  The IRS, on the other hand, argued that the summonses were issued "to" Greisman but "with respect to" the Kahns since it was the Kahns' tax liability at issue. The Commissioner of the IRS has promulgated a regulation supporting the IRS'ition.  The regulation interprets the section to apply only when there is a Justice Department referral of the person whose tax liability is at stake. The Court approached the “question of first impression” under the Chevron two-part analysis. Under Chevron, the Court will uphold or strike a regulation if it is supported or opposed, respectively, by the plain meaning of the pertinent statute. If the statute is silent or not clear, the Court will determine in a second step whether the regulation is a reasonable interpretation of the statute. The Court will uphold it if it is. With respect to the plain meaning of § 7602(d)(1), the Court was attracted to the arguments of both parties. Having found their two competing interpretations both plausible, the Court necessarily found ambiguity in the statute. In its second step analysis, the Court found the Commissioner’s regulation consistent with the statute, as well as the legislative history, and a reasonable interpretation of it. As long as the Kahns were not referred to the Justice Department (which they were not), the summons to Greisman can be enforced.
 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO v. UNITED STATES (October 29, 2008)

The University of Chicago (“the University”) is an Illinois not-for-profit corporation and one of the world’s foremost universities. It maintains two separate retirement plans for employees. Highly compensated and academic employees are covered by the Contributory Retirement Plan (“CRP”). Other employees are covered by the Retirement Income Plan for Employees (“RIPE”). Employees are required to participate by contributing a percentage of their salary. The University, in turn, contributes additional amounts to each employee’s account. The University did not report, withhold, or remit FICA payroll taxes on any of the amounts contributed to the CRP or RIPE in the period 2000-2003. In 2005, the IRS assessed the University with additional FICA taxes and penalties. The University paid a portion of the assessment. The IRS assessed penalties for the University’s failure to pay the full amount. The University again paid only a portion of the assessment. The IRS denied the University’s claim for a refund. The University filed suit. The IRS filed a counterclaim for the still unpaid portions of the assessed amounts. The district court granted summary judgment to the United States. It held the University liable for all the assessed unpaid taxes and penalties. The University appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Sykes, and Tinder affirmed. The Court started with the definition of “wages” in the Internal Revenue Code, one of its exceptions, and an exception to that exception. “Wages” includes “all remuneration for employment” but excludes payments made to an employee “under or to an annuity contract.” That exception itself has an exception for annuity contracts “made by reason of a salary reduction agreement.” The University takes the position that its payments to the CRP and RIPE are not wages, and therefore not subject to FICA, under the annuity contract exception to "wages." It also contends that the contributions are not excluded from the annuity contract exception under the “salary reduction agreement” language. The University’s position is that a salary reduction “agreement” must be a voluntary agreement by an employee to accept a reduced salary in return for the contribution to the plan. To resolve the issue, the Court considered the plain language of the exception as well as its context. It first rejected the University’s argument that the plain language of the statute and the use of the word “agreement” must lead to the single conclusion that the contribution must be voluntary. In fact, the Court found that the plain language was more closely aligned with the government’s position that it simply distinguished between salary supplements and salary reductions. The Court then “wade[d] into the murky waters of ‘context’” in the tax code to see if the context supported a different conclusion. After considering prior statutory provisions, revenue rulings, cross-references, and court decisions, the Court concluded that Congress intended “salary reduction agreements” to include both mandatory and voluntary agreements. Since the University failed to properly withhold FICA taxes from its employees, it is liable for both its and its employees’ contributions. The University is excused from paying the employees’ share if it can demonstrate that the obligation was speculative and not precise. Relying on the plain language and the same “context” it examined in reaching a decision on the merits, the Court rejected the University’s argument and held it liable for the assessed taxes.

The IRS also imposed both failure-to-deposit and failure-to-pay penalties. The former addressed the University’s original failure to withhold and deposit the required amounts. The latter addressed the University’s failure to pay the amount assessed. The Court noted that both penalties are required by law unless a taxpayer carries the “heavy burden” of showing that it exercised “ordinary business care and prudence.” The Court held that the University’s “unsupported and unreasonable” interpretation did not met that burden. Finally, the Court rejected the University’s argument that the “divisable tax doctrine” is incompatible with the failure-to-pay penalty. Under the “divisable tax doctrine,” a taxpayer is allowed to challenge an assessed tax without paying the full amount of the assessment, which is generally a jurisdictional requirement. If the tax is divisable, a taxpayer can pay the full amount for one transaction and have the result of its challenge to that transaction control the other transactions. Here, the tax was divisable and the University was able to have its day in court without having to remit the full assessed amount of taxes. Having lost its case, however, the University is still subject to penalties on the unpaid amount.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

JEFFERSON v. UNITED STATES  (October 8, 2008)

Charles Jefferson served as the voluntary, uncompensated president of the board of directors of New Zion Day Care Center (“Center”). Velma Hayes was the paid director of the Center and ran its day-to-day operations. Jefferson had authority to direct the financial affairs of the Center. The United Way provided financial support to the Center . In early 1998, the United Way informed Jefferson that the Center was not paying its payroll taxes properly. The board ordered Hayes to pay any taxes due to the IRS. By 2000, the Center was in severe financial trouble. It did not pay income and FICA taxes from early 2000 through mid-2001. Hayes reported to the board at its monthly meetings that the Center was delinquent in its bills and tax liabilities. The United Way ceased its support of the Center, in part because of the tax issue. Jefferson arranged for the Center to borrow money to pay the delinquent taxes. In August, 2000, Jefferson co-signed two checks to the IRS for penalties and interest. In 2002, the IRS made assessments against both Hayes and Jefferson for the delinquent taxes. Jefferson filed suit to recover the $41,432 he paid pursuant to the assessment. The district court granted the United States’ motion for summary judgment. Jefferson appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Williams, and Sykes affirmed. The Court addressed each of Jefferson’s arguments in turn: a) that he was not a “responsible person” under the statute, b) that his conduct was not willful, c) that he was exempt as an honorary board member, d) that the IRS was estopped because of its failure to develop explanatory materials as required by statute, and e) that the IRS failed to disclose evidence. The Court stated that a “responsible person” under Section 6672(a) of the Internal Revenue Code is a person who has enough authority over the organization’s finances to determine which debts will be paid. Jefferson had significant involvement in the Center’s financial affairs. The Court found that Jefferson was a “responsible person,” relying on his position on the board, his review of finances at monthly meetings, his securing of the loan to pay IRS penalties and interest, and his direction to Hayes to pay the taxes. On the “willful” issue, the Court observed that a person acts willfully when he acts in reckless disregard of a known risk that taxes are going unpaid. The Court recognized that the board had directed Hayes to pay the taxes but found that Jefferson had taken no steps to make sure that the taxes were, in fact, paid or that effective controls were in place. This made Jefferson’s conduct willful, even if he did not actually know the taxes were still unpaid. The Court rejected Jefferson’s honorary board member argument, noting that the statutory exemption only applied to board members who did not participate in the financial operations of the organization. Jefferson’s estoppel argument is that the government is required by law to develop explanatory materials relating to the circumstances under which a board member of a non-profit organization could be held liable for tax delinquencies. The Court agreed that the materials are required by law and that they were never developed. However, it refused to adopt a blanket rule that would make the assessment invalid as a result. Instead, the Court required a showing of prejudice, which it said Jefferson could not make. The Court rather summarily rejected Jefferson’s evidence argument, citing the substantial evidence of his liability and the fact that the evidence was relevant, if at all, only to collateral issues (e.g., his knowledge of the delinquencies).

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

 UNIV. OF CHICAGO HOSPITALS v. UNITED STATES (September 23, 2008)

The University of Chicago Hospitals (“UCH”) is an Illinois not-for-profit corporation that administers graduate medical education programs. One such program is its residency program, in which medical school graduates perform services at the hospital as part of their medical training. In return for these services, UCH paid residents a salary and paid FICA taxes to the United States on their behalf. UCH applied for a refund of the FICA taxes paid in 1995 and 1996 on the grounds that the residents qualified for the “student exemption” to FICA in the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”). In the district court, the United States moved for summary judgment, arguing that residents could not qualify as “students” as a matter of law under the IRC. The district court rejected the argument, denied summary judgment, and certified its order for appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Cudahy, and Sykes affirmed. The Court started with the language of the student exemption itself, which excludes from the term “employment” any “service performed in the employ of . . . a school . . . if such service is performed by a student who is enrolled and regularly attending classes at such school . . . .” Then the Court addressed the government’s argument that residents did not qualify under the unambiguous, literal language of the statute. The government argued that a resident is not a “student” and a hospital is not a “school” in the common and natural meaning of those words. The Court disagreed with such a narrow reading of the words. In fact, it held that the unambiguous language of the clause did not exclude residents from qualifying.
Although it found the statute unambiguous, the Court nevertheless addressed the government’s arguments that it would have considered had it found ambiguity. The government relied on the legislative histories of the student exemption and the intern exemption, the later repeal of the intern exemption, and a post-1996 amendment to the student exemption that excluded students who worked in excess of forty hours per week. It concluded that, combined, these supported an interpretation that excluded residents from the definition of “student.” The Court did not agree. Instead, it found that, to the extent the statute was ambiguous, the relevant regulations called for a case specific approach to eligibility and that approach was a permissible and proper interpretation of the statute. 
 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link