Arbitrator's Reservation Of "Right to Amend" Does Not Alter The Finality Of His Award
BOARD OF TRUSTEES v. ORGANON TEKNIKA CORP. (July 27, 2010)
The University of Illinois licenses certain intellectual property rights to Organon Teknika for the manufacture of a cancer drug. In return, the University collects a royalty. Because the royalty depends on Organon's revenue and because Organon is allowed to sell to its affiliated companies, the license allows the University to challenge the royalty rate. In the case of a challenge, an arbitrator is asked to determine whether Organon is receiving the equivalent of an arms-length negotiated rate. The University did challenge the rate in 2006. After receiving evidence, the arbitrator concluded that the rate was appropriate and issued a final award closing the proceedings without modifying the rate. He also sent the parties his final bill. In the final two sentences of his award, he explicitly "reserve[d] the right" to amend his findings if new evidence became available. The University neither sought judicial review nor reconsideration under the Federal Arbitration Act. Instead, after six months, it asked the arbitrator to reconsider. When Organon refused to consent to any further proceedings, the University filed suit to compel the resumption of arbitration. Judge Guzmán (N.D. Ill.) dismissed the suit, though on a ground neither party had requested -- that the arbitrator had never issued a final award. Organon appeals.
In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Bauer and Hamilton vacated and remanded. At first blush, the Court questioned its appellate jurisdiction. In the court below, the University had requested an order compelling Organon to arbitrate and Organon had objected to such an order. The court dismissed the suit without granting the University its requested relief. Nevertheless, the University did not appeal -- but Organon did. On the face of it, it appears that Organon prevailed. A prevailing party cannot appeal the judgment even if it disagrees with the content or rationale of the opinion. Upon deeper analysis, however, the Court appreciated that Organon was in fact attacking the judgment. What it wanted was finality -- a dismissal with prejudice -- rather than the dismissal without prejudice entered by the court. Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the Court addressed the merits. It had little difficulty in concluding that the district court erred in concluding that the arbitration was still pending. The arbitrator resolved the dispute, referred to the award as his final decision, and sent his final bill. The reservation in the final two sentences, in the Court's opinion, was nothing more than the arbitration equivalent of Rule 60(b)(2). Just as Rule 60(b)(2) does not stand in the way of the finality of a judgment, neither does the arbitrator's reservation. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, the University had 90 days within which to present new evidence. It did not do so. The arbitration is over.
Robert Anderson sold his California insurance brokerage firm to
India Breweries, Inc. (IBI) is a "virtual brewer." On the one hand, it acquires the rights to brew a beer. On the other hand, it partners with other companies to actually brew and distribute the beer. One of those companies was Mohan Meakin, an Indian brewer with whom it entered into a joint venture to brew and distribute beer in India. IBI then entered into an agreement with
William Brandt, Jr. resides in 
Bruce Golden and his wife were involved in a bitter and hostile divorce. The dispute centered principally on the division of their assets and the custody of their only child. Golden added a battlefield when he brought suit in federal court. The defendants included his child’s court appointed representative and his wife’s attorneys, close friend and neighbor, and two business associates. His claims were based on federal copyright law, RICO, and § 1983 as well as several state law theories. He accused the lawyers of defamation, the lawyers and business associates of copyright infringement, the representative of defamation and failing to maintain neutrality, and the neighbor of a false 911 report. Judge Gottschall (N.D. Ill.) stayed the copyright infringement claim pending completion of the state court divorce proceedings and dismissed all other claims -- the RICO claim for failure to plead sufficiently the predicate acts and pattern of racketeering activity, the § 1983 claim because the representative had not acted under color of state law and enjoyed absolute immunity, and the state law claims by choosing not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. The lawyers, the representative, and the friend all sought sanctions under Rule 11. The district court concluded that some of the claims did violate Rule 11 and ordered Golden to pay the defendants' attorneys' fees for the offending claims. Golden settled with the attorneys and appeals.
Peter Bezich is a 
When Lonnie McKinney fell behind on the property taxes for his 
Dr. Mark Weinberger was a wealthy Indiana physician. It seems, however, that only a portion of his wealth resulted from his legitimate medical practice. The rest of it came from defrauding insurance companies. In 2004, facing the prospect of civil and criminal litigation, Weinberger disappeared during a European vacation (read about his escapades on
Prism Business Media publishes trade magazines and sponsors tradeshows. CE Design subscribes to several Prism publications. When Prism sent an unsolicited fax to CE Design in 2004, CE Design filed a putative class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The TCPA prohibits the sending of unsolicited advertisements to fax machines. Prism moved for summary judgment, arguing that an FCC implementing order allowed the sending of unsolicited advertisements to the fax machines of companies with which the sender had an "established business relationship (EBR)." Judge Pallmeyer (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to Prism. CE Design appeals.
In the spring of 2007, a
Peter Rogan went to
Repository Technologies, Inc. ("RTI") was a software supplier. When it needed additional financing, William Nelson, a minority shareholder, offered to help. He eventually loaned almost $2 million to RTI. Once he sent a notice of default, however, RTI filed for Chapter 11 reorganization. In the bankruptcy proceeding, RTI attempted, unsuccessfully, to recharacterize the entire Nelson debt as equity. Although the bankruptcy court refused to dismiss the case on the ground it was filed in bad faith, it did dismiss it on the ground that RTI was unable to reorganize. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court and denied Nelson's request to strike, as dictum, the finding that the case had not been filed in bad faith. Nelson appeals -- RTI cross appeals. (Meanwhile, Nelson also filed a complaint in federal court seeking damages for the breach of the loan agreement. The district court froze RTI's assets pending resolution of the case, but not before RTI paid $100,000 to its bankruptcy lawyers. The court also appointed a receiver who transferred all of RTI's assets to Nelson as the successful bidder at a UCC sale. The court approved the sale and dismissed the claims without prejudice.)
John Tamburo designs software for dog lovers. He lives and works in Illinois. One of his products is an online
John Miller and his wife entered into an oral agreement with James Herman and his company to build the Millers a new home in
While on leave from a mental hospital where he was a patient, Gregory Zick was arrested and incarcerated in the
Stephen Thorogood filed a state court class-action on behalf of the purchasers of stainless steel dryers in multiple states. He alleged that the defendant’s representation that the dryers were made of stainless steel violated the consumer protection acts of those states. The defendant removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Although the district court certified a class, the Seventh Circuit
Wayne Talley used to have a loan from the
Sandra Bergquist owed money to the bank that issued her a credit card. The bank retained the law firm of Mann Bracken to collect the debt. The firm arbitrated the dispute before the National Arbitration Forum, as provided in the credit card agreement. The bank prevailed at the arbitration and a state court entered judgment enforcing the arbitration award. Bergquist was suspicious of the connection between Mann Bracken and the National Arbitration Forum. She asked the state court to set aside its judgment enforcing the award. It did so and dismissed the case with prejudice. She also filed a class-action on behalf of all persons who were pursued by Mann Bracken and had their claims arbitrated before the National Arbitration Forum. The defendants removed the case to federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The district court remanded, concluding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded federal jurisdiction of the claim. Defendants appeal.
Cunningham Charter Corp. brought a breach of warranty and products liability class action against Learjet in state court. Learjet removed the case to federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). After the district court denied class certification for failure to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23, it remanded the case to state court. The district court concluded that the denial of certification deprived the court of federal jurisdiction under CAFA. Learjet sought leave to appeal.
Rex Carr was a lawyer in southern Illinois. He and his partners had several agreements concerning the allocation of fees earned by the firm. The agreements continued in effect after the dissolution of the firm in 2003. Significant disputes arose, and a host of lawsuits were filed, with respect to those fees. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was agreed to in 2004. It was meant to control the distribution of all fees, past and future, among the partners. Notwithstanding an agreement to dismiss all pending cases, Carr actually amended a counterclaim in one of the pending actions to assert that he had been fraudulently induced to enter into the MOU. The claim was eventually dismissed and the dismissal was affirmed. While the appeal was pending, Carr brought four separate suits in state court, then brought this federal case, and then voluntarily dismissed the state cases. He brought the federal case under RICO, repeating many of the allegations of the earlier suits, including the fraudulent inducement claim. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. Carr appeals. The defendants cross-appeal from the court's denial of their motion for sanctions.
For almost 20 years, Robert Gilbert was a high school social studies teacher -- and a highly regarded one at that. Apparently, he performed better as a teacher than as a colleague or employee. The school district eventually fired for insubordination. Gilbert contested his discharge administratively. After the district presented its evidence at the hearing, the hearing officer granted Gilbert's request to find in his favor. On review, the state appellate court reversed and remanded with instructions to reinstate the termination. Gilbert, concerned that the order would not allow him to reconvene the hearing and present his evidence, sought reconsideration in the appellate court and review in the state Supreme Court. He was unsuccessful. Gilbert then attempted, on remand to the circuit court, to get the state to reconvene the hearing. Again, he was unsuccessful. Instead of appealing that order, Gilbert filed suit in federal court. He asserted a due process claim and sought an injunction to reconvene the hearing and a declaration that his due process rights had been violated. The court dismissed the request for injunctive relief under the
Maria Avila was already in trouble. Her employer, the Cook County Treasurer's Office, was about to conduct a disciplinary hearing. Avila made it worse when she told one of her coworkers that she might "go postal." Her coworker advised her superiors. They not only added a disciplinary count for the implied threat and fired her but alerted the authorities. Avila was criminally prosecuted. The prosecutor charged a felony, taking the position that one of the targets of Avila's threat was a public official. Avila was acquitted, the court holding that he was not a public official. Avila filed suit against her superiors pursuant to §1983, alleging both constitutional violations and state law malicious prosecution. Although the court dismissed the federal counts, it retained the state law claim under supplemental jurisdiction and resolved it on the merits in favor of the defendants. Avila appeals the judgment on the state law claim.
Anodyne Therapy
Stroitelstvo Bulgaria Limited ("Limited") is a Bulgarian construction company. In 2005, it borrowed almost €2 million from the Bulgarian-American Credit Bank ("
Avdo Hukic took out a mortgage in 1997. The monthly obligation was $1335. The agreement allowed him to pay taxes and insurance directly -- as long as he provided proof of payment to the lender. Through no fault of his own, his April 1998 payment was processed for $200 less than the required amount. Although the lender notified Hukic of the error, he took no steps to rectify it. Instead. Hukic continued to pay the correct amount each month, but the lender always considered him one month in arrears because of the continuing shortage. At about the same time, the lender advised Hukic that it would start to pay the taxes and insurance unless Hukic provided proof of payment. Hukic did not respond. The lender set up an escrow for the payments and advised Hukic of a new monthly payment amount. Hukic continued to pay the original $1335 each month. The lender, now Aurora Loan Services, reported the mortgage to credit agencies as delinquent in November of 1999. In early 2000, Aurora assigned the loan to Ocwen. Ocwen notified Hukic of his default but continued to pay the taxes and insurance. In January of 2001, Hukic's lawyer advised Aurora that he was paying his taxes directly and complained about negative information on credit reports. Hukic filed a multiple-count suit against Aurora and Ocwen. The court dismissed seven counts and granted summary judgment to the defendants on the Fair Credit Reporting Act, breach of contract and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage counts. Hukic appeals.
Diane Bond filed a § 1983 action against the City of Chicago and several police officers in 2004. The parties settled. The court entered an agreed order of dismissal on March 23, 2007. About a week earlier, however, journalist Jamie Kalven filed a petition to intervene. Kalven sought to modify a protective order in the case and to obtain access to documents produced during discovery. The City opposed access -- Bond did not substantively respond to the petition. The court granted the motion to intervene and rescinded the protective order. The City appeals.
Stanley Bell was sent to the St. Clair County Jail as a pretrial detainee. At the time, he was taking several medications, including an antidepressant and a sleep aid. The prison psychiatrist, Dr. Amin, met with Bell about a week later. Bell refused to speak with Amin with a jail officer present. Amin refused to meet with Bell without a jail officer present, a practice that was also required by state regulations. Bell became agitated -- Amin told him his medication would be discontinued without the examination -- Bell became more agitated and belligerent. Amin discontinued all of Bell's medications and planned to meet with him the following week. Bell committed suicide two days later. Bell's sister, Elisha Hunter, brought a claim pursuant to § 1983 against Amin, the County, and others. She also bought medical malpractice claims. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of all the defendants. Hunter appeals.
David Jump is a wealthy, St. Louis businessman with a variety of business interests. In 1996, he consulted with a Chicago attorney to develop an estate plan. The attorney created a family trust and reorganized many of Jump's businesses into limited partnerships. He also recommended a tax shelter, and provided the firm's opinion of its validity. A few years later, one of Jump’s towboats caused an accident that almost resulted in damages that could have exceeded his insurance coverage. He again sought advice from his Chicago lawyer, this time on how to limit his liability. The lawyer again designed and executed a restructuring of his companies. He again also recommended a series of tax shelter transactions. Beginning in 1999, Jump claimed substantial tax benefits. Over time, other lawyers and accountants became familiar with these transactions and raised no objections. The IRS eventually caught wind of these shelters and determined them to be illegal. It discovered the involvement of one of Jump's partnerships during its investigation and determined that the shelter was invalid. It issued a Notice of Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment, adjusting the partnership's basis of its towboats, and imposed an accuracy-related penalty of forty percent. On judicial review, the court agreed with the IRS that the transactions were invalid but held that the penalty should not have been imposed. The penalty can only be imposed if the partnership had no reasonable cause for its underpayment. The court found reasonable cause. The United States appeals the latter ruling.
Christine Muro held a Target "Guest Card" for a few years. In late 1999, she paid off the balance and requested that her account be closed. In 2004, Target sent her an unsolicited Visa Card. Muro never used, or even activated, the card. She brought an action under §§ 1637 and 1642 of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). With respect to § 1642, which prohibits the unsolicited issuance of a credit card, the court denied class certification. It concluded that Muro's claims were not typical of the claims of most of the proposed class (because most of the class members had an open “Guest Card” account) and that she had failed to establish numerosity with respect to the claims for which her claims were typical. Muro settled her individual § 1642 claim, reserving the right to appeal the denial of class certification. The court granted summary judgment to Target and denied class certification on the § 1637 claims. Muro appeals.
Kerrie Vesolowski was a passenger on a motor boat when it collided with a barge. Vesolowski sued American River Transportation Co. to recover for injuries in state court. American filed an action in federal court pursuant to the Shipowner's Limitation of Liability Act. The Act limits a shipowner's liability to the value of its ship if it can prove that the acts complained of occurred without its privity or knowledge. The Act also requires that any claims brought against the owner “cease” during the pendency of the proceedings. The district court ordered that Vesolowski’s proceedings be stayed. Vesolowski complied. After more than a year, American asked the court to find Vesolowski (and others) in contempt and to impose sanctions. The court granted the motion and required Vesolowski to dismiss her state court action. Vesolowski appeals.
Apparently, Stephen Hanes and his neighbors in Grayslake, Illinois have been unable to get along for quite some time. The feud has resulted in numerous complaints to the local police. According to Hanes' complaint that the Grayslake police officers denied him equal protection of the law, the police always blame Hanes and arrest him. He has been arrested at least eight times – and every charge was dropped. The officers moved to dismiss the complaint both for failure to state a claim and on qualified immunity grounds. The district court denied the officers' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, although it did not specifically mention qualified immunity. The officers appeal.
Pamela Hoppe, an Illinois citizen, joined a weight loss program at her local L.A. Weight Loss Center ("Center"). After just several months of diet and nutritional supplements, Hoppe died of acute liver hepatitis. Her estate filed suit in state court against the Center alleging a variety of state law claims. The Center removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds, where the parties conducted discovery for just over one year. The estate then amended its complaint, adding claims against two Center employees, both Illinois residents. The estate then moved to remand the case to state court because of the new lack of diversity. On the Center's motion, the court struck the amended complaint on the grounds that the new defendants were fraudulently joined. Later, the court granted summary judgment to the Center. The estate appeals.
Vreni Buchel-Ruegsegger and Georg Buchel were married in Wisconsin in 1951, where they lived until they moved to Switzerland in approximately 1990. Vreni Buchel-Ruegsegger is a dual citizen of the United States and Switzerland -- Georg Buchel is a dual citizen of the United States and Lichtenstein. In April of 2000, Buchel executed his final will and directed that his estate be divided according to Swiss law. Two months later, however, he ordered his bank to transfer 200,000 Swiss francs to his son John. John lived in Wisconsin with his family. Buchel died two days later. A Swiss court appointed Buchel-Ruegsegger as Buchel's personal representative, pursuant to which she sought to rescind the gift. The Swiss court ruled that she was entitled to 100,000 of the francs and that their daughter was entitled to 50,000 of the francs. When Buchel-Ruegsegger attempted to collect the money from her son, he refused. She filed suit in Wisconsin, alleging a conversion under state law. The district court concluded that John had converted the funds, since a Swiss court had determined that the gift was unlawful. John appeals.
Brian French and his siblings (“French”) are the beneficiaries of the trust set up by their father. Wachovia Bank (the “Bank”) is the trustee of the French Trust. French sued the bank, alleging in Count I that the Bank breached its duties and in Count II that the bank provided false information with respect to life insurance policies. On the Bank's motion to compel arbitration, the court determined that only Count II was subject to arbitration. The court ordered the parties to arbitrate Count II and stayed proceedings with respect to Count I. French moved to amend the complaint to dismiss Count II and to lift the stay with respect to Count I. The court granted the motion on October 23. However, in response to an inquiry from the Bank, French denied that they had abandoned the Count II claims. On December 21, the Bank reasserted its request to compel arbitration on Count II and to stay Count I. The court denied the motion. The Bank appeals.
Gabbenelli Accordions & Imports ("American Gabbenelli") used to be the American distributor for a predecessor of defendant Ditta Gabbenelli Ubaldo Di Elio Gabbenelli ("Italian Gabbenelli"). Disputes arose between the two companies in the 1990s. In 1999, the two companies entered into an agreement under which American Gabbenelli retained the exclusive right to use the Gabbenelli mark in North America and Italian Gabbenelli retained the exclusive right to use it in Italy. The parties further agreed that future disputes would be resolved by arbitration. Notwithstanding the arbitration agreement, Italian Gabbenelli sued American Gabbenelli in an Italian court and American Gabbenelli filed this suit in the United States. American Gabbenelli charged Italian Gabbenelli with trademark infringement. The district court first rejected Italian Gabbenelli's contention that the arbitration agreement deprived the court of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the court stayed proceedings pending the outcome of the Italian litigation. When no decision was rendered within a few years, the court lifted the stay. American Gabbenelli served Italian Gabbenelli with requests for admissions in May of 2005. Italian Gabbenelli finally appeared through counsel in October of 2005 but did not respond to the requests for admissions. Italian Gabbenelli filed an opposition to American Gabbenelli's motion for summary judgment in June of 2007, and also asked for leave to deny the requests for admissions, which had since been deemed admitted. The court denied that request and granted American Gabbenelli's motion for summary judgment. Italian Gabbenelli appeals.
Congress passed the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 in order to prevent local interests from outweighing national needs with respect to base closures. The Act creates a Commission that recommends changes and disbands once it delivers its report to the President. The President can accept or reject the recommendations, but only in their entirety. If the President accepts the recommendations, they are forwarded to Congress. Congress can allow the recommendations to proceed, in their entirety, or they can reject the recommendations, also in their entirety. The all-or-none approach was a key component of the legislation. In 2005, a Commission made
The State of Indiana receives federal funds under programs designed to assist those with disabilities and mental illnesses. In return, it must have a system to protect and advocate for their rights. The
Apex brought a breach of contract claim against Sears, alleging Sears owed it in excess of $80 million. Sears moved to dismiss for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It asserted that Apex lacked standing because it had assigned away its rights in the Sears receivables. Sears attached to its motion a letter from Apex attesting to that fact. When Apex offered no response, the district court granted Sears' motion. Apex appeals.
Kerr-McGee received a $4.8 million judgment in 1996 against Lefton Iron & Metal Company for its costs in cleaning up contaminated property. Kerr-McGee continued to expend funds on the cleanup post-judgment. The district court increased the judgment to $9.5 million in 2003. In response to Lefton’s argument that it should receive credit for Kerr-McGee's receipt of insurance proceeds, the court invited Lefton to address the issue in a separate motion Instead, Lefton appealed.
Hansel DeBartolo was a surgeon and a limited partner in a surgical center in Joliet. The partnership agreement required DeBartolo to certify each year that he earned at least one third of his medical income from Medicare-approved procedures and he performed at least one third of those procedures at the surgical center in Joliet. The purpose of the certification was to qualify for a "safe harbor" in the Anti-Kickback Act, an act that makes criminal certain referral payments to physicians. When DeBartolo was unable to meet his certification obligations, the general partner exercised the contractual right to buy his interest. DeBartolo initiated an action for declaratory relief, claiming that the certification requirements of the partnership agreement violated the Anti-Kickback Act and, thus, were unenforceable. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. DeBartolo appeals..jpg)
Christi Turpin thought she obtained a Ph.D. from Southern Illinois University. She completed all her coursework and she wrote and defended her thesis. She alleges that each member of her dissertation committee approved the defense of her thesis. Years later, she learned that the school had not recorded her degree. When she made inquiry, several members of the committee allegedly denied that they approved the thesis. Turpin brought suit against the thesis committee members for specific performance to confer her degree and damages. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It held that the suit was actually against the State of Illinois and belonged in the Court of Claims. Turpin appeals.
Several guests at the Chicago Sheraton Hotel were injured while on
The Goldfarb Corporation, a Canadian company, does not maintain a place of business or employees inside the United States. In 1995, Goldfarb purchased 60% of Fleming Packaging Corporation, a Delaware corporation. Between 1995 and 2003, Goldfarb was actively involved in the financial affairs of Fleming but did not directly control its activities. Members of the Goldfarb family were on the Fleming board and were corporate officers. In February of 2003, the Goldfarbs and Bank One negotiated an amendment to a loan agreement, pursuant to which the lenders agreed to a delay in exercising their rights of default and the Goldfarb agreed to relinquish control of the company (which they did). One of the reasons for the amendment was to allow Fleming to complete a sale of its operations as a going concern. Fleming filed for bankruptcy in May of 2003. Plaintiff, a multi-employer pension plan, filed an action in 2007 to collect Fleming’s withdrawal liability payments from Goldfarb. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that Goldfarb had insufficient contacts with the United States to sustain jurisdiction. The court also denied a request for further discovery. Plaintiff appeals.
In one case, several hundred Argentine hemophiliacs brought a class action against Bayer Corporation and others, alleging that they were infected with AIDS as a result of the defendants’ negligence. In another case, Argentina plaintiffs brought suit against U.S. companies arising out of an automobile accident. Plaintiffs allege that defendants were negligent in the design and manufacture of the vehicle and its tires. Both cases were filed in federal district courts against American defendants by foreign plaintiffs for injuries sustained in Argentina. After significant discovery, the judge in each case dismissed the case based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The plaintiffs appealed.
Two private planes collided while approaching a small airport. The three people aboard all died. Air traffic control at the small airport was under the control of Midwest Air Traffic Control Services, a company hired by the Federal Aviation Administration. The representatives of the deceased brought an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. They allege both that the air traffic controller was negligent in clearing both planes to land and that the FAA was negligent because it had not installed a radar system at the small airport. The district court entered judgment for the United States after a bench trial. The representatives appeal.
Local 150 represents over 22,000 union members in Illinois, Indiana and Iowa. Joseph Ward was its treasurer 1986 until 2007. In 1994, the president of the local asked Ward to purchase property adjacent to the local’s headquarters. Instead of purchasing the property for the union, however, Ward participated in the purchase of the property by an investment group. The group sold the parcel several years later at a substantial profit. Local 150 filed a complaint against Ward, alleging violations of § 501 of the Labor-Management and Reporting Disclosure Act of 1959 (the “Act”) and breaches of fiduciary duty. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that § 501 does not allow a labor union to bring a private cause of action. Local 150 appeals.
Ronald Smart’s non-union electrical company was awarded a contract to perform electrical work at a sports complex. He claims that Local 702 threatened the owner of the sports complex and coerced him to replace Smart’s company with union electricians. Smart brought an action against the local under the Illinois Antitrust Act. He also brought state law unwarranted prosecution and malpractice claims against the union’s lawyers (claims arising from earlier legal actions against Smart by the union). The district court dismissed the antitrust claim, concluding that it was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. It also dismissed the state law claims, holding that the malpractice claim could not be brought against a lawyer who had never represented Smart and that the unwarranted prosecution claim required that he prevailed in the underlying litigation (he did not). Smart appeals
Star Insurance Company ("Star") and its co-plaintiffs registered a $2.4 million judgment in the Northern District of Illinois and began proceedings to collect it. Star also brought a separate action to pierce the corporate veil of defendants Risk Marketing and Cebcor Service Corp. In the collection proceedings, Star sought to set aside fraudulent transfers, to enjoin the disposition of assets, to appoint a receiver and to dissolve the corporate defendants. Instead of responding to Star’s requests, the defendants moved to consolidate the enforcement proceedings with the action to pierce the corporate veil. On August 31, 2007, the court enjoined the disposition of transferred assets and ordered the individual defendants to turn over certain assets in their possession. It also denied their motion to consolidate. On October 19, the court granted Star’s motion for judicial dissolution and the appointment of a receiver. On January 23, 2008 the court entered judgment for $2.4 million against the individual defendants. The defendants appeal the lower court's orders of August 31 and January 23.
Although only in existence for two years, Enterprise Trust managed more than $100 million in hundreds of accounts. Some of the accounts were custodial only, and others authorized Enterprise to choose securities. Enterprise did not honor its customers instructions and traded very aggressively in both the noncustodial and custodial accounts. It lost more than half of the money in its care before the SEC stepped in. The lower court appointed a receiver to propose a distribution plan for Enterprise’s assets. The receiver proposed a plan under which holders of custodial accounts recovered approximately 60% of their investment while holders of noncustodial accounts recovered between 25 and 50% of their investment. The receiver also proposed the use of illiquid assets to repay the noncustodial accounts, further compromising their value. The district court approved the plan. Several owners of noncustodial accounts, who were not parties to the case, appeal.
Juli Pollitt was a federal employee with health care insurance administered by Health Care Service Corporation ("HCSC"). In 2007, HCSC stopped paying all claims submitted by Pollitt on behalf of her son and began trying to recoup payments it had already made to service providers on his behalf. Pollitt filed suit in state court, alleging that HCSC took the action it did when the Department of Labor failed to pay the proper premium. HCSC removed the case to federal court, where it was dismissed as preempted by the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act. Pollitt appeals.
Twenty-two years and $3 million in legal fees and this dispute continues. Samuel Hardige and Kenneth Nelson settled a dispute in the early 1980s. Hardige gave some property to Nashville Residence Corporation (“NRC”), a company belonging to Nelson, in exchange for a promissory note secured by the property and payable to Orlando Residence, Ltd. (“OR”). NRC failed to pay the note when due. OR sued NRC on the note and obtained a judgment. But NRC had already conveyed the property to Nashville Lodging Company (“NLC”), which in turn conveyed it to Metric Partners. In 1992, OR sued Nelson and several companies controlled by him, including NRC, in Tennessee state court. Fourteen years, three trials, three appeals, and two remands later, OR had final judgments against Nelson and his companies. Meanwhile, OR purchased the subject property at a judicial sale for $100,000 – which amount was deducted from his judgment. On another track, GP Credit bought NLC’s personal property at a foreclosure sale. The personal property included a lawsuit against Metric Partners. Although OR tried to reach the proceeds of that lawsuit, GP Credit prevailed in an action to clear its title (which was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit). After GP Credit cleared its title, OR obtained a default judgment against GP Credit on the theory that it was the alter ego of Nelson.
Robert Holmes was an employee of the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) in Minnesota from 1970 until 1992. He sued the USPS under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). The case settled in 1994. Shortly thereafter, he returned to the employ of USPS in Indiana. In 2003, Holmes filed a complaint with the EEOC that the USPS failed to accommodate a disability, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. In mid-2004, Holmes and USPS resolved their dispute at an EEOC mediation. The settlement agreement a) placed Holmes on twenty hours per week administrative leave/twenty hours per week leave-without-pay status through October 2004 and retroactive to January 2003, b) specified his salary, and c) required him to retire or resign in October 2004. Holmes filed this suit to enforce the settlement agreement, complaining that several actions taken by USPS after the settlement violated its terms. The district court granted summary judgment to USPS. Holmes appeals.
Doss refinanced his home. First Franklin Financial Corporation (“Franklin”) loaned him $135,000 on the condition that he obtain title insurance. He did so. At closing, the itemization of costs indicated that he paid $500 for the title insurance. In fact, he paid almost $1500. Doss filed suit against Franklin and others, alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act. The court entered a default judgment against Franklin, which Franklin moved to set aside. Other defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, alleging that Doss sold his home before filing suit. Although Doss disputed this fact in the district court, the court nevertheless granted the motion and dismissed the TILA count. The court then exercised its discretion to dismiss the state law claims as well. It also struck “as moot” all pending motions, including Franklin’s motion to set aside the default. Doss appeals.
Illinois Bell (“Bell”) alleged that Global NAPs Illinois (“GNI”) violated Bell’s federal tariffs, its state tariffs, and the interconnection agreement between them. Bell named as defendants GNI, its parent Ferrous Miner Holdings (“FMH”), and four other affiliated companies. The district court found it did not have personal jurisdiction over FMH and that Bell’s evidence of a “piercing the corporate veil” theory was not sufficient to confer that jurisdiction. The court dismissed FMH and entered a Rule 54(b) final judgment. Bell appeals.
LimitNone, a software development company, was pitching an e-mail application to Google. Before a March 2007 meeting, the parties signed confidentiality agreements that included a forum-selection clause naming a California county as the exclusive venue for disputes. Both agreements limited modifications to writings signed by both parties. LimitNone claims that a Google employee later “accepted” an agreement that provided for exclusive jurisdiction in Illinois by clicking on the “Accept” button for the LimitNone License Agreement. After Google developed its own application, LimitNone brought an action in Illinois state court. It alleged violations of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (“ITSA”) and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act. Google removed to federal court, asserting that the ITSA was preempted by the federal Copyright Act. LimitNone sought a remand. On Google’s motion, the district court transferred the case to the Northern District of California under § 1406(a), holding that the California forum-selection clause applied and venue was improper in Illinois. LimitNone petitions for a writ of mandamus.
Flying J develops and operates travel plazas for truck drivers and other travelers. It purchased 50+ acres in New Haven, Indiana (the “City”) to develop a new travel plaza. The City opposed the development and took the position that it was not allowed under the then-current zoning. Flying J ultimately prevailed in the Indiana state courts on its challenge to the City’s position. Undaunted, the City amended its zoning ordinance to limit developments of this type to two acres. The Flying J development was the only parcel affected by this limitation. The City held several public meetings on the amendment but never gave Flying J specific notice of them. In August of 2007, the City advised Flying J that its development must comply with the two acre rule. Flying J filed suit in September, alleging violations of its rights under the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. Flying J appeals.
David Johnson obtained a certificate of purchase for a tax-delinquent piece of land in Cook County (the “County”). The certificate allowed him to acquire the property by following certain notice requirements and by then petitioning the court. He complied with the notice requirements. Before he petitioned the court, the County realized that its determination of delinquency was in error. The County and Johnson agreed to an order, entered by the court, declaring the tax sale in error and directing the cancellation of the certificate and return of the purchase price. Notwithstanding the order, Johnson petitioned the state court for a deed. Johnson later filed suit in federal court. He alleged that the County’s failure to issue the deed violated his constitutional rights and the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, as well as various other state statutory and common laws. The court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the complaint sought review of a state court decision in violation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that jurisdiction was barred by the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”). Johnson appeals.
In 1996, Llwellyn Greene-Thapedi filed a tax return for tax year (“TY”) 1992. The government challenged her reported tax liability. Ultimately, the U.S. Tax Court determined that she owed an additional ≈$10,000. In December 1997, the IRS assessed a deficiency for the amounts owed plus interest and asserts that it sent Green-Thapedi a notice of deficiency. Green-Thapedi claims that she never received the notice. When the U.S. threatened to levy assets, Green-Thapedi paid the ≈$10,000 and interest through December 1997 but refused to pay the additional interest on the ground that she did not receive the notice. She also brought suit in tax court to recover a ≈$10,000 overpayment on her tax for TY1999. While her suit was pending, the government applied the TY1999 overpayment to the claimed TY1992 deficiency. Green-Thapedi brought an action in federal district court to recover the TY1999 overpayment. The district court stayed the action pending the outcome in the tax court. The tax court held that her TY1999 claim was moot because the government had credited her claimed overpayment to TY1992. The government moved to dismiss in the district court for Green-Thapedi’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies in that she never made a refund claim with the IRS. The district court denied the motion. It held that Green-Thapedi’s petition in the tax court constituted an informal claim for refund. Green-Thapedi then amended her complaint to add a claim for a refund of ≈$10,000 for TY1992. The court below found that the government properly calculated Green-Thapedi’s taxes and penalties and found that Green-Thapedi did not present sufficient evidence to rebut the government’s position on the notice. Green-Thapedi appeals.
Lawrence Ligas owed the government over $300,000 in taxes, penalties, and interest. Federal tax liens attached to his property. The United States brought an action in February 2004, just prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Ligas received a copy of the summons and complaint by mail but did not waive personal service. Between February of 2004 and February of 2005, the government failed to serve Ligas properly. In March, the court granted the government’s fourth request for an extension and permitted service by posting the summons and complaint on the door of Ligas’ home, by mailing copies to his home by certified mail, and by faxing copies to a fax number listed on Ligas’ pro se appearance form. On Ligas’ motion, the district court vacated its March order and dismissed the complaint for failure to serve Ligas. The court determined that the government had not been diligent in its service attempts and was not entitled to the fourth extension. The court relied on two facts – that Ligas’ co-defendant (the bank holding a mortgage on his property) had successfully served Ligas and that the government could not provide evidence of its pre-2005 attempts to serve Ligas. On the same day, Ligas sought to have the tax liens quashed. The government responded by asking for reconsideration of the court’s dismissal, arguing that Ligas had submitted to personal jurisdiction and waived objection to service by appearing to quash the liens. The court agreed. It reinstated the complaint and eventually granted summary judgment to the government. Ligas appeals.
Scott Air Force Base Properties, LLC (“Scott”) entered into a 50-year lease with the United States for property located on
Gail Kay taught in the Chicago public school system. After she retired in 1994, she brought a § 1983 action against the Board of Education (“Board”). She alleged that the Board penalized her on account of her speech. The parties settled the litigation in 1996 and her case was dismissed. In the settlement, the Board offered to rehire Kay into an available future position. In 1997, she was offered an opportunity to return to her former