"100% Healed" Policy Is Not A Per Se ADA Violation

POWERS v. USF HOLLAND, INC. (December 15, 2011)

USF Holland is a large regional trucking company. Drivers at its South Bend, Indiana, terminal are classified as either city or road drivers. City drivers have local routes and frequently assist in dock work, i.e., loading and unloading. Road drivers, on the other hand, drive much longer distances and engage in much less dock work. Keith Powers was a Holland road driver in 2004 when his wife became pregnant. He asked Holland to switch him to city driver status in order to be home more often. Holland granted the request. Within a month, Powers regretted the move. He started experiencing discomfort and lack of mobility as a result of the additional dock work he was required to do is a city driver. Holland rejected his request to return to his prior assignment, citing a restriction in the collective bargaining agreement. Powers' condition worsened and he went on unpaid medical leave in August 2004. In December 2005, he asked to return to work. His physician imposed medical restrictions, including "limited hours of dock work" and "road driver work only." Two Holland supervisors told Powers that he could not return to work until he could work without restrictions. A Human Resources manager told Powers said that she needed clarification regarding the restrictions and also asked him to have his physician fill out a "Request for Accommodation" form. Powers never completed the form. Instead, he brought suit against Holland under the Americans with Disabilities Act. He alleged that Holland violated the ADA by enforcing a "100% healed policy" and thatt Holland discriminated against him and retaliated against him. Judge Van Bokkelen (N.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to Holland. Powers appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Cudahy, Posner, and Manion affirmed. The Court noted that, although Powers brought several distinct claims, each claim required proof that Powers was disabled under the ADA. To be ADA-disabled, a person must have an impairment that "substantially limits one or more of the major life activities," or must have a record of such an impairment, or must be regarded as having such an impairment. The only major life activity at issue in the appeal was working. Powers made claims under both the “having an impairment” and “regarded as having an impairment” prongs. The Court first addressed whether Powers had an impairment. In order to meet that condition, Powers had to show that he was significantly restricted in his ability to work compared to others. The Court concluded that the evidence did not support that conclusion. Powers line of work is truck driving. The only restrictions noted by his physician related to the dock work associated with the truck driving. In fact, Powers testified that he was physically capable of driving. The fact that he is unable to perform a job where the driving is accompanied by significant dock work does not make him significantly restricted in truck driving. The Court turned to the "regarded as" prong. Under that prong, a person can be ADA-disabled if his employer believes that he has a substantial impairment in a major life activity. The Court found no such evidence in the record. In so concluding, the Court rejected Powers' contention that the company's "100% healed policy" supported that position. That policy does not violate the ADA (at least the pre-2008 ADA that applies in this case) unless the person is actually disabled.

Company Not Liable When It Had No Reason To Believe Employee Was Working Overtime

KELLAR v. SUMMIT SEATING INC. (December 14, 2011)

Susan Kellar was promoted to a sewing manager at Summit Seating, a small vehicle-seat manufacturer, in 2004. She remained an hourly employee. Keller managed about eight employees and was responsible for making sure they had their equipment and instructions and that their work was completed on time. Shortly after she voluntarily resigned in 2009, she brought a Fair Labor Standards Act claim. She alleged that she regularly arrived at work 15-45 minutes early and that she used much of the time working (checking schedules, handing out materials, checking patterns, etc.). Her sister, another Summit employee who was frequently with her during those times, claims that Kellar did not work before her shift began. Keller admits that she never told Summit's owners that she was working prior to the beginning of her shift and that Summit had a written policy requiring preapproval for overtime. Magistrate Judge Nuechterlein (N.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to Summit. Keller appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Evans (who, as a result of his death, took no part in the decision) and Williams and District Judge Conley affirmed, although on different grounds. Although the FLSA requires an employer to pay overtime when an employee works over 40 hours, the Portal-To-Portal Act exempts certain preliminary activities. The magistrate judge concluded that the exemption applied, but in doing so ignored Kellar’s own affidavit. He erred in doing so. Although she offered no additional evidence, her affidavit was sufficient to create an issue of fact with respect to the preliminary activities exemption. The Court also concluded that Kellar's work did not fit within the de minimis doctrine, which allows an employer to ignore otherwise compensable work if it only amounts to a few minutes. Keller asserts that she worked anywhere from 10-40 minutes a day before her actual shift began. That does not qualify as to minimus. In order to qualify for overtime, however, Keller must demonstrate that her employer had actual or constructive knowledge of her effort. The FLSA does require an employer to be reasonably diligent and oversee the work of its employees. Here, Summit had no reason to believe that Kellar was working overtime and is not liable for overtime payments under the FLSA.

Tenured Professors Are Not "Similalry Situated" To Non-Tenured Ones

ABUELYAMAN v. ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY (December 13, 2011)

Illinois State University classifies its professors in two ways. First, a professor is ranked either as an assistant professor, an associate professor, or a full professor. The University's expectations of a professor depend on his or her ranking. Professors are also classified as tenured, probationary tenure-track, or nontenure-track. The University conducts fairly rigorous annual evaluations to assess its faculty members’ performance. The University hired Eltayeb Abuelyaman, an Arab Muslim, as a probationary tenure-track associate professor in 2001. The University's evaluation committee gave Abuelyaman low performance scores for several years and elected not to reappoint him in March 2006. Abuelyaman filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging race, religion, and national origin discrimination. He cited several bases for his allegation. First, he complained several times to Dr. Dennis that Dennis' decision to give greater weight to student evaluations disadvantaged foreign born professors. Second, Abuelyaman supported another professor’s complaint that the professor had been discriminated against with respect to his non-renewal. Third, Abuelyaman was involved in the investigation of another professor’s complaint that Dr. Dennis improperly used his authority on a Search Committee to steer the committee to a candidate that Dennis preferred. Abuelyaman filed suit pursuant to Title VII for 1) discrimination, 2) retaliation for backing his fellow professor’s discrimination claims, and 3) retaliation for participating in the Dr. Dennis complaint. Judge Mihm (C.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the University on the discrimination claim and the first retaliation claim. He granted a motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of plaintiff’s case on the second retaliation claim. Abuelyaman appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Ripple, Manion, and Sykes affirmed. The Court first addressed and rejected the University's argument that the district court abused its discretion in granting Abuelyaman an extension of time to file the notice of appeal. Abuelyaman’s attorney attempted to file the notice of appeal electronically before the filing deadline and thought she had done so. When she realized, six days later, that her filing had not been successful, she promptly filed a motion for an extension. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding excusable neglect under Rule 4(a)(5). On the merits, Abuelyaman proceeded under the direct method of proof. His principle argument was that he was treated differently from other, similarly situated faculty members. The Court agreed with the district court that Abuelyaman fell far short of meeting his burden. First, his comparisons to tenured faculty members did not meet the "similarly situated" test. Second, the Court found that the University’s treatment of underperforming non-tenured faculty members was very similar to their treatment of Abuelyaman. With respect to his retaliation claims, Abuelyaman had to show that he was engaged in protected activity and that there was a causal relationship between the activity and his non-renewal. His first claim, that the University retaliated against him for his complaints about discrimination directed at a fellow faculty member, fails both because he did not raise it in time in the district court and because there is no evidence in the record that the decision-makers knew of his involvement in that matter when they decided not to renew his contract. The second claim, that the University retaliated against him for his involvement in the Dennis investigation, fails because Abuelyaman was not engaged in protected activity. The Dennis investigation did not involve any allegations of discriminatory conduct. Abuelyaman’s involvement was therefore not protected under Title VII.

"For Cause" Language In Probationary Employee's Employment Agreement Did Not Create Property Interest

REDD v. NOLAN (November 29, 2011)

Samone Redd was a probationary correctional officer with the Cook County Department of Corrections in May of 2007 when she witnessed an altercation in which a friend was involved. When the friend later complained that she was hit in the face with a beer bottle during the altercation, the Chicago Police investigated. Redd was initially cooperative. The officers investigating the case later found her to be uncooperative and filed a complaint that she was failing to cooperate in an ongoing investigation. Redd alleges that her "failure to cooperate" was simply her refusal to go along with the officer’s request that she lie. The Sheriff’s Department investigated the charges against Redd and eventually sustained several of them. The results of the investigation ended with a recommendation that the Department terminate Redd. On October 31, just 13 days before her probationary employment would end, Redd was told that she would be discharged if she did not resign. She chose to resign. Redd brought suit against the original investigating officer for tortiously interfering with her employment. She also sued the County for First Amendment retaliation, retaliatory discharge, and procedural due process. The City claim was dismissed for failure to state a claim and Magistrate Judge Denlow (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the County on the remaining claims. Redd appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit judges Posner, Flaum, and Hamilton affirmed. With respect to the intentional interference claim, the Court noted that Redd alleged that the complaint with the County was made not by the officer, but by an Assistant State's Attorney. Although she tries to create liability on the part of the officer by alleging a conspiracy, she offers no facts to support the allegation. The Court turned to her First Amendment retaliation and state retaliatory discharge claims. It agreed with the district court that Redd presented no evidence from which a jury could conclude that the County's actions were in retaliation for her conduct during the investigation. The Court went on to note that, even in such had been presented, the investigator was not part of the termination decision. Finally, the Court turned to her due process argument. On its face, the argument seemed to lack merit. Redd was still a probationary officer and possessed no protectable property interest in continued employment under Illinois law. But Illinois courts have concluded that a municipal body can afford more protection than required by Illinois law -- all that is required is a "clear policy statement." In Redd's employment agreement, she confirmed that she was "on probation and can be terminated for cause." Notwithstanding the "for cause" language in the terms of her employment, the Court concluded that the phrase was not a sufficiently clear policy statement to provide protection amounting to a property interest. Since she had no protectable property interest, she was entitled to no particular procedures.

Employer's Post-Resignation Statements Are Not Evidence Of Hostile Work Environment Or Discrimination

OVERLY v. KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION (November 10, 2011)

Krysten Overly was a financial advisor at KeyBank in central Indiana. Rick Bielecki became her immediate supervisor in early 2007 but their interaction was limited because of his broad regional supervisory obligations. One day, while he was working with her, he observed that she was using procedures that were not in compliance with the Bank's policies. After an investigation, the compliance office recommended her termination. With Bielecki’s and his supervisor’s support, Overly escaped with a warning and a small fine. Overly complained to the Human Resources Department about the disciplinary action as well as some sexist remarks she alleged were made by Bielecki. The Bank reorganized beginning in 2007 and almost tripled the number of financial advisors nationwide. Bielecki added one advisor to Overly's region and realigned branch bank assignments. Overly registered a complaint with KeyBank's CEO. She cited the disciplinary action and the sexist remarks, as well as the loss of territory. The Bank conduct an investigation and concluded that there was no evidence of discrimination or retaliation. Overly submitted her resignation to Bielecki on October 1, 2007. Upon receipt of the resignation, Bielecki applauded, pushed her toward the door, and yelled "Good Riddance Bitch." Overly filed suit alleging hostile work environment, constructive discharge, and gender discrimination. Judge Barker (S.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment in KeyBank's favor. Overly appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Evans (who, as a result of his death, took no part in the decision) and Williams and District Judge Conley affirmed. The Court first addressed the hostile work environment claim and concluded that Overly's work conditions did not meet the "severe or pervasive" requirement. Bielecki called her "cutie" five or 10 times, referred to her "pretty face," and made her leave her purse outside of a meeting room. None of this was threatening, it did not occur very frequently, and it did not unreasonably interfere with her work. The Court conceded that adding the disciplinary incidents to the mix might approach the actionable level, but declined to do so because there was no evidence that the discipline was related to her gender. Furthermore, she admitted the noncompliant activities. Likewise, the territory realignment was not shown to be related to gender. The Court acknowledged that there was evidence of gender bias after her resignation. But Bielecki's conduct and remarks after receiving her resignation cannot support a hostile work environment claim. The Court quickly dispensed with her constructive discharge claim since it imposes a higher standard than the hostile work environment claim - which it had just rejected. The Court also rejected the gender discrimination claim, again refusing to consider the resignation remarks as direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination because of the timing of those remarks. Finally, the Court rejected her Title VII retaliation claim. Her complaint to the Bank does constitute protected activity but there is no evidence in the record of a causal link between the activity and Bielecki's conduct.

Appellant's Argument That Local Rule 41.1 Violates Due Process Is Frivolous

SAMBRANO v. MABUS (November 8, 2011)

Cathleen Sambrano filed an EEOC charge alleging that the Department of the Navy, her employer, discriminated against her on account of her race, gender, national origin, age, and disability. Because she was a federal employee, the EEOC decided her claim on the merits and ruled against her. Sambrano filed a federal complaint repeating her allegations. Although the district court set a discovery schedule, Sambrano conducted no discovery and instead filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court denied the motion. Sambrano still took no discovery. More than a year passed. Judge Norgle (N.D. Ill.) dismissed the case for want of prosecution pursuant to Local Rule 41.1. That prompted Sambrano's lawyer to file an ex-parte motion to vacate the dismissal. The court denied the motion (under Local Rule 5.3) for failure to serve the defendant. Sambrano appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Manion and Rovner affirmed -- and also issued a show cause order to Sambrano's counsel for filing a frivolous appeal and violating Circuit Rule 30. The Court noted that Sambrano could have argued that the district court erred in dismissing the case without any notice to the litigants. Instead, her brief contends that Local Rule 41.1 violates due process. In addition to making this frivolous argument, Sambrano violated Circuit Rule 30's requirement that an appellant include the order under review in an appendix. Counsel also submitted a false certification under Rule 30. The Court concluded that counsel's conduct implied that he is not competent to litigate in federal courts. Thus, it issued the show cause order why he should not be sanctioned, censured, suspended, or disbarred.

Front Pay Unavailable When Reason Reinstatement Was Precluded Was Unrelated To The ADEA Discrimination

BARTON v. ZIMMER, INC. (October 18, 2011)

Zimmer, Inc. sells artificial hips and knees. It employed Bruce Barton as part of its sales force since 1993. Andy Richardson became Barton's supervisor in 2004. Richardson eliminated many of Barton's duties over the course of the next year, most likely due to age discrimination (conceded, for purposes of argument, by Zimmer). Barton complained to Human Resources representative Richard Abel after a negative May 2005 performance review. Able investigated the situation, met with Barton and Richardson, and ultimately recommended that Richardson be fired for his divisive leadership. In the meantime, Barton had been on vacation,FMLA leave, and paid administrative leave. In September, Barton returned and began reporting to Sherri Milton. Barton complained about the assignments he received from Milton and filed an EEOC charge, alleging that the assignments were in retaliation for his earlier EEOC charge against Richardson. After Milton criticized his performance, Barton suffered a mental breakdown. He used up his FMLA leave, as well as his short and long-term disability benefits. The Social Security Administration granted a total disability benefits claim and Burton retired from Zimmer. Barton filed suit against Zimmer for ADEA discrimination and retaliation and FMLA interference. Judge Springmann (N.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to Zimmer. In part, she concluded that Barton could not prevail on his ADEA claim because he was only seeking front pay, not reinstatement. Barton appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Evans (who, as a result of his death, took no part in the decision), Sykes, and Hamilton affirmed. The Court first addressed the Richardson ADEA claim. It disagreed with the district court's conclusion that front pay is not available because of the statute's compensatory damages exclusion. In Pollard, the Supreme Court held, in the context of Title VII, that front pay could be an appropriate substitute for reinstatement if the reinstatement remedy was not viable as a result of psychological injuries caused by the discrimination. The Court assumed that the Pollard Title VII approach would apply in an ADEA case but concluded that Barton was not entitled to it. Here, Barton’s psychological injuries that precluded his reinstatement arose out of the job assignments from Milton, not from Richardson. The Milton job assignments were not the result of any age discrimination. The Court turned to the ADEA retaliation claim. To prevail, Barton was required to show a statutorily protected activity, a materially adverse employment action, and a causal relation between the two. The Court concluded that Barton's challenging new job assignment was probably not a materially adverse employment action but that, even if it was, no reasonable jury could conclude that Milton assigned the task to him in retaliation for his protected activity. The project was important to the company and Barton's work history showed that he was qualified to complete it. Finally, the Court addressed the FMLA interference claim. The FMLA requires employers to restore an employee to his prior or equivalent position upon the termination of leave. It is true that Barton was not returned to his prior position since most of his duties had been eliminated and the few projects he had were completed. The record supports, however, the conclusion that Zimmer assigned him to the same duties he would have had he not taken leave. The FMLA requires no more.

Summary Judgment Was Error When Jury Could Have Inferred That FMLA Leave Motivated Employer's Termination Decision

SHAFFER v. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (October 18, 2011)

In late 2008, William Shaffer held the position of Director of Leadership Communications for the American Medical Association. In late October, as a result of budget pressures, the AMA's Chief Marketing Officer asked Michael Lynch, Shaffer's direct supervisor, to recommend a position to eliminate. Lynch recommended the elimination of only one position -- the one held by Peter Friedman. A month later, Shaffer advised Lynch that he had scheduled knee replacement surgery for January of 2009 and would be out of work from 4 to 6 weeks. About a week later, Lynch retracted his earlier recommendation and recommended that Shaffer's position be eliminated rather than Friedman's. The AMA terminated Shaffer's employment in January of 2009. In February, after learning of threatened litigation, the AMA's human resources representative typed up his original notes regarding conversations with Lynch and dated them November 25, 2008. He then destroyed the handwritten notes. At the same time, he instructed Lynch to prepare a memorandum describing his rationale for selecting Shaffer. Lynch prepared the memorandum but dated it November 21, 2008. Shaffer brought suit pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act. Judge St. Eve (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the AMA. Shaffer appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Kanne, Williams, and Tinder reversed and remanded. The FMLA prohibits an employer from interfering with an employee's right to take leave and also forbids an employer for retaliating against an employee for taking leave. Although an interference claim and a retaliation claim are similar, a retaliation claim requires proof of discriminatory intent while an interference claim does not. The record here shows that Lynch changed his mind about what position to eliminate between late October and late November of 2008. One event of note that occurred between those two dates is Shaffer's notification that he was taking leave in 2009. The Court concluded that a jury could find that Lynch's change of mind shortly after learning of Shaffer's intent to take leave supported a conclusion that the request for leave and the termination were causally related. The Court also pointed to the facts that the human resources representative backdated his memorandum and destroyed his original notes and that the AMA gave different explanations of its decision over time. Finally, the Court considered whether Lynch’s "November 21, 2008" memo (actually prepared in February of 2009) was protected by the attorney-client privilege. Although the memorandum was backdated and addressed to the human resources representative, the fact is that it was prepared for and only shared with AMA's in-house counsel. The Court concluded that the memorandum met all of the requirements for the privilege to apply and that the district court did not err in excluding it.

Res Judicata Bars Title VII Claim Following Unsuccessful Constitutional Claim

PALKA v. CITY OF CHICAGO (October 18, 2011)

In early 2007, Assistant Deputy Superintendent Matthew Tobias recommended that Peter Palka be terminated from his position as a Chicago probationary police officer. Matthew's father, Tadeusz, himself a Cook County Deputy Sheriff, complained to Tobias and sought Peter’s reinstatement. Tobias refused. A few months later, an unidentified person placed a suspicious call to the school attended by Tobias' children. Tadeusz was accused of making the call. After an investigation concluded that he was responsible, he took early retirement. He later brought suit against the County and others alleging violations of his constitutional rights. The district court dismissed his complaint and the Seventh Circuit affirmed (opinion and intheiropinion). At about the same time, Peter filed a § 1983 suit against the City and Tobias, alleging discrimination based on his Polish ancestry. He sought reinstatement and back pay. The district court granted summary judgment to the City on the ground that Tobias was not a policymaker under a Monell analysis. Magistrate Judge Nolan (N.D. Ill.) then ruled that Peter was not entitled to reinstatement on the grounds that Tobias, the only defendant, lacked any authority to grant reinstatement. Peter moved for voluntary dismissal. The magistrate judge dismissed the City claims with prejudice and the Tobias claim without prejudice. Peter appealed. In the meantime, Tadeusz and Peter both received EEOC right to sue letters and filed yet a third case based on Title VII against the City (by Peter) and the Sheriff’s Department (by Tadeusz). Judge Kendall (N.D. Ill.) dismissed the claims on res judicata grounds. The Palkas appeal. The appeals were consolidated.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Ripple, Kanne, and Sykes affirmed. The Court addressed Peter's appeal first. Normally, a dismissal without prejudice is not considered final and appealable. Here, however, the statute of limitations on Peter's § 1983 claim has expired. Since the case cannot be refiled, the judgment below is considered final. With respect to the judgment in favor of the City, the Court found no Monell liability and affirmed. It concluded that the two allegations of discrimination could not amount to a widespread pattern or practice and that Tobias was not a final policymaker, since his decisions were subject to review. Turning to the availability of a reinstatement remedy, the Court refused to consider Peter's argument. Since Peter requested and received dismissal of his claim against Tobias, he cannot complain about the earlier interlocutory order barring the reinstatement remedy. The Court next considered the Title VII claims dismissal. It found that the case was a "quintessential example of claim splitting." The cases involve the same parties and the same cause of action (albeit under different theories) and were litigated through final judgment. The Court rejected the Palkas' arguments to the contrary.

Two Plausible Explanations For Firing Preclude Summary Judgment

EGAN v. FREEDOM BANK (October 6, 2011)

Freedom Bank president Greg Dempsey hired Belinda Egan as a vice president in July 2007. According to her complaint, Egan met with Don Burton, a bank director, at his request several times over the next few months. At one of those meetings in September, Burton told Egan that he thought she should be the next bank president and that the directors had the power to fire anyone on the management team. He then made a sexual advance. Egan left but later discussed the conversation with Dempsey and Human Resources. Burton resigned shortly thereafter. The bank hired Dave Barajas to replace Greg Dempsey as president. According to Dempsey, Barajas told him that he had heard that Egan had done something for which she should have been fired. Barajas took over in December and hired four new employees over the next several months. Then, in February of 2008, Barajas told Egan that he had eliminated her position. Egan brought suit for retaliation, hostile work environment, and gender discrimination. Judge Reinhard (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the Bank. Egan appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Manion, Williams, and Hamilton reversed and remanded. The Court first addressed the retaliation claim, which Egan prosecuted under the direct method of proof. The parties agreed that she engaged in statutorily protected activity and suffered an adverse action. The only issue was whether she introduced sufficient evidence of a causal connection between her report of Burton's sexual advances and her termination. Although the Court found the Bank's explanation plausible, it concluded that it was not the only plausible explanation. Several things supported Egan's contention: Barajas' remark to Dempsey, the fact that Egan’s was the only position eliminated while four other positions were filled, and the fact that there were no complaints about her performance. Since a reasonable jury could conclude that the Bank fired her in retaliation for her complaint, the summary judgment was reversed. The Court affirmed summary judgment on both the hostile work environment (a single sexual overture does not establish hostile work environment)and gender discrimination claims (Egan failed to develop this claim below). Finally, the Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over a magistrate judge's sanctions order that Egan challenges. The magistrate judge has only the power to recommend a sanction (since there was no consent to proceed before the magistrate judge). Since the district court judge never addressed the recommended sanction, it is not reviewable on appeal.

Complaint Does Not Amount To Protected Activity Without A Reasonable Belief That Conduct Violated The Law

O'LEARY v. ACCRETIVE HEALTH, INC. (September 21, 2011)

Accretive Health is a Chicago-based firm that provides consulting services to hospitals. It hired Joseph O'Leary in early 2005. Although the firm was initially satisfied with O'Leary's performance, it started having reservations in mid-to-late 2006. It even replaced him at one of the hospitals for which he was responsible at the request of the hospital's CFO. In late 2006, O'Leary learned that one of his female reports had made sexually charged remarks at a company dinner. O'Leary reported the incident to his superiors. At the same time, O’Leary expressed his belief that the same female was treating an African-American subordinate in a harsh manner. A company investigation into the sexual remarks concluded that the employee exercised poor judgment but did not violate any company policy. She was reprimanded. In December of 2006, Accretive terminated O'Leary’s employment. O'Leary brought suit under Title VII and § 1981, alleging that his termination was in retaliation for his actions opposing sexual and racial discrimination. Judge Conlon (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to Accretive. O'Leary appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Cudahy and Rovner and District Judge Adelman affirmed. Both Title VII and § 1981 prohibit retaliation against those who oppose the discriminatory practices made illegal by those statutes. The Court first addressed whether O'Leary established that he engaged in protected activity -- that is, that he took some action in opposition to prohibited discrimination. The Court concluded that he did not with respect to the sexual remarks. Given the relatively tame nature of those remarks and the facts that there was only one incident and that no one present felt harassed, O'Leary could not have reasonably believed that they constituted prohibited sexual harassment. The Court concluded that O'Leary did establish that he engaged in protected activity with respect to the employee’s treatment of her African American subordinate. Although the record is not very clear, the Court concluded that a fair reading supports that conclusion. O'Leary testified that he discussed his concern about race discrimination with his superiors, that his concern was based on more than one incident, and that the conduct resulted in the employee’s resignation. Satisfied that O'Leary met the protected activity requirement, the Court considered his claim under both the direct and indirect methods of proof. It easily rejected his claim under the direct method. O'Leary relied almost exclusively on the temporal proximity between his complaint and his discharge. But temporal proximity is rarely enough, by itself, and the timing in this case does not suggest retaliation. With respect to the indirect method, the Court concluded that O'Leary could neither show that he was meeting his employer’s expectations nor that Accretive's stated reasons for firing him were perpetual. Although there are issues of fact with respect to O'Leary's performance, the record contains sufficient undisputed facts to support the conclusion that he was discharged because of his performance.

Record Supports Poor Performance, Not Discrimination, As Reason For Termination

DICKERSON v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES (September 16, 2011)

The Belleville Area Community College District 522 has employed Robert Dickerson, who suffers from a mild mental impairment, as a part-time janitor since 1999. He unsuccessfully applied for full-time positions in 2005, 2006, and 2007. In October of 2007, he complained, both at a Board meeting and to the District's attorney, that he was the victim of discrimination. Less than two months later, the District conducted its first formal evaluation of Dickerson's work performance and gave him an overall Unsatisfactory rating. Dickerson disagreed with the evaluation and filed a union grievance and an EEOC charge. The District conducted a second review six months later and found his performance still Unsatisfactory. Although the District fired Dickerson in September of 2008, it later reinstated him. A union arbitrator ruled that the termination violated the collective bargaining agreement. Dickerson brought suit alleging that the District's failure to promote him, its negative evaluations, and its termination all violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. Judge Murphy (S.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the District. Dickerson appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Bauer and Williams affirmed. The ADA makes it illegal to discriminate against a disabled employee because of his disability. The Court addressed Dickerson's discrimination and retaliation claims together. It first concluded that neither claim could survive summary judgment under the direct method of proof. The Court concluded that the record established that it was Dickerson's work performance that was connected to his termination, not any discriminatory or retaliatory intent on the District’s part. The Court also addressed the claims under the indirect method of proof. Under that method, Dickerson had the burden to show that he was meeting the District's legitimate employment expectations. The Court noted that the record was replete with evidence of Dickerson's unsatisfactory work performance. Dickerson failed to create an issue fact with respect to satisfactory performance. Summary judgment was proper.

Distinguishing Characteristic Does Not Preclude Similarly Situated Finding If Employer Did Not Consider The Characteristic

EATON v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (September 9, 2011)

The Indiana Department of Corrections employed Autumn Eaton as a correctional officer from early 2006 until early 2008.. For her first year, she had watch tour duty, which required her to walk her assigned unit and monitor the inmates. She was reassigned to control room duty in early 2007, a more attractive assignment that did not involve physical contact with inmates. She also had an attractive work schedule. In late 2007, the Department reprimanded her for excessive absenteeism and warned that she could be given a less attractive work schedule. In fact, shortly after the reprimand, she was assigned to a less attractive work schedule. Before the change took place, she took several weeks of FMLA leave. When she returned, she resumed her duties under the attractive schedule. She was later in a car accident and given certain work restrictions by her physician. Although she did not originally disclosed the restrictions to the Department for fear of a schedule reassignment, she eventually did. The Department told her that her schedule would not be changed. In March of 2008, Eaton returned from a vacation to learn that she had been reassigned from the control room back to watch tour duty. In fact, she was assigned to duty in the "worst unit" in the facility. She refused the assignment, insisting that it was inconsistent with her medical restrictions and that she was not capable of doing it. Her supervisor demanded her badge, which she begrudgingly turned over, insisting that she did not want to quit her job. Her mother, also a Department correctional officer, met with Eaton's supervisor. Although the supervisor originally advised Eaton's mother that Eaton could return for her next shift, he later retracted the statement and barred Eaton from the facility. Eaton brought suit under Title VII for gender discrimination. Judge Magnus-Stinson (S.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to the Department, concluding that she failed to make out a prima facie case under the indirect method because the male comparators she identified were not similarly situated. Eaton appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Rovner and Wood and District Judge Gottschall reversed and remanded. The only issue for the Court on appeal is whether a jury could conclude that a similarly situated male employee received more favorable treatment. A similarly situated analysis requires a factual inquiry into whether the employees are similar enough that any differences in the way their employer treated them cannot be attributed to factors other than, in this case, gender. The district court found that the two employees differed in the way they rejected a job assignment and in their disciplinary histories. Although the Court agreed that there were some minor differences in the way the two employees rejected a new job assignment, it concluded that a reasonable fact finder could overlook those differences and find the employees similarly situated. With respect to the employees' disciplinary histories, the Court noted that the record was clear that the Department did not consider Eaton's disciplinary history in terminating her employment. A factor that an employer does not consider in a termination decision cannot be used as a factor to distinguish the employee from a similarly situated employee, regardless of its significance. Therefore, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the Department.

Equitable Remedies Are Unavailable Where There Is An Express Contract

CARROLL v. STRYKER CORP. (September 6, 2011)

Matthew Carroll was a commissioned sales representative for Stryker Corporation, a medical instrument manufacturer. Each year, Stryker sent its commissioned salespeople a compensation plan that sets sales targets and described the compensation structure. Carroll failed to meet his sales quotas in 2006 and 2007. Beginning in 2008, Stryker warned Carroll that he had to meet his sales quota each quarter or face termination. Although he was short of his quota on March 31, 2008, Carroll had a sale in progress that, if closed, would put him over his target. Stryker rejected the purchase order on March 31 because it sought to modify Stryker's normal terms and conditions. The company gave Carroll an extra day to submit a satisfactory purchase order. When he did not, Stryker fired him. Within a month, Stryker had resumed negotiations with Carroll’s potential customer, modified the financing term that it had earlier refused to modify, consummated the deal, and paid a commission to Carroll’s successor. Carroll brought suit in state court under a Wisconsin wage payment statute. He also asserted claims for quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. Stryker removed the case to federal court, asserting that the statutory claim plus attorneys fees met the $75,000 diversity jurisdiction amount in controversy threshold. But Stryker then asserted in its answer that the statutory claim was unavailable to Carroll because it did not apply to commissioned salespeople. When Stryker made the same argument in its motion for summary judgment, Carroll sought to withdraw the statutory claim and add a claim for breach of contract. Magistrate Judge Crocker (W.D. Wis.) granted summary judgment to Stryker, holding that the equitable remedies could not succeed in light of the written compensation contract, and denied the motion for leave to amend, citing delay and lack of good cause. Carroll appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Manion, Evans (who, as a result of his death, took no part in the decision), and Sykes affirmed. The Court first addressed the propriety of the removal, given that the statutory damages on which it was based appeared to be unavailable to a commissioned salesperson. The Court noted that it may have concluded that it lacked jurisdiction if the statutory claim was the only claim presented. It noted, however, that Carroll included claims for compensatory damages under the quantum meruit and unjust enrichment counts that satisfied the jurisdictional amount requirements. Turning to the merits, the Court stated that Wisconsin law permits quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims only in the absence of an express contract. Although the Court conceded that Carroll had no employment contract and could be discharged at will, it also concluded that he did have an express compensation contract. Each year, the company sent out a compensation plan. Although the plan was not signed by the parties, Carroll continued to work and Stryker continued to pay him. That is all that is required for an express contract. The equitable claims were properly dismissed. Finally, the Court had little difficulty in finding no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Carroll's request to amend. It was filed seven months after a court-imposed deadline and less than a month before the end of discovery. Particularly given that Carroll was aware of the statutory problem from the very onset of the case, the denial was quite reasonable.

Supervisor Can Be A "Similarly Situated Employee"

RODGERS v. WHITE (September 2, 2011)

The Illinois Secretary of State employed Mark Rodgers as a lawn maintenance worker for over 20 years. He was the only black employee on a 27-person crew. He was fired in 2006 by Donna Fitts, the Department director and a white woman, and Stephen Roth, the personnel director and a white man. The termination arose from two or three incidents. First, a late 2005 Inspector General report concluded that Rodgers and his supervisor, Dave Rusciolelli, who is white, allowed their crewmembers to use state-owned equipment on personal time. The department recommended a 3-day suspension for Rusciolelli and an 18-day suspension for Rodgers, although neither suspension was ever implemented. Second, in early 2006, Fitts discovered that Rogers, Rusciolelli, and a third man, a white crew supervisor, were recording overtime off the books. The Department had imposed a moratorium on overtime. This off-the-books system allowed crewmembers to work overtime in return for later, equivalent personal time off. Third, Rodgers skipped a meeting that Fitts called because he was not told it was mandatory and because Fitts had not approved overtime for the meeting. In mid-2006, Fitts recommended Rodgers' termination. Her termination memorandum cited as grounds only the abuse of state equipment and the improper overtime but her letter to Rodgers also included his failure to attend the meeting. Following arbitration, Rodgers was reinstated with back pay. Nevertheless, he brought suit against the Secretary of State under Title VII and against Fitts and Roth under §§ 1981 and 1983. Chief Judge McCuskey (C.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the defendants. He concluded that Rodgers had no direct evidence of discrimination and that, under the indirect method, Rodgers failed to identify a similarly situated coworker. Rodgers appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Bauer, Cudahy, and Tinder vacated and remanded. The Court agreed with the district court with respect to the direct method. It disagreed, however, with respect to the indirect method. The Court conceded that supervisors generally are not good comparators under the similarly situated analysis. But here, it found Rusciolelli a good comparator. Rodgers and Rusciolelli were accused of the same things, were equally responsible, and were disciplined by the same supervisor. The only substantial difference is the accusation that Rogers failed to attend a meeting but there are at least material fact questions regarding that meeting. Rodgers has therefore identified a similarly situated white individual who was treated more favorably -- summary judgment should not have been granted.

State's Significant Control Over In-Home Service Providers Makes It An Employer

HARRIS v. QUINN (September 1, 2011)

The Illinois Department of Human Services runs two programs that provide in-home care to Illinois residents. One is operated by the Division of Rehabilitation Services and the other is operated by the Division of Developmental Disabilities. In both programs, eligible individuals work with program counselors to develop individual service plans. In the Rehabilitation Program, once a service plan is in place, the eligible individual may select any qualified personal assistant to implement the plan. The individual and the assistant enter into employment agreement, the terms of which are dictated by the Department. In 2003, after the Illinois legislature passed a law designating the personal assistants as state employees for collective bargaining purposes, a majority of the Rehabilitation Program personal assistants voted to unionize. A majority of the Disability Program personal assistants rejected unionization. The collective bargaining agreement between the Rehabilitation Program Union and the State contains a "fair share" provision that requires personal assistants who are not members of the union to pay a proportionate share of the collective bargaining costs. In 2010, personal assistants from both programs filed suit against the Governor and the unions. They alleged that the fair share fees violated the First Amendment. The Disability Program personal assistants alleged that they were harmed by the threat of a future agreement. Judge Johnson-Coleman (N.D. Ill.) dismissed the Rehabilitation Program claim for failure to state a claim and dismissed the Disability Program claim on jurisdictional grounds. The personal assistants appeal.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Manion, Wood, and Hamilton affirmed and remanded. The Court first addressed the Rehabilitation Program plaintiffs. It remarked that there is a long line of Supreme Court cases approving fair share agreements. The Court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the Supreme Court cases were not controlling because the personal assistants are employees of the patients, not the state. The Court relied on the ordinary definition of employer -- one who directs the activities of a worker under a contract and pays his wages -- as well as the concept that an employee can have more than one employer. The Court gave the legislative designation no weight but, instead, looked at the State's relationship to the personal assistants. It concluded that the state has significant control -- it sets qualifications, defines job responsibilities through the service plan, and pays the wages, among other things. The Court concluded that this significant amount of control made the State an employer. It also rejected plaintiffs' argument that the Supreme Court cases should not apply because of their unique circumstances. The Court turned to the Disabilities Program personal assistants’ claim. It agreed with the district court that that claim was not ripe in that it rested on future events that may or may not occur. The Court did conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the Disability Program claim with prejudice. A claim dismissed on ripeness grounds is typically dismissed without prejudice. The Court remanded for the proper dismissal.

Pregnancy Complication Is Not A Substantial Limitation On A Major Life Activity Under The ADA

SEREDNYJ v. BEVERLY HEALTHCARE (August 26, 2011)

Beverly Healthcare hired Victoria Seredynj as activity director at its Golden Living nursing home in Valparaiso, Indiana in 2006. Included within Seredynj's duties were several that were physically strenuous. Other employees frequently helped Seredynj with those duties. Seredynj learned that she was pregnant in January of 2007. She informed her supervisor and continued with her normal tasks. After a few months, however, she developed complications. Her doctor told her not to engage in strenuous activities. Under Beverly's modified work policy, Seredynj was not entitled to any restricted or limited duty. She was therefore told that she would not be allowed to return to work until she was released to full duty. Beverly terminated Seredynj's employment in March. Her attorney soon thereafter requested an Americans with Disabilities Act or Pregnancy Discrimination Act accommodation. Beverly declined. Seredynj filed suit against Beverly alleging gender discrimination under Title VII, pregnancy discrimination under the PDA, disability discrimination under the ADA, and retaliation. Judge Miller (N.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to Beverly. Seredynj appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judge Bauer and District Judge Young affirmed. The Court first addressed the PDA and Title VII claims. The legal analysis is the same for both. Seredynj proceeded under both the direct and indirect methods of proof. The Court rejected Seredynj's argument that Beverly's modified work policy, which only accommodates ADA-disabled employees, was evidence of discrimination. The PDA only requires that employers treat pregnant employees the same as non-pregnant employees. Beverly’s work policy does just that and is not direct evidence of discrimination. The Court also rejected her argument that Beverly's refusal to accommodate her, given that other employees frequently assisted her with strenuous tasks before her pregnancy, was direct evidence of discrimination,. The Court pointed out that voluntary assistance is materially different than a formal accommodation. The Court concluded that she failed under the direct method. Under the indirect method, Seredynj had the burden to show that a similarly situated non-pregnant employee was treated more favorably. None of the individuals suggested by Seredynj, however, were similarly situated. Her indirect claim must fail. Summary judgment was properly granted on the gender and pregnancy discrimination claims. The court turned to the ADA. It's first inquiry was whether she was disabled under the Act, an issue of first impression in federal appellate courts. Under the Act, a disability is either: a) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activity, b) a record of such an impairment, or c) being regarded as having such an impairment. The Court addressed each possibility. First, although pregnancy is not an impairment, the Court concluded that a pregnancy with the complications experienced by Seredynj may be an impairment. The Court did not definitively resolve that issue, given its further treatment of the claim. The impairment at issue must substantially limit a major life activity. Generally short-term, temporary conditions do not meet the definition. Here, Seredynj’s condition did not even last as long as her pregnancy and did not affect her ability to conceive again. The Court therefore concluded that Seredynj was not disabled under the first possibility. For the same reasons, Seredynj was not disabled under the record of disability possibility. Finally, the Court stated that the record did not support any belief on Beverly’s part that Seredynj had such an impairment. Summary judgment in Beverly's favor on the ADA claim was therefore appropriate. The Court turned to the retaliation claim, which consisted of Seredynj's claim that Beverly looked for an opportunity to fire her after receiving her attorney’s letter seeking an accommodation. To prevail, Seredynj must prove that she suffered an adverse employment action. Since Beverly terminated her employment before it even received the attorneys letter, she cannot possibly do that -- summary judgment was proper.

County Employee's Causation Evidence Falls Short

EVERETT v. COOK COUNTY (August 24, 2011)

Cook County, Illinois faced a severe budget crisis in 2006. The County President instructed the Chief of the Bureau of Health to submit budget cut recommendations. One of the Bureau of Health functions was the Cermak Health Services, which provided medical and dental services to Cook County Jail inmates. The budget team identified Cermak’s dental program as a good source of some budget cuts. The Bureau Chief agreed to a recommendation that reduced the number of dentists from five to one. In deciding whom to keep among the five, the County looked for management experience, flexibility, productivity, and skills. The County ultimately chose Dr. Ronald Townsend as the dentist who best met those criteria. One of the five dentists who was not chosen was Dr. Carol Everett, a Caucasian woman who had been with Cermak for almost 25 years. Dr. Everett filed an appeal, which was denied. Everett filed suit under Title VII, alleging ethnicity discrimination, and under § 1983 and the Shakman decree, alleging political discrimination. Judge Kendall (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the County. Everett appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Kanne, Evans (who, due to his death, did not participate in the decision), and Sykes affirmed. The Court first addressed and rejected Everett's spoliation argument that the County destroyed certain documents containing notes concerning the layoffs. First, she did not identify any evidence of bad faith, a requirement before a negative inference is imposed. Second, the record does not support a conclusion that the documents were destroyed to eliminate adverse evidence. On the merits, the Court first addressed her political activity discrimination claim, in which she alleges that the decision to retain Everett was due to his political donations. The Shakman decree and the First Amendment prohibit firing an employee for political reasons. Under both theories, however, the plaintiff must show a causal relationship between the employment decision and the political considerations. Everett relied on procedural irregularities in the process to establish that causal relationship. The Court concluded, however, that her evidence was insufficient to establish such a relationship. Even if such a relationship had been established, however, Everett would still fall short because there is no evidence in the record that the decision-makers were aware of the political activity -- or lack thereof -- of either Everett or Townsend. The Court turned to the ethnicity discrimination claim. It concluded that Everett failed to show pretext. Although she provided some evidence of her possible superiority to Townsend in some areas, it was insufficient to show that the reasons the County gave for selecting Townsend were suspect. At most, they could show that the County made a hurried, poorly researched, and possibly poor decision. That is not enough to show pretext.

Failure To Provide Necessary District Court Transcripts Results In Forfeiture

HICKS v. AVERY DREI, LLC (August 17, 2011)

Chance Felling owned and operated Avery Drei, LLC, a hotel management company. In 2006, Avery Drei was constructing a hotel near Indianapolis, Indiana. Lisa Hicks began working as a security guard at the hotel construction site in July of 2006. The hotel opened in October and she became a front desk clerk. During her stint as a security guard, Felling paid her in cash. Once she became a desk clerk, she received her regular wages by check. After Hicks' employment was terminated, she brought suit against Avery and Felling. She sought overtime wages and accrued vacation pay. The case languished for several years until February of 2010, when the district court set a June 2010 trial date. In February, Hicks asked Felling and Avery to supplement certain discovery responses. The defendants failed to respond until ordered to do so by the court in May. Then, they supplemented their answers to the requests identified by Hicks and also supplemented their response to an interrogatory that asked them to identify all cash payments to Hicks. Their original response identified seven cash payments, all while Hicks was working as a security guard. Their supplemental response added six additional payments, all while Hicks was working as a desk clerk. Hicks moved to bar any evidence of the additional payments, claiming the late notice was “trial by ambush.” The district court denied the request. At trial, Judge Magnus-Stinson (S.D. Ind.) granted a directed verdict on the vacation pay claims and on the security guard part of her overtime claim. The jury returned a verdict against Hicks on the desk clerk part of her overtime claim. At Hicks' request, the court waived transcription fees relating to the overtime claim but refused to waive with respect to that portion of the record relating to the vacation pay claim. Hicks appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Cudahy (concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), Flaum, and Kanne affirmed. On appeal, Hicks challenges the directed verdict on the vacation pay claim, challenges the partial directed verdict on the security guard overtime claim, and challenges the district court's refusal to exclude the evidence of additional cash payments. The Court concluded that the vacation pay claim was frivolous. Hicks admitted that she and Felling had an agreement that she would earn vacation time only after she had worked for a year. Her contention that Indiana law requires pro-rata vacation pay from day one in the absence of a written company policy to the contrary is simply wrong. Any agreement to the contrary, which is admittedly present here, is sufficient. The Court turned to the cash payment evidence. It noted that it would normally review such a ruling for abuse of discretion. Here, however, Hicks did not provide transcripts of the argument or ruling on the motion in limine. Without a meaningful basis on which to review the ruling, the Court concluded that Hicks forfeited her challenge. It also chose not to conduct a full plain error review, since it could identify no prejudice -- no extraordinary circumstances -- no miscarriage of justice. The Court turned to the security guard overtime claim. In order to prevail, Hicks had to prove that her employer was covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act. The district court concluded that she was "engaged in commerce" while a desk clerk, and therefore covered by the Act, but was not while working as a security guard. Hicks argued that she was covered because Felling's operation of several businesses made him an "enterprise engaged in commerce" under the Act. The test for enterprise coverage is that the businesses must be engaged in related activities, under a unified operation, have a common business purpose, and engage in $500,000 of business annually. The district court found that Hicks’ proffered common business purpose -- a profit motive -- did not satisfy the Act's requirements. The Court noted that Hicks advanced a different theory on appeal. It found that argument forfeited. With respect to the profit motive argument, the Court agreed with the district court that it was not enough to amount to enterprise coverage. Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the jury should have been allowed to decide whether Felling Hotels had earnings above the $500,000 threshold because Felling testified that it was possible. Felling Hotels was not a defendant, Felling Hotels was not her employer, and Hicks presented no affirmative evidence of its gross revenue.

Judge Cudahy thought that Felling’s admission against interest that Felling Hotel could have had revenue exceeding $500,000 should have been enough to avoid the directed verdict. But since Hicks never explained how Felling Hotels being subject to the FLSA related to the defendants’ liability, he concurred in the result.

Seventh Circuit Rejects Inverse Similarly Situated Employee Approach

DIAZ v. KRAFT FOODS GLOBAL (August 8, 2011)

Jose Diaz, Ramon Peña, and Alberto Robles were all Kraft Foods employees in 2008. Diaz and Peña were hourly employees in the shipping department. Robles was a salaried senior technician in the support services department. They all reported to the same supervisor -- Peter Michalec. Diaz and Peña complained that Michalec discriminated against Hispanics. He assigned them the hardest tasks under the most difficult conditions and scrutinized their work much more closely than non-Hispanics. They also identified a number of discriminatory remarks he allegedly made. In late 2008, Kraft announced plans to outsource its shipping department. Diaz and Peña would lose their jobs. At about the same time, Kraft posted openings for two technician and five sanitation positions. Plaintiffs never made it on the list of interested candidates for the technician position. They claim they were not allowed to apply -- Michalec asserts they the simply failed to apply. Kraft hired two non-Hispanics for those positions. Diaz and Peña were on the list for the sanitation positions. Kraft decided to fill those positions based on seniority and neither Diaz nor Peña were selected. Robles has a different complaint. He received the salary of grade 2 employee but asserts that his position is a grade 3 position. Kraft responds that his position is a grade 2 position. Kraft concedes that two other employees in the same position are paid at a higher rate but only because they were transferred from a higher paying position and the company's policy is to allow them to retain their salaries for two years. Plaintiffs brought suit against Kraft under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Judge Guzman (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the defendants. Plaintiffs appeal.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Kanne, Wood, and Sykes affirmed with respect to Robles but reversed and remanded with respect to Diaz and Peña. The Court first addressed the Diaz and Peña claims. Those plaintiffs presented their case under the direct method of proof. The Court disagreed with the district court's application of an inverted “similarly situated employee" approach. The district court had allowed the employer to satisfy its burden by identifying a person within the protected class who was not discriminated against. The fact that Michalec treated another Hispanic well might tend to negate discrimination, but is not enough to meet the employer's burden. The Court noted Michalec's treatment of Diaz and Peña by assigning disfavored tasks, Michalec's role in the hiring processes, and evidence that Michalec told another employee that he chose one candidate because he was white. The Court concluded that there was enough evidence to submit the question of ethnic bias to a jury. The Court turned to the Robles claim. It first noted that the evidence relied on by Diaz and Peña had no bearing on the claim since Robles’ claim arose months earlier. Although the record contained evidence of some insensitive remarks made by Michalec, the Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to create a triable issue of ethnic bias under the direct method. Under the indirect method, the Court concluded that the higher paid colleagues were not similarly situated because of the company's policy to allow employees to retain a higher salary after a transfer to a lower-paying job.

Ready-Mix Concrete Employers Do Not Fit Within The NLRA "Construction Industry" Exception

LINEBACK v. IRVING READY-MIX (August 5, 2011)

Irving Ready-Mix has five concrete plants in northern Indiana. For years, its truck drivers have been represented by the Teamsters. The last collective bargaining agreement expired on May 31, 2010. Attempts to negotiate a new agreement failed and the drivers went on strike the next day. Irving announced that it would no longer recognize the union as the employees' bargaining representative and offered jobs directly to the drivers. The union filed unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB. A week after an ALJ heard evidence, but before its decision, the NLRB regional director filed a petition for a section 10(j) injunction. The ALJ then ruled and concluded that Irving was subject to the NLRA unfair labor practice restrictions and that it had violated two of those provisions. In reaching its conclusion, it rejected Irving's contention that it was not bound by the unfair labor practices provisions because it was "engaged primarily in the building and construction industry" under section 8(f). Judge DeGuilio (N.D. Ind.) granted the motion for a preliminary injunction and ordered Irving to recognize the union. Irving appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Manion, Wood and Hamilton affirmed. A section 10(j) injunction is an extraordinary remedy and should be granted only when necessary to protect the integrity of the collective bargaining process. Here, Irving does not challenge three of the four requirements for such an injunction -- irreparable harm, balance of harms, and the public interest. It only challenges the assessment of likelihood of success. Its contention is that ready-mix concrete companies are "engaged primarily in the building and construction industry" and not subject to some of the unfair labor practice restrictions. The Court noted that the Board has repeatedly held since 1988 that ready-mix concrete employers are not in the building and construction industry as that phrase is used in the statute. Irving, on the other hand, suggests that the 1988 decision is wrong and cites an earlier Board decision which held that a flooring installer was "primarily engaged." The Court disagreed and found the post-1988 jurisprudence solidly in favor of the Board's position.

Co-Worker's Hostile, Immature, And Boorish - But Not Racially Motivated - Conduct Did Not Support Hostile Work Environment Claim

YANCICK v. HANNA STEEL CORPORATION (AUGUST 3, 2011)

Hanna Steel Corporation employed Matthew Yancick, a white man, for a few years in the mid-2000s. Hanna has a policy prohibiting all forms of harassment and instructs employees to report any harassment to the Human Resource Manager or the General Manager. Yancick signed an acknowledgment of the policy and pledged to follow it. Smith worked with Brad Johnson, an African-American man, while at Hanna. Originally, their relationship was good. It began to deteriorate in early 2005. The two had several confrontations, some of which had racial overtones and some of which did not. Johnson also had confrontations with other employees. Yancick complained at times to his immediate supervisor but never to the Human Resources Manager or the General Manager. In December of that year, Yancick suffered severe and permanent injuries when a steel coil fell on him from a machine operated by Johnson. Yancick asserts that the action was intentional and brought a hostile work environment claim under § 1981. Hanna moved for summary judgment. Yancick moved for and was granted additional time under Rule 56 but was warned by the district court that no additional time would be allowed. With four minutes left in his extension, Yancick filed an oversized brief with a motion for leave to file. He did not file any of the referenced exhibits. A short time later, Yancick filed a substitute response that met all of the page and word limits, again accompanied by a motion for leave to file but again unaccompanied by any exhibits. He finally filed the exhibits a few days later. Judge McDade (C.D. Ill.) denied the motion's, did not consider his response or his disputed facts, and granted summary judgment to Hanna. Yancick appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Wood, Williams, and Tinder affirmed. The Court first addressed the procedural issue and noted that it routinely endorses district courts' strict compliance with local rules. The Court rejected Yancick's argument that he had good cause or that his failure was simply a "requirement of form" under Rule 83. The Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's ruling. On the merits, Yancick must prove that: a) he endured a subjectively and subjectively offensive environment, b) race was the cause, c) the conduct was severe or pervasive, and d) there must be a basis for employer liability. The Court conceded that the record before the coil incident showed that Johnson's conduct was immature and boorish and that he exhibited hostility toward Yancick, but concluded that it did not amount to the severe and pervasive work environment required. In fact, most of Johnson's hostility was not race based. With respect to the coil incident itself, Yancick relied in large part on lay opinion testimony that Johnson was racist to support his assertion that the act was intentional. The Court concluded that the testimony was unsupported by facts and merely reflected the witnesses’ beliefs. In addition, the record supports the conclusion that the incident was an accident and not intentional. Finally, the Court noted that Yancick failed to establish employer liability. Hanna had a formal procedure in place. Yancick was aware of it. Yancick did not take advantage of the remedies provided.

History Of Complaints Coupled With Supervisor's "Race Card" Comment Enough To Survive Summary Judgment On Retaliatory Discharge Claim

BURNELL v. GATES RUBBER CO. (July 27, 2011)

Eddie Burnell, an African-American male, worked in Gates Rubber Co.'s tool room from 1993 to 1996. He claims that he was subjected to racial discrimination during this time. After several years elsewhere, he returned to the tool room in 2003. In December of 2006, his supervisor instructed him to perform a task. When he did not do so, the supervisor issued a written warning. Burnell refused to accept the warning, claiming that he did not have time to perform the task. Burnell complained to the plant manager that the warning was inappropriate. His principal excuse was that he did not have time to complete the task. He later added that he had safety concerns. At a later meeting, the plant manager accused Burnell of "playing the race card." The employee relations manager convinced the plant manager not to fire Burnell if he signed a commitment letter. They presented Burnell with a commitment letter that implied that he was guilty of insubordination and dishonesty. He refused to sign the letter. He was fired. Burnell brought suit, alleging Title VII discriminatory discharge and retaliatory discharge claims and a § 1981 discrimination claim. Judge Kapala (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to Gates. Burnell appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Kanne, Rovner, and Sykes affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The Court first addressed his Title VII discriminatory discharge claim along with his § 1981 claim, which the Court noted are nearly identical. The Court rejected Burnell's claim under the direct method. Most of Burnell's circumstantial evidence related to the 1993-1996 period. The sum of his circumstantial evidence would not permit a rational jury to make a causal connection between Burnell’s termination and race discrimination. The Court also rejected the claim under the indirect method since he could satisfy neither the “met expectations” nor the "similarly situated" prongs of the test. The Court turned to his Title VII retaliatory discharge claim. Burnell clearly suffered a materially adverse employment action and engaged in statutorily protected activity. In fact, he complained quite regularly about what he felt were discriminatory practices in the workplace. To succeed on his retaliation claim, therefore, he needed only to connect his termination with his complaints. The Court relied almost exclusively on the plant manager's "playing the race card" comment, along with the history of discrimination complaints, to conclude that his claim should have survived summary judgment.

Adverse Employment Action Based On Hostility Generally Does Not Amount To Gender Discrimination

BENUZZI v. BOARD OF EDUCATION (July 21, 2011)

Thirty years ago, the Chicago Public School System hired Jessica Benuzzi, a white woman now in her fifties, as one of its first female custodial assistants. A promotion in 2004 qualified her to be the senior custodian at a large school. She was granted a transfer to a school that was closed and undergoing major renovation -- and was scheduled to be opened as the John J. Pershing West Magnet School in the fall 2005. In March of 2005, however, the Board of Education named Cheryl Watkins as the new Pershing principal. Watkins is an African-American woman in her forties. From their first encounter, the two women did not get along. Over the next several school years, Benuzzi complains that Watkins refused to accommodate her request for a shift change, unfairly reprimanded her on numerous occasions, treated her very roughly, demanded a fitness for duty examination, and suspended her without pay on more than one occasion. Benuzzi filed a gender discrimination charge with the EEOC in October 2006. She updated the charges several times thereafter. She filed suit against Watkins and the Board in June 2009 alleging, among the things, gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. A few days after Watkins waived service, she reprimanded Benuzzi again. When Benuzzi wouldn't sign the reprimand, she asked the Board to remove her from the school. The Board refused. Watkins was present at Benuzzi's deposition on February 25, 2010. The very next day, Watkins restricted Benuzzi's presence at Pershing and also issued a Notice of Disciplinary action that referred to nine different instances going back several months. Judge Conlon (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the defendants. In doing so, she did not consider most of Benuzzi's factual submissions because their length violated a local rule. Benuzzi appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Flaum, Wood, and Tinder affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. The Court first addressed the district court's ruling on the factual submissions. It emphasized its support for local rules and a district court’s policy to insist upon strict compliance. The rule at issue here is 56.1, which requires that a party opposing summary judgment respond to the movant’s statement of facts in no more than forty "short numbered paragraphs." Benuzzi's filed forty paragraphs but her paragraphs sometimes ran as long as 18 lines. Apparently, the district court considered only four of Benuzzi's paragraphs. The Court expressed some concern about such a strict interpretation of the standard that uses the word "short." Since both sides acquiesced at oral argument to the Court's consideration of the entire record, the court did not need to decide if the 56.1 ruling was an abuse of discretion. On the merits, the Court first addressed her gender discrimination claim. One of the requirements for her to succeed on the claim is to show not only that the reasons for her suspensions were dishonest but that they were, in fact, based on discrimination. Benuzzi presented no evidence that gender bias had any impact on Watkins's decisions. Her gender discrimination claim must fail without that link. The Court turned to her retaliation claim. It quickly concluded that she satisfied the statutorily protected activity element and that her suspension without pay was a materially adverse action. The Court also concluded that the Notice of Disciplinary Action and memorandum restricting her hours could constitute a materially adverse action and left that question for a jury. The Court acknowledged that written warnings are generally not enough to constitute a materially adverse action but noted that the context here (numerous charges, for minor transgressions, going back several months, delivered the day after she was deposed) could lead a jury to conclude otherwise. Finally, the Court considered causation. Again, the Court thought that a jury should decide causation with respect to the Notice of Disciplinary Action. Suspicious timing is frequently not enough to establish causation. But here, where the gap was so short and there were no intervening events, a jury should decide. The Court decided that there was not enough causation evidence to send the retaliation claim to the jury.

County's Elimination Of Position Did Not Violate Plaintiff's Due Process Rights

SCHULZ v. GREEN COUNTY (July 20, 2011)

Wisconsin law requires each county in the state to provide defined juveniles services through a juvenile-intake worker. Green County is a small Wisconsin County on the Illinois border. Due to its size, it can employ its juvenile-intake worker through its court system or its Human Services Department. The Green County Circuit Court employed Sheila Schulz as the County's juvenile-intake worker from 1997 to 2008. During that time, she supervised some part-time employees. She was making $26.99 per hour in 2008. As part of a cost-cutting effort, the Green County Board of Supervisors eliminated Schulz's job and created a new job within the Human Services Department with much the same responsibilities, except it did not include supervising other employees. The County hired Schulz to fill that position at an hourly rate of $19.28. Schulz brought suit against the County, alleging that its actions deprived her of a property interest without due process in violation of § 1983. Chief Judge Conley (W.D. Wis.) granted summary judgment to the County. Schulz appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook, Circuit Judge Bauer, and District Judge Young affirmed. The Court admitted the general rule that a government employee who can be removed from her position only for cause has a property interest in that position and may not be fired from it without due process. A corollary to the general rule, however, is the reorganization rule. If a government eliminates a position, there is no longer anything in which one can have a property interest. But the Court noted that the reorganization rule might not apply if the reorganization only affects a single person. In that case, the reorganization might simply be a pretext. The record in this case does not support the notion that the County's reorganization was a pretext to fire Schulz. First, the undisputed record shows nothing but that the County reorganized to save money. Second, if the purpose of the reorganization was to get rid of Schulz, the County would not have hired her to fill the new position.

Similarly Situated Employee Was Not Treated More Favorably When He Took Advantage Of Available Grievance Procedure

LUSTER v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (July 19, 2011)

Milton Luster is an African American male. In June of 2006, he was a lieutenant with the Illinois Department of Corrections assigned to the Dwight Correctional Center in Dwight, Illinois. On June 6, he and Christine Cole, a white female guard, got into a heated conversation during which Cole called Luster a "bitch." Luster filed an incident report accusing Cole of insubordination. Two days later, Cole filed her own report. In her report, she acknowledged a consensual affair with Luster years earlier and reported that Luster on two occasions had pinned her against the wall and put his mouth on her neck, that he had touched her buttocks, that he made suggestive remarks to her, and that he made unsolicited and uninvited phone calls and visits to her home. The Department began an investigation and put Luster on paid leave. Luster denied all the allegations but two other guards told investigators that they witnessed at least one of the incidents. In his final report, the investigator criticized Cole for the "bitch" remark and for her delay in reporting the harassment but credited her report of the events. The resulting disciplinary proceedings ended with a recommendation that Luster be fired. The warden agreed and suspended Luster without pay. As she was required to do under regulations, she requested the approval of the Illinois Department of Central Management Services for Luster's firing. Lester could have, but did not, file a grievance or administrative appeal. Instead, he resigned. He brought suit against the Department, alleging that he was fired because of his race in violation of Title VII. Judge Mihm (C.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the Department. Luster appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Tinder, and Hamilton affirmed. The Court stated the familiar elements under the indirect method of proof: member of a protected class, meeting the Department's performance expectations, an adverse employment action, and a similarly situated coworker treated more favorably. The first and third elements were not at issue and, here, the second and fourth elements merged. Luster put forward two "similarly situated" employees who he claims were treated more favorably. The Court rejected one of them as a comparator because the admissible evidence established that the accusations against that employee were found to be unsubstantiated. The other employee was an apt comparator. Accusations of physical harassment of a female coworker were found substantiated. That employee was also suspended without pay pending his discharge. Up until that point, the Court noted, he and Luster were treated identically. But the comparator employee, unlike Luster, successfully grieved his termination. The same opportunity was available to Luster. Therefore, he was not treated more favorably than Luster. The Court added that even if it had found a prima facie case, the Department would still prevail because it came forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their treatment of Luster. Luster did not provide sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the Department's reason was pretextual.

Wage Claim By Fired Employee Must Be Brought Under Indiana's Wage Claims Statute

TREAT v. TOM KELLEY BUICK PONTIAC GMC, INC. (July 13, 2011)

The Kelley Automotive Group operates a number of car dealerships, including Tom Kelley Buick Pontiac GMC ("Kelley") in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Kelley hired Jill Treat and her son Cody in July of 2006. Kelley fired them both three months later. The Treats brought a multi-count complaint against Kelley, including a claim for unpaid wages under the Indiana Wage Payment Statute. Judge Lee (N.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to Kelley. The Treats appeal.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Tinder and Hamilton and District Judge Murphy affirmed. The Court addressed two similar Indiana wage recovery statutes. The Wage Payment Statute dictates the frequency of wage payments, addresses the situation if an employee leaves a job voluntarily, and allows a person to recover in any court with jurisdiction the amount of wages due and liquidated damages. The Indiana Wage Claims Statute addresses the situation where an employer discharges an employee. In the case of a wage dispute, the Commissioner of Labor is required to enforce the law, to institute actions for penalties, and to refer a claim to the Attorney General, who can initiate a claim on behalf of the claimant. The remedy under the Claims statute is the same as the remedy under the Payment statute. The Indiana Supreme Court has stated, in dicta, that the statutes are mutually exclusive. The Payment statute applies to individuals still employed or who voluntarily resigned. The Claims statute applies to individuals who were fired. However, the Treats’ complaint raises issues that arose during their employment as well as after their termination. Although one Indiana appellate case supports the Treats' position, the Court predicted that the Indiana Supreme Court would conclude that a person’s status at the time of the claim would govern. Here, the Treats filed a claim after they were terminated by Kelley. Therefore, their appropriate remedy was under the Claims statute, not the Payment statute.

Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction Depends On Jurisdiction Of Hypothetical Complaint By Defendant

NEWPAGE WISCONSIN SYSTEM, INC. v. UNITED STEEL, PAPER & FORESTRY, RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION (July 12, 2011)

NewPage Wisconsin System recently closed several paper mills that it operates in Wisconsin in order to save money. It also stopped subsidizing medical care for retirees over 65. The Union claimed the subsidy elimination violated both the Retiree Health Plan and the Collective Bargaining Agreement. It brought suit under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act and ERISA § 502 in the Southern District of Ohio. Several weeks later, NewPage filed a declaratory judgment action in the Western District of Wisconsin raising the same issues. Judge Crabb (W.D. Wis.) dismissed the suit. She concluded that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the ERISA claim. The court did have jurisdiction over the LMRA claim but dismissed in deference to the Ohio suit. NewPage appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook, Circuit Judge Bauer, and District Judge Young vacated and remanded. The Court noted that § 2201 authorizes declaratory judgment actions but does not itself grant subject matter jurisdiction. Jurisdiction must arise from the substantive claims. The Court agreed with the district court that ERISA § 502(a)(3) only grants jurisdiction for a request for appropriate equitable relief. There is no such request here. Nevertheless, the Court found two other bases for jurisdiction. First, ERISA § 502(e) grants jurisdiction for actions arising under its subchapter. NewPage's claim does arise under that subchapter. In order to determine jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment action, a court must determine whether a complaint filed by the defendant would meet jurisdictional requirements. The Court looked to the actual complaint filed by the defendants in Ohio to conclude that it, and therefore the declaratory judgment action, came within § 502(e) jurisdiction. Second, the Court looked to § 1331’s general federal question jurisdiction grant. ERISA claims are always federal in nature. In concluding that the district court had jurisdiction of both the ERISA claim in the LMRA claim, the Court had to overrule part of its 2008 decision in Newell Operating Co. (another part of the decision was overruled in 2010). The Court next addressed whether the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the case in deference to the Ohio litigation. Since the district court decision, that case has stalled on procedural matters and is on appeal in the Sixth Circuit. Wisconsin now seems to be the better forum for litigating the issues on the merits. The Court remanded to the district court, however, to make that decision.

Race Discrimination Claim Fails For Lack Of Evidence That Race Was A Motivating Factor

ROBERTHENRY DAVIS, SR. v. TIME WARNER CABLE OF SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN (July 5, 2011)

Time Warner Cable of Southeastern Wisconsin employs two sales teams. The inside team takes calls from business subscribers and is paid mostly through commissions. The outside team is responsible for landing new customer accounts and is paid principally by salary. In the early 2000s, the inside team was comprised of mostly African Americans and the outside team was comprised of mostly whites. Roberthenry Davis was an African-American member of the inside team. Two women, one African-American and one white, joined the inside team in 2005. The white saleswoman's lack of success created friction on the team and even led to rumors outside the team. The team's manager, a white male, criticized the African-Americans on the team for not being more cohesive. The African-Americans objected to that treatment and Davis complained. In late 2006, Davis erroneously treated a simple service request as a commissionable transaction, even though two of his colleagues disagreed. Time Warner ultimately reversed Davis' treatment of the request and concluded that he had violated employee guidelines. Time Warner fired Davis. After further investigation, however, a human resources manager recommended that the company reinstate Davis with back pay, but with a warning and an improvement plan. Although there was disagreement within the company, Davis was soon reinstated. Davis was unhappy about the way he was treated when he returned and he was also unhappy with a new compensation scheme that reduced commission opportunities for the inside team. Davis filed suit, alleging that Time Warner discriminated against him and retaliated against him when it fired him and when it changed the compensation scheme. Judge Adelman (E.D. Wis.) granted summary judgment to Time Warner on the ground that race was not a motivating factor in the company's actions. Davis appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Manion, and Tinder affirmed. The Court addressed each claim (discriminatory firing, retaliatory firing, discriminatory compensation, and retaliatory compensation) separately. With respect to discriminatory firing, the Court agreed with the district court that Davis failed to provide evidence of a causal connection between Time Warner’s conduct and his termination. The Court noted that there was some evidence of his manager's insensitivity, or even bigotry, but no evidence that it was a motivating factor. And there was evidence that Time Warner strictly enforced its guidelines and had fired many employees, both white and African-American, for violations similar to Davis’. Davis' retaliatory firing claim was based on his complaints to his manager about what he perceived as unfair treatment. Again, the Court noted the lack of evidence that it was his complains that led it to his termination. Indeed, the evidence was that the company regularly terminated employees for guidelines violations. Davis classified his discriminatory compensation claim as a disparate treatment claim. In order to succeed on that claim, he had to produce evidence that Time Warner reduced his compensation on account of his race. Here, the revised compensation plan applied to all employees of whatever race on the inside team. That fact, coupled with the fact that a member of the inside team could transfer to the outside team, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the decision was not race-based. Finally, the Court reached the same conclusion with respect to Davis' retaliatory compensation claim. There was no evidence to link his complaints to his manager with the changes in the compensation plan.

Vague Affidavit Did Not Carry Employer's Burden

JOHNSON v. HIX WRECKER SERVICE (July 1, 2011)

Bobby Johnson worked twelve-hour shifts as a tow truck driver for Hix Wrecker Service in 2006. He later sued the company, claiming that he had not been paid for overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Hix Wrecker claimed that Johnson was not subject to the FLSA but, rather, was exempt under its motor carrier exemption. Judge Lawrence (S.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to Hix. Johnson appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook, Circuit Judge Williams, and District Judge Pallmeyer reversed and remanded. The Court recognized that not all employees of a motor carrier are governed by the FLSA. If the employee engages only in intrastate commerce, the FLSA governs. If the employee is wholly engaged in interstate commerce, the employee is exempt from the FLSA and comes under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Transportation. Many motor carriers and their employees engage in both in intrastate and interstate commerce -- but they cannot be subject to both statutory schemes. Under a Department of Transportation interpretation, an employee is exempt from the FLSA if the employer presents "concrete evidence" that the employee is "engaged in interstate commerce within a reasonable period of time" before the time period in question. A driver who has not engaged in interstate commerce can still be exempt if the carrier has been engaged in interstate commerce and the employee could be expected to engage in the commerce. The interpretation also adopted four months as a "reasonable period of time." In support of its motion for summary judgment, Hix did not assert that Johnson actually engaged in interstate commerce. Instead, it submitted an affidavit that asserted that Hix "routinely" provides interstate services and that Johnson could have been assigned an interstate wrecker run at any time during his employment. The Court concluded that Hicks did not carry its burden of proving the exemption. The affidavit's use of the term "routinely" was too vague to meet the four-months reasonable time threshold. In the Court's view, "routinely" could mean, for example, once every six months or once a year.

Record Does Not Support Employee's Retaliation Claim

SMEIGH v. JOHNS MANVILLE, INC. (June 29, 2011)

For years, Aaron Smeigh was a model employee at Johns Manville. He had a spotless record. That changed in September of 2008. It was then that Smeigh severed his finger at work. While awaiting the arrival of an ambulance, Smeigh told his supervisor that he did not take drugs but that he might not be able to pass a drug test. He said it was because he had recently been in a room where marijuana had been smoked. The supervisor told the plant manager that Smeigh might not pass a drug test. In fact, Smeigh took a drug test at the hospital and it came back negative. The company considered whether Smeigh's statement violated Johns Manville's substance abuse policy. A human resources manager decided that it was. The company decided to allow Smeigh to keep his job if he entered into a Stipulation of Understanding. The stipulation would require him to meet with a counselor, submit to random drug and alcohol tests, and possibly pay for the tests. Smeigh refused to sign the agreement and the company fired him. After the union filed a grievance, the company offered to hire him back if he passed a drug test and agreed to be subject to random drug tests over two years. Again, Smeigh refused. A union secretary cleaned out his locker to separate company property from personal property. Someone apparently stole some of his personal property before it was returned to him. Smeigh brought suit for unlawful discharge in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim and for civil conversion under state law. Judge Pratt (S.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to the company. Smeigh appeals

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Evans, and Tinder affirmed. Although an employee can recover damages if he has been terminated for filing a workers' compensation claim, he must present evidence that his termination was solely in retaliation for filing such a claim. Here, Smeigh relies on indirect evidence of causation. In fact, he relies almost exclusively on timing. The Court noted the timing is rarely sufficient, by itself, to create a question of fact. In addition, here there is an intervening event -- his refusal to sign the stipulation. The Court noted that the record shows that the company actually submitted the workers’ compensation claim on his behalf, wanted him to sign the stipulation and retain his job, and was willing to reinstate him a few months later. No reasonable jury could find in his favor. The Court also affirmed on the conversion count. In order to prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must prove criminal intent. Here, company policy required a company employee to clear out a terminated employee's locker, separate company property from personal property, and return the personal property. The record shows that the employee's control over Smeigh's property was authorized or, at least, she had a reasonable belief that it was. In addition, the only defendant is the company and there is no evidence in the record that the company knew that the employee continued to possess Smeigh's property and Smeigh did not argue vicarious liability. The Court chastised Smeigh for even including the conversion count in the appeal without even explaining his rationale for disagreeing with the district court's analysis. Notwithstanding its criticism, the Court declined to impose sanctions.

Monkey Metaphors Did Not Create Hostile Work Environment

ELLIS v. CCA OF TENNESSEE (June 9, 2011)

Harriett Ellis, Patricia Forrest, Shavon Jones, and Delores McNeil were all employed as nurses at the Marion County Jail II. They are all also African-American. CCA of Tennessee operates the jail pursuant to a contract with the Marion County Sheriff and employs its entire medical staff. Plaintiffs allege several instances of racial discrimination at the jail: a) a shift change directive that required nurses to rotate among shifts rather than work the same shift, as the plaintiff nurses had been doing, b) the health services administrator's possession of a management book excerpt that compared workplace problems to monkeys, c) a reference to monkeys over the intercom system, d) a coworker who wore clothing with a picture of the Confederate flag, and e) a doctor stating to one of the nurses that the first name of an inmate named Cole must be "black as." The plaintiffs all resigned in late 2006 or early 2007. They all claim they were constructively discharged because they complained about improper or unsafe work practices. They filed suit under Title VII and § 1981, alleging race discrimination and hostile work environment. They also alleged state law retaliatory discharge. Judge Barker (S.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to the defendants. She also concluded that plaintiff Forrest's claims were precluded by res judicata. Plaintiffs appeal.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Flaum and Williams and District Judge Herndon affirmed. The Court first addressed the hostile work environment claim. Such a claim must show that the environment was both objectively and subjectively offensive. Here, although the Court assumed that the plaintiffs found the management book offensive, they concluded that no reasonable person would find it so. The monkey in the book is clearly a metaphor for management problems, not people. There is also not enough in the record regarding the monkey comments on the intercom to establish a hostile work environment. Although the court found the Confederate flag and the doctor’s statement offensive, the limited number of incidents does not support a hostile work environment claim. The Court turned to the race discrimination claim. A race discrimination claim requires a material, adverse employment action. The Court rejected each of plaintiffs' three suggestions: a) the shift-change policy does not qualify because it did not include any particular hardship, b) plaintiff Ellis' three-day suspension does not qualify because she was unable to show that CCA's explanation was pretext, and c) they cannot show a constructive discharge since it requires more than hostile work environment. The Court then addressed the Indiana statutory whistleblower claim. In order for an employee to get the protection of the statute, she must report a violation of federal or state law, an ordinance violation, or the misuse of public resources. The reports at issue primarily addressed CCA safety practices. Since the plaintiffs have not identified any violation or misuse, they cannot prevail under the statute. The Court did find the district court's ruling on res judicata erroneous. One of the plaintiffs made similar allegations in an earlier lawsuit. The district court concluded that she should have amended her complaint in that suit to include incidents between its filing and the summary judgment motion. The court was wrong. Res judicata does not bar a second lawsuit based on facts that arose after the first complaint was filed.

Title VII Supervisory Status Requires More Than Authority To Direct Daily Activity

VANCE v. BALL STATE UNIVERSITY (June 3, 2011)

Ball State University's Dining Services department has employed Maetta Vance for over 20 years. She was a substitute server from 1989-91, a part-time catering assistant from 1991-2007, and now is a full-time catering assistant. She filed a lawsuit against the University in 2006 alleging Title VII claims of hostile work environment and retaliation. She included several specific allegations of hostile work environment, including: a) co-worker Davis hit her, b) supervisor Kimes made her feel unwelcome, c) co-worker Davis threatened her, d) co-worker McVicker used a racial epithet, e) co-worker McVicker called her a "porch monkey," and f) supervisor Adkins made faces at her. The University responded each time she filed a complaint. It disciplined McVicker for using the epithet. On other occasions, it found no basis for discipline. Her retaliation allegations related to diminished work duties and denial of overtime, and a reassignment to menial tasks in connection with her promotion. Judge Barker (S.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to the University. Vance appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Wood, and Sykes affirmed. The Court first addressed Vance's hostile work environment claim. The elements of that claim are that the work environment is objectively and subjectively offensive, that the conduct was based on race, that it was either severe or pervasive, and that there was employer liability. With respect to employer liability, a plaintiff must either show that the harassment came from supervisors or that the employer was negligent in discovering or fixing the situation. The Court rejected supervisor liability. First, Davis was not her supervisor. Although other circuits have expanded the supervisor term to include persons with authority to direct daily activity, the Seventh Circuit has limited the term to those who have the authority to directly affect the terms and conditions of employment. Second, Adkins was her supervisor but did nothing more than make ugly faces at her. Third, Kimes was her supervisor and may have engaged in sufficient harassment to create employer liability but there was no evidence that his harassment was based on Vance's race. In the absence of supervisor harassment, the Court turned to co-worker harassment. It concluded that Vance could not establish that the University failed to take reasonable steps to discover and correct the harassment. Every time she made a complaint, the University investigated and responded appropriately. The Court turned to the retaliation claim. Ironically, Vance's retaliation claim is based on her promotion. She admitted that she received more pay and benefits but alleged that her responsibilities were diminished. The Court concluded that the promotion was not a materially adverse employment action. Although she may have enjoyed it less, she sought it out knowing that the responsibilities would be different from her prior position. The only other employee occupying the position had similar responsibilities. Finally, the Court rejected her claim that the University retaliated against her by giving her fewer overtime hours. Although she did work fewer overtime hours than her co-worker, the two were not similarly situated. Her co-worker worked more regular hours, was available more often, and took fewer sick days and leaves of absence.

Plaintiff Cannot Avoid Oral Settlement Agreement Because Of Defendants' Unrelated Nondisclosure

LEWIS v. SCHOOL DISTRICT #70 (June 1, 2011)

After School District #70 fired Debra Lewis, she brought suit. She alleged, among other things, violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act. Although her employer prevailed in the district court, the Seventh Circuit reversed the FMLA and breach of contract counts. On April 25, 2009, on remand, the parties orally agreed to a settlement in the presence of a magistrate judge. Within weeks, however, Lewis learned that the school superintendent had been accused and was under investigation for child molestation. Lewis refused to sign the settlement agreement. Judge Stiehl (S.D. Ill.) granted defendants' motion to enforce the oral settlement and, when Lewis continued to refuse to sign the agreement, he dismissed the case with prejudice. Lewis appeals.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Bauer and Williams and District Judge McCuskey affirmed. Illinois enforces oral settlement agreements if there is an offer, acceptance, and a meeting of the minds on its terms. Given the record in open court before the magistrate judge, the Court had no difficulty in finding each element. Lewis also argued that the agreement should be set aside because of the defendants' "fraud." The Court agreed that a contract could be set aside when there is evidence of fraud in the inducement but found the materiality element lacking here. Although the Court conceded that knowledge of the investigation could have given Lewis more bargaining power and possibly a more valuable settlement, it would have been unrelated to the defendants' conduct in terminating her employment. The Court turned to the sanction imposed by the district court. Although it believed the result "unfortunate" and noted that Lewis turned a substantial recovery into nothing, the Court found no abuse of discretion. The district court ordered Lewis to sign the settlement agreement several times and it warned her that not doing so could result in dismissal and sanctions. Only after eight months had passed did he dismiss the case.

Employee Is "Picture-Perfect Example" Of Someone Not Entitled To Overtime

VERKUILEN v. MEDIABANK (May 27, 2011)

MediaBank provides complex software programs to advertising agencies. The software integrates a number of different functions and is custom-designed to meet the varying needs of its purchasers. MediaBank employs Penny Verkuilen as an account manager. In that position, she acted as a liaison between the company’s software engineers and its customers. She had to make sure she understood the customers' needs, communicated those needs to the engineers, and trained the customers on the finished product. Verkuilen brought suit against MediaBank under the Fair Labor Standards Act, alleging that she was denied overtime. Judge Grady (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment against her on the ground that she fit within the administrative exception to the overtime requirement. Verkuilen appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Cudahy and Posner affirmed. The Court started with the "pretty vague" Department of Labor regulation describing the administrative exception. It provides that the employee’s "primary duty" must include the exercise of discretion and independent judgment and must include non-manual work directly related to general business operations of the employer or its customers. The Court concluded that Verkuilen’s primary duty was directly related to the business operations of her employer and its customers. She was directly responsible for understanding each customer's needs, translating those needs into specifications that could be understood by the software engineers, and assisting the customers in implementing the solution. In fact, the Court believed that Verkuilen was a "picture-perfect example" of someone to whom the overtime requirement should not apply.

Summary Judgment Was Improper When Genuine Fact Issues Remained Regarding Retaliation

MOORE v. VITAL PRODUCTS (May 25, 2011)

Raymond Moore delivered and installed medical equipment for Vital Products. He claims that other Vital employees, including his supervisor, exposed him to sexual paraphernalia and pictures and made unwelcome sexual remarks. Vital suspended Moore for poor performance in January of 2005. On February 16, shortly after his return from the suspension, Moore injured his back. He has not worked at Vital since. Vital sent a COBRA notice to Moore on February 21. The contents of the letter suggested that Moore was no longer employed at Vital. Moore filed an EEOC charge on December 7, 2005. The charge included allegations of hostile work environment based on race and gender but did not include allegations of unlawful discharge. Moore brought suit pursuant to Title VII, alleging a hostile work environment, discriminatory discharge, and retaliatory discharge. He also alleged retaliatory discharge under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act. Magistrate Judge Schenkier (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to Vital but denied its request for sanctions. Moore appeals -- Vital cross-appeals the denial of sanctions and seeks sanctions on appeal.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Kanne and Wood affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Court first affirmed the dismissal of the hostile work environment claim. Since Moore filed his EEOC charge on December 7, he must present evidence of a hostile work environment within the 300-day window, or after February 10. He failed to present any evidence of hostile work environment between February 10 and February 16, his last day on the job. The Court next affirmed the dismissal of his Title VII discriminatory discharge claim. A Title VII plaintiff can only bring claims that were included in his EEOC charge, or at least reasonably related to the contents of the charge. Moore did not include in his EEOC charge any allegations relating to his discharge. In fact, he stated in his charge that he was on medical leave, not discharged. The Court reversed, however, summary judgment on the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act claim. It is not clear whether Moore: a) is an employee on leave, b) abandoned his job in February 2005, or c) was discharged. The Court found genuine issues of fact with respect to Moore's status and, if he was discharged, whether the discharge was motivated by his intention to file a workers' compensation claim. Finally, the Court affirmed the district court's sanctions ruling and declined to impose its own.

In Disparate Impact Case, Use Of Challenged Test May Be Illegal Even If Test Itself Is Beyond Challenge

LEWIS v. CHICAGO (May 13, 2011)

In 1995, applicants for Chicago's Fire Department took a written examination. The City divided the applicants into three categories, based on their test scores. Applicants scoring 64 or less were rated not qualified. Applicants scoring 89 or more were rated highly qualified. The middle group was rated qualified but told in January of 1996 that they were not likely to be hired. The City hired applicants on 11 different occasions between May 1996 and November 2001. Each time, it chose at random from the well-qualified pool. An applicant in the qualified pool filed a charge of discrimination in March of 1997. The charge claimed that the 89 cut-off had a disparate impact on African-Americans. Several applicants later filed a class-action. Judge Gottschall (N.D. Ill.) concluded that the charge was timely, notwithstanding the fact that it was filed more than 300 days after qualified applicants were told that they were not likely to be hired. She also rejected the City's business necessity defense and awarded relief to the class. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the charge was not timely. The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, concluding that the 300-day clock starts anew in disparate impact litigation whenever the employer makes a hiring decision based on the challenged test. The Supreme Court's decision made the charge timely with respect to each hiring event except the first. The Supreme Court remanded for consideration of: a) whether the City preserved an argument that the charge was untimely with respect to the first hiring event, and b) whether the City preserved an argument that the plaintiffs failed to prove disparate impact arising from any particular use of the test.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Power and Posner affirmed the original district court opinion as modified to eliminate any relief based on the first hiring event. The Court first concluded that the City preserved both arguments identified by the Supreme Court. Since the City preserved its argument that the charge was untimely with respect to the first hiring event, and since the Supreme Court concluded that it was untimely, the Court reversed the District Court with respect to any relief arising from that event. Although the Court concluded that the City preserved its argument that the plaintiffs failed to prove any particular disparate impact, the Court rejected the argument on its merits. First, the City had conceded that the 89 cut-off had a disparate impact. Because each hiring event was a random selection from the well-qualified pool, each event resulted in the same disparate impact as the list as a whole. The Court rejected the City's argument that since it could treat the original creation of the pool as legal (because of the delayed charge), then each use of the pool was legal. In a disparate impact case, which does not require evidence of discriminatory intent during the charging period, the use of the test can be unlawful even if the original creation of the highly qualified pool was not.

Fact Issues Regarding Employer's View Of Disability Preclude Summary Judgment

MILLER v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (May 10, 2011)

The Illinois Department of Transportation hired Darrell Miller in 2002 as part of a bridge crew. The crew, which consisted of five employees, was responsible for a wide variety of tasks. Many of those tasks were performed at ground level, while some were performed at various heights above the ground or water. Miller had some fear of heights and there were a few jobs that he could not perform. For years, the crew worked as a team. IDOT allowed his other crew members to fill in for him on those few occasions when he could not do his assigned task. Other team members also had tasks they could not perform for various reasons and IDOT accommodated those limitations as well. In 2006, Miller was asked to do a task that he considered unsafe. He performed the task but filed a grievance. Just a few weeks later, his crew leader assigned him to a task that resulted in a panic attack. IDOT put him on sick leave. Its examiner diagnosed him with acrophobia and declared him unfit to work on the bridge crew. IDOT began treating Miller as unable to work at any height in excess of 20 feet. Miller filed a grievance and also requested an accommodation identical to that which he had enjoyed in the past. His request was denied and he was ordered to return to work. When he encountered an IDOT personnel manager, he commented to a colleague that he "would like to knock her teeth out." Miller was told to go home and was later discharged for threatening violence against another employee. After an arbitration, he returned to work but without back pay or benefits. Miller filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act. He alleged discrimination arising from the refusal to provide accommodation and his termination. He also alleged retaliation. Judge Stiehl (S.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to IDOT on both counts. Miller appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Rovner, and Hamilton reversed and remanded. The ADA protects only those individuals with a disability. But disability is defined in the statute as not only having a significant impairment but also being regarded as having such an impairment. A substantial limitation on being able to work qualifies as such an impairment. Since Miller did not claim to be actually impaired, his challenge was to present evidence that IDOT regarded him as substantially limited in his ability to perform a wide range of jobs. The Court noted that the regulations require consideration of several factors, including the nature and severity of the impairment, its duration, and its longer-term impact. The Court concluded that Miller presented sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find that IDOT regarded him as limited in his ability to do a substantial number of jobs. Summary judgment on the discrimination claim was improper. On the reasonable accommodation claim, the Court also found issues of fact that should have gone to the jury. Although working at heights in extreme positions is an essential element of the crew's work, the Court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that it was not an essential element of any individual crew member's work. The Court cited the history of team accommodations in the record. A reasonable juror could also find that Miller's request for an accommodation was reasonable. Finally, on the retaliation claim, the Court found that Miller presented sufficient evidence going to IDOT’s honesty to get to a jury. The Court cited an example of a similar violent outburst that was not disciplined, the agency's general hostility towards accommodations, and the ambiguity of the threat itself.

Admitted Policy Violation Constitutes A Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason For Termination

ZELLNER v. HERRICK (April 29, 2011)

Robert Zellner was a biology teacher at Cedarburg High School in Cedarburg, Wisconsin between 1995 and 2006. He was active in Cedarburg Education Association (the teacher's union) throughout his employment and was its president between 2003 and 2005. The relationship between the District and the Union during this time was quite strained. During his presidency, Zellner was very publicly critical of the District, in particular Superintendent Daryl Herrick. After his presidency ended in August of 2005, Zellner remained active in the Union but no longer spoke out publicly. Also in August 2005, Zellner signed his consent to a new District computer usage policy. The policy notified District employees that their computer usage was not private and could be monitored, expressly prohibited access to offensive pictures, and warned that any violation could result in disciplinary action. Soon thereafter, the District’s IT Department had to clean up Zellner's computer for a second time. The IT technician reported to her supervisor her opinion that Zellner's computer problems were caused by visiting “questionable” Internet sites. The Director of Technology reported these suspicions to Superintendent Herrick, who ordered monitoring software be placed on the computer. The Director of Technology checked the usage logs from time to time. In December, the log indicated that Zellner had visited a number of pornographic websites. Herrick confronted Zellner, who admitted accessing pornography on the District computer several times and conceded that his actions violated school policy. Zellner refused to resign. The School Board held a disciplinary hearing in January. The Board gave Zellner an opportunity to testify and present evidence. He declined to testify but instead read a statement apologizing for his conduct and admitting using poor judgment. The School Board considered a range of discipline but ultimately chose to fire Zellner. A state trial court and appellate court upheld the termination. Zellner filed suit in federal court, alleging a violation of his due process rights and his First Amendment rights. Judge Randa (E.D. Wis.) dismissed the due process claim and granted summary judgment to the defendants on the First Amendment claim. Zellner appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Evans, and Hamilton affirmed. Although the Court was somewhat critical of the district court's dismissal of the due process claim sua sponte, it nevertheless upheld the dismissal. Even if the Zellner were able to make out a due process claim, the only relief to which he would be entitled was a opportunity to be heard. He was given a hearing and he was given an opportunity to testify. Instead, he read a statement which did not even dispute the charges. He is entitled to no more process. The Court also agreed with the district court's ruling on the First Amendment claim, finding an absence of proof of but-for causation. Notwithstanding the years of animosity between Zellner and the School District, the Court concluded that no jury could find that Zellner's union activities amounted to but-for causation. Zellner admits that he accessed pornography on the District computer and that his conduct violated the District’s policy. Therefore, the School District had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to fire him.

EEOC Hiring Data Subpoena In Discrimination And Termination Investigation Meets "Realistic Expectation" Test

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION v. KONICA MINOLTA BUSINESS SOLUTIONS U.S.A. (April 29, 2011)

Konica Minolta Business Solutions hired Elliot Thompson, an African-American male, in early 2005. Konica assigned him to a Tinley Park, Illinois sales team. Thompson believe that he was being discriminated against because of his race and registered a complaint with Konica's Human Resources Department in late October. Konica fired him the very next day, Thompson filed a charge with the EEOC. He alleged that he was subjected to different terms and conditions of employment and was discriminated against on account of his race. Konica initially cooperated with the EEOC investigation. During its investigation, the EEOC learned that Konica had four Chicago area facilities, that only six of its 120 employees were African-American, that all six were assigned to the Tinley Park facility, and that five of the six were on the same sales team. The EEOC issued a comprehensive subpoena, requesting substantial information regarding Konica's hiring history at all four sites. Konica petitioned to revoke the subpoena. The EEOC denied the petition. Judge Manning (N.D. Ill.) granted the EEOC's application for an order enforcing the subpoena. Konica appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Flaum, and Wood affirmed. Although the EEOC has primary authority for enforcing Title VII and must investigate discrimination charges, its authority is limited to evidence relevant to the charge. The Supreme Court adopted a generous relevance standard in Shell Oil. The EEOC need only have a "realistic expectation" that the requested evidence will advance its investigation. Although Thompson's charge did not include any allegations relating to his hiring, the Court had no trouble finding that the EEOC subpoena met the relevance test. Any discrimination in hiring or team assignments would be relevant to the EEOC's investigation of Thompson’s treatment. The Court also concluded that Konica failed to adequately develop its burdensomeness argument.

Party Did Not Waive Objections To Arbitration When It Withdrew Its Consent Before The Hearing

ROUGHNECK CONCRETE DRILLING & SAWING CO. v. PLUMBERS’ PENSION FUND (April 7, 2011)

Roughneck Concrete Drilling & Sawing Co. is a Chicago-based construction company. Its concrete drilling services are used in the building construction industry. Sometimes its services are used in connection with a building's plumbing, sometimes in connection with a building’s electrical system, and sometimes in connection with other aspects of a building’s construction. Roughneck employs union plumbers or electricians or laborers, depending on the purpose of its work. It has collective bargaining agreements with unions representing each. The pension fund representing the plumbers union conducted an audit and concluded that Roughneck had done plumbers work without employing plumbers. They concluded that Roughneck owed $2.2 million in contributions. They filed grievances with the Joint Arbitration Board pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. Roughneck responded by filing its own grievance. Several days before the scheduled JAB hearing, Roughneck wrote to the administrator of the National Plan, an agreement between employers and the national unions. Roughneck claimed that the Fund's grievances were "impediments to job progress" and that the dispute should therefore be resolved by the Joint Conference Board. The JCB resolves jurisdictional disputes between different crafts. The Fund disagreed but the National Plan administrator scheduled a hearing for the day before the JAB hearing. At the JCB hearing, an arbitrator ruled that the dispute was in fact beyond the authority of the JAB and ordered the JAB hearing canceled. No one told the JAB about the order, so it went forward with the hearing. Roughneck did not attend. The JAB found for the Fund and ordered Roughneck to pay over $3.3 million. Roughneck filed two actions -- one to vacate the JAB order and one to enforce the JCB order. Judge Lefkow (N.D. Ill.) found for the Fund, concluding that Roughneck had waived its objection to the JAB's jurisdiction, both by submitting a grievance and by not appearing at the hearing. It was therefore bound by the JAB order and could not avail itself of the JCB order. Roughneck appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Posner, and Williams reversed and remanded. The Court first concluded that the Fund's failure to bring suit to set aside the JCB order did not prevent it from raising a defense in Roughneck's suit to set aside the JAB order. It could have sued to set aside that order but it would be redundant to require it to file its own suit when it raised a timely challenge in Roughneck’s suit. On the merits, the Court concluded that Roughneck did not waive any rights. Roughneck could have handled things better -- it could have invoked the jurisdiction of the National Plan earlier, it could have informed the JAB of the JCB decision, it could have shown up at the JAB hearing. Nevertheless, it did withdraw its consent to the JAB arbitration before any order was issued. It was entitled to do so. Finally, the Court noted that judicial review of arbitration awards is so limited that multiple, inconsistent awards can be enforced. Here, however, it is impossible for the parties to comply with both orders. The Court reversed with instructions to vacate the JAB order and enforce the JCB order.

Disputed Question Of Fact Regarding "Honest Belief" Precludes Summary Judgment

RADENTZ v. MARION COUNTY (April 5, 2011)

Prior to 2005, forensic pathologists at Indiana University performed certain services, including autopsies, for the Marion County Coroner's office under a contract. The contract terms were very favorable to the County, in that the University subsidized much of the cost. The contract expired on the last day of 2004, the day before Kenneth Ackles, an African-American chiropractor, became the new Coroner. Notwithstanding the contract expiration, the University continued to provide services at no cost for a few months but it eventually terminated the contract. The Chief Deputy Corner reached out to two of the University's pathologists who had been providing the services, Stephen Radentz and Michele Catellier. Radentz and Catellier formed a limited liability company and entered into a five-year contract with the County to provide forensic pathology services. Under the contract, the pathologists could perform autopsies for other counties, but Marion County had to furnish the supplies for those autopsies. With six months notice, either party could terminate the contract without cause and the County could amend the contract to eliminate permission for other county autopsies. In late 2005, Ackles replaced his deputy with Alfarena Ballew, an African-American woman. Ballew terminated the contract with Radentz and Catellier. They brought suit pursuant to § 1983 against the County, Ackles, and Ballew, alleging that the contract termination was based on race discrimination in violation of the Constitution. Judge Lawrence (S.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to the defendants. Radentz and Catellier appeal.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Posner and Rovner reversed and remanded. The Court noted that the district court concluded that plaintiffs had met their prima facie indirect method burden, and that determination is not challenged on appeal. What is at issue is whether the defendants' nondiscriminatory reason given for the contract termination was pretextual. In order to prevail, the plaintiffs must do more than show that the decision was unwise. They must show that it was not honestly believed. There was evidence that Ballew and the County were concerned about the contract costs. Ballew was particularly concerned about the costs the County incurred providing supplies for the other county autopsies. The County received no income from these autopsies. The Court noted that the contract allowed the County to withdraw that permission with six months notice. The County never explained why it gave six months notice to terminate the contract rather than giving the six months notice to withdraw the other county autopsy permission. Their failure to explain their decision casts some doubt on it. The Court noted other evidence that was consistent with a race based decision: the County was satisfied with plaintiffs’ work, the County hired an African-American woman to replace the plaintiffs, Ackles was on record discussing his desire for more African-Americans in the Coroner’s office, the racial demographics of the office were changing, and the new hire provided no economic benefit to the County. On that record, the Court concluded that a factfinder would not have to believe the County. The factual disputes concerning the termination decision preclude summary judgment.

Class Action Requiring Individual Hearings Is Inappropriate Under Rule 23(b)(2)

RANDALL v. ROLLS-ROYCE CORP. (March 30, 2011)

Rolls-Royce Corporation sets its employee compensation in three stages. First, it sets up compensation categories with broad pay ranges into which it assigns classes of employees it thinks are of equal value to the company. Second, within each compensation category, it creates narrower pay ranges for each job based on market conditions. Third, the company authorizes supervisors to adjust compensation individually. Female employees of one of the Rolls-Royce's Indiana facilities brought a class action pursuant to the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, alleging that Rolls-Royce engaged in sex discrimination by paying male employees more than female employees and by denying female employees promotions. Judge Barker (S.D. Ind.) denied class certification and granted summary judgment to Rolls-Royce. Plaintiffs appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Flaum, and Sykes affirmed. The Court noted that the average male employee compensation was approximately 5% higher than female employee compensation in the same compensation categories throughout the complaint period. But is that differential the result of sex discrimination, which would violate Title VII? The company's expert testified that the differential disappeared when adjustments were made for differences in the jobs performed. The plaintiff's expert failed to rebut this testimony. Plaintiffs’ Title VII base pay claim must therefore fail. Their Equal Pay Act claim also fails. Although that claim does not require proof of discrimination, the Court concluded that the district court was correct in finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet the statutory comparator requirement. The named plaintiffs' promotion claims also fail. Again, the company's expert corrected the data to account for male employees with the same title but substantially different responsibilities and found that females are, in fact, much more likely to be promoted that males. Again, plaintiffs failed to rebut the testimony. The Court also affirmed the district court's denial of class certification. It concluded that the named plaintiffs were not adequate class representatives because their promotion claims were weaker than many other class members and because they had a conflict of interest. They are supervisors and have some control over the compensation of both male and female employees. In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected plaintiffs' attempt to style its action as a Rule 23(b)(2) claim (under which they might avoid the adequacy issues). The request for monetary relief and the need for individual calculations and hearings make the case inappropriate for Rule 23(b)(2) treatment.

Laid Off Tenured Teachers Are Entitled To Recall Procedures

On June 13, 2011, the Court granted the Board's Petition for Rehearing, vacated this opinion, and certified three questions to the Illinois Supreme Court.

CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION v. BOARD OF EDUCATION (March 29, 2011)

Chicago's Board of Education operates the city's public school system and employs more than 20,000 teachers. In the summer of 2010, the Board laid off almost 1300 of them. The Board received an increase in federal funding toward the end of that summer and was able to recall over 700 teachers who had been given the layoff notices. The Board used no particular procedure or policy in the recall. The Board has also continued to fill vacancies as they open up in the system naturally, again without any particular policy with respect to laid off teachers. The Chicago Teachers Union filed suit complaining that the Board was filling many of those vacancies with new hires instead of recalls. They sought injunctive relief. Judge Coar (N.D. Ill.) concluded that the laid-off teachers had a property interest emanating from state law that entitled them to some retention procedures. The court also found that the Union met the other elements of injunctive relief and therefore entered an injunction ordering the Board to rescind the discharges of (although not reinstate) tenured teachers and to promulgate a set of recall rules in conjunction with the Union. The court enjoined further layoffs until such rules had been promulgated. The Board appeals.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Manion (concurring in part and dissenting in part) and Williams and District Judge Clevert affirmed, with modifications to the injunction. In order to be entitled to Fourteenth Amendment due process protection, one must first establish the existence of a protected property (or liberty) interest. Property interest themselves are not created by the Constitution but come from independent sources, frequently state law. In the employment context, a property interest only arises when an employer's discretion to deny employment is limited. Under Illinois law, tenured teachers enjoy permanent employment, subject only to removal for clause. The Court concluded, therefore, that an Illinois tenured teacher has a property interest in continued employment. But establishing the property interest only takes us to the next question -- what process is due. Hearings are generally not necessary when the deprivation of the property interest is caused by a good faith economic layoff. Here, the Union does not challenge the good faith of the layoffs nor does it ask for hearings. Instead, it seeks opportunities for its members to compete for vacancies as they arise. The Court looked to state law prior to 1995, when Illinois had "reserve teachers." Basically, reserve teachers were competent teachers who were laid off but who had significant opportunities with respect to vacant positions. When the Legislature eliminated reserve teachers in 1995, it authorized the Board to establish procedures for layoffs and recall rights. Relying in large part on Illinois law interpreting the new provision, the Court concluded that the Board must use the "authority" given it by the Legislature to formulate layoff and recall procedures. Applying the Mathews weighing analysis, the Court noted an employee has a substantial interest in retaining her job and a significant risk of deprivation without any procedures at all. It concluded that the teachers were entitled to a recall procedure that would allow them a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate their qualifications for open positions for a reasonable period of time. With respect to the content of the injunction, however, the Court had two comments. First, it removed the requirement that the Board promulgate rules in conjunction with the Union. Nothing in the statute requires consultation with the Union -- although nothing prohibits it, either. Second, the Court emphasized that the district court's order requiring that the discharges be rescinded did not result in the recall of any teachers. The teachers are still laid-off.

Judge Manion dissented in part and concurred in part, although his concurrence was limited to the majority’s modification of the injunction. First, Judge Manion disagreed with the conclusion that the Illinois statute required the Board to enact recall procedures in the event of the layoff. He pointed out that the Board has established recall procedures in other circumstances, such as a school closing. Second, although teachers have a property interest in their employment, he noted that the Board terminated their employment and honored all process to which they were entitled. No case holds that an employee in that situation has some residual property rights. Third, Judge Manion disagreed with the majority's identification of recall rights as property rights. He pointed out the circularity of the logic. The majority concluded that the recall procedures were the property rights. In order to protect those rights, the Court ordered the Board to develop the procedures. Simply put, even if the statute and other circumstances created a property interest, the property interest cannot be the procedures themselves.

Firm Incurs No Withdrawal Liability For Bona-Fide Sale Of Business

CENTRAL STATES, SOUTHEAST AND SOUTHWEST AREAS PENSION FUND v. GEORGIA-PACIFIC (March 29, 2011)

In the early 1990s, Georgia-Pacific contributed to the multiemployer Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund on behalf of employees in three different divisions. In 1994 and 1995, it laid off workers in its wood-pulp division and stopped its contributions for that division. In 1997, the company laid off workers in its building division and ceased those contributions. Then, in 2004, the company sold its building-products division. The new owner began contributing to the Fund and posted a bond. The Fund claims that Georgia-Pacific owes approximately $5 million in withdrawal liability. Georgia-Pacific, on the other hand, asserts that it has no liability under ERISA § 1384 because it ceased operations "solely because" of an arms-length sale of assets to an unrelated party. The parties proceeded to arbitration, as required by the statute. The arbitrator ruled in Georgia-Pacific's favor. Judge Pallmeyer (N.D. Ill.) enforced the arbitrator's award. The Fund appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Flaum and Ripple affirmed. The Court noted that withdrawal payments are necessary to ensure the continued viability of underfunded multiemployer plans. The purpose of § 1384 is to prevent a windfall to a plan. But what does "solely because" mean? The Court found no appellate court jurisprudence on that question. The Fund argued that the arms-length sale was not the sole cause for Georgia-Pacific no longer contributing to the Fund. It cited the earlier layoffs as additional contributors. The Court identified and elaborated on the problems created by the Fund’s approach and concluded that the proper statutory construction requires consideration only of the transaction at issue. If no withdrawal liability would have accrued to the seller had there been no sale, then no withdrawal liability should accrue to the seller when the sale does go through. The Court recognized an exception to this general rule if an employer manipulates its business planning to avoid withdrawal liability. Here, the arbitrator was asked to consider whether the three stages of Georgia-Pacific's fund withdrawal should be considered as one. The arbitrator concluded that each stage was independent. The Court found that factual conclusion adequately supported by the evidence.

Paycheck Accrual Rule Applies To Section 1983 Pay Discrimination Claims

GROESCH v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD (March 28, 2011)

Kevin Groesch, Greg Shaffer, and Scott Allin are all white males, were all police officers in the Springfield, Illinois Police Department, all voluntarily resigned from the department, all sought reemployment with the department, and all were ultimately rehired between 1989 and 1996 as entry-level officers pursuant to City policy. Donald Schluter, on the other hand, is African-American. He also was a Springfield police officer who sought reinstatement after a voluntary resignation. He was rehired in 2000 -- but he was given a retroactive leave of absence and he returned to the force with full credit for his prior years of service. The City policy had not changed but the City Council enacted a special ordinance allowing the exception. The police union challenged the ordinance in state court but it was upheld. The City ignored the white officers' request to be credited with their prior years of service. A state court dismissed, on statute of limitations grounds, the officers’ lawsuit alleging disparate treatment under the Illinois Constitution. The officers then filed race discrimination claims under Title VII in federal court in 2004. Judge Scott (C.D. Ill.) denied the City's motions for summary judgment in late 2006, relying on the "paycheck accrual" rule, under which each department paycheck amounted to a separate discriminatory act. Five months later, however, the Supreme Court decided Ledbetter and rejected the paycheck accrual rule. The district court reversed course and granted the City's motion. The court also ruled that the officers' § 1983 claims were barred by res judicata because they could have been brought in the state court action. The officers appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Wood, and Hamilton affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Court first noted that Congress enacted the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 during the pendency of the appeal. In effect, the Act reinstated the paycheck accrual rule and also made the reinstatement retroactive to any claim pending on the day of the Supreme Court's decision or later. The City attempted to avoid application of the Act or distinguish the case -- but to no avail. The Court reversed the district court with respect to the Title VII claims relating to the time period after the state court dismissal. Next, although the Act only directly applies to Title VII actions, the Court concluded that the paycheck accrual rule applied to pay discrimination claims under § 1983, as well. Finally, the Court considered the impact of the earlier state court decision. Under Illinois law, res judicata requires a final judgment, an identity of causes of action, and an identity of parties. The district court correctly concluded that res judicata bars recovery for claims that arose before the date of the final judgment. But each individual paycheck after that final judgment supports a separate cause of action and triggers a new statute of limitations. They therefore do not share an identity of causes of action and are not barred by res judicata. The Court emphasized that the state court had never ruled on the merits, therefore not implicating collateral estoppel or issue preclusion.

Employee Fails To Qualify As A "Person With A Disability"

KOTWICA v. ROSE PACKING CO. (March 22, 2011)

Teresa Kotwica was employed as a general laborer at the Rose Packing Company's facility on the south side of Chicago from 1996 to 2006. General laborers perform a number of functions and are purposely rotated through different positions on a regular basis. Rose adopted this work policy in order to be able to reassign workers easily as demand fluctuated and to minimize repetitive motion injuries. Rose also required its employees to have unconditional medical releases before returning to work after a non-work related injury. On the advice of her doctor, Kotwica had a total hip replacement in late 2005. She tried to return to her job after 12 weeks leave, but her doctor included several conditions on her work authorization letter. Rose's in-house physician also conducted an evaluation but could not give her an unconditional clearance. Rose terminated Kotwica's employment in March of 2006 in accordance with its policy. Kotwica brought suit alleging that Rose violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Judge Lefkow (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to Rose. Kotwica appeals.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Cudahy and Rovner and District Judge Adelman affirmed. The Court noted that the district court considered only one of the three requirements of a prima facie case -- whether Kotwica was a qualified individual with a disability. The ADA, at the time, defined a "qualified individual" as an individual with a disability who can perform the "essential functions" of her position. In order to qualify as a person with a disability, Kotwica must show that she had an impairment that limited a major life activity, that she had a record of such an impairment, or that Rose considered her to have such an impairment. She cannot. First, she denies having an impairment. Second, she failed to show that she has a record of an impairment. Third, she failed to show that Rose believed that she suffered from an impairment that substantially limited her ability to work. On this third prong, the Court stated that Kotwica had to produce evidence that Rose thought she was disqualified from a broad category of jobs. That is not what the record shows. Rose only considered her precluded from a general laborer’s job because she was unable to perform the entire job rotation. The ADA does not require an employer to create a new job that consists only of a subset of an employee's prior position.

District Court's Erroneous Dismissal Results In Disaster For Title VII Plaintiffs And Their Lawyer

LEE v. COOK COUNTY (March 22, 2011)

Twelve African-American Cook County employees believed that the County discriminated against them on account of their race in making promotions. They filed a charge with the EEOC. The EEOC issued right-to-sue letters in March 2008. The employees brought suit pursuant to Title VII in May of 2008, well within the 90-day window. Judge Castillo (N.D. Ill.) did not think that the twelve plaintiffs belonged in the same suit. So, in a September 18 order, he dismissed the complaint without prejudice and gave each individual plaintiff 40 days within which to file an individual action. But three of the plaintiffs waited over seven months before filing their individual actions. Judge Kendall (N.D. Ill.) and Judge St. Eve (N.D. Ill.) dismissed the individual actions as untimely. Plaintiffs appeal.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Cudahy and Posner affirmed -- and issued sanctions. The Court first pointed out that there was nothing improper about the original filing. Rule 20 only requires multiple plaintiffs to share a common question of law or fact, which we have here. It does not require that a common question predominate, as do the class action rules. The district court therefore erred when it dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs should have appealed, but they did not. Instead, the plaintiffs waited several months, refiled, and appeal the dismissal of the refiled complaints. So the Court turned to the merits of the actual appeal and agreed with the district courts that refiled actions were untimely. First, the district court's order directing the plaintiffs to file individual actions within 40 days did not extend the statute of limitations or the EEOC filing window. Second, equitable tolling requires a litigant to pursue his rights diligently. Plaintiffs' lawyer did anything but. Third, the Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the defendants either waived or waited too long to assert the limitations defense. Having resolved the merits of the case against the plaintiffs, the Court turned to their lawyer. It noted his "calamitous handling" of the case in the district court, the "sloppy performance" in the appellate court, his several procedural gaffes, his failure to file required pleadings, his grossly inadequate response to the Court’s order to show cause, and his numerous violations of the Circuit Rules. The Court reprimanded the attorney, fined him $5000, and ordered him to send a copy of the opinion to his clients.

Union's Grievance Resolution Procedure Is Not An Arbitration Governed By The FAA

MERRYMAN EXCAVATION v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS (March 21, 2011)

Merryman Excavation and Local 150 of the International Union of Operating Engineers entered into a Memorandum of Agreement in 2000. The agreement basically adopted the terms of Local 150's Collective Bargaining Agreement. In addition to setting wages and describing working conditions, the agreement provided that all disputes were to be resolved by an informal process. The final phase of this process was a hearing before the joint grievance committee. The committee is comprised of an equal number of employer and union members. A majority decision of the committee on a dispute is final and non-appealable. On two different occasions in 2006, a joint committee heard a total of 13 grievances initiated against Merryman. Some of the grievances were settled, some resulted in a committee deadlock, and some were resolved in the union's favor. In total, Merryman was ordered to pay almost $100,000. At the two hearings, Merryman objected to the committee's jurisdiction, objected to proceeding with only two voting members on each side, objected to proceeding before an attempt to settle, and objected to "unbiased" committee members on the union side. Merryman brought suit pursuant to § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. The complaint alleged violations of the agreement and sought to set aside the awards. Local 150 counterclaimed for enforcement of the awards. Judge Kendall (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to Local 150. Merryman appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Manion and Hamilton affirmed. The Court first identified some confusion in the briefing and even in its own jurisprudence. It pointed out that the joint committee proceeding is not an arbitration subject to the Federal Arbitration Act and its impartiality requirements. Rather, it is a creature of contract -- a failure to honor a valid award is simply a breach of contract. The Court categorized Merryman's arguments into three categories: procedural errors, orders to pay the union assistance fund instead of union members, and bias. The Court quickly disposed of the alleged procedural errors. First, most of the alleged "errors" were contract disputes and the joint committee had the absolute authority to resolve them without appeal. Second, with respect to the composition of the committee and whether a quorum was required, the Court concluded that Merryman received all the procedures to which it was entitled under the agreement. With respect to the awards to the assistance fund, the Court also concluded that the issue involved construction of the agreement and was within the joint committee's authority to resolve without appeal. Finally, with respect to bias, the Court conceded that bias is one of the few grounds to attack the decision of a supposedly unbiased arbitrator or panel. But the agreement here does not require a neutral committee members. Instead, it strives to achieve achieves fairness by requiring an equal number of voting members from each camp. There is no evidence that that requirement was not met in this case. Whether any particular voting individual lacked impartiality is irrelevant.

Teacher Unable To Show Causal Relationship Between Pregnancy And Adverse Employment Actions

SILVERMAN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION (March 21, 2011)

Amy Silverman taught special education at a Chicago public high school during the 2004-2005 school year. Because she was a probationary teacher, her contract was subject to annual renewal. In early 2005, the Board of Education decided to eliminate a special education teacher slot at her school. The principal decided not to renew Silverman's contract. Silverman was pregnant at the time. She complained to the EEOC. A few months later, the Board offered her a position at the same school for the 2005-2006 school year. Silverman accepted the position, although she thought it was a more difficult assignment. The Board did not renew her contract for the 2006-2007 school year. Silverman brought suit under Title VII, alleging that the Board discriminated against her as a result of her gender by not renewing her contract when she was pregnant and also retaliated against her, after she filed an EEOC charge, by offering her a more difficult assignment and, again, not renewing her contract. Judge Manning (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the Board. Silverman appeals.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Tinder and Hamilton and District Judge Murphy affirmed. Before addressing the merits, the Court rejected Silverman’s argument that the district court erred by not considering the EEOC's reasonable cause finding. A district court has much discretion in how it treats a reasonable cause determination. On the merits, the Court noted that Silverman chose to proceed under both the direct and indirect methods of proof. Silverman had no direct evidence of discriminatory intent so she attempted to create a "convincing mosaic" of circumstantial evidence under direct method. She attempted to do so almost exclusively with what these she thought was evidence of suspicious timing and her principal’s ambiguous comment regarding her maternity leave. The Court was not convinced. First, suspicious timing is rarely enough by itself. Second, although the principal decided not to renew Silverman's contract shortly after learning of her pregnancy, the Board’s records actually show that the principal decided to renew her contract on two separate occasions after learning of her pregnancy. The decision not to renew only came after the Board decided to eliminate a position. With respect to the indirect method, the Board stipulated to a prima facie case for summary judgment purposes. The only issue on appeal, therefore, was whether the Board articulated a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions and whether that reason was a pretext. The Board did offer such a reason. It argued that Silverman was the weakest of the probationary teachers, based on performance evaluations. Although Silverman disagreed with the evaluations, that is not enough to make the reason a pretext. Silverman raised no issue regarding the honesty of the evaluations, only their accuracy. The Court also rejected Silverman's speculation arising out of the fact that the principal interviewed other candidates for the position that she offered Silverman in 2005. The Court also rejected Silverman's retaliation claim. Under the direct method: a) the offering of a "more difficult" position is not an adverse employment action since the Board was not obligated to offer her any position, b) the negative performance evaluations could amount to an adverse employment action but there is no evidence that they were causally related to the EEOC charge, and c) the Board's 2006 decision not to renew was an adverse employment action but, again, is not causally connected to the charge. Under the indirect method, the Court concluded both that Silverman failed to identify a similarly situated individual and failed to offer sufficient evidence of pretext.

Reservist's Differential Pay Was Not A "Benefit Of Employment"

GROSS v. PPG INDUSTRIES (March 7, 2011)

PPG Industries has employed Eric Gross as an industrial technician since 1997. Gross is a member of the United States Marine Corps Reserve. He was called up for active duty in 2004. Before he left, he met with the PPG's human resources advisor, who explained his benefits. PPG’s policy guaranteed his return to his job and also paid him the differential between his PPG salary and his military salary. PPG computed the salary differential by subtracting his military monthly base pay from his PPG monthly base pay. When Gross returned from deployment, he submitted a complaint regarding the differential calculation. Since Gross was required to work more days per month in the military, he wanted PPG to: a) calculate a daily rate of pay for his military job, and b) subtract from his PPG salary his military salary for only those days he would have worked at PPG. PPG refused to apply that calculation retroactively, but did adopt it prospectively. Gross brought suit against PPG pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act. Judge Stadtmueller (E.D. Wis.) granted PPG summary judgment. Gross appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Rovner, and Evans affirmed. The Court first addressed Gross' argument that the pay calculation violated the Act. Under § 4311, someone in Gross' position cannot be denied a "benefit of employment" because of his service obligations. The Court noted that it has very recently held (opinion and intheiropinion) that § 4311 does not require an employer to provide benefits to military personnel that it does not offer to other employees. Section 4311's purpose is to protect military personnel from discrimination, not to provide preferential treatment. The Court added that Gross would not be entitled to relief even if it accepted his argument that differential pay was a "benefit of employment." PPG did not deny Gross his differential pay. It just did not pay it under Gross' calculations -- nor was it required to. Next, the Court considered and rejected Gross’ retaliation claim. The Act only prohibits an adverse employment action against a person who has sought protection under the Act. Here, there was no adverse employment action. PPG paid Gross under a calculation that it was within its rights to use and denied him no pay. Even if the calculation constituted an adverse employment action, it could not amount to retaliation. All of the calculations and payments under the PPG formula took place before Gross made any complaints. They could not possibly been in retaliation for something that had not yet occurred.

Whether Non-Citizen Is Covered By Title VII And ADEA Is A Merits Question, Not A Jurisdictional One

RABE v. UNITED AIR LINES (February 28, 2011)

United Air Lines hired Laurence Rabe as a flight attendant in 1993. Although United assigned her to fly out of Paris , she signed an employment agreement in Chicago. Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, she was to perform her work on United's aircraft, she was required to join the flight attendants' union in the United States, she agreed that her employment would be governed by United States law, and she agreed that only a United States court would have jurisdiction over any employment claim. Rabe transferred to Hong Kong in 1997. She was on leave between 2002 and 2005, when she returned to Hong Kong. She was fired in 2008 amid allegations that she had misused travel vouchers. Rabe brought suit pursuant to Title VII, the Age Discrimination and Employment Act, and the Illinois Human Rights Act. She alleged that the real reason for her termination was the fact that she was a lesbian. Judge Pallmeyer (N.D. Ill.) dismissed the complaint, concluding that she lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Rabe was a non-citizen working principally outside of the country. The court did not address United's argument that the claims were precluded or preempted by the Railway Labor Act. Rabe appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Coffey and Hamilton reversed and remanded. The Court first corrected the nature of the issue. Although Title VII and ADEA generally do not protect non-citizens working outside the country, it is not because district courts lack subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, in Arbaugh, held that Title VII's minimum employee threshold is a merits question, not a jurisdictional one. That same analysis applies here. Therefore, the Court concluded that the district court should have treated United’s argument as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On that issue, the Court stated that whether Rabe was protected by the statutes was debatable. Her recent employment involved very few flights to or from the United States, but her earlier employment mostly involved United States flights. The Court also noted without deciding that the United States registration of the aircraft on which she worked might be enough to justify statutory protection. Ultimately, though, the Court concluded that United’s motion to dismiss should have been denied for other reasons. United elected to protect itself from the uncertainties associated with international employment by insisting, in the employment agreement, that Rabe's employment was to be governed by United States law. She agreed. Therefore, in addition to her colorable statutory claims, she has state law claims for breach of contract or promissory estoppel. She should have been allowed to proceed on those claims. The Court also decided to address the Railway Labor Act question, although the district court did not. It concluded that the claims were not precluded or preempted because they are not based on the collective bargaining agreement and will not require a construction of that agreement.

Hybrid Employment Agreement Did Not Create A Property Interest

COLE v. MILWAUKEE AREA TECHNICAL COLLEGE DISTRICT (February 24, 2011)

Milwaukee Area Technical College employed Darnell Cole as its president. His employment agreement, which ran through June of 2011, contained two termination provisions. Under one provision, the College could terminate his employment without cause by giving him 90 days notice and paying him all of this salary and vacation that he would have earned through the end of his contract term. Under another provision, the College could terminate his employment at the end of any month for performance or conduct "considered grounds for dismissal" by the College. In February of 2009, Cole was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. In a February board meeting, the College decided to terminate Cole's employment effective February 28. Cole brought suit pursuant to § 1983 (the College is a creature of Wisconsin law), alleging a due process violation. Magistrate Judge Gorence (E.D. Wis.) granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. Cole appeals.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Flaum and Wood and District Judge McCuskey affirmed. The threshold question in any due process case, stated the Court, relates to the existence of a property interest. If Cole has a property interest, it must come from his employment agreement and state law. Under Wisconsin law, due process attaches only when the employment agreement requires a "cause" for termination. The Court concluded that Cole’s employment agreement fell somewhere between an at-will employment agreement and a "cause" employment agreement. Although the College needed some reason to terminate Cole's employment without notice and without severance, their discretion to do so was not meaningfully restricted. The Court therefore concluded that Cole did not have a constitutionally protected property interest.

Suspicious Timing, In The Proper Context, Can Support An Inference Of Causation

LOUDERMILK v. BEST PALLET CO. (February 18, 2011)

Kevin Loudermilk, an African-American male, worked as a laborer at the Best Pallet Co. He came to believe that the company treated its Hispanic employees more favorably. He claims that he complained without success. He even talked about filing an EEOC charge. One day, he took some pictures of his work area. A supervisor, Dan Lyons, directed him to stop. Loudermilk again voiced his concerns about the discriminatory work environment. Lyons told him to put it in writing. When Loudermilk handed Lyons his written complaint the next day, Lyons immediately fired him. Loudermilk brought suit under Title VII, alleging that Best Pallet fired him for opposing its discriminatory practices. Judge Reinhard (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to Best Pallet. He concluded that Loudermilk's only evidence, the timing of his discharge vis-à-vis the written complaint, was insufficient to establish causation. Loudermilk appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Wood and Evans reversed and remanded. The Court rejected the district court's conclusion for several reasons. First, the court did not look at the evidence in the light most favorable to Loudermilk. Second, the several different reasons the company put forth for its actions (it told the EEOC that Loudermilk was let go as part of a reduction in force, it first told the court that Loudermilk resigned, and it later told the court that he was fired for taking pictures) could support an inference of pretext. Third, the Court rejected the notion that timing, by itself, can never support an inference of causation. It depends on the context. Here, the termination came immediately after a protected act. The Court concluded that the context could support a causation inference.

Indiana Late Wage Penalties Are Not Debts "For Services" Under NY Law

WHITELY v. MORAVEC (February 16, 2011)

Waste Reduction, Inc. laid off several workers at its Indiana facilities in 2006 and filed for bankruptcy. It paid the workers' wage claims through the bankruptcy proceedings but had insufficient assets to satisfy the statutory penalty claims. Former employees filed suit against the company's ten largest shareholders pursuant to New York (where Waste Reduction was incorporated) law imposing employer liability on shareholders in some circumstances. Then-Judge Hamilton (S.D. Ind.) concluded that the defendants were entitled to judgment but kept the case open until the bankruptcy court resolved the wage claims. Once no wage claims existed, the court entered judgment. The plaintiffs appeal.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Posner and Rovner affirmed. The Court first rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the district court abused its discretion in not remanding the case to state court once it decided the federal ERISA issues. On removal, a federal court has discretion to resolve both the federal and state issues, which is what the court did here. The Court turned to the merits. Under New York law, the ten largest shareholders of privately held companies are jointly and severally liable for "debts, wages or salaries . . . for services performed." The Court seemed to hold that the plaintiffs could not cobble together both the Indiana late wage penalty statute and the New York investor liability statute to create a hybrid statute (likening it to a jackalope or griffin). It decided the case on narrower grounds, however. The New York statute only imposes liability for debts "for services performed." The Indiana statutory penalty is not a debt "for services."

Employee Who Fails To Notify Employer Of Expected Return Date Is Not Entitled To FMLA Protection

RIGHI v. SMC CORPORATION (February 14, 2011)

SMC Corporation employed Robert Righi as a sales representative from 2004 until 2006. Righi worked out of his home in Henry, Illinois, where he lived with a roommate and his ailing mother. His principal methods of communicating with his sales manager was his cell phone and e-mail. Righi was attending a training session in Indianapolis on July 11, 2006 when he received a call that his mother was in a coma. He immediately returned home. Although he advised a colleague of his plans and asked the colleague to inform others, he did not inform his sales manager of the situation until the next morning. In fact, he turned his cell phone off and missed several calls from his sales manager on July 11. He sent his sales manager an e-mail on the morning of July 12. He stated that he needed "the next couple days off" to care for his mother, that he had vacation time, or that "I could apply for the family care act, which I do not want to do at this time." Over the next several days, Righi's sales manager attempted to reach him by phone multiple times. Righi did not answer or return the calls. His roommate finally answered one of the calls and took a message that the sales manager needed to speak with Righi as soon as possible. Righi finally called his sales manager -- after nine days of silence. SMC terminated Righi's employment the next day for violating its leave policy. The leave policy required prior approval for a leave and provided that two days absence without notification was grounds for termination. Righi brought suit against SMC pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act, alleging that SMC interfered with his statutory rights. Judge McDade (C.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to SMC on two grounds: that Righi was not entitled to FMLA protection because he stated in his e-mail that he did not want it, and that he was not entitled to FMLA protection because he did not comply with the Act's regulations requiring notification of a return date. Righi appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Wood, and Sykes affirmed. In order to be entitled to protection under the FMLA, employee must notify his or her employer of a desire to take leave and of a projected return date. With respect to the former, the Court disagreed with the district court's conclusion. Very little is required of an employee to trigger the FMLA protection. Putting an employer on notice of a basis for leave is sufficient. An employee can waive FMLA protection, but only by a clear expression of intent to do so. The Court concluded that Righi met the notice requirements with his July 12 e-mail. It mentioned the “family care act” and left open, at least, the possibility that he could choose to use it. The Court also concluded that his expressed desire not to use it was not a clear expression of a waiver. The Court agreed with the district court, however, with respect to its alternate grounds for summary judgment. Righi was obligated under the FMLA and its regulations to keep SMC informed of his anticipated return date. The regulations require him to provide that information within two working days. Here, Righi never provided that notice and, in fact, ignored all of SMC's attempts to obtain additional information. He is not entitled to the FMLA's protection.

Plaintiffs Bound By Summary Judgment Response Admissions

DELAPAZ v. RICHARDSON (February 14, 2011)

Pablo Delapaz and Michael Sarkauskas are both employees of the City of Chicago's Department of Streets and Sanitation (DSS). They are also both supporters of the Hispanic Democratic Organization. In 2001 in 2002, DSS Commissioner Al Sánchez appointed both men to temporary acting foremen positions in the Department. Michael Picardi replaced Sanchez as Commissioner several years later. Delapaz and Sarkauskas still occupied their temporary positions. Shortly after Picardi became Commissioner, he ordered the elimination of all acting foreman positions and the return of those employees to their prior positions. When Deputy Commissioner Richardson advised Delapaz that he would have to return to his prior position, he also remarked: "Your guy is gone." Both Delapaz and Sarkauskas assumed their prior positions in the summer of 2005, as did all the other acting foremen. Later that year, the Richardson appointed another man as an acting Foreman for snow removal purposes. That man was a contributor and volunteer for Chicago Alderman Richard Mell. Delapaz and Sarkauskas filed suit against Deputy Commissioner Richardson under § 1983, alleging that he violated their First Amendment rights of free association by demoting them because of their HDO affiliation. Judge Marovich (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to Richardson. Delapaz and Sarkauskas appeal.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Flaum and Evans and District Judge McCuskey affirmed. The Court agreed that a public employee’s firing or demotion because of his or her political affiliation is a First Amendment violation. But to state a claim against a particular defendant, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant participated or caused the deprivation. In their summary judgment response pursuant to local rule, plaintiffs admitted that Picardi ordered the demotions, not Richardson. Courts are entitled to rely on these admissions. In light of the admission, the plaintiffs cannot establish Richardson's liability. The Court did cite another reason why they could not prevail: they waived the Richardson liability argument by not addressing it in their response brief in the district court. And the Court cited yet a third reason why they could not prevail: the merits. The only evidence the plaintiffs presented that Richardson even knew of their HDO affiliation is the "your guy" remark he made to Delapaz, an apparent reference to Sanchez. But they presented no evidence that Sanchez was even affiliated with HDO or, if he was, that Richardson knew about it. And they presented no evidence at all that Richardson knew of Sarkauskas’ HDO affiliation -- only that the timing of his demotion (two weeks after Delapaz) was suspicious. Without a triable issue of fact on whether he knew of their party affiliation, Richardson is entitled to summary judgment.

Railway Labor Act Does Not Completely Preempt State Retaliatory Discharge Claim

HUGHES v. UNITED AIR LINES (February 8, 2011)

United Airlines and its flight attendant union agreed that flight attendants retain seniority for only three years while on medical leave. When Constance Hughes' three-year deadline was near, United asked her to return to work. She received medical clearance and completed her requalification training. Unfortunately, a few days before her first assigned flight, she fell and injured herself so severely that she could not perform her duties. United terminated her employment. Hughes brought suit in Illinois state court, alleging that her discharge was in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. Notwithstanding the complaint’s state law basis, United removed to federal court on federal question grounds. It contended that the Railway Labor Act completely preempts the field. Judge Bucklo (N.D. Ill.) agreed, based on the Seventh Circuit’s Graf decision, denied the motion to remand, and dismissed the complaint. Hughes appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Cudahy and Posner vacated and remanded with instructions to remand to Illinois state court. The Court first distinguished between the "misleadingly named" doctrine of complete preemption and ordinary preemption. Ordinary preemption is an affirmative defense that must be raised in the court where the litigation was filed. Complete preemption, on the other hand, is not a defense. It is a theory under which federal law so controls a field that a state law claim is not possible. The Court turned to its own and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the issue. In Graf, the Court held that a retaliatory discharge case like Hughes' against an employer covered by the Railway Labor Act was completely preempted. It extended that principle to other employers the following year in Lingle. The Supreme Court reversed the Lingle decision, however, holding that a retaliatory discharge claim is preempted only if it requires construction of a collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court then extended that principle to a Railway Labor Act employer in Hawaiian Airlines. The Court concluded that Lingle and Hawaiian Airlines controlled and that Graf had to be overruled. Without diversity of citizenship, the case must be remanded to the state court. That is the appropriate forum for United to raise its claim of ordinary preemption on the ground that Hughes' claim requires interpretation and construction of the collective bargaining agreement.

Court Reinstates "Cat's Paw" Jury Verdict

SCHANDELMEIER-BARTELS v. CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT (February 8, 2011)

Cathleen Schandelmeier-Bartels, a Caucasian, began working for the Chicago Park District in early 2006. She reported to Andrea Adams (an African-American) who reported to Alonzo Williams (an African-American) who reported to Megan McDonald (a Caucasian). [Taking the facts in a light most favorable to Smith] During the summer of 2006, Schandelmeier-Bartels was supervising summer camp. One day, she heard what she thought was the sound of flesh being struck and a child's screams. Upon investigation, she came upon a young African-American child who had been suspended from summer camp. The child's aunt was kneeling over him with her arm raised and a belt in her hand. The child was crying and had visible welts on his arm. When Schandelmeier-Bartels told the aunt to stop, the aunt and the child left. Schandelmeier-Bartels reported the incident to Adams. Adams stated that what happened was acceptable discipline in their culture. Schandelmeier-Bartels reported the incident to the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services and, on their advice, to the police. The next morning, Adams, in the company of the child's aunt, confronted Schandelmeier-Bartels. Adams screamed at her, criticized her for sending the police to the aunt’s house, repeated her statement about the acceptability of that type of discipline in her culture, and ordered Schandelmeier-Bartels out of her office. Adams immediately sent a memo to McDonald complaining of Schandelmeier-Bartels’ poor performance. She recounted several examples, including failure to supervise, failure to report an emergency, and poorly written incident reports. The last example she gave was the incident with the young child. The Park District fired Schandelmeier-Bartels by the end of the day. Schandelmeier-Bartels filed suit for race discrimination under Title VII. A jury awarded her $200,000 in compensatory damages. Judge Coar (N.D. Ill.) granted the Park District’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. He concluded that Adams' racial animus did not affect the termination decision. Schandelmeier-Bartels appeals. The Park District cross-appealed the court's conditional denial of its motion for a new trial (although the Court pointed out that the cross-appeal was unnecessary).

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Williams, and Hamilton affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court first addressed Schandelmeier-Bartels’ appeal. It noted that the case was based on a "cat's paw" theory. There was evidence of a racial animus on the part of Schandelmeier-Bartels’ supervisor but not on the part of the decision-maker. The Court noted the lack of consistency in recent cases regarding what is necessary to bridge that causal gap. Is evidence that the biased employee exerted "singular influence" over the decision-maker required or will something less suffice? The Court concluded that it need not resolve that issue since it found that a reasonable jury could have found for Schandelmeier-Bartels even under the more stringent test. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Schandelmeier-Bartels, the jury could have found that Adams' input was decisive and that neither McDonald nor the human resources representative conducted an independent investigation. The Court thus reinstated the jury's verdict on liability. It turned to the Park District’s motion for a new trial. First, it rejected the argument that the district court should have modified a jury instruction in response to a jury question during deliberations. The objection came too late in the proceedings and, given the entirety of the instructions, there was no plain error. Second, the Court addressed the admittedly improper suggestion by plaintiff’s counsel during closing argument that an important e-mail actually had been created after the fact. Although the suggestion was without merit and even baseless, the Court noted that closing argument remarks rarely require a new trial. This remark was no different -- it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny the new trial. Finally, the Court addressed the amount of the compensatory damage award. Although the Court found a rational connection between the evidence and a significant compensatory damage award, it concluded that the evidence did not support the $200,000 award. It relied on similar cases from the circuit to reduce the award to $30,000 (noting that, but for the district court judge’s retirement, it would have remanded the issue to him for redetermination).

TSA Employee Has No Remedy For Disability Discrimination

JOREN v. NAPOLITANO (February 7, 2011)

Verlaine Joren was a security screener with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) at Midway Airport in Chicago. At the age of 63, Smith claimed to have a condition that limited her ability to stand or walk. She asked her supervisor for accommodations, including a relocation to Florida and schedule modifications. Her supervisor was skeptical of her complaints and refused her requests. Joren claims that he even refused to reassign her a "safe distance" from an x-ray machine when she temporarily had a heart monitor without a doctor's clarification of "safe distance." Joren resigned her position in January 2004 after her supervisor confronted her regarding a Social Security claim she had filed. Joren filed suit pursuant to Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, alleging age, gender, and disability discrimination and retaliation. Judge Bucklo (N.D. Ill.) dismissed the complaint, holding that Joren failed to state a cause of action under Title VII and that her Rehabilitation Act claim was foreclosed by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA). Joren appeals

In their opinion, Judges Rovner, Evans, and Williams affirmed. First, the Court stated that the gender and age discrimination claims were properly dismissed because Joren's complaint did not suggest that gender or age motivated her employer's actions. Instead, the complaint linked those actions exclusively to her disability. Federal employees’ disability claims are generally governed by the Rehabilitation Act, but Congress passed the ATSA after the September 11 attacks. The ATSA established the TSA and gave the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security the authority to hire and fire "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law." The Court agreed with the other circuits that have considered the question that the "notwithstanding" language meant that the Rehabilitation Act’s disability discrimination prohibitions did not apply to TSA employees.

Res Judicata Bars Suit Under Different Legal Theory

CZARNIECKI v. CITY OF CHICAGO (January 21, 2011)

For a few months in late 2006 in early 2007, Wojciech Czarniecki was a probationary police officer with the Chicago Police Department. He alleges that Assistant Deputy Superintendent Tobias made several negative references to his Polish ancestry in a discussion about Czarniecki's use of exam study guides. He alleges that his dismissal followed shortly thereafter and that another Polish probationary officer was dismissed at about the same time. He brought suit under § 1983 against the City and Tobias, alleging national origin discrimination in violation of the 14th Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the City. Shortly before trial, the court granted Czarniecki's motion to dismiss his claim against Tobias without prejudice - but conditioned the dismissal on a requirement that he seek her permission if he ever wanted to refile it. Czarniecki appealed that order because of its refiling condition, then sought permission to refile and appealed that order when the court denied permission on the grounds that his first appeal deprived her of jurisdiction. A few months later, Czarniecki filed a new complaint alleging national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, naming only the City. Judge St. Eve (N.D. Ill.) dismissed the complaint on res judicata grounds. Czarniecki appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Bauer, Flaum, and Hamilton consolidated the three appeals, affirmed the res judicata dismissal, and dismissed the other appeals as moot. The Court noted the three familiar ingredients of federal res judicata (federal res judicata applies when the earlier judgment was in federal court): a final decision, a dispute arising out of the same operative facts, and the same parties. The Court found that the three requirements were met here. There is no dispute that the earlier decision against the City was final, the parties are the same (the fact that Tobias is not a defendant in the second suit is of no consequence), and the claim arises from the same operative facts. The fact that he sets forth a new theory of liability, even with different proof requirements, does not change the res judicata result. The Court also rejected Czarniecki's argument that res judicata should not apply because he lacked a "right to sue” letter at the time of his first complaint and could not have brought a Title VII claim. The Court concluded that Czarniecki had several ways in which he could have dealt with that situation -- splitting his claims was not one of them. Finally, the Court dismissed as moot Czarniecki's two other appeals since both only dealt with his ability to refile.

Facts Do Not Support Employer Liability For Hostile Environment

SUTHERLAND v. WALMART STORES (January 21, 2011)

Arturo Aguas and Maria Sutherland worked together in the deli section of a Walmart store in Seymour, Indiana. They had worked together for years without incident -- but that changed on December 11, 2006. On that day, Aguas assaulted Sutherland in the deli cooler. He kissed her and fondled her and gave her an inappropriate Christmas card. Sutherland reported the incident to her supervisor the following day. A Walmart manager interviewed one co-worker on that day and another co-worker the following day. They continued their investigation throughout December, while Aguas was on vacation. When confronted upon his return, Aguas admitted some inappropriate conduct but denied the most serious allegations. The company decided that it could not substantiate all the allegations but disciplined Aguas severely for those that they could substantiate. The company also adjusted both employees' time schedules so that they rarely worked at the same time and also assigned them to workstations almost 80 feet apart when they did work together. Not satisfied with the company's response, Sutherland filed a police report. The police investigation was more successful than the company's. Aguas ultimately admitted the allegations and pled guilty to a sexual battery charge. Walmart revisited its investigation and terminated Aguas' employment. Sutherland took medical leave shortly thereafter for stress. Walmart terminated her employment when she failed to return to work, even after her leave expired. Sutherland brought suit against Walmart, alleging a hostile work environment and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Judge Lawrence (S.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to Walmart. Sutherland appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Cudahy, Flaum, and Kanne affirmed. The Court assumed that the harassment was severe enough to create a hostile work environment and addressed only the issue of employer liability. Sutherland presented two theories -- a failure to prevent the assault theory based on an incident two or three years earlier in which Aguas was accused of harassment and a failure to investigate theory. The Court rejected the first theory based on its opinion in Longstreet in which it found no employer liability on very similar facts (one prior incident, probably not rising to the level of actionable harassment, properly investigated). On the second theory, the Court conceded that employer liability can arise when its investigation is not prompt and adequate. Here, the Court found that Walmart's investigation was prompt and adequate and that its corrective actions were reasonably likely to end the harassment. There is, therefore, no basis for employer liability and summary judgment was proper. The Court also rejected Sutherland's "underdeveloped" negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. To the extent the claim is based on pre-assault actions, it fails because Walmart was not on notice that Aguas was likely to assault her. To the extent that the claim is based on post-assault actions, it fails because Sutherland has not even alleged a physical impact, a requirement of Indiana law.

FLSA Collective Action And State Law Rule 23(b)(3) Class Action Can Co-exist

ERVIN v. OS RESTAURANT SERVICES (JANUARY 18, 2011)

OS Restaurant Services operates an Outback Steakhouse in Calumet City, Illinois. It has both hourly and tipped employees. A number of its former employees brought suit, alleging that certain of its employment practices violated the Fair Labor Standards Act as well as the Illinois Minimum Wage Law and theIllinois Wage Payment and Collection Act. The plaintiffs sought to pursue their federal claims as an FLSA collective action and their state law claims as a Rule 23 class action. Judge Guzman (N.D. Ill.) refused to certify the class. He concluded that the plaintiffs failed to meet the superiority requirement because of a conflict between Rule 23's opt-out approach and the FLSA's opt in approach. The plaintiffs petitioned for an interlocutory appeal.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Flaum, Wood, and Hamilton granted the petition and reversed and remanded. The only issue on appeal was whether the plaintiffs satisfied the Rule 23(b)(3) superiority requirement. Although Outback argued that the Court could affirm on the ground that individual issues predominated, the Court concluded that the district court's treatment of that issue was not clear enough to support alternate ground affirmance. On the superiority issue, the Court agreed that the two vehicles had different approaches. An FLSA collective action allows participation only upon the written consent of a party -- while a Rule 23(b)(3) class action includes all potential class members who do not affirmatively opt out of the class. Notwithstanding this distinction, however, the Court found nothing in the FLSA that precluded a companion class action on state law claims. Because the district court concluded that the two claims could not proceed simultaneously as a matter of law, the Court remanded for further consideration of the Rule 23 requirements.

Plaintiff Does Not Overcome General Rule That Suspicious Timing Is Not Enough To Establish Causal Connection

LEITGEN v. FRANCISCAN SKEMP HEALTHCARE (January 13, 2011)

From 1993 to 2006, Dr. Christine Leitgen was a physician in the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at a hospital owned by Franciscan Skemp Healthcare. She was one of the busiest and highest paid doctors in the department. She also served as chair of the Department from 1999 to 2004. The Hospital distributed the revenue it received for deliveries equally among the physicians in the department, regardless of the number of deliveries each performed. Since the female physicians usually performed more deliveries, they were generally unhappy about the Hospital's compensation scheme. Leitgen herself complained to the Department chair several times. The issue came up while Leitgen herself was the Department chair, as well. She chose not to address the issue for fear that it would affect morale. Leitgen and another female physician complained to Dr. Sandy, Leitgen's successor as chair. She claims that she identified the flaws in the compensation system as gender discrimination. The issue was discussed several times at department meetings but never voted on -- and never changed. Leitgen complained to the Hospital's CFO in August and September of 2006. Again, she alleges that she framed the issue as one of gender discrimination. Throughout her employment, Leitgen's was the subject of numerous complaints from both staff and patients. In fact, as early as 2003, one of the Hospital's managers recommended that she be fired. In her March 2006 performance review, Leitgen was told that she had shown "some improvement" in the area. In July of 2006, a nurse complained that Leitgen humiliated her in front of the patient. The complaint prompted Sandy to consider discipline. The complaints continued through September. In early September, Sandy and Leitgen's supervisor began to prepare a termination recommendation. The collected information about all the complaints. Sandy made a recommendation to the executive committee that Leitgen be terminated on October 31, 2006. On November 14, Leitgen was told to resign or be fired. She resigned the following day. She brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, claiming that her termination was in retaliation for her complaints about gender discrimination. Judge Crabb (W.D. Wis.) granted summary judgment to the defendants. Leitgen appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Rovner, Sykes, and Tinder affirmed. As Leitgen proceeded under the direct method of proof, she was required to establish that she engaged in protected conduct, that she suffered an adverse employment action, and that there was a causal connection. In order to establish protected conduct, she need not prove that the Hospital’s compensation system was discriminatory, but she must prove that she had a reasonable and good faith belief that it was. At this summary judgment stage, the Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence that she had such a belief and that her conversation with the CFO was therefore protected conduct. With respect to the causal connection, however, the Court concluded otherwise. In order for her to meet that requirement, she must show that her complaints were a "substantial or motivating factor" in the Hospital's decision. Her reliance on the temporal proximity between the communication with the CFO and her termination did not persuade the Court. First, suspicious timing is almost never enough. Second, her conversation with the CFO was not the first time she raised the complaint. Third, the conversation was not even the first time she raised the complaint outside her department. Fourth, Sandy and Leitgen's supervisor began their discipline discussions before Leitgen's meeting with the CFO. Leitgen failed to establish the required causal connection and summary judgment was appropriate.

EEOC Right To Sue Notice Is Inadequate If It Does Not Include Limitations Period Advice

DETATA v. ROLLPRINT PACKAGING PRODUCTS (January 12, 2011)

Sherry DeTata had a rather short career at Rollprint Packaging Products. She was fired after only eight days -- allegedly a few days after she complained about sexual harassment. She sought advice from Jewell Bracko, the Director of the American Civil Rights Trust. Although Bracko wrote a letter to Rollprint on her behalf, his role and relationship with DeTata is not clear on the record. In any event, she filed a charge with the EEOC in December of 2008. The agency issued a right to sue letter on March 2, 2009. Although the letter was addressed to DeTata, it was sent to Bracko. DeTata alleges that Bracko never received it. It was returned to the EEOC as undeliverable. When DeTata later called the agency to inquire about her case, she was told that the letter had been issued but was also told that her file had been lost. The EEOC eventually resent the letter on June 18. Of course, the letter stated that she had 90 days after her receipt of the notice to file a lawsuit. She filed her suit pro se on August 18. Rollprint moved to dismiss on the grounds that she did not meet the 90-day requirement. Judge Pallmeyer (N.D. Ill) held an evidentiary hearing. Based on DeTata's testimony that her conversation with the EEOC occurred in April, the district court granted Rollprint's motion. It concluded that the 90-day period began running when she had actual oral notice. DeTata hired an attorney and filed an amended complaint, which was also dismissed. On a motion for reconsideration, she explained that she misspoke when she stated that the call was in April and that it was really in May. The court denied the motion. DeTata Appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Wood and Evans vacated and remanded. The statute requires the agency to notify a party when it dismisses a discrimination charge but it does not elaborate on either the form or content of that notice. The Court noted that it has consistently held that written notice is required and that the 90-day period does not run until actual receipt of the letter. It also noted, however, that cases from both the 6th and the 11th Circuits held that oral notice was sufficient. In both those cases, the court believed that the plaintiff was at least partially at fault for the delayed actual receipt, which is not the case here. But even if oral notice is sufficient, it must be sufficient notice. The Court held that proper notice must include authorization to institute an action within 90 days and advice regarding the institution of the action, if appropriate. The record does not establish that the oral notice received here met that threshold. Rollprint has the burden to show that the case was filed late -- it has not met that burden. The Court also rejected Rollprint's request to affirm the district court on the grounds that the initial notice sent to Bracko was sufficient. The Court noted that the undisputed facts surrounding that notice were insufficient for it to conclude at this stage that it constituted adequate notice.

Indiana Tax Preparer's Seasonal Compensation Is Not "Wages"

THOMAS v. H&R BLOCK EASTERN ENTERPRISES (January 12, 2011)

Amorita Thomas worked as a seasonal tax preparer for H&R Block for the 2005-06 and the 2006-07 tax seasons. Her employment agreement provided for two different types of compensation. First, she was paid hourly. Second, she was eligible for compensation at the end of the tax season to the degree that the sum of several identified amounts exceeded her total hourly income for that season. Those other amounts included incentives for products sold, return clients, and number of returns prepared. The returns prepared number was based on fees collected. Thomas received her hourly wages on a biweekly basis but did not receive her seasonal compensation until sometime in May of each year, even though she stopped working several weeks earlier. Thomas brought suit against H&R Block pursuant to Indiana's Wage Payment Statute, which requires "wages" to be paid within 10 days after they are earned. Then-Judge Hamilton (S.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to the defendant. Thomas appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Ripple, and Evans affirmed. The Court noted that it was its obligation to apply the law of Indiana, as the Indiana Supreme Court has or would determine. The only issue on appeal was whether Thomas’ seasonal compensation amounted to “wages" in the Indiana Wage Payment Statute. Although the term is not defined in that particular statute, Indiana courts have looked at the definition in the Wage Claims Statute and the Indiana Supreme Court's decision in Highhouse. Considering that, the Court found the answer dependent on several factors. Compensation is less likely to be considered "wages" if: a) it is linked to a contingency, b) it would be hard to calculate and pay it within the statutory period, c) is not directly related to hours worked, and d) is paid in addition to other compensation. In this case, the Court found that each of those factors weighed against Thomas: a) the amount of the compensation for returns prepared is contingent on collections, b) evidence in the record indicates it would be almost impossible to calculate and pay the compensation within 10 days, c) the compensation was not directly related to hours worked, and d) the compensation was paid in addition to her hourly wages. Thus, the compensation is not "wages" under Indiana law. The Court rejected Thomas' request to certify the question to the Indiana Supreme Court in light of Highhouse and the fact that any decision of the state court would have limited application, given the unique compensation scheme.

Employees Who Accept Severance Packages Are Not "Affected" Under WARN Act

ELLIS v. DHL EXPRESS (January 11, 2011)

In late 2008, DHL announced that it was discontinuing its domestic shipping business. Five of its Chicago facilities were sure to close. The union successfully negotiated severance agreements. One agreement was available to full-time drivers and provided 10 weeks severance. The other agreements provided only four weeks. The drivers had less than a week to make their decisions. Other employees had between two and six weeks. Workers who were already laid off at the time the severance package was negotiated were nevertheless eligible for the four-week agreement. Eventually, 506 DHL employees accepted a package, resigned, and signed a release. The employees who did not accept a severance package received no severance but did retain seniority and recall rights and, of course, did not release the company from any claims. John Ellis and Timothy Price, both DHL drivers, brought suit against DHL alleging a violation of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act. Judge Kennelly (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to DHL. He concluded that the WARN Act did not apply because a) the layoffs did not constitute a "plant closing" under the Act because the five facilities were not a single site, b) the employment losses were less than the Act’s 33% trigger, and c) the employees who accepted severance packages did so voluntarily and are therefore not counted as involuntary separations under the Act. Ellis and Price appeal.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Wood, Evans, and Tinder affirmed. The Court stated that the WARN Act requires covered employers to provide 60-days notice of a plant closing or mass layoff. The Act does not apply if fewer than 33% of full-time employees are affected. Since the plaintiffs concede that the 33% threshold would not be met if the 506 employees who accepted the severance packages are not considered "affected," the Court confined its review to that issue. Although the Act excludes "voluntary" departures from its definition of employment losses, it does not define "voluntary." The Secretary of Labor has clarified the term, a clarification to which the Court gives significant weight. The clarification states that incentive retirement programs should normally be considered voluntary if the employer has not created a hostile environment or otherwise improperly induced employees. The Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the economic uncertainties and narrow window within which to make decisions made those decisions involuntary. The agreements were negotiated by the union for the benefit of the employees and they were written clearly. The record contains no evidence that the company put any improper pressure on any employees. The Court recognized the narrow decision window but concluded that it did not transform the decisions into involuntary ones. The Court also rejected the argument that employees who were already laid off at the time they accepted a severance package could not have resigned "voluntarily." Although they were not working, the Court noted that they gave up valuable seniority and recall rights when they signed their agreements. Finally, the Court affirmed the District Court's decision to sua sponte grant summary judgment to DHL's German parent. The claims against the parent were identical to the claims against DHL.

Alcoholism Requires Inpatient Care Or Continuing Treatment To Qualify As An FMLA "Serious Health Condition"

AMES v. HOME DEPOT (January 6, 2011)

Diane Ames had a five-year, incident free employment record with Home Depot when she asked her store manager for the company's assistance with her alcohol problem. She enrolled in the company's employee assistance program and was put on paid leave. She was told that she could return when she had a treatment plan, passed a drug and alcohol test, and obtained return authorization. She did so and returned to work within a month. The following month, however, she was arrested for driving under the influence. When Home Depot found out, it required her to schedule an alcohol treatment evaluation. The company gave her several extensions within which to schedule the evaluation. In the meantime, she sought scheduling accommodations from her manager so she could attend her Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, she provided her manager a treatment note from her physician, and she shared many of her other personal difficulties with her manager. During a regularly scheduled shift on December 23, an assistant manager suspected that she was under the influence of alcohol. She was immediately tested. When the company learned that she tested positive for alcohol, it decided to terminate her for substance abuse. Her manager scheduled a meeting with her on January 2 to notify her. She missed the meeting because she began drinking more and checked herself into a hospital on January 1. Home Depot mailed Ames a letter on January 10 informing her of the termination of her employment. Ames filed suit pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Judge Coar (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to Home Depot on those claims. Ames appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Tinder, and Hamilton affirmed. On her claim under the FMLA that Home Depot interfered with her leave rights, Ames was required to establish (among other things) that she was entitled to leave under the Act. An employee is entitled to live under the FMLA only if she is suffering from a "serious health condition," which is defined as an illness that involves inpatient care or continuing treatment. Substance abuse can qualify as a serious health condition but only if it meets the inpatient care or continuing treatment standard. The record contains no evidence of either. She did check into a hospital, but that was after her employment was terminated. Therefore, no reasonable juror could conclude that she had a serious health condition -- her FMLA interference claim fails. Ames also asserted an FMLA retaliation claim, pursuant to which she had to establish that she engaged in a protected activity, that she suffered an adverse job action, and that there was a causal connection between them. The Court addressed only the causal connection prong. Here, the record contains no evidence that Home Depot's decision to fire Ames was related to any alleged request for FMLA leave – her FMLA retaliation claim fails. Lastly, the Court rejected Ames' ADA claim. In order to prevail on that claim, she had to establish that she had a disability. Alcoholism can be a disability under the ADA but only if it "substantially limits" a major life activity. Ames offered no evidence that her alcoholism even adversely affected her life's activities. In fact, the only evidence on that score was her testimony that it did not affect her performance on the job. Her ADA claim fails.

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Promotion Candidate Was Similarly Situated To Higher Ranked Candidates

STINNETT v. CITY OF CHICAGO (JANUARY 4, 2011)

Gregory Stinnett was a black male Ambulance Commander in Chicago's Fire Department. He took the promotional exam for Field Officer in 2000. Based on his score and seniority, he ranked 32nd. Over the next several years, the Department promoted from the list on eight different occasions. By February of 2007, after the Department promoted two white officers, Stinnett's name was next in line and there were vacancies. Unfortunately, promotions for the additional vacancies were not budgeted. By the time of the next promotions in March 2008, the Department had retired the 2000 list and had administered a new exam -- and Stinnett went from 1st to 48th. He brought suit against the City, alleging that its failure to promote him violated Title VII. Judge St. Eve (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the City. Stinnett appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Posner, Tinder, and Hamilton affirmed. Under McDonnell Douglas, the Court noted that Stinnett can survive summary judgment if he shows that he was qualified for a promotion, was denied the promotion, a similarly situated member of another race got the promotion, and the City was unable to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct. The district court concluded that Stinnett was not similarly situated to either a) the two white officers who were just ahead of Stinnett on the 2000 list and promoted in February 2007 or b) to all of the officers (some of whom were white) who had been promoted ahead of Stinnett from the 2007 list. The Court disagreed with the former. Stinnett was not claiming that he should have been promoted ahead of the two officers who ranked higher in 2007 -- he was claiming that the City should not have stopped filling vacancies when it got to him on the list. Thus, the Court concluded he was similarly situated to the last two promotions from the 2000 list because they were all eligible for the 2007 promotions. Getting past the similarly situated hurdle was not enough for Stinnett, however. The City's reasons for its behavior -- that it filled the only two budgeted promotions in 2007 and that it needed to update its promotion list from time to time to allow newer employees a chance for a promotion -- was reasonable. The fact that the last two promotions were white males and the next name on the list was that of a black male does not make its behavior suspicious. Also, the record clearly establishes that the Department official who closed down the 2000 list did not know whose name was next.

Almost Daily Need For Self-Care Assistance Is Enough For Jury To Find Disability

EEOC v. AUTOZONE (December 30, 2010)

John Shepherd was a parts sales manager at AutoZone in Macomb, Illinois. His job duties included pitching in to help with routine cleaning assignments, like mopping the floor. A computerized system assigned the jobs randomly. Shepherd had an old back injury, however, that interfered with his ability to perform these physical tasks. His head would swell, he would get headaches, and he would sweat profusely. He was receiving medical treatment. Notwithstanding the treatment, Shepherd took medical leaves on several locations between 2001 and 2003. After one such leave, he asked to be excused from the mop detail based on his physician’s physical restrictions. AutoZone accommodated his request, but only on occasion. When he returned from his 2003 leave, his physician originally recommended no mopping. He modified that restriction when AutoZone advised Shepherd that he could not return to work with the complete restriction. Shepherd suffered another incident while mopping in September of 2003. Again, he took a medical leave. Although he was authorized to return as early as December of 2003 with no greater restrictions than he had in September, AutoZone did not allow his return. Instead, it kept him on involuntary leave until February of 2005 and then dismissed him. The EEOC filed a complaint on his behalf pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The complaint alleged that AutoZone failed to accommodate Shepherd's disability between March and September 2003, that AutoZone discriminated against him by refusing to allow him to work after 2003, and that AutoZone's dismissal of him was in retaliation for his filing charges. Magistrate Judge Gorman (C.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to AutoZone on the failure to accommodate claim, concluding that Shepherd was not disabled within the meaning of the statute between March and September 2003. He did not reach the other claims. The EEOC appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Manion, Sykes, and Hamilton reversed and remanded. The ADA requires an employer to make "reasonable accommodations" for the mental or physical limitations of a "qualified individual with a disability." A disability under the ADA is a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities." The Court concluded that a rational jury could find that Shepherd suffered from a disability in 2003. First, self-care is a major life activity and the record is replete with references to Shepherd's inability to care for himself. He needed help dressing, brushing his hair, bathing, tying his shoes, and brushing his teeth. He certainly had an impairment -- but was it substantial. The implementing regulations require a court to consider the nature, severity, duration, and expected continuing impact of an impairment. Here, the record, particularly on summary judgment, shows that Shepherd required help on an almost daily basis and experienced episodes multiple times a week. The Court had no difficulty in concluding that a reasonable jury could conclude that his impairment was substantial. Finally, the Court rejected AutoZone's contention that medical evidence was required to establish a substantial impairment. Neither the statute nor the regulations require it. The nature of the limitations and the detailed testimony were sufficient to establish the impairment and its scope.

Assistant Prosecutor Is A "Policymaker" Not Covered By ADEA

OPP v. STATES ATTORNEY OF COOK COUNTY (December 29, 2010)

Christine Opp, Edward Barrett, and Leonard Cahnmann were each employed as Cook County Assistant State's Attorneys as of the end of 2006. Each of them was dismissed in the first three months of 2007, ostensibly for budgetary reasons. Each of the three filed suit claiming that his or her dismissal was a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). Judges Bucklo, Leinenweber, and Castillo (N.D. Ill.) each granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs were excluded from ADEA coverage because they held policymaking positions. The plaintiffs appeal.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Bauer, Sykes, and Hamilton affirmed. ADEA excludes from the definition of "employee" elected officials, anyone on an elected official's staff, or an appointee of an elected official "on the policymaking level." The Court noted that, unlike the Second Circuit, it applies the same test in an ADEA case that it applies in a First Amendment political affiliation case. That test is whether the position authorizes "meaningful input into governmental decision-making." In applying the test, a court should look at the powers inherent in the job rather than any one person’s actual duties. The powers inherent in the position of Assistant State's Attorney are set by state law and have been described in prior decisions of the Court. In fact, an Assistant State's Attorney is a surrogate for the State's Attorney and does have the power to create policy. The plaintiffs therefore hold policymaking positions and are not covered by ADEA.

Employer Cannot Overcome Arbitration Presumption Arising From CBA's Broad Arbitration Clause

KARL SCHMIDT UNISIA, INC. v. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE, AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA (December 17, 2010)

Karl Schmidt Unisia and the Union representing its workers negotiated a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). It contains several provisions relevant to this case: a "Thirty and Out" provision providing enhanced retirement benefits to employees who reach a certain age and seniority, a provision stating that the retirement plan would remain in effect during the term of the CBA, and a four-step dispute resolution process ending in arbitration. In early 2007, the Company announced its intention to lay off employees at its Fort Wayne facility. The Union initiated the dispute resolution process because of its belief that the Company intended to deny "Thirty and Out" provisions to eligible employees. The Company and the Union exhausted the first three stages of the dispute resolution process. The Union proceeded to arbitration and added a grievance on behalf of two affected employees. The Company filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the grievances were not arbitrable. The Union counterclaimed to compel arbitration. Judge Van Bokkelen (N.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to the Union and ordered arbitration. The Company appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Posner, Kanne, and Sykes affirmed. The Court first noted the care it would take in not addressing the merits and set forth some general principles regarding arbitration -- there is a federal policy favoring arbitration, a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate unless it has contractually agreed to do so, and a presumption of arbitrability arises from a broad arbitration clause. Here, the Court had little difficulty in finding the presumption. The CBA states that the dispute resolution process is the "sole and exclusive remedy" for a grievance and that the Union may grieve any alleged violation of the CBA. In order to overcome this presumption, the Court stated, the Company must come forward with either an express exclusion or the "most forceful evidence" of an intent to exclude the issue from arbitration. The Court first rejected the Company's express exclusion argument, concluding that it distorted the Union's claim. The Company offered several "most forceful evidence" arguments -- that the answer to the underlying dispute lies in the Pension Plan and not the CBA, that the provisions in dispute were never negotiated, and that the issue is governed by the Pension Plan's dispute resolution process. The Court concluded that none of these arguments were supported by the record or the case law. 

Driver's Volatile Manner Of Expressing Safety Concern Crossed The Line

FORMELLA v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (December 10, 2010)

Don Formella has been driving a truck for more than four decades. In late 2005, he started driving for Schnidt Cartage, a small, local transportation company near Chicago. On a February morning in 2006, Formella arrived at work and discovered that he had been assigned to a different truck than he had been driving. Formella inspected the vehicle and discovered missing permits, non-operable lights, and mismatched tires. Formella was particularly concerned about the potential safety hazard of the mismatched tires. Formella complained to the company's vice president, Linda Marcus. Marcus' and Formella's versions of what happened next vary greatly. Formella claims it was a professional exchange, in which he indicated his belief that the truck was not in compliance with federal and state law -- after which Marcus fired him. Marcus, on the other hand claims that Formella was loud and volatile, that she listened to and made arrangements to correct each of his safety complaints -- and that she fired him only after he became more and more agitated and unstable. Other Schnidt employees confirmed several aspects of Marcus' account of the exchange. Formella filed a complaint with the Department of Labor, alleging that Schnidt fired him for in retaliation for his safety complaints, in violation of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act. After an evidentiary hearing, the ALJ found that Schnidt discharged Formella because of his volatile conduct, not in retaliation for his complaints. An administrative review board upheld the decision. Formella seeks review.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Kanne, Rovner, and Williams denied review. The Surface Transportation Assistance Act prohibits an employer from taking any disciplinary action against a driver who refuses to drive a vehicle that does not comply with regulations. The statute was amended in 2007 to make it easier for a driver to sustain his burden. Prior to 2007, a driver had to show that his protected conduct was a but-for cause of the discipline. Since the amendment, a driver only has to show that his protected conduct was a contributing factor in the discipline. The employer then must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it would have acted similarly even in the absence of the protected conduct. The ALJ considered the pre-amendment burden, since the amendment took effect after the conclusion of the hearing but before the decision. The Court rejected Formella's argument that it should consider his case under the amended statute. Because he asked neither the ALJ nor the review board to consider the amendments, Formella has forfeited that argument. On the merits, the Court accepted the ALJ's findings regarding Schmidt's reason for termination since they were supported by the record. The Court then noted that this case was, nevertheless, a close one. Employees are given some degree of latitude in expressing their safety complaints to their employers. Here, Formella assaulted no one, threatened no one, and prevented no one from doing his work. He did lose his temper and shout. Although it concluded that reasonable people could differ, the Court found that the review board was neither arbitrary nor illogical in concluding that Formella’s conduct exceeded that latitude. 

Proof Of Pretext Requires Lie, Not Mere Error

VAN ANTWERP v. CITY OF PEORIA (December 6, 2010)

Gene Van Antwerp served as a Peoria patrol officer for 18 years. The Police Department announced two vacancies in the Crime Scene Unit, one immediate and one a few months later, in September 2006. Van Antwerp applied. The Department offered the immediate slot to Officer Tuttle. They offered the delayed slot to Van Antwerp. The decision-makers actually believed that Officer Wong was a better candidate but they selected Van Antwerp because Wong was a month shy of the required seniority. A few months later, the Department rescinded Van Antwerp's offer. It reposted the same job several months later and offered it to Wong, who now had the requisite seniority. Although the Department offered no explanation at the time, it later stated that the vacancy was delayed because the incumbent's promotion was delayed. Van Antwerp, who was 50 years old at the time of his application, brought suit against the City of Peoria, alleging that its conduct violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Judge McDade (C.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the City. Van Antwerp appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Posner, Kanne, and Williams affirmed. ADEA makes it illegal to discriminate against a person because of his age. However, in order to prevail on such a claim, the plaintiff must establish that age played a role in and actually motivated the decision. The Court analyzed Van Antwerp's claim under the direct method of proof -- and found it lacking. First, the Court concluded that he offered insufficient evidence of pretext. Even his strongest evidence would not allow an inference that the Department lied. It might allow an inference of error, but that is not enough to show pretext. The Court added that Van Antwerp's claim would fail even if he successfully established pretext. He had to show that the Department's made its decision because of his age. There is actually no evidence in the record that age was the reason the Department rescinded his transfer. The Court briefly considered Van Antwerp's claim under the indirect method. The claim fails under that method both because Van Antwerp waived it and because he was unable to show pretext.

"Subtle Indicia Of Distaste" Does Not Satisfy Direct Case Proof Requirement

GRIGSBY v. LAHOOD (December 6, 2010)

Brian Grigsby worked with for the FAA at the Indianapolis Center from 1991 until 1997. He entered as part of a learning program while he finished his degree and continued as a developmental Air Traffic Controller. In that role, he was trained and certified as a radar associate and was in the middle of his radar controller training when he asked for a transfer. Although he never made a formal complaint, it appears that Grigsby requested a transfer to escape hostile comments from his coworkers directed at his then-recent discovery of and pride in his Native American heritage. The FAA granted his transfer request. From 1997 until 2005, Grigsby worked at and became fully certified at the Terre Haute, Indiana automated center. Unfortunately, the FAA privatized the Terre Haute Center in 2005 and eliminated Grigsby's job. Grigsby applied for each of several different vacancies at the Indianapolis Center. On several occasions, he met with the Assistant Air Traffic Manager at the center. He alleges that, at their last meeting, she "bristled" and abruptly ended their meeting when he mentioned that he was Native American. The FAA did not offer Grigsby any of the positions. Each of the successful candidates was a Certified Professional Controller and was familiar with the technology at the Indianapolis Center, which had changed drastically since Grigsby's transfer. Grigsby brought a claim against the FAA pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging Native American origin discrimination. Judge Young (S.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to the FAA. Grigsby appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Posner, Kanne, and Wood affirmed. The Court addressed the claim under both the direct and indirect methods. It first rejected the claim under the indirect method because Grigsby's only evidence, direct or circumstantial, of discriminatory animus is the alleged reaction of the assistant manager to his statement regarding his heritage. Such "subtle indicia of distaste" falls short of establishing a case under the direct method of proof. With respect to his indirect proof case, the Court concluded that he could not prevail for several reasons. First, he was not qualified for the positions. Each position required a certified controller familiar with the Indianapolis Center operations -- Grigsby was neither. Next, even if he was qualified, he failed to show that the positions were filled by candidates with similar or less qualification.Each of the successful candidates was a Certified Professional Controller. Even if his qualifications were similar, which he alleges, each of the successful candidates was also operationally current at the Indianapolis Center. Again, Grigsby was neither. Finally, even if he met his prima facie case, he failed to show that the FAA's reason was pretext. The FAA has shown a legitimate reason for its decisions. Grigsby's allegations of pretext are not supported by the record. Grigsby also sought to proceed under a mixed-motive theory, as well. That theory of liability also requires proof of discrimination, direct or circumstantial. He has none and his mixed-motive theory fails as well.

Sales Representative Who Falsifies Call Reports Is Not Meeting His Employer's Legitimate Expectations

NAIK v. BOEHRINGER INGELHEIM PHARMACEUTICALS (November 22, 2010)

In early 2004, Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals hired Prakash Naik, a 53-year-old India native, as a sales representative in its Schaumburg territory outside of Chicago. Naik’s job was to make sales calls on doctors and other medical professionals and promote BIP's products. Naik complained to the company that his manager, Brett Lundsten, made inappropriate comments regarding both his age and his national origin. In early 2005, a regional performance review disclosed that the Schaumburg territory was underperforming. Lundsten began investigating his employees’ sales call activities. He found several irregularities with respect to Naik's call activity, including recorded sales calls at times when the identified medical professional was apparently not available. He investigated further, directly contacting the professionals’ offices. His investigation resulted in a list of at least six occasions on which Naik recorded a sales call with a person who was not present. Lundsten, along with the regional manager and a regional human resources representative, confronted Naik. Naik claimed that he had no recollection of the calls. The company representatives provided him with the details of their investigation and gave him until the following day to provide additional information. When Naik was unable to provide any information to explain the apparent irregularities, BIP terminated his employment. The company replaced him with a 36-year-old non-Indian male. Company records also show that two other employees were fired for falsifying sales calls, two other employees voluntarily resigned after being accused of falsifying sales calls, and that no employee accused of falsifying sales calls was retained. Naik brought suit against the BIP, alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and national origin discrimination under Title VII. Judge Andersen (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to BIP. Naik appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Cudahy, Rovner, and Evans affirmed. Naik relies on the indirect, McDonnell Douglas formula for proving discriminatory intent. Two of the four elements of the tests are at issue here -- whether Naik was meeting his employer’s legitimate expectations and whether BIP treated similarly situated employees more favorably. The Court quickly disposed of the legitimate expectations element, concluding that the call record falsification without explanation was adequate evidence of a failure to meet legitimate expectations. The Court also agreed with the district court that Naik failed to establish that any similarly situated employee was treated differently. In fact, the record shows no disparity in the company’s treatment of employees who falsify sales call records. Although Naik fell far short of meeting his burden, the Court added that he also could not have established that BIP's nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual. The company's belief that he falsified his call reports was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating his employment.

Employer Not Liable For Hostile Work Environment Claim Where Employee Never Brought Complaints To Supervisor's Attention

MONTGOMERY v. AMERICAN AIRLINES (November 19, 2010)

Anthony Montgomery has been an American Airlines employee for over 20 years, all but five months of it as a Fleet Service Clerk. It is the events of those five months, however, that matter in this case. Late in 2006, Montgomery asked for and was granted a transfer to a mechanic's position. The collective bargaining agreement required and defined a six-month probationary period, toward the end of which Montgomery would have to pass a tool inspection and qualification test. Montgomery took his test in April of 2007. Two company supervisors and a union representative were present. Montgomery failed the test and was returned to his prior position. Nearly 3 months later, Montgomery complained to American that he was subjected to racial harassment and discrimination during his probationary period. In the initial meeting with a company representative, he never stated that he had complained to his supervisors at the time. The company conducted an investigation and concluded that it could not substantiate the allegations. The results of the investigation were that the test was administered fairly, that the few employees who became mechanics without passing the test fell into different categories, and that any tension in the workplace was not based on race. Montgomery filed suit. He alleged a hostile work environment in violation of § 1981 and Title VII and racial discrimination, also in violation of § 1981 and Title VII, for his return to the clerk position. Judge Der-Yeghiayan (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to American. Montgomery appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Bauer and Kanne affirmed. The Court first addressed the hostile work environment claim, noting that the analysis under the two statutes is the same. The Court found triable issues of fact with respect to three of the four elements of the claim. In order to recover against an employer, however, Montgomery had to establish that American either participated in the harassment or was negligent in finding and correcting it. His only allegation of participation referred to a coworker and thus does not satisfy the participation prong. In order to satisfy the second prong, Montgomery had to establish either that he informed his supervisors of the harassment or that it was so obvious that it amounted to constructive notice. The record does not support either conclusion. The only person he reported his concerns to was his crew chief, a non-management coworker. America cannot be liable for the harassment without clear and direct reporting from the employee. Even if the harassment had been reported, the Court stated that American would have avoided liability because of its prompt and appropriate investigation. The Court turned to the discrimination claim, which Montgomery pursued under both the direct and indirect method of proof. Again, the analysis is the same under both statutes. Under the direct method, Montgomery asserted that non-African-Americans were not required to take the test. The Court rejected this as proof. Even if true, it did not allow the inference of discriminatory motive. Under the indirect method, Montgomery had to establish that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably. He alleged that three individuals became mechanics without passing the test. But the Court concluded that none of the three was similarly situated to Montgomery -- one became a mechanic before the test rule was enforced, one became a mechanic when a recalculation of his probationary time put him past the time limit for taking the test, and Montgomery presented no admissible evidence with respect to the third individual. The Court concluded that Montgomery cannot prevail on his claim that the test requirement was discriminatory. Montgomery also claimed that the test itself was discriminatory. On that claim, the Court concluded that Montgomery simply presented no evidence. Finally, although Montgomery failed to make out a prima facie case, the Court also addressed pretext. It found that American had a legitimate reason for its actions and that Montgomery provided no evidence otherwise.

Lost Documents Do Not Support A Spoliation Inference Without Bad Faith Evidence

NORMAN-NUNNERY v. MADISON AREA TECHNICAL COLLEGE (November 8, 2010)

Elvira Jimenez brought a race discrimination lawsuit in 2000 against Madison Area Technical College and three of its employees (Carol Bassett, Jackie Thomas, and William Stryker). Her lawyer was Willie Nunnery. The suit was dismissed as frivolous -- Nunnery was sanctioned and lost his law license for a period of time because of his involvement in the case. On two separate occasions in the following few years, Judy Norman-Nunnery applied for positions at the College. Norman-Nunnery is an African-American woman and is married to Willie Nunnery. In 2002, she made it through an initial screening but was not interviewed. In 2005, she was encouraged to apply for a different position by the College's minority recruiter and Eugene Fujimoto, its Diversity Coordinator. Carol Bassett screened the 77 applicants for minimum qualifications. Norman-Nunnery and 45 others advanced. At that point, a five-person selection committee chaired by Jackie Thomas developed a weighted scoring system with five criteria. Each committee member separately scored the remaining 46 candidates. The College selected the top 10 to interview. Norman-Nunnery was not in the top 10. In fact, only one minority candidate made the list. Under the College’s diversity policy, it added the next two highest-scoring minority candidates to the interview list. Norman-Nunnery was not one of those two, either. Fujimoto met with Basset, Thomas, and William Stryker to discuss why Norman-Nunnery did not make the cut. They told him that she did not score well on two of the five criteria. Although he advised Bassett, Thomas, and Stryker that her resume may not have accurately reflected her experience, they chose not to add her to the interview list. A white woman was hired for the job. Norman-Nunnery filed suit against the College as well as Bassett, Stryker, and Thomas. She alleged violations of Title VII, the 1st and 14th amendment, and § 1981 for discriminating against her on account of her race and her association with her husband. Judge Crabb (W.D. Wis.) granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that no rational jury could conclude that race or marital status was the motivation for the defendants' actions. Norman-Nunnery appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Bauer and Rovner affirmed. The Court first addressed Norman-Nunnery's argument that she was entitled to a spoliation inference due to the unexplained loss of a number of documents relevant to her claim. It concluded that she was not. To be entitled to an inference that the missing documents would support her claim, she must show that the documents were intentionally destroyed in bad faith in order to hide adverse information. Here, the files were lost before any claim was made and there is no evidence that they were intentionally destroyed in order to cover up harmful evidence. The Court cited the fact that the office in which they were located had moved twice, that the filing system was haphazard, and that in fact most of the documents relevant to the claim were not lost. Without evidence of a bad-faith motive, Norman-Nunnery is not entitled to a favorable inference. On the merits, Norman-Nunnery proceeded under both the direct and indirect approaches. Her only claimed direct evidence, however, once the inference was rejected, is an unscientific study that concluded that the College's selection process favored internal candidates. Since most internal candidates were not minorities, the process therefore favored non-minorities. The Court stated that such a study cannot, by itself, meet the standard for a discrimination claim and rejected the claim under the direct method. In reviewing a case like this under the indirect method, the analysis of the prima facie case and the defendants' non-discriminatory reason response frequently overlap. Norman-Nunnery must show that she was qualified and that defendants rejected her in favor of someone of like qualifications. The defendants, on the other hand, assert as their non-discriminatory reason that Norman-Nunnery was not as qualified as those interviewed and as the individual who was hired. The undisputed facts in this case established that the defendants applied the same criteria to all applicants and made their decision based on the applicants' qualifications. Summary judgment on her race discrimination claim was appropriate. For much the same reason, the Court rejected her claim that she was discriminated against because of her husband. There was some evidence that at least some of the defendants knew who her husband was and continued to have negative feelings about him. There was no evidence, however, that the defendants made their hiring decisions because of him.

Employer Cannot Raise Issues On Appeal That It Failed To Argue Or Present To Jury Below

THOMPSON v. MEMORIAL HOSPITAL OF CARBONDALE (November 3, 2010)

Archie Thompson was a paramedic with the Jackson County Ambulance Service (JCAS), which served the Southern Illinois Regional Emergency System. Memorial Hospital of Carbondale had medical control of the System. Thompson was the only African-American full-time paramedic in the entire System. In late 2003, Thompson handled a diabetic emergency call. He administered an intravenous solution and revived the patient. The patient declined further medical assistance and Thompson left. After he returned to his base, Tim Brumley (Thompson's supervisor) criticized him for not following the proper protocol of calling medical control before leaving the scene of a diabetic emergency. Thompson claimed not to know the protocol. It was not posted at the base or in his ambulance. Brumley also learned, on inquiry, that other paramedics were doing the same thing. Brumley reported his concerns to Paula Bierman, the System Coordinator. Bierman advised the Hospital's Medical Director that Thompson should be disciplined, citing both his “total disregard” for protocol and a then-recent failing test result. A few days later, Bierman prepared a disciplinary report removing Thompson from primary care medical duties and signed Doolittle's initials. Thompson was placed on paid probation for three months, during which time he was under constant supervision. While on probation, he began seeing a counselor. Shortly thereafter, he took a medical leave of absence and eventually decided not to return to work. Thompson filed suit against Memorial Hospital and the ambulance service, alleging race discrimination, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge. Judge Murphy (S.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the ambulance service on all claims and to Memorial Hospital on the hostile work environment and constructive discharge claims. A jury heard the race discrimination claim against the Hospital, found in Thompson's favor, and awarded $500,000. The Hospital appeals from the jury verdict -- Thompson cross-appeals from the hostile work environment and constructive discharge summary judgment rulings.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Evans, and Williams affirmed in all respects except with respect to the amount of damages. The Court dispensed with the cross-appeal in relatively short order. To be successful, a hostile work environment claim must contain evidence of severe and pervasive harassment -- so much so that it changes the conditions of employment. The test is even higher for a constructive discharge claim. The Court concluded that the evidence here did not reach that level. With respect to the Hospital's appeal, the Court noted that it raised several arguments that were improperly preserved below. First, the Hospital argues that Thompson was not its employee. But it admitted below that this was a factual question and it never presented the issue to the jury. Second, the Hospital argues that the jury should not have heard testimony of the racial comments Bierman made because she was not the decision maker. But the evidence is relevant if she exerted significant influence over the decision maker. Here, the district court made a threshold determination that there was enough evidence on that issue to go to the jury and the Hospital did not seek an instruction on the point. Third, the Hospital argued that the probation was not an adverse employment action. But, although probation is not always an adverse employment action, the district court ruled that whether it was here was a factual question. The Hospital did not argue the point the jury or ask for an instruction. Having decided not to press these issues before the jury, the Hospital cannot rely on them now. Finally, the Court did believe that the $500,000 award was excessive. There was testimony of Thompson's depression and anxiety that his therapist characterized as "severe." But the adverse employment action was only placement on probationary status with no change in compensation. After reviewing awards in similar cases, the Court landed on a remittitur to $250,000.

Consent Order's Goal Of Increasing African-American Promotions Did Not Require Race-Based Decisions

FINCH v. PETERSON (September 10, 2010)

In 1978, the Indianapolis Police Department and the United States Department of Justice entered into a consent decree designed to correct racial discrimination in the Department. The long-range goal of the decree was to increase the number of African-Americans to the point where it reflected the racial composition of the workforce in the city. In part, it provided that assignments, transfers, and promotions were to be based on appropriate criteria without regard to race. Now fast forward almost 30 years to 2006. That year, the Department promoted 11 lieutenants to captain. To prepare for the promotions, the Department screened, tested, and ranked each applicant. Instead of promoting the highest-ranked applicants, however, the Department promoted three African-Americans who ranked as low as 26th. Three white applicants, all of whom ranked in the top 10, brought suit pursuant to Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983. Magistrate Judge Lynch (S.D. Ind.) rejected the individual defendants' argument that they were entitled to qualified immunity because their actions were required by the consent decree and denied their motion for judgment on the pleadings. The defendants appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Williams, and Sykes affirmed. The Court first confirmed its jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine. Even in the absence of a final judgment, a decision denying qualified immunity on an issue of law is immediately appealable. On the merits, the Court recited the familiar two questions raised by a qualified immunity analysis -- was a constitutional right violated and was the right sufficiently well-established to put the defendants on notice. The Court rejected the defendants' only argument that their race-based promotion decisions did not violate the Constitution -- that is, that the consent decree required them. Although it conceded that the consent order had general goals of increasing the number of African-American captains, the Court pointed to the several, very specific provisions of the order requiring race-neutral decisions. Other provisions of the consent decree (e.g., requiring sufficient African-American representation in an applicant pool) were designed to allow the department to reach its general goal without engaging in race-based promotions. The Court also rejected the defendants' only argument with respect to the "sufficiently well-established" prong because it also relied on the premise that the consent order required them to promote the African-Americans.

Employee Loses FMLA Interference Claim Because She Failed To Provide The Required Leave-Extension Notice

BROWN v. AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTS HOLDINGS (September 8, 2010)

Letecia Brown was employed at Ford's Indianapolis plant from 1998 until her discharge in 2006. Her discharge resulted from her noncompliance with the FMLA leave policies in the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Under the CBA, an employee desiring leave: a) must submit a doctor's form before the leave’s expiration date, b) is deemed AWOL if she fails to do so, c) is considered AWOL if she fails to do so even if she seeks extension, and d) is sent a five day termination notice by registered mail if AWOL. Brown requested leave on August 11, 2006. Her doctor submitted the required form on August 21, indicating an August 28 leave expiration date. He also referred her to a psychiatrist. When Brown could not get an appointment with the psychiatrist until August 29, she asked her referring doctor to submit additional paperwork for an extension. He failed to do so – she failed to check. Brown's psychiatrist recommended that she extend her leave through September 15. Brown claims she advised Ford of the extension and was told to pick up a new form. Once her original leave expiration date (August 28) arrived without additional forms, Ford considered her AWOL and sent her a termination notice on August 31 by certified mail. Brown picked up a form from the clinic on September 6. She claims that she advised Ford that she could not return the completed form until September 11. On September 11, she found out that she had been fired. Her union filed a grievance but withdrew it because of her failure to follow the CBA procedures. Brown filed suit, alleging FMLA interference. Chief Judge Young (S.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to the defendants. Brown appeals.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Evans and Sykes and District Judge Der-Yeghiayan affirmed. The FMLA prohibits an employer from interfering with an employee's exercise of any rights under the Act. In order to state an interference claim, an employee must prove that she was eligible, that the employer was covered, that she was entitled to the leave, that she provide sufficient notice to her employer, and that her employer denied her FMLA benefits. At issue in the appeal was the notice element. The FMLA regulations in effect at the time addressed the notice requirement in the context of an unforeseeable extension of leave. The regulation provided that the employee should give notice as soon as practicable -- "within no more than one or two working days of learning of the need for leave." Here, Brown's doctor referred her to the psychiatrist on August 21. On that same day, she learned that she would not be able to see him until August 29, the day after her leave expired. She knew at that time that she would need an extension. The regulation required her to notify Ford within one or two days of August 21. She did not contact Ford until August 30. Brown fails to satisfy the notice element of an FMLA interference claim.

Plaintiff's Evidence Fails To Establish Essential Elements Of Her Claim

GOODMAN v. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (September 3, 2010)

Claudette Goodman was hired in August 2004 as a private security guard by the National Security Agency (National). Her initial pay was $8.25 an hour. National assigned her to an overnight shift at a housing complex. For family reasons, Goodman desired a daytime shift. She soon transferred to a different location on the more desirable dayshift. Although she was promoted to supervisor with a raise to $8.75, her employment was not without problems. National had difficulty with its payroll -- paying late, paying less than owed, bouncing checks, etc. In mid-2005, she began suspecting that National paid its male employees more than she. The owner denied it. In any event, in October 2005, she found another job at $10.00 an hour and quit her job at National. She brought suit against National under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Judge Norgle (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the defendants. Goodman appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Rovner, Sykes, and Tinder affirmed. The Court first addressed her retaliation claims under both statutes. Goodman relied on three acts in support of her claims -- that her hours were reduced, that she was demoted, and that she was reassigned. Unfortunately, the evidence did not fully support the accuracy of her claims. For example, her own testimony was that her hours did not change and that she was never actually reassigned (only threatened). To the extent it did, she failed to establish any harm. Her testimony suffered from inconsistencies and a lack of clarity and was insufficient to support a retaliation claim. Goodman's equal pay claims suffered from the same lack of clarity in the record. She offered the testimony of Michael Moore, a male supervisor, in support of the claim. Upon close examination, and adjusting for confusion about certain dates, the Court concluded that the evidence established that Goodman was in fact paid more than Moore. Obviously, that was fatal to her Equal Pay Act claim.

Isolated Statements, Inconsistent With The Entire Context, Do Not Support A Finding Of Actual Discharge

CHAPIN v. FORT-ROHR MOTORS (September 3, 2010)

Trent Chapin is a used-car salesman. For years, he has worked on and off for Larry Kruse at several different dealerships owned by Bob Rohrman. In early 2004, Kruse hired him at Rohrman's Mid-States Motors in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Within weeks, however, Kruse was replaced by a Pakistani Muslim. The new manager fired Chapin within a month. In June, Kruse became the manager of Rohrman's newly opened Fort-Rohr dealership, also in Fort Wayne. He hired Chapin again as a used-car salesman. Chapin filed an EEOC charge in February of the following year. He alleged that Mid-States had discriminated against him on the basis of race. When Kruse found out about it, he was very upset. He met with Chapin and made it very clear to him that he needed to withdraw the EEOC charge if he wanted to keep his job. Although Chapin indicated at the meeting that he would withdraw the charge, he did not -- and he did not return to work. Kruse tried to contact Chapin on several occasions after the meeting. They finally met again in March. Kruse made it clear at that meeting that he had not intended to fire Chapin and that he still had a job. Chapin told him that he would return to work when he was finished with a painting project. The dealership followed up that meeting with several letters to Chapin stating that he was still employed and was expected to be at work. Chapin filed suit under Title VII, alleging racial discrimination against Mid-States and retaliation against Fort-Rohr. A jury found against him on his discrimination claim but found in his favor on the retaliation claim, awarding $1.1 million in compensatory and punitive damages. Fort-Rohr appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Williams, and Sykes reversed and remanded. Title VII makes it illegal for an employer to take an adverse employment action against an employee for filing an unfair employment charge. The Court addressed both of Chapin's “adverse employment action” theories -- that he was actually discharged or that he was constructively discharged. On the former, the Court concluded that no rational juror could have found that Chapin was actually discharged at the first meeting with Kruse. The Court conceded that the exchange at the first meeting, in a vacuum, could support an argument for discharge, particularly if he filed suit the next day. Kruse was angry, raised his voice, and told Chapin that he would not have a job unless he withdrew the charge (which Chapin did not). However, the Court emphasized that the question must be addressed not in isolation but in the context of all subsequent interaction. All of the dealership's conduct after that short meeting is inconsistent with an actual discharge. In fact, Chapin's own testimony is that he was not fired at that meeting but that he would have been fired had he returned without withdrawing the charge. There was no actual discharge. With respect to the constructive discharge argument, the Court again concluded that no reasonable juror could find for Chapin. Two forms of constructive discharge are recognized in this Circuit and both require intolerable working conditions. In the first, an employee resigns because of discriminatory harassment -- that does not apply here. In the second, an employer acts in such a way as to communicate to a reasonable employee that he or she will be terminated. Again, Chapin may have had such a belief immediately after the first meeting but such a belief would have been corrected almost immediately in response to subsequent events and communications. Chapin simply decided not to return to work -- the Court refused to speculate on what would have happened had he decided otherwise.

Co-workers With Less Egregious Policy Violations Are Not "Similarly Situated" To Plaintiff

WEBER v. UNIVERSITIES RESEARCH ASSOCIATION (September 2, 2010)

Katherine Weber had been employed at Universities Research Association (URA) for almost twenty years when she received a negative performance review. She believed the review was unfair and filed a grievance. The grievance was ultimately resolved in her favor and the negative review was removed from her record. Weber claims that a number of bad things began to happen to her after the grievance, ultimately including the elimination of her position in early 2004. She accepted another position with the organization under a new supervisor. Weber had difficulty with her new supervisor from the beginning. She complained that she was the victim of retaliation and that her new supervisor treated her differently than other employees. Her supervisor complained that she was not getting her work completed and became suspicious of her computer usage. URA decided to monitor her Internet usage. The results of its trace showed that Weber spent more than 16 hours in one workweek visiting websites unrelated to her work. Her usage included accessing dog-related sites and her personal e-mail accounts in connection with her dog training business. URA terminated Weber's employment for violating its policies: a) requiring disclosure and authorization of outside employment and b) prohibiting the use of URA computer equipment in connection with outside employment. Weber brought suit pursuant to Title VII for gender discrimination and retaliation. Judge Andersen (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to URA. Weber appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Kanne, and Tinder affirmed. The Court first concluded that Weber waived both claims under the direct method of proof by not sufficiently developing them in the district court. Since Weber does not challenge the district court's decision with respect to the retaliation claim under the indirect method, the only other issue before the Court was the discrimination claim under the indirect method. Weber attempted to meet the "similarly situated" element of her prima facie case by identifying a number of male co-workers who had unauthorized outside employment, who accessed the Internet for personal and outside employment use, and who accessed the Internet to view pornography. The Court concluded that Weber did not meet the "similarly situated" element. To meet that requirement, she must identify employees who engaged in similar conduct in the absence of circumstances that would distinguish their conduct from hers. The Court acknowledged that she identified multiple instances of policy violations but distinguished those violators. Weber presented no evidence that the violators had trouble finishing their work or that any of them violated a company policy "with the same reckless abandon" as Weber.

Burden-Shifting Analysis Does Not Apply After Plaintiff Presents Case-In-Chief

RUNYON v. APPLIED EXTRUSION TECHNOLOGIES (August 30, 2010)

Timothy Runyon began working at Applied Extrusion Technologies' (AET) Terre Haute, Indiana plant in 2005 at the age of 45. A few months later, the company hired Troy Corbett, about fifteen years his junior. The two men worked for the same supervisor and had the same job title. Runyon had two fairly serious and heated altercations with coworkers in his first seven months on the job. Then, in February of 2006, Runyon and Corbett got into a heated argument that escalated into a fight. Both men were suspended for three days and instructed to write letters of apology. Runyon's letter focused more on his desire to remain employed and did not address the fight or issue an apology until its fourth and final paragraph. Corbett's letter, on the other hand, opened with an apology and expressed his sincere regret. Because of the earlier two incidents and the content of the letter, AET fired Runyon. It did not fire Corbett. Runyon brought an action against the company based on the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). Judge McKinney (S.D. Ind.) granted judgment as a matter of law to AET at the close of Runyon's case-in-chief. Runyon appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Flaum, and Wood affirmed. The Court stated that Runyon was wrong in approaching the appeal as if it were a McDonnell Douglas indirect proof analysis. That burden-shifting approach is only appropriate at summary judgment, not after a plaintiff has had an opportunity to present his entire case at trial. The question at that time is whether he presented enough evidence to allow a rational factfinder to rule in his favor. On that question, Runyon must fail. He presented insufficient evidence to carry his burden that his age rather than his behavior was the real reason for his discharge.

"Cat's Paw" Theory Does Not Apply Where There Is An Independent Decisionmaker

HILL v. POTTER (August 30, 2010)

Carla Hill has been an employee of the United States Postal Service in Hazel Crest, Illinois for several years. In the early 2000s, she filed a number of EEO complaints against her supervisors for discrimination. In late 2002, Hill hurt her back in a work related injury and went on "limited duty" status. Limited duty status employees are paid for a full day's work even if no qualifying work is available. Just as her limited duty status period was about to end, Hill claimed that she reinjured her back and reapplied. Her supervisor, Patrick Kavanaugh, wrote a letter to Dale Schultz of the Office of Workers' Compensation Programs. He communicated his belief that Hill’s injury was not as serious as she claimed. Schultz put Hill on "light duty" status. Light duty status employees are not guaranteed a full day's pay if qualifying work is not available. Hill lost 618 hours of pay while on light duty status -- even while other employees worked in excess of 800 hours of overtime. Hill, who was a letter carrier, also wanted a position as a window clerk. She submitted written applications in 2000 and 2003 and again documented her interest in 2004. Clerk positions became available in 2005, 2006, and 2007. She did not submit written applications at any of those times. On each of those occasions, the Postal Service offered the job to someone who had submitted a written application. Hill brought an action against the Postmaster General, alleging that the lost hours and failure to promote were in retaliation for her protected activities (her EEO complaints). Judge Coar (ND. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the defendant. Hill appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Kanne, and Evans affirmed. The Court noted that Hill proceeded under the indirect method of proof -- which requires proof of a statutorily protected activity, a materially adverse job action, satisfactory job performance, and treatment worse than a similarly situated employee. The elements at issue here are whether there was an adverse job action (on the reduction in hours claim) and whether Hill was treated differently from similarly situated employees (on the failure to promote claim). The Court first addressed adverse job action. Although a reduction in hours can be an adverse job action, the reduction here came as a result of her light duty status. It does not amount to an adverse job action without other evidence. The Court rejected Hill's claim that Kavanaugh's letter to Schultz somehow imputed a retaliatory motive to Schultz under a "cat's paw" theory. There was no evidence in the record that the letter had any effect on Schultz -- let alone a dispositive one. Therefore, Hill's light duty assignment itself was not an adverse job action. The Court also concluded that sending her home without pay was also not an adverse job action. Although there was evidence in the record that other employees worked overtime, there was no evidence in the record that that overtime work fell within her work performance limitations. Finally, the Court rejected Hill's failure to promote theory of liability. In order to prevail, she had to establish that she properly applied for the promotion. The Postal Service presented evidence that its unofficial policy required an application in writing -- even though that unofficial policy was inconsistent with the written policy and the Postal Service presented no documentary evidence that supported it. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that Hill had not met her burden of establishing pretext. She failed to come forward with any evidence from which an inference could be drawn that the Postal Service evidence was not credible.

Title VII's "Participation" Clause Does Not Apply To Wholly Internal Investigations

HATMAKER v. MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER (August 30, 2010)

When the director of its chaplain staff died, Memorial Medical Center announced a search for her replacement. Rev. Greg Stafford, the acting director, was a candidate for the job. Forrest Hester, the Center's Human Resources Officer, solicited opinions from the staff regarding Stafford's candidacy. Janet Hatmaker, a part-time chaplain, expressed concerns about Stafford's demeanor, appropriateness, and leadership. Hatmaker remained critical of Stafford after his appointment. She told Hester that she and other women were uncomfortable with him, that she thought he was distrustful and uncomfortable with women, and that he had diminished view of younger women. Her remarks prompted Hester to conduct an investigation into the possibility of a hostile work environment. Although Hatmaker was reluctant to participate in the investigation, she ultimately did so. Hatmaker was quite opinionated in her remarks to the investigator, including negative references to Jews, Catholics, Al Sharpton, Jesse Jackson, and the Center itself. Hester and the investigator concluded that no hostile work environment existed. In fact, Hester was more concerned about Hatmaker's attitude and remarks. He instructed her to stop talking with her co-employees about Stafford and advised that she should resign if she was uncomfortable working under his leadership. When she responded with another communication indicating her preoccupation with Stafford's professional development, Hester suspended her. He later fired her. She brought suit against the Center under Title VII. Title VII prohibits discrimination against an employee because the employee has opposed an unlawful employment practice or has participated in an investigation under the statute. Judge Scott (C.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the Center. Hatmaker appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Posner and Evans affirmed. Title VII’s “participation” clause prohibits discrimination against an employee who participates in investigation but does not protect the employee from being fired if circumstances otherwise warrant. Here, Hatmaker was not fired because of her communications to the investigator -- she was fired for exercising poor judgment and for being preoccupied with some rather innocuous characteristics of her new supervisor. None of her comments actually accused him of discrimination or of creating a hostile work environment. Furthermore, alternatively, the Court stated that an independent ground for affirmance was the fact that Title VII's reference to an "investigation" includes only official investigations, not purely internal investigations. Since no official investigation was conducted here, the participation clause does not apply. Finally, the Court briefly addressed her "opposition" claim. An opposition claim must be based on a good faith and reasonable belief that there is a statutory violation. That belief is not present here.

District Court's Finding That Employer Was Unaware Of Prospective Employee's Religious Beliefs Was Not Clear Error

XODUS v. WACKENHUT CORP. (August 27, 2010)

Lord Osunfarian Xodus is a Rastafarian and Hebrew Israelite. He sports a dreadlocked hairstyle as a result of his religious beliefs. In mid-2004, his employer, a security firm, discharged him for his failure to comply with its grooming policy. He sought another security guard position and on July 7 interviewed at Allied Security and Wackenhut Corporation. Allied refused to hire him because of his dreadlocks. Later the same day, Wackenhut also refused to hire him. Xodus brought an action against Wackenhut, alleging religious discrimination. On summary judgment, Judge Walter (N.D. Ill.) concluded that genuine issues of fact existed and denied Wackenhut's motion. The case was tried to the court -- the only issue was whether Xodus brought to the interviewer's attention the fact that he had dreadlocks because of his religious beliefs. Xodus and the interviewer presented different versions of the day's events. Xodus testified that he specifically informed the interviewer that his refusal to cut his dreadlocks, which led to his earlier discharge, was based on his religious beliefs. The interviewer, on the other hand, testified that he raised the company's grooming policy as soon as he saw the dreadlocks and told Xodus that he would have to cut his hair in order to be hired. He further testified that Xodus never informed him of his specific religious beliefs, although he admitted that Xodus did make a single, innocuous reference to a "belief." The interviewer testified that he made no connection to a religious belief as a result of the remark. The court found for Wackenhut, concluding that the testimony of the interviewer was more credible. Xodus appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Rovner, and Hamilton affirmed. The Court concluded that the district court's factual finding that the interviewer was not aware of Xodus’ religious beliefs was not clearly erroneous. A person's religion, unlike a person's gender or race, is not readily apparent. An employee or prospective employee, therefore, must advise his employer of particular religious practices or beliefs. The Court found that the district court's opinion, although brief, provided sufficient detail of the testimony and corroborating evidence that led to his conclusion that the interviewer's testimony was more credible.

Appointed Police Commissioner Has A Duty Of Loyalty To The Town

GROSS v. TOWN OF CICERO (August 27, 2010)

For several years after Clarence Gross retired as a Cicero police officer, he served in a number of appointed positions in the Town's government. The Town President appointed him Chairman of the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners. As Chairman, Gross oversaw the hiring of the Town's police officers. Gross admits that he hired several officers that he deemed unqualified because he was directed to do so by the Town President. Rhonda Gross, Clarence's daughter, also served as a Cicero police officer during this time. She complained to Gross that she and other female police officers were the victims of sexual harassment. Gross approached the Town President on several occasions to discuss the harassment. On each occasion, she deflected his attempt and promised to address it later. Rhonda filed an EEOC charge. The EEOC found substantial evidence that she was the subject of sexual harassment -- the Town settled. After Rhonda filed her charge, Gross was removed from his various appointments. He complained to the Town's attorney that he was owed compensation. When he became involved as a potential witness in litigation against the Town, he claims that the attorney told him he would not get his compensation until the other litigation was resolved. Gross brought suit pursuant to § 1983 against the Town, the President, a successor President, and the Town’s attorney. He alleged First Amendment free-speech violations. The Town brought counterclaims for breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment. Judge Darrah (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the defendants on Gross' claim, granted summary judgment to Gross on the unjust enrichment claim, but granted summary judgment on liability to the Town on the breach of fiduciary duty claim. The court ultimately awarded over $300,000 on the claim after a bench trial, representing Gross' entire salary for the years in question.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Williams, and Tinder affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The Court first addressed Gross' First Amendment retaliation claims, specifically the first prong of the retaliation inquiry -- whether his speech was constitutionally protected. Three different episodes of retaliation were alleged: a) his sexual harassment complaints on behalf of Rhonda to the Town President, b) his instruction to Rhonda to file an EEOC charge, and c) his conversations with the plaintiffs’ lawyers in another case against the Town. The Court concluded that none of the episodes constituted protected speech: a) his complaints to the Town President about sexual harassment (to the extent there was even any actual content to the speech, as opposed to a mere request to discuss) were not matters of public concern but merely a private grievance, b) any encouragement to Rhonda to file the EEOC charge was not speech on a matter of public concern but, again, a mere private matter (the record also contains no evidence that any defendant was aware of this speech, precluding a finding of causation), and c) there is no evidence in the record to establish that a conversation with plaintiffs' lawyers in another case could constitute protected speech. The Court therefore affirmed the district court's finding in favor of the defendants on Gross’ First Amendment claim. The Court next addressed the Town’s breach of fiduciary duty claim. The district court noted that an Illinois statute sets standards by which municipalities’ Police Boards must evaluate appointed police officers. The court held that the statute created a fiduciary duty on the part of Police Board members to exercise independent judgment. The Court disagreed. The statute does not refer to fiduciary duties and the Court was reluctant to create one. Instead, the statute merely grants authority and establishes rules for the exercise of that authority. Although it concluded that the statute did not create a duty, the Court did recognize that Gross was subject to a duty of loyalty owed by all public officials. Relying on the standard the Illinois Supreme Court stated in upholding a criminal conviction, the Court ruled that there was sufficient evidence (barely) in the record for a factfinder to conclude that Gross violated that duty. A factfinder could conclude that Gross engaged in a quid pro quo arrangement with the Town President by which he protected his and his daughter’s jobs in return for appointing unqualified police officers selected by the President. The Court remanded for additional factual findings on that issue. Its conclusion on liability did not necessitate any analysis of the damage award. Nevertheless, the Court commented that the district court’s total salary forfeiture was not correct, unless Gross was breaching his duty during his entire tenure, a conclusion not supported by the current record.

Decisionmaker Is Not "Cat's Paw" When She Did Not Rely Exclusively On Allegedly Biased Supervisor

LINDSEY v. WALGREEN CO. (August 11, 2010)

Katie Lindsey had worked as a Walgreens pharmacist for only a few years when district supervisor Connie Jenkins promoted her to manager. Her management career did not go well or last long. Lindsey admitted to multiple violations of company policy and was demoted to staff pharmacist and transferred to another store. Jenkins warned her that additional violations could result in her discharge. Lindsey claims that she was the target of age-related disparagement at her new assignment, including from her direct supervisor. Shortly after her transfer, Lindsey filled a prescription although she was aware of a potentially serious interaction the drug could have with another medication that the customer was taking. She had to manually override the pharmacy's warning system in order to dispense the drug. Her supervisor reported the incident to Jenkins, who independently reviewed the prescription history, the customer's medical history, and the threat of interaction. Jenkins concluded that Lindsey violated company policy and terminated her employment. Lindsey brought suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Judge Leinenweber (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to Walgreens. Lindsey appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Ripple, and Kanne affirmed. Lindsey relies principally on the "cat’s paw" theory of recovery, under which the bias of another employee can be attributed to an unbiased decision maker. The Court noted that the record contained evidence of inappropriate age-related remarks by her supervisor but did not include evidence that Jenkins relied on the supervisor or was presented with false or incomplete information. The undisputed evidence is that Jenkins conducted an independent investigation and did not rely solely on information conveyed by the supervisor. Without such evidence, the Court stated that a cat's paw theory could not survive. The Court added that even with such evidence, Lindsey's claim would fail. ADEA requires evidence that age was a determinative factor, not just a motivating factor. Lindsey cannot meet that threshold, given the undisputed evidence that Jenkins fired Lindsey because of her violation of company policy.

Employer Is Entitled to Judgment Where Record Contains No Evidence of Pretext

CASANOVA v. AMERICAN AIRLINES (August 5, 2010)

Bruce Casanova, an American Airlines baggage handler, reported an on-the-job injury to his supervisor toward the end of his shift on a Monday. The injury, however, is alleged to have occurred the preceding Friday. His supervisor sent him to the medical center and reported his injury to the firm that handles workers compensation claims for the airline. The medical staff instructed Casanova not to use his arm pending further examination. His supervisor was suspicious: Casanova claimed to be in too much pain to debrief her on the injury but had waited 72 hours to even report it and had worked most of a full shift in the meantime. She also noticed him using his left hand, apparently without pain. The airline decided to put him under surveillance. He was observed using his left arm frequently. American demanded an "Article 29F" hearing, an employer inquiry proceeding pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement. Casanova failed to cooperate at the hearing, answering "I don't recall" most questions. He did affirmatively deny any use of his left arm after the injury. Casanova also refused to provide a written explanation of the injury. American fired Casanova for lying and insubordination. Casanova brought suit, claiming that his discharge was in retaliation for his claim for workers' compensation benefits. At trial, a jury awarded over $1 million (mostly punitive damages). Judge Guzmán (N.D. Ill.) denied American's post trial motions. American appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Kanne and Sykes reversed. The Court concluded that the district court erred in finding that Casanova prevailed because the injury (and his implied future claim for workers' compensation benefits) was a but-for cause of the later discharge. The injury claim was, in fact, a necessary condition of Casanova's discharge -- but it was not a sufficient condition. The record is clear that American fired Casanova for his lying and insubordination. Casanova did not even try to offer evidence suggesting that American's reason was pretextual. Instead, he attacked American’s use of the Article 29F procedure. Without any material dispute on an absence of pretext, America was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Court Rejects Department Of Labor Rule For Calculating Non-Payment Of Overtime - But Reaches Same Result

URNIKIS-NEGRO v. AMERICAN FAMILY PROPERTY SERVICES (August 4, 2010)

Todd Lash owned American Family Property Services, a real estate appraisal firm. Although Lash was the only certified appraiser at the firm, he worked with associate appraisers, both independent and employed by the firm. In mid-2004, Lash hired Brenda Urnikis-Negro to help him review appraisal reports. Urnikis-Negro was hired at an annual salary of $52,000 with an understanding that her hours would probably fluctuate and not be limited to a 40-hour week. Urnikis-Negro's work at the firm turned out to be fundamentally clerical in nature and did not involve the exercise of judgment or discretion. Although no one kept track of her actual hours, the firm was very busy in 2004 and 2005 and Urnikis-Negro worked in excess of 40 hours per week. By the end of 2005, business was off and Urnikis-Negro was fired. She filed suit against the firm seeking overtime compensation pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") and the Illinois Minimum Wage Law. After a bench trial, Judge Kennelly (N.D. Ill.) found that Urnikis-Negro's position was not exempt as an "administrative" position and that she was therefore entitled to overtime compensation. He also made a finding of willfulness which allowed Urnikis-Negro to recover overtime for the entire period of her employment. In calculating the amount of her overtime compensation, however, the district court rejected Urnikis-Negro's position that she should be treated as earning $1000 per 40-hour week. Instead, the court made its calculations based on an assumption that her fixed $1000 per week salary was her regular hourly rate compensation for every hour worked in each week. The court also made findings with respect to the totals hours worked during four different time periods of her employment. For each hour of overtime during her employment, the court awarded half of her hourly rate that applied during that period. Her total overtime compensation came to just over $12,000. The court awarded liquidated damages in an equal amount as well as attorney's fees. Urnikis-Negro appeals the calculation.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Rovner, and Williams affirmed. The Court first took exception to the district court's application of the fluctuating workweek ("FWW") method of calculating Urnikis-Negro's rate of pay. The FWW method is set forth in a rule promulgated by the Department of Labor. Under that method, an employee's rate of pay is derived by dividing the weekly wage by the total number of hours worked. If an employee works more than 40 hours per week, the method results in a lower hourly wage rate for the employee. Several aspects of the application of the FWW bothered the Court. First, the rule is a forward looking rule that provides a methodology for an employer to comply with the overtime obligations imposed by statute. Second, it is not remedial in nature. Third, it requires an understanding between the employer and employee that the fixed weekly wage is meant to cover regular pay for all hours worked. The Court noted a difference of opinion among the courts in the propriety of using the FWW method in calculating a remedy in an overtime case. The Court found the reasoning of the courts that have rejected the rule to be more persuasive. Having rejected the application of the Department of Labor rule adopting the FWW method, the Court nevertheless approved of the application of the same method based on the Supreme Court's decision in Missel. In Missel, the Supreme Court addressed the situation in which an employee was paid a fixed sum for any and all hours worked, worked substantial overtime, and was not compensated for that overtime. The correct approach in that situation is to calculate a rate of pay by dividing the weekly wage by the hours worked. The employee is entitled to an overtime premium for overtime hours of one half the hourly rate. The result is thus the same as the application of the FWW.

Several Factors Support Finding Of Qualified Immunity

MOSS v. MARTIN (August 2, 2010)

William Moss was hired as the Chief of the Illinois Department of Transportation's (IDOT) Springfield, Illinois Highway Sign Shop in 2000. He was responsible for taking care of the signs on Illinois' highways. Moss was also a Republican. In 2003, a Democratic governor was elected in Illinois for the first time in a long time. Shortly thereafter, IDOT personnel manager Jacob Miller, who knew that Moss was a Republican, discovered that he was non-exempt. Non-exempt employees are those that are not protected from employment decisions based on their political affiliation. Miller started the process for firing Moss. Before any action was taken, Scott Doubet replaced Miller. Independently of anything Miller had decided or started, Doubet fired Moss in order to provide a job to Joe Athey, who was loyal to the new governor. Moss brought suit under § 1983, alleging that his First Amendment and due process rights were violated. Judge Scott (C.D. Ill.) dismissed the claims. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reinstated the First Amendment claim. The district court then granted summary judgment to the defendants on qualified immunity grounds. Moss appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Wood, and Hamilton affirmed. The district court only addressed the second prong of the qualified immunity test, whether Moss’ constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the defendants' conduct. The Court nevertheless briefly visited the first prong of the test, whether Moss' First Amendment rights were even violated. The Court noted that a fact finder could find that the firing was politically motivated, particularly against some of the defendants. It also found that Moss had a "promising" argument that his classification as non-exempt was wrong. Non-exempt positions are reserved for individuals with policymaking responsibilities or those who handle confidential information. The Court did not believe that the Chief of the Highway Sign Shop met that definition. Thus, the Court moved to the issue addressed by the district court -- whether it was "clearly established" that defendants' actions would violate the First Amendment. Although not dispositive, the Court agreed with the district court that Illinois' designation of the position as non-exempt favored a qualified immunity finding. The Court also relied on the fact that the job was designated exempt before Moss took the position. Finally, the Court found it particularly telling that Moss was unable to point to a closely analogous case despite a large number of political patronage case. The Court therefore concluded that qualified immunity was appropriate.

Collective Bargaining Agreement Does Not Trump State Law That Requires Payment For "Donning and Doffing"

SPOERLE v. KRAFT FOODS GLOBAL (August 2, 2010)

Kraft Foods operates an Oscar Mayer plant in Madison, Wisconsin. It requires its employees to wear boots, hardhats, smocks, and hairnets for safety and cleanliness. Obviously, it takes a short time each day to put on and take off this equipment. The Fair Labor Standards Act provides that an employer must pay an employee for the time spent "donning and doffing." However, the Act allows for the non-payment of that time if a collective bargaining agreement so provides. The Collective Bargaining Agreement between Kraft and its union does so provide and Kraft does not compensate its employees for the activity. Several employees brought suit against Kraft. They alleged that Wisconsin's state law also requires "donning and doffing" payment and does not have a collective bargaining agreement exception. Judge Crabb (W.D. Wis.) agreed and entered judgment in plaintiffs' favor. Kraft appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Manion and Evans affirmed. The Court first focused on the plain language of § 203(o) of the Act, which is the definition of “Hours Worked” and contains the collective bargaining agreement exception. Section 203(o) specifically limits its application to §§ 206 and 207 of the Act -- the federal provisions relating to minimum wage and overtime. The Court turned its attention to § 218(a) of the Act, which specifically allows a state to specify a higher minimum wage or a shorter maximum workweek than that provided in the Act. Since Wisconsin could establish a higher minimum hourly wage, the Court reasoned that it would be "senseless" to preclude it from dictating what work hours should be compensated. The Court therefore concluded that the Act did not prevent a state from requiring the donning and doffing payment. Finally, the Court also concluded that federal labor law did not preempt the Wisconsin law since it does not interfere with the collective bargaining process – it simply sets forth a requirement that an employer must meet.

Substantial Evidence Of Pretext Is Enough To Affirm An EEOC Award

MARION COUNTY CORONER'S OFFICE v. EEOC (July 27, 2010)

Kenneth Ackles, an African-American male, was elected Marion County, Indiana coroner in November 2004. Two deputy coroners -- white male John Linehan and African-American female Alfarena Ballew -- sought the position of chief deputy coroner. The chief deputy coroner is responsible for the day-to-day management of the office. Ackles chose Linehan because he was currently serving in that position on an interim basis. Very early on, Ackles made it clear to Linehan that he wanted to increase the number of African-American employees (particularly deputies) in the office. The relationship between Ackles and Linehan did not go well: Ackles complained that Linehan received a salary increase without his knowledge, Ackles and Linehan disagreed over disciplining Ballew, Ackles instructed Linehan not to report Ballew's tardiness, Ackles told Linehan not to file a police report concerning a missing $3000, and Ackles instructed Linehan not to discipline the janitor who allegedly took the $3000. Finally Linehan filed a hostile work environment complaint with the human resources department. On that very day (November 14), Ackles told Linehan that he was going to make a change in the chief deputy position but that Linehan was to continue performing his duties. Some of those duties were later reassigned but Linehan continued to receive the same salary. A few weeks later (December 2), Linehan received a letter terminating his employment. Although the letter provided no reason for the termination of employment, Ackles testified later that he had "lost confidence and trust" in Linehan. Ackles named Ballew the new permanent chief deputy coroner. Shortly thereafter, Ackles and Ballew canceled an outsourcing contract for autopsies and hired directly several of the company's employees. They hired only African-Americans -- none of the white employees were offered positions. Linehan filed an EEO charge against the coroner's office. He alleged race, sex, and age discrimination as well as retaliation for protected activity. His charge was processed administratively at the EEOC pursuant to the Government Employee Rights Act (GERA). The ALJ found that Ackle's testimony was incredible (among other things), that his reason for terminating Linehan's employment was pretextual, and that Linehan was demoted and fired on account of his race and in retaliation for his complaint. The ALJ awarded front and back pay, attorney's fees, and compensatory damages in the amount of $200,000. The EEOC affirmed. The Coroner's Office petitions for review.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Evans, and Sykes granted in part, denied in part, vacated in part, and reversed and remanded. The Court noted, under GERA, that it should uphold the decision of the EEOC if it is supported by substantial evidence. Here, the heart of the case is the pretext analysis. Although the Court admitted that this analysis looks only to whether the employer’s explanation was "honestly believed," it nevertheless found a wealth of evidence that the "lost confidence and trust" rationale was pretextual. It cited the testimony concerning the discipline of Ballew, the janitor theft, and Linehan’s raise in support of its conclusion. Next, it considered the issue of the EEOC’s jurisdiction. GERA applies only to policymaking employees chosen by an elected official. The coroner’s office argued that Linehan was not a policymaking employee when he was fired because of the November 14 demotion. The Court rejected the argument. Linehan was certainly stripped of some duties before he was fired but he was never formally demoted, he continued to receive his salary, and the December 2 letter advised that he was being terminated from the position of “Chief Deputy Coroner.” Finally, the Court addressed the $200,000 award of compensatory damages. The Court concluded that the award bore no rational relation to the very scant evidence of Linehan’s suffering and was excessive compared to similar cases. It offered a remittitur of $20,000 or a new hearing on damages.

Surface Transportation Assistance Act Reinstatement Exception Is Limited To Application Of Public-Safety Concerns

ROADWAY EXPRESS v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (July 22, 2010)

When Peter Cefalu applied for a job as a truck driver with Roadway Express in 1999, he lied on his application. He stated that he left two prior jobs voluntarily. In fact, in both cases, he was fired for reckless driving. Roadway fired him a few years later, shortly after he supported a co-worker's grievance against Roadway. Cefalu filed an administrative complaint claiming that his dismissal violated the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982. During the administrative proceedings, Roadway claimed that it fired Cefalu not because of his protected activity but because of its then recent discovery of his dishonesty on his application. Roadway refused, even when ordered, to disclose the source of its information. The administrative law judge sanctioned Roadway. The judge prohibited the introduction of any evidence learned from the undisclosed source. Without that evidence, Roadway could not rebut Cefalu's allegations. The ALJ found for Cefalu and ordered his reinstatement. The Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) affirmed. On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the Court upheld the sanction at the merits stage but remanded to allow Roadway an opportunity to establish, for purposes of reinstatement, that it would have fired Cefalu absent the protected activity. On remand, the administrative law judge concluded that Roadway failed to meet its burden. The ARB affirmed. Roadway petitions for review.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Ripple, and Wood denied the petition. The Court first revisited its earlier conclusions and its distinction between the use of the sanction at the merits stage and the reinstatement stage. Although the statute seems to require reinstatement, the Court borrowed the Mt. Healthy "mixed motive" framework to avoid the “absurd” result of reinstating an unsafe driver. The framework would allow Roadway to meet its burden by showing that it would have fired Cefalu because of his driving history even in the absence of his protected activity. The exception the Court adopted was limited to a showing of a public safety concern. The Court rejected Roadway's attempts to meet its burden by showing that it would have fired Cefalu for his dishonesty, as opposed to his driving. On its review of the record, the Court found the evidence of Roadway's treatment of drivers with similar records ambiguous. There was evidence that Roadway fired several drivers who were involved in accidents -- there was evidence that Roadway retained several drivers who were involved in accidents. The Court had little difficulty, therefore, in finding that the administrative decision was supported by "substantial evidence" -- the applicable standard of review.

Nursing Home's Accession To Residents' Racial Preferences Created Hostile Environment

CHANEY v. PLAINFIELD HEALTHCARE CENTER (July 20, 2010)

Brenda Chaney, an African-American female, worked at the Plainfield Healthcare Center as a nursing assistant for three months in the summer of 2006. Plainfield's policy (possibly undertaken in a good faith belief that it was required by law to do so) was to acquiesce in its residents' racial preferences. Accordingly, every daily assignment sheet noted that particular residents preferred no African-American nursing assistants. Chaney also was the target of a number of derogatory racial comments during her employment. Plainfield did take corrective action when instances of racial remarks were reported. In September of 2006, Chaney and a coworker both refused to come to the aid of a resident. A nurse reported the incident and also reported that Chaney used profanity when she ultimately did respond. Although the unit supervisor's investigation and knowledge of Chaney led her to be skeptical of that charge, the director of nursing decided to fire Chaney. She was informed that the reason for her termination of employment was her use of profanity. Chaney brought an action under Title VII alleging a hostile work environment and an unlawful termination. Judge Barker (S.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to Plainfield. Chaney appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Rovner, Williams, and Sykes reversed and remanded. The Court had "no trouble" concluding that Chaney's work environment was objectively offensive. It relied not only on the overt derogatory comments and the more subtle remarks supported by the record, but also the fact that the daily assignment sheet contained the racial restrictions. The Court rejected Plainfield's argument that its policy was reasonable and necessary to comply with law. Although recognizing that gender discrimination may sometimes be allowed to accommodate privacy interests, the Court stated that the same is not true for racial discrimination. The Court also concluded that Indiana law did not require the policy and, even if it did, federal law would trump the requirement. On a practical level, the Court recited a number of options an employer has when faced with racial hostilities. With respect to the discharge claim, the Court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Plainfield's decision to fire Chaney was motivated by race. It relied on Plainfield's shifting justification for its action, the unusual way in which the incident investigation was conducted and concluded, and the absence of any disciplinary action with respect to the other nursing assistant involved in the incident.

Discrimination Claims Are Barred When They Were Either Untimely Or Not Raised In The EEOC Charge

JONES v. RES-CARE, INC. (July 16, 2010)

Tamika Jones, an African-American female, has several complaints about the way she was treated during her employment at Res-Care. She claims she was promoted in both 2003 and 2004 and acquired increased job responsibilities without an increase in compensation -- unlike several non-African-American employees. She claims she had to specially request time off and that she was denied tuition reimbursement -- unlike several non-African-American employees. She claims she was passed over for promotions in April and November of 2005 and June of 2006 – in favor of non-African-American employees. She filed an EEOC charge in August of 2006, referring to the November 2005 failure to promote and the tuition reimbursement treatment. In 2007, while under specific orders not to vary her work schedule without permission, she returned from her honeymoon three days early. She was given corrective action for the incident. She brought suit under Title VII in June of 2007. She filed a second EEOC charge in November of that year, claiming that the corrective action from the honeymoon incident was in retaliation for the first EEOC charge. She also amended her complaint accordingly. Testimony was elicited during discovery that the Executive Director, after an internal investigation established that Jones improperly charged her employer for some lunches, called her either a "rat" or a "fink" and referred to her as "untrustworthy" to another employee. Jones added a state law slander claim. Judge Lawrence (S.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to Res-Care on all claims. Jones appeals.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Manion and Williams and District Judge Darrah affirmed. One of the principal issues on appeal was the timing of the acts of discrimination and the content and timing of the EEOC charge. The Court concluded that the retaliation claim was the only claim that was both mentioned in an EEOC charge and occurred within the 180 days prior to the date of the charge. Jones struck out on each of her three attempts around the ruling: Strike 1) the Court rejected Jones' arguments of continuing violation (they were all discrete acts), Strike 2) the Court rejected her equitable tolling argument (she failed to meet the "aware of the possibility" standard), and Strike 3) the Court rejected her “closely related” argument ("part of a pattern" is not enough). On the merits of the honeymoon incident retaliation claim, the Court concluded both that the corrective action imposed did not amount to an adverse employment action and that Jones failed to establish a causal link between the corrective action and the EEOC charge. The Court also agreed with the district court on the defamation count. Indiana law grants a qualified privilege to alleged defamatory statements if they relate to the fitness of employee and are contained in intra-company communications. The privilege can be lost in certain circumstances, including if it was motivated primarily by ill will. The record established that the statements at issue met the definition of qualified privilege and Jones offered no evidence of ill will other than the offensiveness of the terms themselves -- which is not enough.

Federal Court Must Apply Illinois' Summary Judgment Framework to Workers' Compensation Retaliatory Discharge Claim

GACEK v. AMERICAN AIRLINES (July 15, 2010)

John Gacek was a baggage handler for American Airlines. In December of 2005, he suffered a severe sprain to a finger on his left hand. The doctor advised him to wear a splint and to avoid lifting anything with that hand. Gacek called in sick on December 29, 30, and 31. He failed to answer or return a phone call from American on the 29th. Its suspicions aroused because of the inability to reach Gacek and the holiday timing, American hired a detective to conduct surveillance. Gacek was videotaped running errands and generally using his hands to lift and carry objects. Gacek first told American that he had the flu -- he later changed his story and asserted that he called in sick because his finger was bothering him. American fired him. He brought an action under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act for retaliatory discharge. Judge Conlon (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to American. Gacek appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Wood, and Hamilton affirmed. Although the Court quickly concluded that no reasonable jury could decide that the reason for American's action was the opening of the claim file as opposed to lying about having the flu and disobeying doctor's orders, it decided to address a recurring issue that it had previously ducked. That issue is whether the summary judgment framework in this case is provided by Illinois law or by federal law (that is, McDonnell Douglas). In the 1998 Clemons case, the Illinois Supreme Court specifically rejected McDonnell Douglas in the context of a state workers' compensation retaliatory discharge claim. It's stated rationale was that it did not want to reduce the plaintiff’s burden of proving its case. The Court noted that the application of the Illinois test could result in a different outcome. Illinois requires proof of causation, whereas a McDonnell Douglas plaintiff could potentially prevail without such proof. The Court then addressed whether, under Erie, the Illinois test is a substantive or procedural rule in order to determine whether it should be applied in a diversity case. Although recognizing that the rule was ostensibly procedural, the Court concluded that it was nevertheless substantive under Erie and should be applied in the case. It based its conclusion on the fact that the test applies to a discrete area of substantive law and was motivated by substantive concerns. Illinois simply chose not to provide the McDonnell Douglas advantage to state retaliatory discharge plaintiffs -- the federal courts must honor that policy choice and apply it in diversity cases. Here, Gacek is unable to establish causation since he presented no credible evidence that American's stated reasons for firing him were not credible.

Court Finds Sufficient Evidence of Retaliation to Uphold Jury Verdict

PICKETT v. SHERIDAN HEALTH CARE CENTER (June 25, 2010)

Danielle Pickett was employed as a housekeeper at the Sheridan Health Care Center in Zion, Illinois. In 2005 and 2006, she was the victim of several incidences of inappropriate remarks and touching by nursing home residents. Although the Center responded to her complaints, the promised response never quite succeeded. In a June 2006 meeting with several Center staff members, the Center agreed to reassign Pickett from cleaning residents' rooms, although, according to Pickett, the Center's VP of Operations suggested that Pickett invited the inappropriate conduct. The next morning, Pickett had a very emotional conversation with the Center's Administrator. According to Pickett, the Administrator said some things that indicated that her job may be in jeopardy. The meeting ended with Pickett still upset and in tears. Instead of resuming her assigned tasks, she left the Center. She called the Administrator the next day to ask if she still was employed. He consulted with the VP of Operations and advised Pickett that she no longer had a job. Beginning about a month later, after Picket filed an EEOC claim, the Center offered on several occasions to reinstate Pickett. She refused several such offers but eventually returned to the Center in January of 2007. She brought suit against the Center for sexual harassment and for retaliatory firing under Title VII. Judge Pallmeyer (N.D. Ill) granted summary judgment to the Center on the harassment claim. The retaliation claim went to trial. The jury found for Pickett and awarded $15,000 in compensatory and $50,000 in punitive damages. The court awarded back pay and injunctive relief. The Center appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Kanne, and Evans affirmed. The Court first rejected the Center's argument that Pickett could not prevail on the retaliation claim because she could not prevail on the harassment claim. In order to prevail on retaliation, a plaintiff need only show statutorily protected conduct, adverse action, and a causal link. The Court found that there was sufficient evidence of each of those elements in the record -- the jury was entitled to find in Pickett's favor. Each of the Center's other arguments was also rejected: a) counsel’s "send some message" language in closing argument was not improper, b) the compensatory damage award was not excessive and did not require corroborating evidence from a third party, and c) the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the punitive award to stand in light of the evidence that supported a conclusion that the Center knew it might be retaliating when it terminated Pickett's employment.

Arbitrator May Not Provide Relief For Period Of Time When He Has No Authority

PRATE INSTALLATIONS, INC. v. CHICAGO REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS (June 4, 2010)

Prate Installations, Inc. filed a grievance against its Union, the Chicago Regional Counsel of Carpenters, in 2003. Prate alleged that the Union's requirement that Prate pay hourly wages while allowing competitors to pay on a piece work basis violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The parties selected an arbitrator in accordance with the terms of the 2001 CBA. Arbitrator Martin issued an award in September of 2008. He awarded close to $10 million in damages, injunctive relief and attorney's fees. Meanwhile, the parties entered into a new CBA in 2005 that modified the arbitration procedure. It established a rotating panel of arbitrators -- Martin was not on the panel. Prate brought suit to confirm the award. Judge St. Eve (N.D. IL) confirmed the damages award, as amended to eliminate damages after the revised CBA, and the attorneys’ fees. She also vacated the equitable relief because it applied after the expiration of the earlier CBA. Both parties appeal.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Cudahy and Manion affirmed. The Court noted that their review of the arbitration award is quite limited. Here, the arbitrator relied on the contract in concluding that the Union was in violation. The district court correctly upheld that conclusion. The Court also found that the district court correctly determined that Arbitrator Martin had no authority under the 2005 CBA. His damages award covering the period after the new CBA was therefore improper. The analysis of the equitable award is slightly different. Martin could have ordered equitable relief if he issued his award prior to the expiration of the earlier agreement. Since he did not, however, the Court concluded that it had to treat the equitable remedy like the damages remedy and vacated it.

Court Does Not Impute Subordinate's Alleged Retaliatory Motive To Decision-Maker

 POER v. ASTRUE (May 27, 2010)

Darrell Poer has been an attorney in the Social Security Administration's (SSA) Office in Indianapolis for years. In 2003, he testified on behalf of two female African-American employees in a suit against Allen Kearns, the Hearing Office Director. In 2005, a more senior attorney position opened in the Indianapolis office. Poer applied for the position. Under the applicable procedures used by the office, a) the HR Department processed applications and made a list of the best qualified candidates, b) they forwarded the list of candidates to Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) de la Torre for his recommendation, and c) ALJ de la Torre forwarded her recommendation to ALJ Lillios, who is the decision-maker. In addition, the practice of the office was to cancel a vacancy if fewer than three qualified candidates existed. At the time of the 2005 vacancy, severe budget cuts prohibited moving employees from one region to another and severely limited relocation expenses. The list of candidates for the 2005 promotion included Poer and two other candidates, one from inside the region and one from outside the region. ALJ de la Torre received the candidate list from Kearns and understood from Kearns that Poer was the only candidate from within the region – and therefore the only viable candidate. The vacancy expired without a selection. Kearns advised the region office: "no FTEs available." Kearns represented himself to Poer as the selecting official and told Poer that he was not selected because he was the only candidate on the list. Poer filed suit, alleging that the SSA failed to promote him in retaliation for his testimony against Kearns. Judge Barker (S.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to the SSA, concluding that no decision-maker was even aware of Poer's testimony and that there was no evidence of Kearns significantly influencing the promotion decision. Poer appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Manion, and Williams affirmed. At least for purposes of the summary judgment motion, the SSA conceded that Poer engaged in protected activity and suffered an adverse job action -- two of the three requirements under the direct method of proof in a Title VII claim of retaliation. The third requirement, a causal connection between the two, was the only issue for the court. Since it was undisputed that the decision-makers were unaware of Poer's protected activity, Poer had to succeed in imputing the alleged retaliatory motive of Kearns to the decision-makers to establish a causal connection. The Court noted that it has imputed such motives when the non-decision-maker has concealed information or fed false information to the decision-maker. Here, the evidence supports an inference that Kearns provided false information to ALJ de la Torre. However, the evidence also establishes that the false information had no impact on ALJ de la Torre's decision not to fill the vacancy. Whether the other two candidates came from outside the region, as mistakenly believed by de la Torre, or came from outside Indianapolis, as is the truth, ALJ de la Torre's decision would have been the same. Because of the relocation expense restrictions, Poer was the only viable candidate and could not have been promoted under agency policy. His retaliation claim fails.

Causal Connection Is Not Established In A Title VII Retaliation Claim

LEONARD v. EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY (May 26, 2010)

For almost 20 years, Robert Leonard worked in a janitorial position at Eastern Illinois University. Leonard was of Native American descent and was very outspoken and active on those issues. In particular, Leonard was very critical of the use by the University of Illinois (since discontinued) of a Native American mascot called “Chief Illiniwek.” In March 2005, Leonard applied for a promotion. He interviewed before a panel of six supervisors, two of whom wore shirts picturing Chief Illiniwek. Although the University of Illinois basketball team was scheduled to play a collegiate championship game that very night, Leonard was offended by the shirts and believed them to be a statement regarding Leonard's criticism of the mascot. Neither Leonard nor any other applicant was promoted as a result of the March 2005 interviews. In April, Leonard complained to the school's Office of Civil Rights. As a result of his complaint, the supervisors were requested not to wear clothing depicting the Chief Illiniwek when dealing with Leonard. In October of 2005, Leonard and seven others applied for another promotion. They all interviewed before the same six supervisors without incident. The University promoted the three applicants who scored the highest -- Leonard was seventh of the eight. Leonard brought suit against the University under Title VII. He alleged that the University failed to promote him in retaliation for his earlier complaint. Judge McCuskey (C.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the University. Leonard appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Evans, and Tinder affirmed. Leonard had proceeded in the trial court under the direct method of proof, which requires him to prove, among other things, a causal connection between a protected activity and an adverse job action. The Court found no such evidence. There was no evidence that the supervisors reacted negatively to his complaint or that the results of the scoring showed any bias. All six supervisors scored Leonard in the bottom half of the candidates. A causal link cannot be inferred from "suspicious timing" because of the six-month gap between the complaint and the interviews. The Court also rejected Leonard's attempt to use 10-year-old statements of allegedly anti-Native American bias to support an inference of retaliation.

Individual Actions Remain Viable After Decertification Of FLSA Collective Action

ALVAREZ v. CITY OF CHICAGO (May 21, 2010)

A group of Chicago Fire Department paramedics brought a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards (FLSA) against the City of Chicago. The complaint alleged that this City violated the FLSA by not properly calculating overtime payments. The plaintiffs identified ten different ways the City allegedly miscalculated overtime pay, not all of which applied to each paramedic's situation. Over three hundred paramedics eventually opted into the collective action. When several were dismissed for failure to opt in in time, they filed their own individual suit with the same allegations. The two cases were consolidated. Judge Hibbler (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the City as against all plaintiffs. He concluded that the fact that each plaintiff would use a different combination of the various alleged miscalculations prevented them from being similarly situated. He also directed the plaintiffs to arbitrate their complaints, even though he recognized that arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement was not mandatory. The plaintiffs appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Flaum, and Evans reversed and remanded. The Fair Labor Standards Act allows employees to bring complaints as collective actions, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. Although a district court is given substantial discretion to manage collective actions, the Court concluded that the district court had misinterpreted a prior case. In Jonites, the Court had found a collective action inappropriate in a situation requiring significant individual fact-finding. Here, although different plaintiffs would be affected by different sub claims, very little individual fact-finding will be required. In addition, the Court concluded that the district court erred in comparing the efficiency of the collective action to arbitration. If the plaintiffs are willing to proceed individually, the proper comparison is between those individual actions and a collective action. Finally, even if a collective action is unwarranted, the proper remedy is not to dismiss the action but to convert it to individual actions.

Complaints About Supervisor In Formal Request For Department Reorganization Are Not Protected Speech Under Garcetti

OGDEN V. ATTERHOLT (MAY 18, 2010)

In late 2006, Paul Ogden was hired as the manager of the Title Insurance Division of the Indiana Department of Insurance. He reported to Carol Mihalik, the head of the Consumer Protection Unit. Mihalik in turn reported to James Atterholt, the Commissioner. From early on, Ogden was critical of Mihalik. He even managed to avoid her and report directly to Atterholt on some of his projects. In September 2007, Ogden took two separate steps related to Mihalik. First, he filed a formal complaint with the State Personnel Division, complaining that Mihalik did not follow hiring regulations, misused funds, and fostered a hostile work environment. A few days later, he delivered a memorandum to Atterholt requesting that his division be removed from the Mihalik’s Unit. Almost all of the reasons in support of his request referred to Mihalik’s incompetence or dishonesty. Many of them repeated items from his formal complaint. He did not refer to his formal complaint, however, nor did the memorandum suggest the need for any discipline. A few hours after receiving the memorandum, Atterholt summoned Ogden to his office and gave him an opportunity to resign or be fired. Ogden resigned -- but then sued the Department, Atterholt, and Mihalik. He claimed a violation of his First Amendment rights under § 1983. Magistrate Judge Magnus-Stinson (S.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to the defendants. Ogden appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Williams, Sykes, and Tinder affirmed. The only First Amendment issue addressed by the Court was whether Ogden's speech was constitutionally protected. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Garcetti, the Court held that it was not. Garcetti tells us that public employees' speech is not constitutionally protected when the statements are made "pursuant to their official duties." Here, the Court concluded that the memorandum was simply a request for departmental reorganization – a request which fell squarely within the scope of his official duties. Although many of the reasons given alleged incompetence and dishonesty on the part of his superior, they were all made in support of this effort to convince Atterholt of the need to reorganize.

FMLA Plaintiff Presents Enough Evidence Of Interference And Retaliation To Survive Summary Judgment

GOELZER v. SHEBOYGAN COUNTY (May 12, 2010)

Dorothy Goelzer began her employment with Sheboygan County, Wisconsin in 1986. In 1999, she became the full-time assistant to Adam Payne, the Administrative Coordinator for the County. For several years, she received consistently favorable performance reviews. Her health deteriorated beginning in 2002. She used over 300 hours of FMLA leave in 2002, over 175 hours in 2003, and almost 100 hours in 2004. Although her health improved in 2005, she continued to take intermittent FMLA leave to care for her mother. Her significant use of FMLA leave was noted negatively in each of her performance reviews and salary discussions during this time. In May of 2006, Goelzer requested two months of FMLA leave for a foot surgery. Although the County approved her request on August 8, she was fired on September 8. Payne had been promoted to the new position of County Administrator on August 15 and, for the first time, had been given the power to fire Goelzer. Goelzer filed an action against the County and Payne. She alleged violations of the FMLA for the County's failure to restore her to her position and for discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Goelzer appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Wood, and Williams reversed. The Court noted two fundamental principles of the FMLA: the right to be restored to one's position (or an equivalent one) upon return from a leave and the right not to be discriminated against for using leave. The only contested issue in Goelzer's interference claim was whether she was terminated to prevent her from being reinstated. Although Payne's stated rationale was his desire for a greater skill set, the Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to decide in Goelzer’s favor. That evidence included the many references by Payne over the years to her use of sick leave. The Court next addressed the retaliation claim, which differs from the interference claim by requiring proof of discriminatory intent. Again, the Court concluded that the record supported two possible explanations for Payne's decision to terminate Goelzer. Goelzer was entitled to have a jury select one.

Insubordinate Employee Fails To Satisfy The "Meets Legitimate Job Expectations" Prong

EVERROAD v. SCOTT TRUCK SYSTEMS (May 10, 2010)

David Scott owned and operated Scott Truck Systems, a commercial trucking company. Sherry Hantzis, his wife, was its general manager. In 2004, on Hantzis’ recommendation, Scott hired 51-year-old Diana Everroad as a dispatcher. Things did not go very well -- her supervisor complained, two large customers complained, and she had several run-ins with her coworkers. On the other hand, she was the target of several gender-based derogatory comments from those coworkers, one of which came during a conversation she secretly recorded. Within months, Scott and Hantzis created a new job for Everroad as a "data administrator." The hours and the pay were identical to her dispatcher job, but she had to share an office. Her officemate had a habit of making lengthy personal phone calls. Everroad’s complaints resulted in a meeting with Scott, Hantzis, and the officemate in an attempt to resolve the conflict. The meeting lasted a long time and became very tense. Everroad again secretly recorded much of the meeting. There was shouting, crying, eye-rolling, and accusations -- but the meeting did end with some constructive proposals. Scott and Hantzis were upset with Everroad's conduct during the meeting and considered it insubordinate. They were still considering their options when, upon arrival at the office the next morning, Everroad ignored Hantzis' greeting and overreacted to Scott's greeting. Scott terminated her employment at the end of that workday. Everroad sued Scott Truck for gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and for age discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted summary judgment to Scott Truck. Everroad appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Bauer and Rovner affirmed. The Court first rejected Everroad's complaint that the district court erred in refusing to consider the transcripts of her secretly recorded conversations. First, Everroad never actually submitted the tapes themselves, only the transcripts. Second, the Court found the transcripts demonstrated that the conversations were, in large part, incomprehensible. Addressing the merits, the Court accepted as fact that Everroad could establish that she was a member of a protected class and that she suffered an adverse employment action for both the gender and age discrimination claims. The Court nonetheless rejected her discrimination claims: a) because of her insubordination, she was unable to meet the job performance prong of the test and she was unable to identify a similarly situated employee (i.e., another insubordinate employee), and b) she was unable to present evidence undermining the sincerity of Scott's nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her (her insubordination). The Court also rejected her retaliation claims: a) her claim that she was transferred because of her complaints about some derogatory comments fails because she never raised it in the district court, the transfer was not an adverse employment action, and there was no evidence that she complained to Scott or Hantzis, and b) her claim that she was terminated for complaining about a different derogatory remark fails because the remark was made a year prior to her termination and she presented no evidence establishing a causal connection between the two.

Illinois Firefighter Has A Property Interest In Employment After One Year Anniversary, Notwithstanding Lengthy Leave

KODISH v. OAKBROOK TERRACE FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT (May 10, 2010)

Brian Kodish began work as a full-time firefighter and paramedic for Oakbrook Terrace in June of 2003. The Illinois Fire Protection Act prohibits the termination of a firefighter without just cause after the firefighter has "held that position for one year." In March of 2004, Kodish went on leave for a knee surgery. While he was out, he received a letter indicating that the District was going to extend his 12-month probationary period for 90 days. Although the evaluations he had received in his first nine months contained some positive remarks, Kodish was evaluated as "fair" in most categories. He was criticized for a lack of motivation, poor communication skills, and an inability to follow authority. Kodish returned from leave on July 24. On August 11, the District Board decided to terminate his employment. He filed suit against the District under § 1983, alleging a violation of his due process rights. He also alleged that he was fired in retaliation for speaking out on union issues. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Kodish appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Ripple and Rovner reversed. The Court first addressed the existence of a property right, a prerequisite for the federal due process claim. Of course, Kodish had passed his one-year anniversary before he was fired -- but, because of his four-month leave, he only actually worked a little over ten months. The Court looked to Illinois law to determine whether Kodish was protected. No Illinois court has interpreted the "held that position" language of the Act. The Court looked to Illinois decisions with respect to analogous statutes and concluded that the Illinois Supreme Court would read the plain language of the Act to impose a simple twelve-month employment requirement for the creation of the property interest. The Court rejected defendants' other arguments based on the Illinois Municipal Code and the District’s own Wage and Benefit Policy as either in applicable (in the case of the Code) or not controlling (in the case of the Policy) -- and reversed the district court's conclusion that Kodish had no property interest in continued employment. The Court then addressed Kodish's First Amendment claim. It quickly concluded that Kodish met two of the three requirements of the claim -- that the speech was protected speech and that he suffered a deprivation. In addressing the third requirement -- whether he would have been terminated but for his speech -- the Court reviewed his mixed employment evaluations as well as the evidence of the fire chief's opinion of Kodish's speech. The Court disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the only reasonable conclusion for his discharge was his employment record. Although the Court found that theory "plausible," it also found the alternate theory -- that he was fired for his speech -- one that a reasonable jury could adopt. In concluding that the First Amendment claim should have survived summary judgment, the Court also concluded that Kodish presented sufficient evidence that the fire chief's animus should be attributed to the District under either the "singular influence" or the "motivating factor" test.

Seven to Ten Month Gap Between Allegedly Discriminatory Statements And An Adverse Job Action Is Too Long To Support An Inference Of Discrimination

EGONMWAN v. COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT (April 22, 2010)

Iyare Egonmwan was a black male jail guard at the Cook County Jail. In 2001, he was transferred into the women's division. The following year, the female superintendent of the division disciplined him for conduct that had occurred prior to his transfer. Several days later, Egonmwan accused the superintendent of sexual harassment. The claim was investigated and determined to be unfounded. In 2003, during a general investigation into allegations of sexual misconduct between guards and prisoners, a female detainee informed the investigators that she and at least one other prisoner had had a sexual encounter with Egonmwan. Although Egonmwan was acquitted of criminal charges in 2004, an administrative hearing board terminated his employment in January of 2005 for violation of institutional rules. Egonmwan brought suit against, among others, Cook County and the Sheriff's Department. He alleged § 1981 race discrimination and § 1983 gender and race discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Egonmwan appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Evans, and Sykes affirmed. The Court first affirmed the summary judgment on the gender discrimination claim. Egonmwan proceeded under the direct method but presented only a few isolated remarks by the women's division superintendent. The Court noted that isolated remarks may be sufficient to establish a discriminatory motive, but they must be made by the decision-maker, at the time of the decision, and regarding the decision. Here, the Court doubted (but did not decide) that the superintendent could be considered the decision-maker. It upheld the summary judgment because of the seven to ten month lag between the remarks and the action and the fact that the remarks did not refer to Egonmwan's termination. With respect to the race discrimination claim, the Court concluded that Egonmwan was unable to show that similarly situated non-blacks were treated more favorably or that the defendants' reasons for his termination were not legitimate.

De-deputization And Transfer Do Not Amount To Constructive Discharge

SWEARNIGEN-EL v. COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT (April 22, 2010)

Swearnigen-El was a black male guard in the women's division at the Cook County Jail. He had a run-in with the head of the division, who wanted the correctional staff in the women's division to be comprised totally of women. Swearnigen-El thought that belief was discriminatory and he reported his concerns to other supervisors. Shortly thereafter, Swearnigen-El found himself in trouble when a female prisoner's allegations that male guards were engaged in sexual activity with female prisoners launched an investigation. The Sheriff's Police conducted the initial investigation, followed by an investigation by the State's Attorney’s office. Several prisoners reported that Swearnigen-El was having sex with a female prisoner. The prisoner herself admitted the activity. Swearnigen-El was de-deputized and transferred for violating a General Order that forbids "activities unbecoming" an employee. He was later charged with sexual misconduct and suspended with pay. Before he had a termination hearing with the merit board, Swearnigen-El resigned. After he was acquitted of the criminal charges, he filed a complaint alleging gender discrimination, race discrimination, Title VII retaliation, First Amendment retaliation, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed the Title VII retaliation claim and granted summary judgment to the defendants on all other claims. Swearnigen-El appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Wood, Evans, and Sykes affirmed. The Court first upheld summary judgment on all gender and race discrimination claims because there was no adverse employment action. Swearnigen-El was de-deputized and transferred after a internal investigation demonstrated evidence of misconduct. His pay was not affected and there was no evidence that the conditions were intolerable. The Court concluded that no reasonable jury could find a constructive discharge under those circumstances. Alternatively, the Court found that Swearnigen-El a) failed to establish sufficient evidence of race or gender discrimination to create a triable issue, and b) was not meeting his legitimate job expectations. Next, the Court considered the First Amendment retaliation claim. The principal speech at issue was Swearnigen-El's disagreement with his superior regarding the staffing of the women's division and his subsequent complaints to other officials that her actions constituted discrimination. The Court concluded that the speech was not protected -- Swearnigen-El was speaking not "as a citizen" but as a public employee under Garcetti. Again, the Court came to the alternative conclusion that no reasonable juror could find the defendants' actions pretextual. On the claim of malicious prosecution, the Court found sufficient evidence of misconduct after the investigation to establish probable cause. Since the absence of probable cause is an element of a malicious prosecution claim, Swearnigen-El's claim must fail. Finally, the Court agreed that there was no "outrageous" conduct that would amount to an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and upheld the district court's dismissal of the Title VII retaliation claim on the ground that Swearnigen-El failed to include it in his EEOC charge.

Appellant's Failure To Respond To Alternative Basis To Uphold The Judgment Results In Forfeiture

TRUHLAR v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE (April 12, 2010)

Kenneth Truhlar was injured while working as a letter carrier for the United States Postal Service. He was required to periodically submit a form to the Department of Labor (DOL) in order to collect his partial disability payments. On the forms, he reported that he had no other job during the period for which he was claiming disability. In fact, Truhlar was a bass guitarist in a rock band and earned several thousand dollars during the period in question. The Service suspended him -- his union filed a grievance and, when it was denied, appealed. After the Service completed its investigation and concluded that Truhlar violated several rules, it notified Truhlar of its decision to terminate his employment. Again, the union grieved -- again, it appealed the denial of the grievance. Meanwhile, the DOL sought repayment of the benefits he had already received and a federal prosecutor considered criminal charges. The union and the Service agreed to a stay of the grievances pending the disposition of those actions. Truhlar appealed the DOL forfeiture order. The prosecutor decided not to prosecute. When a newly appointed postmaster inquired into the status of the pending grievances, she was provided with the Service's and the Department's reports concluding that Truhlar had knowingly failed to report outside income. She was also told, though incorrectly, that Truhlar had not appealed the forfeiture order. The postmaster met with the union representative and passed that accurate information to him. Based on the internal investigation, the Department's investigation, the prosecutor's rationale for declining to prosecute, and his belief that the DOL proceedings were complete, the union representative decided to withdraw the grievances. The Service terminated Truhlar's employment. A few months later, the Department's forfeiture order was reversed. The Appeals Board decided that the form did not put Truhlar on notice that he had to report his bass guitarist earnings. Truhlar filed suit under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. He alleged that the Service violated the collective bargaining agreement by terminating him without cause and alleged that the union breached its duty of fair representation by not pursuing the grievances. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Truhlar appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Manion and Evans affirmed. In a § 301 "hybrid" action, a plaintiff must prevail on both his claims against his employer and his union. Here, the district court concluded that the Service did not violate the collective bargaining agreement. Since that conclusion was enough to grant summary judgment to the Service, the district court did not address Truhlar's claim against the union. On appeal, the union renewed its argument that it did not breach its duty of fair representation. Truhlar never responded to that argument, explaining at oral argument that he did not think he was required to address a position he had not lost below. The Court explained that an appellee may defend the district court's judgment on any ground raised below. The Court concluded that Truhlar had therefore forfeited any opposition to the union's position on fair representation. Notwithstanding that conclusion, the Court reviewed Truhlar's district court submissions on the topic and concluded that Truhlar would lose on the merits as well. Truhlar's burden was to show that the union's actions were arbitrary and discriminatory or in bad faith. The Court noted that the union representative met with the postmaster, reviewed the internal investigation, reviewed the Department's report and decision, and considered the actions of the prosecutor before reaching his decision to withdraw the grievances. Far from arbitrary, the Court considered the representative's decision rational.

An Employer Is Not Required To Keep A Job Position That Is No Longer Necessary In Order To Accomodate A Disability

GRATZL v. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUDGES (April 7, 2010)

Jeanne Gratzl has suffered from incontinence for several years. It has interfered with her ability to perform certain jobs and undertake normal commutes. All seemed well when she was hired by DuPage County for a “control room” court reporting position. Unlike most court reporting positions that require attendance at trials and in courtrooms, her position allowed her to manage her condition well. In fact, she managed it so well that her colleagues and superiors were not aware of it. In 2006, all that changed. The Chief Judge of DuPage County redefined the position of a court reporter – and required all court reporters to do the same job. That meant that all court reporters had to rotate through the control room and the courtrooms. Gratzl disclosed her condition to the Chief Judge. The parties engaged in a series of conversations attempting to reach an accommodation. The only accommodation Gratzl would accept was a full-time assignment to the control room. The Chief Judge offered several accommodations; including no trial assignments, assignments to courtrooms nearest the restrooms, and allowing her to use a hand signal to indicate to a presiding judge that she needed a break. When she rejected these accommodations, the County terminated her employment. Gratzl brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the County on the ground that Gratzl was not disabled. Gratzl appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Manion, and Williams affirmed. The Court noted the similar requirements of both the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. A plaintiff must show that she is a qualified individual, with a disability, of which the defendant is aware, and for which the defendant failed to reasonably accommodate. Although the Court briefly addressed whether Gratzl had a disability, which was the basis of the district court's ruling, it ultimately decided it did not have to resolve that issue. Instead, it addressed whether Gratzl was a "qualified individual," meaning whether she was able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodations. The Court focused on the employer's legitimate description of the functions of the job. Here, that included rotating through the control room and the courtrooms. The fact that Gratzl was able to perform the functions of her prior job was not the issue. The County eliminated that job for legitimate reasons. It is not required to maintain a job, for which an employee is qualified, that it no longer believes is necessary or appropriate. Since Gratzl basically concedes that she cannot perform the job as it is now defined, she is not a “qualified individual.” As an alternative ground, the Court concluded that the accommodations offered by the County were reasonable under the ADA. Her only real objection to the accommodations was that the disruption to the courtrooms necessitated by her frequent breaks would be an embarrassment to her. She is not entitled to reject a reasonable accommodation for that reason.

FMLA Service Requirement Period Is Not Tolled During A Leave

BAILEY v. PREGIS INNOVATIVE PACKAGING (April 2, 2010)

Michelle Bailey was employed by the defendant Pregis Innovative Packaging -- that is, until they terminated her for accumulating too many absenteeism points during a 12-month period. She brought suit against Pregis under the Family and Medical Leave Act. The district court granted summary judgment to Pregis. Bailey appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Manion, and Hamilton affirmed. The Court noted the two issues raised by the appeal: a) whether the 12-month period during which an employee must accumulate 1,250 hours of service to be entitled to take leave is tolled during a period of leave, and whether Pregis retaliated against Bailey by not including leave time in its own policy of removing absenteeism points twelve months after they are imposed. The Court rejected Bailey's position on the first issue. Although it found no precedent, it also found no basis for the tolling in the statute and also found comfort in the line of cases that refused to adopt an expansive definition of the term "service" in the Act. Thus, Bailey is not entitled to "service" credit for a number of days preceding the twelve month period equal to her number of days of leave. With respect to the second issue, the Court first addressed whether the employer's policy of removing absenteeism points is an “employment benefit" under the Act. Although it gave no weight to a Department of Labor opinion letter concluding that such a policy is an "employment benefit" because the letter contained no reasoning, it concluded on its own that the letter reached the right result. Even if it is an employment benefit, however, the Court noted that the Act provides that taking leave cannot result in the loss of employment benefit that has already accrued. Benefits that have not already accrued are not protected. For example, the Act specifically provides that an employee on leave does not accrue seniority. For much the same reason, an employee on leave does not accrue service days toward the twelve months after which the employer forgives an absentee day.

Mixed-Motive Liability Theory Is Improper Under The LMRDA

SERAFINN v. LOCAL 722 (March 12, 2010)

Mark Serafinn is a member of Local 722 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. In fact, he served three terms as its president. Serafinn is also a member of the Teamsters for a Democratic Union ("TDU"), a large and active dissident group opposed to the current international leadership. Serafinn alleges that the presidents of the union and the joint council, which is a group of leaders from locals in the same region, colluded to have internal disciplinary charges brought against him. The joint council suspended Serafinn and ordered restitution. Serafinn brought an action against both the local union and the joint council under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act. He alleged that the actions taken against him were taken without due process in retaliation for his exercise of free speech and assembly rights, all in violation of the Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the joint council. The claim against the local union proceeded to a jury trial, where Serafinn was awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages and $55,000 in punitive damages. After trial, the court denied a motion by Serafinn for relief from the summary judgment granted to the joint council on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. The court also awarded attorneys fees to Serafinn, but in a lesser amount than requested. The union local appeals. Serafinn cross appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Evans, and Tinder affirmed. The Court first addressed the local's contention that the district court should have given a mixed-motive instruction. The district court had instructed the jury that Serafinn's exercise of free speech had to be a "but for" cause, not just a motivating factor. In that situation, the Court stated, a mixed-motive instruction would be inappropriate. The Court noted that some courts have approved of mixed-motive liability theories in cases under the Act but that the Supreme Court's decision in Gross overruled that approach. The Court then addressed the local's challenge to a limiting instruction with respect to a witness’ misdemeanor convictions. Although the convictions may be admissible for some purposes, Rule 609 prohibits their admission to attack general character for truthfulness. Here, the lower court properly allowed the convictions into evidence for some purposes but erred when it allowed the jury to consider them for improper impeachment purposes. Nevertheless, the Court found no prejudice from the error and declined to order a new trial. Addressing Serafinn's cross-appeal, the Court concluded that his "new evidence" was simply cumulative. Finally, the Court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's consideration and decision with respect to the award of attorney's fees.

Title VII Reverse Race Discrimination Claim Fails In Face Of Fire Chief's Honest Belief That Plaintiffs Were Ill-Suited For Promotion

STOCKWELL v. CITY OF HARVEY (March 12, 2010)

Jason Bell, Harvey's fire chief, decided to hire a Deputy Chief and three Assistant Chiefs. Chief Bell wrote down traits that he considered desirable (competence, loyalty, dedication, and confidence) and unacceptable (selfishness, complaining, dishonesty, and undermining authority). Anyone with ten years of service on the Fire Department could apply and a sign-up sheet was posted. Nine members of the department indicated an interest in the Assistant Chief position -- eight of the nine also indicated an interest in the Deputy Chief position. Three of the nine were African-American (Buie, Tyler, and Patterson). Before any interviews, Chief Bell offered the Deputy Chief position to a white fireman who had not applied - he declined. Each of the nine candidates was then interviewed and evaluated in several categories. Chief Bell ranked the candidates based on several factors, including the interview evaluation scores. The three African-Americans all scored in the top four. The fourth candidate withdrew his name from consideration. The African-Americans all received promotions. The next highest scorer was Rich Stockwell. Chief Bell did not offer Stockwell a promotion, based on his belief that Stockwell was nearing retirement. The fourth promotion was given to a white candidate who had not applied for the position. Rich Stockwell and three other white firemen brought an action under Title VII against the City of Harvey for race discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to the City. The firemen appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Williams, and Tinder affirmed. The Court described the prima facie case and burden shifting analyses under the McDonnell Douglas indirect method of proof. It then proceeded to decide the case under the pretext requirement, assuming a prima facie case. In order to prevail, the Court stated, a plaintiff must establish that the non-discriminatory reason given by an employer was dishonest and that the real reason reflected a discriminatory intent. Even an unreasonable decision is not actionable if the decision-maker believed it. The Court reviewed the record with respect to each plaintiff and found legitimate and non-discriminatory reasons not to promote each: a) Bell testified that DeYoung had a reputation for being negative and Chief Bell had a belief that he might undermine management, b) Bell testified that he thought Ciecierski was dishonest and not trustworthy, c) Bell testified that Gary Stockwell did a lot of complaining and would not support the department, and d) Bell testified that he believed that Rich Stockwell was nearing retirement and not committed to the department for a long term. In light of Chief Bell's testimony, the Court concluded that none of the plaintiffs could establish a genuine issue of fact with respect to pretext.

ADA Claim Fails Where Claimant Is Unable To Perform The Essential Functions Of His Job

BUDDE v. KANE COUNTY FOREST PRESERVE (March 4, 2010)

Charles Budde enjoyed several glasses of wine at the Moose Lodge one night. He decided to drive home anyway and caused an accident that sent two people to the hospital. His blood-alcohol level at the time was nearly three times the legal limit. Budde was also the police chief for the Kane County Forest Preserve District. The district fired him, giving three reasons: errors in judgment, an inability to perform his duties, and engaging in below-standard conduct. Budde sued the District, alleging his termination violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant, concluding both that he could not recover because he was terminated for misconduct, not a disability, and that he was not a "qualified individual with a disability" because he violated a District rule. Budde appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Manion, and Tinder affirmed. One of the prerequisites for an ADA claim, noted the Court, is that the plaintiff can perform the "essential functions" of his job. The Court concluded that Budde could not meet that prerequisite for two reasons: he violated a workplace rule and he was unable to operate a motor vehicle. With respect to the former, the Court found sufficient evidence that Budde violated the rules that prohibited public intoxication and prohibited the violation of public laws. The Court noted that the District need not wait for the outcome of any criminal charges. With respect to the latter, the Court rejected Budde’s distinction between the ability to operate a motor vehicle and the ability to operate a motor vehicle legally (i.e., in possession of a valid drivers license). The essential function of the job is the ability to operate a motor vehicle legally -- which Budde is unable to do.

Acts Of Harassment Occuring Outside The Limitations Period Should Be Considered In A Hostile Workplace Claim If Any Act Falls Within The Period

TURNER v. THE SALOON (February 8, 2010)

Paul Turner was a waiter at The Saloon restaurant. After working there for several years, Turner and one of his supervisors carried on a sexual relationship that lasted for about nine months. According to Turner, the supervisor retaliated against him after she ended the relationship. He alleges that she changed his table assignments, disciplined him without cause, and sexually harassed him on a number of specific occasions. Turner also alleges that he was discriminated against because of his psoriasis. He wears no underwear as a result of that condition and therefore occasionally exposes himself while changing clothes. He claims that his supervisors failed to accommodate his condition. Instead, he was forced to change in a “vile” men’s room. One day, in the middle of a shift and with no other waiters on duty, Turner left the restaurant to run an errand. When he returned, he was fired. Turner sued the restaurant and several managers for gender and disability discrimination under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act. He also made a claim for overtime. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Turner appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Rovner, and Sykes reversed and remanded in part in affirmed in part. The Court first addressed the Title VII sexual harassment claim. It concluded that the district court erred in not considering most of the alleged acts of harassment because they occurred outside the limitations period. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Morgan, whether an alleged act of harassment is considered by a court depends on whether the claim is for employment discrimination or for hostile work environment. In an employment discrimination claim, discrete acts outside the limitations period should not be considered. However, in a hostile work environment claim, all acts can be considered as long as one act contributing to the hostile environment took place during the limitations period. Taking all the alleged acts into account, the Court had little difficulty in finding that they were sufficient to survive summary judgment. The Court noted the presence of at least five discrete acts, three of which were aggressively physical. Since the district court did not reach the issue of employer liability, the Court left the issue for remand. The court next addressed Turner's claim that his termination was in retaliation for his complaints about the harassment. The Court concluded that Turner was unable to establish a prima facie case under either the direct or indirect method. It noted a series of at least ten serious reprimands in the eight or nine months preceding his termination as well as the fact that he left his job in the middle of the shift. The serious performance problems as well as the passage of time since his harassment complaint belie a causal connection between the complaint and his termination. The Court summarily rejected Turner's ADA discrimination claim -- his psoriasis is not a disability under the Act since it does not limit any major life activity. The fact that he is not disabled does not preclude his ADA retaliation claim. Since he did raise such a claim with his employer, his employer is not allowed to retaliate. He does not prevail on that claim, however, for the same reasons he could not prevail on his Title VII retaliation claim. Finally, the Court rejected Turner's wage claims as wholly unsupported by the evidence presented.

Government Employee Who Serves "At The Pleasure" Has No Property Interest In Employment

COVELL v. MENKIS (February 8, 2010)

The Illinois Deaf and Hard of Hearing Commission (the "Commission") was created several years ago to provide services for and advocate on behalf of the hard of hearing. Gerald Covell served as its Director from 1998 until 2003. In July of that year, the Commissioners terminated him. Covell filed suit under § 1983, alleging that defendants violated both his property and liberty interests. Specifically, he alleged that he was let go without any pre-or post-termination process in violation of a property interest. He also alleges that defendants circulated false information about him, without providing him an opportunity to clear his name, in violation of his liberty interest. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that Covell had no property interest in this position and that he failed to demonstrate that any particular defendant circulated negative information. Covell appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Manion and Williams affirmed. The Court first addressed the existence of a property interest. Although a property interest can arise from state law, a person must identify a specific statute, rule, or contract that limits the ability of the state to terminate him. The rules governing Covell's position states that he "shall serve at the pleasure of the Commission." The Court rejected Covell's position that an inconsistent right was somehow incorporated into the regulation by its reference to the Personnel Code. Since he had no property interest, he had no right to due process. With respect to his liberty interest claim, the Court stated that the plaintiff must show that he was stigmatized by publicly disclosed information and that he suffered a tangible loss. Specifically, the plaintiff must show that a named defendant made the public disclosure. Here, Covell contends only that the disclosure was made by someone in the government. Without evidence that the disclosure was made by a named defendant, Covell's claim fails.

ADA Mixed-Motive Plaintiff Must Now Prove That Her Employer Would Not Have Fired Her But For The Disability

SERWATKA v. ROCKWELL AUTOMATION, INC. (January 15, 2010)

Kathleen Serwatka was an employee of Rockwell Automation. Upon her discharge, she brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). She alleged that she was discharged because her employer considered her to be disabled. At trial, the jury indicated its belief on a special verdict form that a) Rockwell terminated Serwatka because it believed her to be disabled and b) that Rockwell would have fired her anyway. Treating the verdict as a mixed-motive finding, the court awarded no damages but did grant declaratory and injunctive relief and awarded attorneys fees. Rockwell appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Rovner, Evans, and Van Bokkelen vacated and remanded. The Court began its analysis with the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse. In that case, the Supreme Court held the an employer could violate Title VII even if an improper motive was not the only motive for a termination decision. It also held, however, that an employer would escape liability if it could prove that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the improper motive. Courts applied that Title VII decision to other anti-discrimination statutes. A few years later, Congress codified the Price Waterhouse holding that an improper motive need not be the only motive for a plaintiff to recover. It provided limited remedies, not an absence of liability, in the situation where the employer proves that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the improper motive. Specifically, it allowed for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorneys fees. The ADA incorporates by reference the mixed-motive remedy provisions of Title VII. It was on this basis that the district court fashioned its relief. While the case was on appeal, however, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Gross. In Gross, the Supreme Court held, notwithstanding Price Waterhouse, that mixed-motive claims were not allowed under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The Supreme Court concluded that Congress' decision to specifically incorporate the Price Waterhouse approach into Title VII and not to incorporate it into ADEA indicated its intent not to authorize mixed-motive claims under that statute. The "because of" language of the statute therefore required "but for" causation. Like ADEA, the ADA does not include an expressed mixed-motive provision and it uses the same "because of" language. The Court therefore concluded that an ADA plaintiff must establish that the employer would not have fired her absent the improper motive. The special verdict form below indicates that Serwatka failed to do so. The Court vacated and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in Rockwell's favor.

Failure To Prove Employer's Knowledge Of Pregnancy Defeats Discrimination Claim

LAFARY v. ROGERS GROUP, INC. (January 12, 2010)

Angela LaFary was a field clerk for Rogers Group, Inc. (RGI), a producer of crushed stone. In 2003, she was performing primarily administrative duties but longed for a chance to get into sales. Michael DeMartin, her supervisor, indicated she was on a track to do so. Unfortunately, she got derailed in 2004. In February, she married a man who worked as an independent trucker for the same RGI office. She found out she was pregnant on March 15. On March 24, DeMartin proposed, in an e-mail, to transfer LaFary to another RGI office. He noted business needs as well as a concern about the possible conflict of interest presented by LaFary's marriage. He recommended a transfer based solely on the business needs, however. On April 1, RGI assigned LaFary's husband to work with a different RGI office. In the same month, they transferred LaFary to the same office. Although DeMartin knew she was pregnant when he transferred her, he asserts that he was unaware of her pregnancy at the time of his recommendation. The transfer resulted in a pay increase but may have negatively affected LaFary's opportunities for a sales position. LaFary suffered complications from her pregnancy. She was hospitalized for two weeks in June and never returned. In January of 2005, although LaFary indicated her desire to return, DeMartin informed her that, pursuant to RGI policy, she was terminated because she did not return when her leave expired. LaFary filed an EEOC complaint, alleging sex discrimination. She then brought suit under Title VII. The court granted summary judgment to RGI. LaFary appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Wood, and Sykes affirmed. On the claim related to her transfer, the Court noted that the district court found both that it was not an adverse employment action and that LaFary did not establish that DeMartin knew of her pregnancy at the time he proposed her transfer. Although finding the first conclusion a close question, the Court affirmed on the second. LaFary's declaration stated only that DeMartin knew of her pregnancy "shortly after" she became pregnant. It never stated precisely when he knew. In fact, she never presented any competent evidence that DeMartin knew of her pregnancy at the time he recommended her transfer. Thus, she cannot prevail on that claim. With respect to her termination claim, the Court concluded that LaFary never established that a similarly situated individual not in her class was treated more favorably. Having failed to do so, she cannot prevail on the termination claim either.

Highly Inflammatory Evidence Properly Excluded At Trial

LEWIS v. CITY OF CHICAGO (December 21, 2009)

Donna Lewis was an officer in the tactical unit of the Chicago Police Department in 2002 when Lt. Terrence Williams became her supervisor. When she volunteered for a special security detail in Washington DC, Williams took her off the list. Lewis filed a grievance, alleging that it was a gender-based decision. She claims that she was the victim of several instances of retaliation after she filed the grievance. She filed an EEOC charge concerning both the security detail and retaliation. She alleges that the very next day Williams directed her to assist a narcotics team operation. During the operation, another officer accidentally struck her with a sledgehammer, breaking her neck. She is now on permanent disability. She filed suit. Although the court originally granted summary judgment to the defendants, the Seventh Circuit reversed her gender discrimination claim against Williams and the City and the retaliation claim against the City. At trial, a jury found in favor of the defendants. The court denied Lewis' motion for new trial. Lewis appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Evans and Sykes and District Judge Simon affirmed. Lewis raised four categories of error: jury instructions, evidentiary errors, prejudicial closing argument and insufficient evidence. With respect to the seven instruction challenges, the Court found the instructions to be proper or that Lewis either did not object or waived her objection. Likewise, with respect to Lewis' several evidentiary objections, the Court found no error. Specifically, the Court agreed that allowing Lewis to testify regarding the incident in which she suffered a broken neck at the hands of a fellow police officer would have been highly inflammatory. She was allowed to present evidence that she was diverted to a dangerous assignment. The Court also rejected her arguments with respect to the defendants' closing argument and the sufficiency of the evidence.

Discrimination Claims Fail In The Face Of Substantial Evidence Of Failure To Meet Expectations

PATTERSON v. INDIANA NEWSPAPERS, INC. (December 8, 2009)

Lisa Coffey and James Patterson were both employees in the editorial department of The Indianapolis Star in 2003 when Dennis Ryerson was named editor. Both describe themselves as "traditional Christians" opposed to homosexuality on religious grounds. Both believe that Ryerson's opposing view was somehow responsible for their employment troubles. Neither, however, had particularly stellar employment records. Coffey regularly violated the newspaper's overtime rule. She ultimately left the newspaper when a restructuring left her with the choice of a part-time editorial job or a full-time copy-desk job -- when what she wanted was a full-time editorial job. Patterson's issues were more substantive. His writing was weak and he made frequent, serious mistakes. After many warnings, Patterson was fired. Coffey and Patterson brought suit. They both alleged violations of Title VII for discrimination on the basis of religion. Patterson also alleges age and race discrimination, in violation of Title VII and the Age Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA), and retaliation for filing an EEOC complaint. Finally both plaintiffs include a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court granted summary judgment against both plaintiffs. Coffey and Patterson appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Flaum and Sykes affirmed. Although the Court noted the parties' sharply diverging views of the facts in some respects, it ultimately found no reason to resolve them. Both plaintiffs were required to establish that they met their employer's legitimate performance expectations and that they were treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee. With respect to Coffey, the Court concluded that she failed to establish her prima facie case. First, the evidence of her regular violation of the overtime policy was undisputed. Second, she failed to identify any similarly situated employee, much less one who was treated more favorably. Patterson suffered the same fate. All of his discrimination claims (religion, race, and age) and his retaliation claim require that he prove that he was meeting the newspaper's expectations. To the contrary, the record contains his long history of performance problems. Finally, the Court rejected the state law negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. Indiana law requires a "direct physical impact" to recover for emotional distress -- losing a job does not qualify.

Evidence Of Expected Benefit Is Required To Support Probabilistic Injury Theory

MILAM v. DOMINICK'S FINER FOODS (December 7, 2009)

Ahmad Milam is one of several African-American produce clerks at a Chicago Dominick's grocery store. Each week, Dominick's posts the produce clerks’ schedule of hours for the upcoming week. A more-senior produce clerk is allowed to "claim" the hours of a less-senior clerk. Milam and five other African-American produce clerks filed suit against Dominick's, claiming that it was guilty of race discrimination when it classified two more junior white women as produce clerks but did not include them on the schedule. The court granted summary judgment to Dominick's on the ground that plaintiffs had no evidence of damages. Plaintiffs appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Kanne and Rovner affirmed. The Court was quite critical of the district court's handling of the case. It noted that one of the women at issue was actually never a produce clerk. Although she had been offered and accepted a promotion to produce clerk, she changed her mind and never was scheduled to work as one. Dominick's presented evidence years ago that the failure to list the second woman on the produce clerk schedule was an innocent mistake. Plaintiffs never challenged the evidence as pretextual. The court should have granted summary judgment to Dominick's. With respect to the eventual order of the district court, the Court agreed that the plaintiffs presented insufficient evidence of either actual or probabilistic injury. The Court conceded that the plaintiffs' probabilistic injury theory was a proper damages theory. It requires, however, evidence of the expected benefit – which was never presented. In the end, the Court termed the case frivolous.

No Evidence Supports Employee's Pretext Argument

SENSKE v. SYBASE, INC. (December 3, 2009)

Robert Senske joined Sybase as a Strategic Account Manager in 2002. He was 55 years old at the time. For two years, Senske's performance was marginal at best in most areas. He did outperform his financial goal in 2004, but only because he got partial credit for two large deals on which he had little input or contribution. He was particularly criticized for excessive tardiness and incomplete paperwork completion. In early 2005, he was put on a performance improvement plan. He was told to improve his business skills, to be more responsive, and to complete his paperwork in a timely manner. Instead of showing improvement, Senske's performance deteriorated during the performance improvement period -- and he was fired. Senske sued Sybase under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, alleging that he was fired as a result of his age. The district court granted summary judgment to Sybase. Senske appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Kanne and Evans affirmed. Instead of enumerating the elements of a prima facie case under the indirect method, the Court proceeded directly to address the question of pretext. If Senske is unable to show that Sybase's stated reasons for his termination are pretextual, he also would not be able to establish that he was meeting his employer's legitimate expectations. The Court reviewed, in some detail, the evidence in the record of Senske's history of performance and Sybase's stated reasons for his termination. The Court concluded that Senske failed to present any evidence that the reasons given by Sybase for his termination were not sincere.

Failure To Pursue Complaint Regarding Racial Comments Forecloses Hostile Environment Conclusion

FORD v. MINTEQ SHAPES AND SERVICES (November 24, 2009)

Dennis Ford has been employed as a forklift operator for Minteq for many years. Throughout those years, he has been the only African-American employee at his facility. In 2007, Ford brought a race discrimination claim against Minteq. He complained that a coworker referred to him as "black man," that a supervisor called him a guerrilla, that he was not allowed to bring his grandchildren to a holiday party and that he was retaliated against for seeking outside medical attention for an on-the-job injury. The district court granted summary judgment to Minteq. Ford appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer and Wood affirmed. The Court noted that Ford's racial harassment claim required proof of an abusive work environment. The factors to be considered in determining whether the employer's conduct is severe and pervasive are the frequency and severity of the conduct, whether it is physically threatening and whether it interferes with the complainant's job. The Court concluded that Ford's complaints, individually and in the aggregate, did not rise to that level. Specifically with respect to the "black man" comments, the fact that Ford complained only once and never followed up with his employer on that complaint would not allow a reasonable juror to find that it rose to the level of harassment. The Court also concluded that Ford failed to present sufficient evidence on his disparate pay and retaliation claims to reach a jury.

Plaintiff Fails To Create Issue Of Fact With Respect To Employer's Non-Discriminatory Reasons For Actions

SCRUGGS v. GARST SEED CO. (November 20, 2009)

Dayna Scruggs worked for Garst Seed Company as a Research Technician. Curtis Beazer became her supervisor in 1995. Scruggs and Beazer did not get along. In fact, Beazer did not get along with a number of people. He made many derogatory remarks directed at Scruggs, several of them with a gender bias. In 2004, company management decided to demote or sever Beazer. Before they could do so, however, Garst was purchased by a competitor. New management decided to eliminate Scruggs' position. Scruggs filed an EEOC charge in December 2004 in response. In 2005, Scruggs applied for a Research Assistant position as part of the restructuring. New management did not hire Scruggs -- instead selecting the incumbent (a man) in the Research Assistant position with Garst. Scruggs filed a lawsuit, alleging retaliation and hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment against Scruggs. Scruggs appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Wood and Williams affirmed. Scruggs' retaliation claim had two prongs -- that her technician position was eliminated and that the company failed to hire her for the Research Assistant position. Instead of addressing the elements of her retaliation claim, the Court went directly to the company's reasons for its actions. If Scruggs cannot create a material issue of fact with respect to whether the reasons were pretextual, she loses. The Court concluded the Scruggs failed to raise an issue of fact with respect to either the elimination of her technician position or her failure to be hired for the assistant position. Her technician position was eliminated as part of a restructuring and the company's decision to hire someone else for the assistant position was based on their evaluation of qualifications. Summary judgment was appropriate. With respect to the hostile work environment claim, the Court considered that the occasional inappropriate comments, which were not physically threatening, by someone who made such comments to males and females alike did not rise to the level of comments that alter the terms and conditions of employment.

Failure To Even Contest Evidence Of Not Meeting Employer's Expectations Defeats Title VII Claim

O'NEAL v. CITY OF CHICAGO (November 17, 2009)

Brenda O'Neal was a Chicago police officer. After ten years on the force, she was promoted to sergeant in 2001. In 2002, Neil sued the Chicago Police Department (CPD), alleging that a then-recent transfer violated Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment against her -- the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Since that lawsuit, the CPD has transferred her ten times into a total of seven different units of the department. O'Neal filed another lawsuit in 2007, alleging that the transfers amounted to discrimination and retaliation. The district court again granted summary judgment against her. O'Neal appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Wood and Williams affirmed. The Court first emphasized that it would consider only the last two transfers because of the timing of O'Neal's EEOC complaint and that it would not consider the transfers as a whole because O'Neal failed to make the argument. One of the elements of O'Neal's retaliation claim is that the adverse action taken by the department must be causally connected to her protected activity. Here, her protected activity includes her 2002 lawsuit and a 2006 grievance. The Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence of a causal connection under either the direct or indirect methods of proof. Specifically, with respect to the indirect method, O'Neal failed to rebut the department's evidence that she was not meeting its legitimate expectations. The Court stated that her gender discrimination claim failed for the same reasons.

Officer's Sworn Statement Of His Inability To Perform His Job During Pension Hearing Dooms His ADA Claim

BUTLER v. ROUND LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT (October 27, 2009)

Patrick Butler was a sergeant on the police force of a small community north of Chicago. Beginning in 2003, Butler's health began to deteriorate rapidly. He experienced fatigue, night blindness and trouble breathing. In May of 2004, he was diagnosed with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. After a short time off, his physician permitted him to return to the force on "light duty." Because of the size of the force and the number of sergeants, no light duty assignment was available. The village advised Butler that he could return to work only when he had clearance to work any possible assignment. Shortly thereafter, Butler applied for a disability pension. He testified at his pension hearing that his physical condition prevented him from performing the required duties of his job. Three physicians also completed certificates of disability for Butler. The pension board found him disabled and awarded him disability benefits. He then brought suit against the village under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment to Round Lake.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Manion and Evans affirmed. In order to succeed on an ADA claim, the Court stated that one must show that he can "perform the essential functions" of his job. Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a party cannot prevail in one proceeding and then deny the very ground on which he prevailed in a subsequent proceeding. Here, Butler's sworn testimony that his physical condition prevented him from performing his job would appear to negate an element of his ADA claim. Although the Court noted that a disability pension claim (based on one's inability to perform one's job) and an ADA claim (based on one's ability, at least with accommodation, to perform one's job) are not necessarily mutually exclusive, they do require a satisfactory explanation of their consistency. For example, the passage of time or a change in one's disability can render seemingly inconsistent positions consistent. Here, however, Butler offered no explanation -- his ADA claim must fail.

FMLA Retaliation Claim Fails Where Decisionmaker Was Not Aware Of Leave When He Fired Employee

LONG v. TEACHERS’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM (October 23, 2009)

The Illinois Teachers’ Retirement System (“TRS”) manages the pension benefits of Illinois’ retired teachers. For almost two decades, Julie Long received favorable performance reviews at her job there. During the mid-2000s, however, her performance deteriorated. She missed a lot of work, made a number of errors in processing data, and failed to conduct required training. TRS’ personnel manager, Gina Larkin, met with Long and her immediate supervisors in late 2005. Larkin learned of Long’s performance problems and her absences. She suggested that Long might be eligible for FMLA leave. Long applied for and took intermittent FMLA leave from October – January 2006. Larkin met with Long’s supervisors again and learned that Long’s performance and attendance issues remained uncorrected. Larkin recommended to Jon Bauman, the Executive Director, that Long be fired. Bauman, after reviewing Long’s evaluations and speaking with her supervisor, decided to fire her. Long brought suit, alleging that her termination was in retaliation for taking FMLA leave. The district court granted summary judgment to TRS. Long appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook, Judge Sykes and District Judge Kendall affirmed. The FMLA does not allow an employer to discriminate against an employee for taking FMLA leave. Here, two of the three elements of a claim of discrimination – protected activity and adverse employment action --- are not disputed. The issue on appeal is whether there is a causal connection between the two. In order to do that, stated the Court, Long had to produce evidence that the decisionmaker acted with an unlawful purpose. Bauman had the only authority to fire a TRS employee. The record shows that Bauman not only did not act discriminatorily – he did not even know about Long’s FMLA leave. While the “cat’s paw” doctrine sometimes imputes a subordinate’s intent to a supervisor, the “singular influence” requirement of that doctrine does not exist here. The Court also rejected Long’s arguments that discriminatory intent could be inferred from TRS’ failure to follow its own disciplinary policy (the Court concluded that it did follow it) and from the sudden decline in her performance evaluations (the Court noted that the decline in evaluations prior to the protected activity does not support the inference.)  

Plaintiff, Though Not Actually Disabled, Presented Triable Issue Of Fact As To Whether Employer Regarded Him As Such

BRUNKER v. SCHWAN'S HOME SERVICE (October 22, 2009)

Frank Brunker was employed as a Route Manager for Schwan's Home Service, a home-delivery food service company. Brunker sold and delivered the company's products to its customers. Beginning in early 2003, Brunker began experiencing shaking, dizziness, headaches, etc. -- later to be diagnosed as multiple sclerosis. On his doctor's advice, he took two months disability leave, returned to light duty for one month, and then returned to unrestricted work. Several months later, he decided to take some time off for additional tests and evaluation. Around that time, he was disciplined on several occasions for failure to run a route, failure to adhere to a dress code, and writing a check with insufficient funds. When Brunker returned with his diagnosis of multiple sclerosis, the company fired him for unsatisfactory performance, but backdated his termination to the day before he left. Brunker brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court granted summary judgment to Schwan's. Brunker appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Flaum and Rovner affirmed in part, vacated and reversed in part and remanded. On the merits, the Court first addressed the issue of whether Brunker created a genuine issue of fact as to whether he was "disabled." Under the ADA, one is "disabled" if one has an impairment which substantially limits a major life activity -- or if one is regarded as having such an impairment. The Court agreed with the district court that Brunker failed to show a substantial limitation on a major life activity -- the evidence showed only an intermittent or occasional impairment. However, the Court concluded that the evidence, including the discipline and the backdating of his termination, was sufficient to show that Schwan's regarded Brunker as disabled. Thus, the Court remanded the discrimination claim for additional proceedings. The dismissal of the failure to accommodate claim, however, was affirmed by the Court. The Court found no issue of fact with respect to Schwan's offering of an accommodation. The Court also resolved numerous discovery and sanction disputes.

Defendants' Lack Of Knowledge Of Plaintiffs' Political Affiliation Precludes First Amendment Retaliation Claim

GUNVILLE v. WALKER (October 9, 2009)

Robert Gunville and Richard Oakley had both worked for the Illinois Department of Corrections for over twenty years, all during Republican administrations, when a Democratic governor was elected in 2003. Both were laid off within months of the new administration’s inauguration. Gunville was an active member of the Republican Party while Oakley had a record of voting in Republican primaries. Gunville and Oakley brought suit, alleging a violation of their First Amendment rights. They also allege a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights as a result of their placement on a reemployment list for only their last county of employment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Gunville and Oakley appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Rovner and Sykes affirmed. In first addressing their First Amendment claim, the Court noted that there was no dispute that their speech was constitutionally protected and that they suffered a deprivation. The issue on appeal was whether the layoff came as a result of their political affiliation. In order to establish the unlawful motivation, the plaintiffs must first establish that the defendants knew of their political affiliation. After concurring with the district court's hearsay ruling on one particular statement, the Court concluded that there was a complete absence of evidence that the persons deciding which jobs to eliminate knew of plaintiffs' political affiliations. The Court came to the same conclusion with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment claims. The due process clause does not provide an opportunity to challenge the meaning of a regulation, the relief plaintiffs sought. To the extent that plaintiffs assert political retaliation, the due process argument suffers from the same complete absence of evidence as the First Amendment claim.

Reasonable Jury Could Find That Reassignment Of Teacher To Room With Natural Light Was A Required Accommodation

EKSTRAND v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SOMERSET (October 6, 2009)

Renae Ekstrand had been teaching successfully at Somerset Elementary School for several years when the school reassigned her to an interior classroom without natural light. Ekstrand had a disorder which limited her ability to function in an artificial light environment. She told the principal of her condition. She repeatedly requested a transfer to a room with natural light, two of which were available. The school addressed some of her concerns but refused to change her room assignment. Her condition deteriorated to the point where she had to seek medical attention and took a medical leave of absence. She continued to request a room reassignment during her leave. Ultimately, she left the school and brought an action pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment to Somerset. Ekstrand appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Bauer and Evans (concurring) reversed in part and affirmed in part. On the failure to accommodate claim, the Court stated that Ekstrand had to provide evidence that she had a disability, that the school was aware of the disability and that the school failed to reasonably accommodate her. The Court found evidence in the record that she was disabled and that the school was aware of her disability. The principal issue on appeal was whether the school accommodated her disability. The Court noted that a request for accommodation requires significant communication between the parties, particularly when the disability is a mental one. The Court found that the school did reasonably accommodate Ekstrand's disability in the early stages of their communication. During that time, Ekstrand identified a number of conditions in her classroom that exacerbated her depression but never provided direct evidence of the necessity of natural light. However, the court did find a time in November when Ekstrand's psychologist identified natural light as a key to her improvement. Once it was so advised, the Court concluded that the school could have given Ekstrand a room with natural light at a reasonable cost. The Court therefore disagreed with the lower court's finding that no reasonable jury could find in Ekstrand's favor. On the constructive discharge claim, the Court agreed with the district court that Ekstrand failed to show that her working conditions were so intolerable that her resignation was an appropriate response.

Judge Evans concurred in the judgment but wrote separately. He expressed his doubt whether Ekstrand could demonstrate that she was a "qualified individual" under the ADA given her condition and the fact that she was a first grade teacher. He suggested that the district court address that issue on remand.

Insufficient Details Of Work Restrictions And Job Duties Fails "Similarly Situated" Requirement

MCGOWAN v. DEERE & CO. (September 11, 2009)

William McGowan, an African-American male, had over 20 years of employment at Deere & Company when he injured his back. He eventually underwent surgery. He returned to work with a 25-pound weight restriction imposed by the company doctor. His surgeon and physical therapist both cleared him, on separate occasions, to return to work with less onerous restrictions. The weight restriction prevented him from returning to his prior job and also disqualified him from two other positions. McGowan brought an action under Title VII and § 1981, complaining of Deere's refusal to reinstate him and refusal to select him for the other positions. The district court granted summary judgment to Deere. McGowan appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum and Williams and District Judge Lawrence affirmed. The Court first noted that the elements and proof necessary for Title VII and § 1981 are essentially identical. McGowan proceeded under the indirect approach, in which he had to prove, among other things, that other persons similarly situated but not in his protected class were treated more favorably. The similarly situated test, said the Court, is a flexible test. The purpose is to identify a sufficient number of common factors between the claimant and others in order that a meaningful comparison can be made. The critical comparators here are job duties and weight restrictions. The court concluded that McGowan did not provide sufficient evidentiary basis for either job duties or weight restrictions on the employees that the proffered as similarly situated. He therefore failed to make a prima facie case. Alternatively, the Court concluded that McGowan failed to produce any evidence that Deere's stated reasons for its decisions were discriminatory.

Evidence Of Discriminatory Intent Based On First-Hand Experience, Even If Uncorroborated And Self-Serving, Is Enough To Get A Discrimination Claim To The Jury When It Is Coupled With An Adverse Job Action

DARCHAK v. CITY OF CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION (September 3, 2009)

Anna Darchak, a native of Poland, worked for several years in the Chicago public school system as a teacher of English as a Second Language. In 2005, she was hired as a full-time teacher at the Princeton Alternative Center on a one-year contract. It was not a good year. Almost immediately, Darchak complained that Hispanic students were being treated more favorably than Polish students. Darchak alleges that Princeton's principal made several disparaging remarks in reference to Darchak's heritage. Later in the year, the principal assigned Darchak to a classroom with a large number of Spanish speaking students. Darchak complained – and she received a negative evaluation. The principal chose not to renew Darchak's contract at the end of the year. Darchak filed suit, alleging retaliatory discharge, First Amendment retaliation under § 1983, and national origin discrimination under Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Darchak appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Ripple and Wood affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court addressed each claim in turn. First, with respect to the state law claim of retaliatory discharge, the Court stated that Darchak had to demonstrate that she was discharged, that the discharge was retaliatory, and that the discharge violated a clear mandate of public policy. The Court concluded that the claim failed on both the first and third elements. First, Darchak was not discharged -- her one-year contract was not renewed. Second, the public policy relied on by Darchak -- equal education -- has never been recognized by Illinois courts as support for a retaliatory discharge claim. With respect to her First Amendment retaliation claim, the Court concluded that the Board of Education was not liable under Monell. Although Darchak alleged that the principal was a final policymaker, the Court stated that Illinois law makes the Board the final policymaker. The Court agreed that the Board's adoption of the principal's recommendation could be a basis for liability but only if they adopted the retaliatory basis as well. The Court found no evidence of that. Finally, with respect to the Title VII national origin discrimination claim, the Court noted that she put forth both a direct and an indirect case. The Court rejected her indirect method approach because she could not demonstrate pretext with respect to the Board's reasons for nonrenewal. On her direct method, however, the court found that Darchak presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to reach a jury. The evidence of derogatory remarks followed shortly by a disciplinary notice from the principal follow later by the nonrenewal establish a prima facie case. The fact that Darchak's testimony is uncorroborated and self-serving does not change that result, as the district court believed. The testimony is based on her first-hand experience and deserves to be considered. The Court concluded that the evidence raised a question of intent that had to go to the jury.

After Lulling Pro Se Plaintiff Into Thinking The Procedure Was Proper, District Court Erred In Denying Motion To Reopen On The Last Day Of The Limitations Period

 PRINCE v. STEWART (September 2, 2009)

The Chicago Teachers Union fired Earl Prince from his job. Prince filed an administrative discrimination charge. He then brought an action pro se for employment discrimination under Title VII before he received any response from the Illinois Department of Human Rights or the EEOC. The district court dismissed the complaint because Prince had not yet received a right-to-sue letter. Several months later, after Prince had received the letter, the district court granted his motion to reopen the case. The court vacated the order, however, a few days later at Prince's request. Months later, on the last day to sue, Prince again moved to reopen the case. This time, the judge turned him down -- and it was too late to file a new complaint. Prince appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Coffey and Manion reversed and remanded. The Court recognized Prince's mistake when he followed up the first order reopening his case with a request to reinstate the dismissal. He was simply going to be out of the jurisdiction for a short time and need not have worried about his temporary unavailability. However, the Court also recognized that no one was prejudiced by his mistake. If the second motion to reopen was filed in a timely fashion, the Court could not see any reason why it should not have been granted. The Court concluded that the district court’s lulling of the pro se litigant into believing that he did not have to refile his complaint amounted to equitable tolling.

Municipal Liability Cannot Be Based On Retaliatory Firing By Department Head Who Did Not Have Final Policymaking Authority

WATERS v. CITY OF CHICAGO (September 2, 2009)

Daniel Waters was a painter in the Chicago Department of Transportation (CDOT). In 2000, he refused a request by his supervisor to participate in a political campaign. At about the same time, he twice contacted local investigative journalists. On one occasion, he complained about a bridge that he thought was in such a state of disrepair that it was a danger to the public. On the other occasion, he complained that the City was making some improvements to a piece of property and that it did not own. Several of his superiors were unhappy with his conduct. He was transferred into a job working for a supervisor for whom he had worked before several times. Their relationship was strained, at best. Within a matter of weeks, Waters had several run-ins with his supervisor and was reported multiple times for violent behavior. A deputy commissioner recommended his firing. The department did not act on the recommendation. Department policy required that Waters be given an opportunity to respond to the charges of violence before any discipline was handed out. Waters provided his side of the story -- but the department ruled that his conduct amounted to violence in the workplace. The deputy commissioner resubmitted his recommendation. A pre-termination hearing was held. Commissioner Rice, who held the only authority to fire, terminated Waters. Waters sued the City under § 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation. A jury awarded Waters $225,000 in damages and the court awarded more than $1 million in back pay, front pay and pension benefits. The City appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Rovner and Tinder vacated, reversed and remanded. The Court stated that, under Monell, a city can be liable for a constitutional deprivation but only if it resulted from a policy or practice, or that the injury was caused by someone with final policymaking authority. Waters relied on the latter prong. Final policymaking authority comes from state and local law, though. Here, said the Court, local law gives policymaking authority to the City Council, which has delegated it to the Commissioner of Human Resources. Although the Court recognized that department commissioners do have some authority to execute existing policy, they do not have policymaking authority. Since Commissioner Rice had no such authority, municipal liability cannot be based on her actions. The Court went on to note that Waters presented no evidence that Rice’s termination was in retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment rights. Even if she had policymaking authority, the absence of that evidence would have defeated his claim.  

Plaintiff's Continued Pressing of "Worthless" Counts Through Summary Judgment Justifies An Award Of Fees

MACH v. WILL COUNTY SHERIFF (September 1, 2009)

Michael Mach was a Will County Deputy Sheriff assigned to the traffic division. For years, he maintained a satisfactory performance record. That changed after 2003. Because of budget pressure, the department notified the deputies in the traffic division that they could be temporarily assigned to the patrol division. Mach and other deputies were not happy. He started acting out, failing to follow directives, disregarding instructions, and neglecting his duties. After reprimands and warnings, he was permanently transferred to the patrol division. Mach brought an action pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). In addition to his transfer, he stated five other grounds for his claim. In response to the defendants’ opening briefing on summary judgment, he abandoned all five of those other grounds. The court granted summary judgment to the Sheriff and also awarded fees of 5/6 of the costs of preparing the summary judgment motion, reflecting effort that went into attacking the "worthless" claims. Mach appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Flaum and Kanne affirmed. On the merits, Mach relied on the direct method of proof, which required him to produce evidence that he was transferred because of his age. The Court noted an absolute lack of evidence in the record supporting any such inference. His poor job performance was well documented by the department. The only circumstantial evidence of age discrimination was one stray comment made by an individual who had no influence on the transfer decision. Mach's ADEA claim fails. With respect to the fee award, the Court noted a prior holding that ADEA does not preclude an award of fees to a prevailing defendant if a plaintiff litigates in bad faith. Here, the Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Mach litigated the five claims in bad faith. The Court noted its belief that such sanctions would be rare -- here the district court explicitly held that the five claims were "worthless."

Sexual-Harassment Plaintiff Cannot Establish A Tangible Employment Action When She Simply Stopped Reporting For Work

ROBY v. CWI, INC. (August 27, 2009)

Misty Roby was a cashier at a CWI retail store. For months, she experienced sexual-harassment by a store supervisor, Joe Schiavone. Notwithstanding the fairly frequent and offensive behavior, she did not report it. Only after another supervisor overheard a comment she made to a coworker and specifically asked her about it did she report the conduct. The store manager immediately reported it to Human Resources, which conducted an investigation. The company reorganized the store schedule so as to minimize the times Roby and Schiavone worked together. As a result of the investigation, Schiavone received a written warning. Roby was informed of the results of the investigation. Several weeks later, when Roby complained about having to close the store with Schiavone, she was allowed to go home and stay home until the store manager returned from vacation. Although the company told her that they could not accommodate her desire to never be scheduled at the same time as Schiavone, they kept her on the schedule and expected her to come to work. She simply never returned. Instead, she brought an action under Title VII alleging the sexual harassment and also alleging that she was retaliated against for her complaints. The district court granted summary judgment to CWI. Roby appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Williams and Lawrence affirmed. In order to prevail on a hostile work environment claim, the Court noted that Roby had to demonstrate employer liability. Here, because Schiavone is a supervisor, the company is strictly liable if there was a tangible adverse employment action. If not, however, the company may assert an affirmative defense that they used reasonable care in trying to prevent the harassment and that Roby failed to take advantage of corrective opportunities. The Court found no tangible employment action. The record presented insufficient support for an actual discharge or for the degree of intolerable working conditions necessary to establish a constructive discharge. Although Roby continued to have to work with Schiavone, CWI made an effort to minimize their contact. Without a tangible employment action, the Court found that the company met its burden on the affirmative defense. It conducted an effective investigation and disciplined Schiavone. Roby, on the other hand, failed to report the behavior when it first occurred and did not take advantage of the company’s anti-harassment policy. With respect to Roby's retaliation claim, she must establish the presence of a material adverse employment action. The Court found no such evidence in the record.

Veterans' Benefits Improvement Act's Elimination Of A Statute of Limitations Is Not Applied Retroactively

MIDDLETON v. CITY OF CHICAGO (August 24, 2009)

From 1960 until 1989, Charles Middleton served in the Air Force. On two occasions in the early 1990s, he applied for positions with the City of Chicago. He was not hired for either position. In 2007, Middleton sued the City pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA). He alleged that the City refused to employ him on account of his military service. The district court applied the four year "catch-all" statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (a) and dismissed his complaint. Middleton appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Rovner and Wood affirmed. The Court considered not only the application of § 1658 (a) to the claim but also the provisions of the Veterans' Benefits Improvement Act (VBIA), enacted after the appeal. Section 1658 was enacted in 1990. Its purpose, said the Court, was to minimize the borrowing of state statutes of limitations for federal causes of action. It provided a four-year statute of limitations for any federal claim brought under a later-enacted statute, if the statute had no expressed limitations period. USERRA was enacted four years later and contained no expressed statute of limitations. The Court concluded, based on the plain meaning of the statute, that the four-year limitations applied. In doing so, it rejected the Middleton's arguments that: 1) the section did not apply because USERRA was simply an amendment of an earlier-enacted statute, and 2) the legislative history indicated Congress' intent that no statute of limitations apply. The Court turned its attention to the VBIA. The VBIA eliminates any limitations period for a USERRA cause of action. The Court noted the "well-established" rule that a statute should not be applied retroactively unless Congress' intent is clear. Nothing in the statute addresses retroactivity. The Court concluded that the statute should not be given retroactive effect. Finally, the court rejected Middleton's argument that the VBIA was merely a clarification of existing law.

Gender Discrimination Claim Fails When Plaintiff, Although Female, Fails To Link Her Alleged Mistreatment With That Fact

COFFMAN v. INDIANAPOLIS FIRE DEPARTMENT (August 20, 2009)

Tonya Coffman worked as a firefighter in Indianapolis for a few years without incident. In 2003, however, several of her coworkers began to express concern about her ability to drive safely because of her height (she is less than 5 feet tall). The department conducted a series of safety evaluations, which she passed. The concerns continued -- another round of evaluations followed. Her coworkers’ concerns expanded beyond safe driving into issues concerning her mood and interactions with others. Eventually, the department recommended a fitness-for-duty evaluation and a transfer to limited-duty status. The evaluation resulted in an individual therapy referral and more fitness evaluations. After one of those evaluations, she was approved for light duty and eventually returned to full active duty. Coffman sued the department and several individuals under Title VII. She alleged that the driving tests and fitness evaluations were gender discrimination and harassment. She also brought a claim alleging that the medical examinations violated the ADA. The district court granted summary judgment against Coffman on all claims. Coffman appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Posner and Rovner affirmed. The Court first addressed her Title VII claim under the direct method of proof. Coffman asserted that the record established a "convincing mosaic" of evidence from which a jury could conclude that she was the victim of gender discrimination. To the contrary, the Court found an absence of any evidence in the record that the driving evaluations, the fitness evaluations or her reassignments occurred, even in part, because of her gender. Her failure to do so illustrates the correctness of the district court summary judgment ruling. On her hostile work environment claim, the court concluded that the conduct of the department did not amount to degrading or hostile behavior. In fact, the Court noted that much of the conduct she complains of was accompanied by offers of support and guidance. In addition, as with the discrimination claim, Coffman failed to create a causal link between the alleged hostile behavior and her gender. With respect to the ADA claim, the Court noted that the statute prohibits a covered employer from requiring a medical examination unless it is shown to be job related and a business necessity. Based on the special work environment of a fire department and its responsibility to the public at large, as well as the fact that the department experienced two suicides in the preceding months, the Court concluded that the examinations were consistent with the requirements of the statute.

Impressive Credentials, Work Experience And Job Evaluations Are Not Enough To Demonstrate That An Employee Is Meeting Her Employer's Legitimate Expectations At The Time Of An Adverse Employment Action

DEAR v. SHINSEKI (August 20, 2009)

Deborah Dear, an African-American woman, had impressive educational and employment credentials when she was hired by a Veterans Affairs hospital in 2004. She continued to do well and received positive evaluations for a few years. In 2006, however, her supervisor discovered that the morale in her department was very low and staff members were complaining about Dear’s supervision. The supervisor also witnessed Dear engage in inappropriate discipline. Another supervisor asked Dear to develop and submit a plan for improving the situation. Dear did develop and submit a plan -- but it was late and failed to address many of the issues. Dear was temporarily reassigned to a non-supervisory position with a decrease in salary. She was replaced by a white woman. Dear filed an EEO complaint alleging race discrimination. Several days later, she was permanently reassigned to a staff nurse position. Dear filed a lawsuit pursuant to Title VII, alleging race discrimination, retaliation and hostile work environment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant. Dear appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Ripple and Wood affirmed. The Court addressed Dear’s discrimination claim under the indirect method of proof. The parties did not dispute that Dear was in a protected class and that her reassignment was an adverse employment action. The Court addressed the other two elements: whether she was meeting her employer's legitimate expectations and whether she identified a similarly situated employee who was treated more favorably. The Court concluded that she met neither element. With respect to meeting expectations, Dear relied on her impressive education and employment history. While those may be relevant, the Court emphasized that it must look to her performance at the time of the adverse employment action. The record contained several instances of her failure to meet expectations at the time of her reassignment. Dear also failed to meet her burden of identifying a similarly situated employee who was treated differently. The same two shortcomings prevent her from avoiding summary judgment on her retaliation claim. Finally, with respect to her hostile work environment claim, the Court noted that there was little support in the record for her contention that the environment was hostile to African-Americans.

Amendment To Regulation That Converted A Labor Certification Of "Indefinite" Validity To One Of 180-Day Validity Was Not A Retroactive Application Of The Amendment In That It Did Not Impair Any Vested Right

DURABLE MANUFACTURING CO. v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR (August 18, 2009)

Congress has specified a process under which an employer is allowed to obtain a visa for an alien worker. Before the government can issue a visa to such an alien, it must have issued a labor certification. A labor certification is a statement by the Secretary of Labor that there are insufficient qualified workers available to perform specific work and that the hiring of an alien to perform the work will not adversely affect wages and working conditions. In the past, labor certifications were generally valid indefinitely. The regulations were amended, effective July 2007, to provide that a labor certification was only valid for 180 days from the date of the certification. A number of employers who had received labor certifications and the aliens who were to be hired filed suit, alleging that the agency acted beyond its authority in amending the regulation or, alternatively, that it should not have been applied retroactively. The district court granted summary judgment to the government. The employers and aliens appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Rovner and Tinder affirmed. The Court looked to both the language of the statute and its purpose in order to determine whether the agency acted within its authority in amending the regulation. Here, the statute actually requires the Secretary of Labor to certify the labor supply "at the time of" the visa application. The earlier version of the regulation did not address this temporal requirement -- the amendment does. The amended regulation also promotes the purposes of the statutory scheme by ensuring that the visa determinations are based on current labor market indicators. The Court concluded that the agency was within its authority in promulgating the amendment. With respect to the argument that the amendment was an illegal retroactive rulemaking, the Court concluded that the amendment did not, in fact, have retroactive application. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Landgraf, an amendment only has retroactive effect if it "would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed." Some of the certifications at issue were not approved until after the effective date of the amendment -- the amendment had no retroactive application with respect to them. With respect to the applications that were approved prior to the amendment, the plaintiffs possessed a right -- the right to a certification of "indefinite" validity. Their right was to a certification that was valid until the agency fixed a different period of validity. The amendment did nothing more and thus does not operate retroactively.

An Employer Need Not Reinstate An Employee On FMLA Leave Before Firing Him

DAUGHERTY v. WABASH CENTER, INC. (August 14, 2009)

Michael Daugherty worked for Wabash Center, Inc. for seven years. He had an excellent employment record. He was promoted on several occasions and always received positive reviews. Things changed in 2006. He started having trouble with his coworkers and his staff. He was given a written reprimand for abusive e-mails and unacceptable management style. Permission for a month-long vacation was revoked. Daugherty immediately visited his doctor and requested two weeks FMLA leave from the Center. His request was granted. In his absence, the Center discovered that he had used the Center's credit card to make at least five unauthorized purchases. It also discovered that he had failed to follow through on some key responsibilities. When Daugherty was due back from his leave, the Center presented him with a corrective action plan -- which he refused to sign. He instead requested additional medical leave. The Center granted his request but asked that he not access the network while on leave and asked him for his keys and passwords. He refused. After further analysis revealed that he had deleted thousands of files while on leave, the Center fired him. Daugherty filed suit, alleging a violation of the FMLA. The court granted summary judgment to the Center. Doherty appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Kanne and Sykes affirmed. Under the FMLA, the Court stated, an employee is not entitled to any right he or she would otherwise not be entitled to absent the leave. The FMLA does not prohibit an employer from terminating an employee's employment during FMLA leave if it discovers misconduct that justifies the termination. Here, Daugherty admitted most, if not all, of the misconduct. The Center did not violate the FMLA by failing to reinstate Daugherty. The Court also rejected the Daugherty's alternative claim that the Center retaliated against him for taking leave. The undisputed evidence in the record is that the Center fired Daugherty for multiple instances of misconduct. Finding no factual dispute, the Court affirmed the summary judgment for the Center. 

Prompt And Appropriate Action By Employer, Combined With Employee's Own Lack Of Cooperation, Shields Employer From Liability In Title VII Suit

PORTER v. ERIE FOODS INTERNATIONAL (August 7, 2009)

Tremeyne Porter, an African-American man, was an employee of a temporary placement agency. He was assigned to work the third shift at Erie Foods, a food production facility. He was the only African-American on the shift. After a few weeks without incident, things changed. One night, co-workers showed him a rope noose hanging on a piece of machinery. His supervisor ordered its removal, although she then proceeded to hang it on the bulletin board in her office, in plain view of the entire staff. She conducted an investigation as to its origin, unsuccessfully. The next night, a human resources representative held a meeting with the entire shaft. He advised the workers that harassment would not be tolerated. He later met privately with many of the shift workers as well as the shift supervisor. Porter was asked several times if he knew who was responsible for the news. He said he did not. In another incident, a co-worker showed Porter a noose. Porter felt threatened and did not disclose the identity of the culprit. Porter declined an offer to move to a different shift. Porter's supervisor continued to investigate, asking other shift supervisors if they had heard anything. Porter reported the incidents to the local police, identifying individuals, but asked that nothing be done. Porter left Erie Foods after about a month. He provided the company a statement with additional information about the incidents, including the identity of the worker who had handed him the noose. That worker was fired. Porter brought an action under Title VII, alleging hostile work environment and constructive discharge for engaging in a protected activity. The district court granted summary judgment to Erie Foods. Porter appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Ripple and Rovner (concurring) affirmed. With respect to the hostile work environment claim, the Court noted the elements of the claim: that Porter was the subject of harassment, that it was based on race, that it was so severe or pervasive so as to alter his working conditions, and that there is a basis for employer’s liability. The Court found the first three elements met. With respect to employer liability, however, the Court noted that an employer can avoid liability if it takes prompt and appropriate action that is likely to prevent a recurrence of the conduct. The Court concluded that Erie Foods had done just that -- the noose was taken down, there was an immediate inquiry, supervisors were informed, human resources met with the entire shift, the anti-harassment policy was reiterated, and individual meetings were held with many of the workers. The Court also noted that Porter’s own lack of cooperation hindered the investigation. Porter had a responsibility to provide his employer with additional information if he is to expect his employer to be able to respond effectively. On the record, the Court found Erie Foods not liable. On the constructive discharge claim, the Court explained that an employee must show working conditions “so intolerable” that any reasonable person would resign. Again, based on Erie Foods’ reasonable response to the initial incident and Porter’s failure to bring the additional incidents to the company’s attention, the Court concluded that Porter failed to establish a constructive discharge. Since there is no constructive discharge, Porter’s retaliation claim fails.

Judge Rovner concurred. She agreed with the majority that a reasonable juror could find that the company acted reasonably. She disagreed, however, with the majority’s treatment of the act of Porter’s supervisor displaying the noose, even if innocently, on her bulletin board for hours. Since Porter never complained of that conduct, however, he is not entitled to complain that the company failed to respond to it or correct it.

Union Member's Section 301 "Hybrid" Claim Fails When He Cannot Demonstrate That The Employer Breached The Collective Bargaining Agreement

NEMSKY v. CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY (August 3, 2009)

George Nemsky had been an engineer at ConocoPhillips’ Wood River Refinery for over twenty years and had a solid reputation. He was represented by Local 399 of the International Union of Operating Engineers (the Union). In 2004, ConocoPhillips adopted a substance abuse policy which provided for random drug and alcohol testing. It also provided that any employee who had a confirmed positive test result would be terminated. Although the Union filed a collective grievance over the company's adoption of the policy as well as an unfair labor practice charge, it eventually entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the company in which it agreed not to grieve a termination under the policy. In 2006, Nemsky was selected for a random drug and alcohol test shortly after he used solvent to remove cement from his shoes. The test came back as a confirmed positive. ConocoPhillips terminated Nemsky's employment. The Union indicated its intent to arbitrate his termination. Nemsky filed an action against the Union and ConocoPhillips with the NLRB, complaining that the Union and ConocoPhillips never arbitrated his termination. Nemsky filed suit against both ConocoPhillips and the Union. Nemsky alleged that ConocoPhillips breached the Collective Bargaining Agreement and that the Union had breached its duty of fair representation. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. Nemsky appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Wood and Tinder affirmed. The Court identified Nemsky's claim as a "hybrid 301" action. In such an action, Nemsky must prevail on both his claim that the company breached the Collective Bargaining Agreement and his claim that the Union breached its duty of fair representation. The Court first addressed the fair representation claim. In order to prevail on that claim, the Court noted that Nemsky must show that the Union’s conduct was arbitrary or discriminatory or in bad faith. Nemsky argued that the Union acted arbitrarily in agreeing to the Memorandum of Understanding. The Court concluded otherwise. The Union’s unfair labor practice charge had been dismissed and no other union in the country had been successful in challenging the company's policy. The Court did, however, note that there was evidence that the Union failed to arbitrate Nemsky's termination after he filed his charges. The Court concluded that that was enough to preclude summary judgment on the fair representation aspect of Nemsky's claim. With respect to the company's breach however, the Court concluded that the Union’s agreement to the Memorandum of Understanding defeated any allegation that Nemsky's termination was a breach of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Since he was required to prevail on both aspects of the hybrid claim, the Court affirmed the lower court's ruling.

Defendants Were Not Guilty Of Fraud When They Allowed Departing Employee To Keep Stock Options As Part Of A Package But Did Not Warn Him That The Company Was In Economic Trouble

SMITH v. DUFFEY (August 3, 2009)

Jack Smith sold his company and its intellectual property to Dade Behring, Inc. He received, as part of the consideration, options to purchase 20,000 shares of Dade Behring stock. He soon left the employ of the company. He agreed to accept $1.4 million in cash, while retaining his options. A few months later, the company entered bankruptcy. Smith's options were extinguished as part of its reorganization. Smith sued several officers of the company, alleging that they had a duty to disclose at the time of this termination agreement the fact that the company would soon enter bankruptcy. The district court dismissed his fraud claim for failure to state a cause of action. Smith appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Posner and Kanne affirmed. The Court stated that when the fraud alleged is the failure to disclose something, the plaintiff must establish the presence of a duty. A duty can arise in a fiduciary relationship. In the absence of relationship, it can arise when silence would be misleading because of some other statement made by the defendant. Here, the Court concluded that the defendants did not say anything that lulled Smith into thinking the company was doing well. In fact, the Court noted that the defendants advised Smith that the company was in trouble and was seeking an "exit strategy." The Court concluded that Smith's claim was without merit.

Village Employee's Speech Of Public Importance Becomes Unprotected Private Speech Only When It Is Solely Motivated By The Employee's Personal Interest

VALENTINO v. SOUTH CHICAGO HEIGHTS (July 30, 2009)

Sandra Valentino worked for the Village of South Chicago Heights for several years. In 2001, she became suspicious of Mayor David Owen's hiring practices. She was aware that the Village employed many of the mayor's friends and family members. She believed that many of these employees were on a “ghost payroll,” i.e., being paid for work they did not perform. She shared her concerns with William Bramanti, a former village employee who quit as a result of a dispute with the mayor. Bramanti submitted a FOIA request to the village for employee time records. At the same time, Valentino began to make copies of the daily employee sign-in sheets. In February of 2003, Bramanti accused the mayor publicly of ghost payrolling. The very next business day, the Village Administrator searched Valentino's desk, found the copies, and fired Valentino when she arrived for work. Valentino filed a § 1983 action against the Village, the mayor and others. She alleged retaliation in violation of her First Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Valentino appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Rovner, Evans and Williams reversed and remanded. The Court first looked to whether Valentino's speech was constitutionally protected, i.e., whether she spoke as a private citizen on a matter of concern. The Court found it "well-established" that speech which protests government waste is entitled to constitutional protection. Although the Court recognized that Valentino had a private interest in determining whether she was receiving proper compensation, it concluded that her speech was protected since she was not motivated solely by those personal interests. The Court next addressed whether there was evidence that the protected speech was a motivating factor in her termination. The Court found the circumstantial evidence -- knowledge of her relationship with Bramanti, the search of her desk, the search and firing the day after Bramanti's public accusations, and a comment by the mayor threatening her employment -- sufficient to take that issue to a jury. That same evidence, as well as the fact that the sign-in sheets were on public display and were simply copied by Valentino, was enough for the Court to conclude that a jury could also find the village's stated reason for her termination pretextual. Thus, the Court reversed the summary judgment for the defendants. With respect to the Monell claim, the Court stated that the Village could be liable for the constitutional violation if it was caused by an individual with final policymaking authority. The question for the Court was whether Owens had final authority on matters of hiring and firing. The Court concluded that the evidence was conclusive that Mayor Owen made personnel decisions for the village without any meaningful oversight, and thus had final authority. The Court reversed the district court with respect to the village's liability under Monell. Finally, the Court rejected defendants' argument that the Illinois Tort Immunity Act immunized them. That Act immunizes village officials from certain discretionary policy decisions. The decision to fired Valentino was not a policy decision -- the defendants are not entitled to immunity.

Even Assuming A Prejudicial Supervisor, Two Layers Of Bias-Free Analysis Defeats Plaintiff's "Cats-Paw" Theory Of Age Discrimination

MARTINO v. MCI COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, INC. (July 28, 2009)

MCI hired Guy Martino in 2005 at the age of 54. He was hired as a business solutions consultant and provided support to the company's sales force. Although he was not directly responsible for sales, he did receive commissions on the sales to which he was assigned. Martino was assigned to and received commissions for one blockbuster deal in mid-2005. Other than that one deal, however, Martino's performance was generally lacking. In fact, even the lead salesman on the large deal was quite critical of his individual contribution. MCI merged with Verizon in early 2006. As a result, Steve Rumstein, his group head, was asked to come up with a list of individuals least likely to be strong contributors in the future. Rumstein identified six employees, including Martino. He based his selection on geography, ability, credibility with sales staff and sales performance. With respect to ability, Rumstein focused on a new service being offered by Verizon with which Martino was not well-versed. The five employees on the list other than Martino ranged in age from 33 to 45. Rumstein submitted the list to Ed Franklin, his superior. Franklin decided to fire Martino for all the same reasons that led to his inclusion on the list. Martino brought an action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted summary judgment to MCI. Martino appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Evans and Tinder affirmed. The Court noted that the sole evidence of age discrimination was Martino's allegations that his direct supervisor, Bob Gross, sometimes use "old-timer" to describe him. Under the direct method of proof, Martino relied on the cat's paw theory since Gross was not the decision maker. The Court rejected the theory: there was weak evidence of discriminatory intent to begin with, there were two layers of bias-free decisions, and Rumstein and Franklin both considered a host of legitimate factors. The Court concluded that Martino did not come close to the "singular influence" standard necessary to establish a cat's-paw case. With respect to the indirect method, the Court concluded that Martino failed with respect to two of the elements: that he met the company's performance expectations and that the company treated similarly situated employees under 40 more favorably. First, the record was replete with evidence of Martino's performance limitations. Second, a number of younger employees were let go along with Martino. Although the company did keep several employees under 40, the Court had no trouble concluding that they were not similarly situated.

City Cannot Escape Its Due Process Obligations to Employee Occupying State-Protected Job By Simply Transferring Her Into An Unprotected Job Before Firing Her

CASNA v. CITY OF LOVES PARK (July 24, 2009)

From 1996 through 2003, Mary Casna worked for the City of Loves Park in two different positions. Though she had a serious hearing impairment, it did not interfere with her performance. In her second job, Casna and one of her superiors did not enjoy a good working relationship. The City transferred her to a temporary police clerk position for six months in order to evaluate her performance in a less volatile atmosphere. Casna's hearing impairment became an issue. In one particular episode, Casna explained to her supervisor, Kay Elliot, that she had not heard her make a request. Elliot snapped: "How can you work if you cannot hear?" Casna accused Elliot of being discriminatory. Elliot consulted with her supervisor and prepared a written performance evaluation, even though Casna was only two months into the job. At the police chief's request, and based on the negative evaluation, the Mayor fired Casna. Casna brought suit against the City, the Mayor and the Police Chief. She alleged that she was fired in retaliation for her complaints of discrimination. She also alleged that the City violated Due Process by discharging her without a hearing. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. Casna appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Rovner and Sykes reversed and remanded. On the due process claim, the Court stated that Casna must establish a property interest that is guaranteed by the Constitution but found in Illinois law. Relying on Illinois’ civil service statute, the Court concluded that her first position was exempt but that her second job was not exempt (although the resolution appointing her said it was). Although the Court agreed that a temporary position (her third job) is normally exempt, the Court also concluded that the City could not transfer Casna out of a protected job into an unprotected job and then fire her without process. The Court also rejected the City’s reliance on the requirement that a protected employee obtain her job through the civil service process. Since it was the City that wrongfully tried to make the second position exempt, the Court held that it was estopped from relying on that requirement. Casna is entitled to prove her damages, if any, arising from the lack of process. The Court also reversed the lower court on the retaliation claim. It concluded that Casna’s single statement to Elliot complaining of discrimination, though informal, was sufficient to amount to “protected activity.” Finally, although the Court cautioned that suspicious timing is rarely enough to establish a triable issue on causation, it concluded that it did here, where the police chief recommended her termination the day after the protected activity.  

Evidence In The Record That The Promoted Employee Was Better Qualified Than Plaintiff Defeats Her Gender And Race Discrimination Claim

HOBBS v. CITY OF CHICAGO (July 21, 2009)

Kelly Hobbs was an African-American woman employed by the City of Chicago's Department of Transportation since 1989. She began her employment as a truck driver and was promoted to Lot Supervisor in 2000. She applied for a Foreman position in both 1997 and 2000and was rejected both times in favor of white males. She filed a charge of gender and race discrimination in January of 2005, shortly after she found out that another white male had been promoted to Acting Foreman. She complains that, after her discrimination charges were filed, she was disciplined on several occasions, her car was vandalized and her job duties were changed. In 2006, she brought suit against the City, alleging race and gender discrimination and retaliation claims against the City under Title VII, race discrimination and retaliation claims against the individual defendants under § 1981, and a hostile work environment claim against the City. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. Hobbs appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Kanne and Williams affirmed. The Court considered the Title VII and § 1981 race and gender discrimination claims together. Under the indirect method of proof, the Court concluded that Hobbs failed to establish she was passed over in favor of a person similarly or less qualified than she. The record showed that the male was more qualified, at least with respect to those skills that were part of the job qualifications. Hobbs also failed to show that the City's reasons for promoting him were pretextual. The Court admitted that the process by which he was promoted was somewhat questionable and may suggest favoritism, but did not prove discrimination. Her retaliation claims failed as well. She failed to show a materially adverse job action and she failed to establish a causal connection between her charges and the discipline imposed on her. The Court was troubled by her charge of automobile vandalism and the City's failure to investigate it, but concluded that the mere fact that it occurred after she filed charges was not enough to survive summary judgment. Finally, the Court concluded that the same facts upon which she based her retaliation claim were similarly insufficient to rise to the "severe or pervasive" threshold of hostile work environment.

The Resolution Of An Employee's Personal Employment Suit Does Not Preclude A Later Qui Tam Action

UNITED STATES v. ROLLS-ROYCE CORPORATION (June 30, 2009)

Curtis Lusby was an engineer at Rolls-Royce Corp. He became suspicious that the company was falsely certifying that one of its aircraft engines met government specifications so he informed his superiors. He claims that the company fired him for doing so. He brought suit under the False Claims Act, alleging that the company punished him for preparing to bring an action under the statute. The parties jointly dismissed the suit in 2003. However, two months earlier, Lusby had filed a qui tam action under seal. The court dismissed the action for failure to plead fraud with particularity and because of the claim preclusion effect of the earlier lawsuit. Lusby appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Posner and Wood affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court first addressed claim preclusion. It noted its 2007 decision in Cole. In Cole, the Court held that a person who did not prevail on a Title VII claim cannot later bring both a personal and qui tam claim under the False Claims Act. Here, however, Lusby disputes one of the elements of claim preclusion -- that the cases involve the same parties (Cole conceded the issue). The Court noted that the United States is not an actual party to a qui tam suit unless it intervenes. It is, however, the real party in interest. In addition, the Court identified several procedural requirements for qui tam litigation that would make it very difficult to bring a personal claim in the same suit. The Court concluded that the resolution of an employee's personal suit does not preclude a later qui tam suit. With respect to the particularity issue, the Court stated that the complaint contained quite specific allegations of fraud. It rejected Rolls-Royce's argument that a specific allegation of the details of the invoices was required. The Court did affirmed the lower court with respect to Lusby's allegations that Rolls-Royce committed fraud during the earlier settlement negotiations.

City's Failure To Promote (Four Times) Is Not Actionable Where Interview Process Was Reasonable And Fair

STEPHENS v. ERICKSON (June 30, 2009)

Lesley Stephens, an African American, has worked for the City of Chicago since 1979, except for a disability leave from 1988-1993. He has been a truck driver, an acting foreman, and an accident adjuster, all within the Department of Fleet Management. He filed a lawsuit against the City in 1997, alleging that it engaged in racially discriminatory hiring and promotion practices. Shortly after he settled the lawsuit in 2004, Stephens applied for four promotions. He was passed over each time. He again brought suit, alleging violations of § 1981 and Title VII. He claims that the City retaliated against him for his earlier lawsuit and his complaints of discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to the City. Stephens appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Wood and Sykes affirmed. The Court stated that it would apply the same elements to the claims under § 1981 and Title VII. Stephens chose to establish his retaliation claim under the direct method of proof. The principal issue on appeal was the causal connection between Stephens' protected activity and the City's failure to promote him. The Court set out the promotion procedure in detail – and stated that Stephens produced no evidence that any of the several employees who interviewed him for the promotions even knew of the earlier lawsuit or his prior complaints of discrimination. The Court noted that in each case, the City interviewed several applicants, rated the applicants on the same criteria, and recommended the applicant with the highest score. The Court also rejected Stephens' argument that the head of the department retaliated against him by pre-selecting his preferred candidate by choosing him for an "acting" position, leading the interviewers to a predetermined selection. Nothing in the record linked the department head to any of the interviews or any of the interviewers. The Court concluded that Stephens simply had not produced evidence sufficient to create an inference of retaliation. The Court also concluded that the retaliation allegations other than failure to promote (menial job assignments, intimidation, segregation, etc.) would not dissuade a reasonable employee from making a charge of discrimination and were therefore not "materially adverse" and actionable.

Without Evidence Of Pretext, Employer's Firing Is Non-Discriminatory When Employee Admits To The Conduct At Issue

FARR v. ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CENTERS (June 29, 2009)

David Farr was a respiratory therapist at St. Francis Hospital. In 2000, he was the only male among the seven respiratory therapists in his department. There was a single computer in the department for the use of all the therapists. Although the hospital policy was for each therapist to log on with a unique password before each use, the practice was quite different. Typically, the first user of the day logged on with his or her password and all later users piggybacked on that login. When one of the therapists discovered inappropriate material on the computer, the hospital conducted an investigation. It found that: a) pornographic and hacking sites were accessed at the computer, b) Farr was logged on to the computer at the time the sites were accessed, and c) that Farr was the only one working on one particular day when a substantial amount of the activity took place. Farr eventually admitted that he was responsible for visiting some of the sites and that the others may have been generated by a computer virus during his use of the computer. The hospital terminated Farr's employment. Farr sued the hospital, alleging gender discrimination and a breach of implied covenant of fair dealing based on the employee handbook. The court granted summary judgment to the hospital. Farr appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Bauer and Evans affirmed. Although Farr asserted that he could prove his claim by both the direct and indirect methods, the Court disagreed. Neither test resulted in a conclusion that Farr was the victim of gender discrimination. In fact, the Court stated, the hospital's investigation convinced it that he was the one responsible. He even admitted he accessed the inappropriate sites. Nothing in the record showed that the hospital's reasons were pretextual. The Court also affirmed with respect to the state law claims. Farr's covenant of fair dealing claim is inconsistent with Indiana law. His defamation claim fails because the hospital's report was privileged, in that it was used during the grievance proceedings that he himself initiated. 

An Employer's Retaliation For An Employee's Wholly Verbal Complaints Is Not Actionable Under The Fair Labor Standards Act

KASTEN v. SAINT-GOBAIN PERFORMANCE PLASTIC CORP. (June 29, 2009)

Kevin Kasten worked at one of Saint-Gobain's facilities in Wisconsin. In 2006, Kasten received three warnings regarding his use of the on-site time clock. The third warning included a statement that it was the last step of the disciplinary process and that another violation could result in further discipline, up to termination. Kasten alleges, and Saint-Gobain denies, that he verbally complained about the legality of the time clock’s location about the same time he received the third warning. He alleges that his complaints consisted of a) telling his supervisor, b) telling a human resources representative, c) telling a lead operator and d) telling the lead operator he was considering a lawsuit. Saint-Gobain suspended Kasten after his fourth violation and later terminated his employment. Kasten alleges, and Saint-Gobain denies, that he also complained about the legality of the clock’s placement at a meeting regarding his suspension. Kasten brought an action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, alleging that he was terminated in retaliation for his complaints. The court granted summary judgment to Saint-Gobain. Kasten appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Flaum and Kapala affirmed. Kasten alleges that Saint-Gobain violated the FLSA when it terminated him after he "filed any complaint." The Court focused on two issues: whether the FLSA's use of the term "complaint" includes informal, intra-company complaints not formally filed with any body and whether it includes wholly verbal complaints. The district court had answered the first question yes but the second question no. With respect to the intra-company complaint issue, the Court relied on the plain language of the statute and the majority of other appellate courts to conclude that "any complaint" includes internal complaints. If then decided, however, that purely verbal complaints are not protected. The Court relied again on the plain language of the statute and the use of the word "file," which connotes the use of a writing, and the fact that Congress used broader language (i.e., “opposed any practice”) in analogous provisions of other statutes.

Arbitrator's Award Based On An Interpretation Of The Contract, Even If Wrong, Is Enforced

 UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS v. ILLINOIS-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY (June 26, 2009)

Glenn Williams was a wastewater treatment operator for Illinois-American Water Company ("IAWC"). IAWC discovered that Williams was operating without a required Illinois EPA license. Because it was Williams' second offense, it was punishable by termination. Instead of firing Williams, however, IAWC offered him a Last Chance Agreement ("LCA"). Under the LCA, Williams was suspended without pay for 30 days, he was required to obtain his license within six months, and he was required to repay the extra compensation he received as a result of IAWC's belief that he was licensed properly. The LCA also provided that failure to comply would result in Williams' immediate termination and any disputes regarding the agreement would be resolved through the collective bargaining agreement’s arbitration procedure. The United Food and Commercial Workers Union, which represented Williams, filed a grievance contesting the LCA's validity. When Williams failed to make repayment arrangements, IAWC terminated his employment. The union filed a second grievance. The grievances were consolidated and brought before an arbitrator. The arbitrator ruled against the union on the validity of the LCA but ordered Williams reinstated. He concluded that the termination was improper because of the pending, good faith challenge to the LCA itself. On review, the district court confirmed the arbitration award. The union appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Kanne and Wood affirmed. The Court identified its limited role in reviewing arbitrator's awards. As long as an arbitrator bases his decision on an interpretation of the agreement, the court will enforce the award. Here, the arbitrator confronted a situation that he thought was not covered by the agreement. One provision gave IAWC the absolute right to terminate Williams' employment. Another provision gave the union the right to challenge the validity of the LCA. The arbitrator concluded that the agreement contained an implied term – that Williams' employment could not be terminated during the pendency of a good faith grievance over the validity of the agreement itself. Since his award was based on an interpretation of the agreement, the Court affirmed.

Unilateral Actions Of Labor Union Representing City Police Officers, Without City Involvement, Does Not Satisfy State Action Requirement Of A Section 1983 Claim

HALLINAN v. FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE OF CHICAGO LODGE NO. 7 (June 25, 2009)

Shawn Hallinan and Wayne Harej were Chicago police officers and members of the police union, the Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7 (the Union). They led an effort to unseat the Union’s president and his organization in early 2005. During the course of the campaign, they discovered that the president had underreported his income. They reported the matter to the Attorney General and discussed it publicly. The president was, nevertheless, reelected. The Union soon suspended, and then expelled, the two men from the Union. At the Union's request, the City of Chicago converted the two men into "fair-share payers." Fair-share payers are those members of the Police Department who are not Union members and do not pay Union membership dues but who contribute a "fair-share" for the Union's continued representation of them in matters concerning their wages, hours and working conditions. Hallinan and Harej brought an action against the Union under section 1983 alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court dismissed the action for plaintiffs’ failure to plead state action. Plaintiffs appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Rovner, Wood and Sykes affirmed. The allegations of constitutional violations in the complaint, noted the Court, are actionable only against conduct of the government -- not against private conduct. Unions, of course, are not government actors. A deprivation of a constitutional right may be actionable against a private actor in certain limited circumstances. The Court noted several examples: when the state compels the action, when the private actor is only nominally private, when the state delegates its function to a private actor, etc. Here, the state action alleged is that the Union is the sole collective bargaining unit for the Chicago Police. However, the acts complained of were not taken in concert or in agreement with the City. They were exclusively internal actions. The Court concluded that there was not enough evidence of entanglement by the City to give rise to state action. Although the Court agreed with the district court that the claim should be dismissed for failure to allege state action, it corrected the district court’s categorization of it as a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. An absence of a proper allegation of state action is simply a failure to plead an essential element of the claim.

Employee Is Unable to Show Pretext When the Record Supports the Defendant's Honest, Even If Mistaken, Belief That the Employee Threatened His Co-workers

BODENSTAB v. COUNTY OF COOK (June 22, 2009)


Dr. Philip Bodenstab was an anesthesiologist at Cook County Hospital from 1993 until 2002. In February of 2002, Bodenstab, recently diagnosed with cancer, had a telephone conversation with a friend during which he threatened to kill his supervisor and co-workers. The friend contacted theFBI and Chicago police. The FBI and police contacted the director of the hospital and told him that the threats were credible. The hospital suspended Bodenstab with pay. Over the next several months, Bodenstab went through a series of assessments, evaluations and treatments. After his discharge from treatment and evaluation by the hospital's own psychiatrist, the hospital conducted a pre-disciplinary hearing on the major infraction of threatening to kill coworkers. The hearing officer concluded that the infraction warranted discharge. The hospital fired him. Bodenstab brought an action against Cook County and several individuals seeking to overturn the administrative decision and bringing affirmative allegations that his discharge violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, the First Amendment and due process. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Bodenstab appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Flaum and Manion affirmed. The Court rejected each of Bodenstab's arguments in turn. The ADA disparate treatment claim failed because Bodenstab presented no evidence challenging the sincerity of the hospital's belief that he threatened to harm his co-workers. Even if they were mistaken, the Court held that Bodenstab could not show pretext if they reasonably believed the threats. The ADA failure to accommodate claim failed because there is no obligation to accommodate conduct -- and conduct was the reason Bodenstab was fired. The First Amendment claim failed for the same reason the ADA disparate treatment claim failed. Bodenstab was fired because he threatened to kill coworkers -- not because of his speech -- and Bodenstab introduced no evidence otherwise. The Court next rejected Bodenstab's common-law certiorari claim to review the administrative decision on the merits. That claim presents the question of whether the record contains any evidence which fairly tends to support the findings -- it does. Finally, the Court concluded that Bodenstab was afforded adequate notice and a pre-termination hearing that complied with the mandates of due process.

Insurance Agent's Signing Of Another's Name, With Authority But Without An Indication Of Authority, Is "Dishonest" Under Agency Agreement

ROTH v. AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY (June 5, 2009)

The plaintiffs, Bonnie and Connie Roth, were insurance agents. Each had an agency agreement with American Family Mutual Insurance Company. The agreement provided that it could be terminated for "undesirable performance" only with six months notice and an opportunity to correct. It also provided that it could be terminated without notice if an agent engaged in "dishonest, disloyal or unlawful" conduct. One of the agents signed an applicant's name on a insurance policy application at the applicant’s request. The other signed the name of a different agent on a policy certification, also with authorization. American Family terminated their agency agreements. The Roths brought suit for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment to American Family. The Roths appeal.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Posner and Wood affirmed. The Court considered whether signing another's name is "dishonest" under the agreement. The Court appreciated that neither agent gained personally by her conduct and that a typical element of dishonesty is theft. However, the Court went on to consider other meanings of dishonesty, including breach of trust and deceitful behavior. The Court concluded that the act of signing another’s name without any indication of authority was deceptive and fit within the agreement’s provision allowing termination without notice.

USERRA Does Not Require A City To Continue To Provide A Historical Benefit Of Employment To A National Guard Member That It Does Not Provide To Non-Guard Members

CREWS v. CITY OF MT. VERNON (June 2, 2009)
 

Ryan Crews is a member both of the Mount Vernon Police Department and the Army National Guard and has been so for years. His work obligations to the department and the military frequently conflict. Since 1997, however, the department has allowed Crews to adjust his work schedule by moving any weekend department shifts that conflict with his guard exercises to the regular workweek. Thus, Crews was paid for a full week's work without using vacation or other time-off. Between 2000 and 2003, the department offered the same arrangement to three additional guard members hired as police officers. Non-guard members had no comparable opportunities to reschedule workdays. When the department hired two more guard members in 2006, the department rescinded the policy. The additional guard members in the department made implementation of the policy too costly. Crews brought an action against the City under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment ct ("USERRA"), alleging that the rescission of the policy denied him a benefit of employment. The district court granted summary judgment to the City, ruling that § 4316(b) did not require the City to provide scheduling benefits not generally available to members of the department not in the National Guard. Crews appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Evans and Tinder affirmed. The Court noted that USERRA contains a general anti-discrimination provision in § 4311 as well as the § 4316 requirement that service members who are on leave to fulfill their obligations are entitled to benefits generally afforded other employees on similar leave. Addressing § 4316, the Court held that Crews was entitled only to equal treatment, not to the preferential treatment the policy afforded. The Court further held, however, that § 4311 could also apply. The Court found some basis for Crews' claim in the statute's "any benefit of employment" language. It concluded, however, that the better interpretation of the statute is that a "benefit of employment" is one afforded military and non-military employees alike. Thus, Crews could not prevail under § 4311, either.

A Teaching Reassignment To Teach The Same Subject In The Same School Under The Same Conditions To A Different Grade Does Not Meet The Burlington Northern Test Of Materially Adverse Employment Action

LUCERO V. NETTLE CREEK SCHOOL CORPORATION (May 29, 2009)

Sharon Lucero, a female Hispanic, was hired by the Nettle Creek School Corporation in 2001 to teach English at the Hagerstown Junior - Senior High School (the "School"). The School served students in grades 7 through 12 in the same building. Lucero was informed, at the time of her hire, that she could be assigned to teach English at any of the grade levels. For her first two years, Lucero taught 7th and 8th grade English, respectively. For the third year, the School assented to her request to teach 12th grade English. The year progressed quite differently than her prior years of service. The principal criticized her performance, the students complained of her teaching style, and the parents complained of her grading policies, to name just a few of her problems. In addition, two specific incidents late in the year stood out. In one, a student showed a photograph in class of a partially naked classmate. In another, a group of students left several Playboy magazines in her classroom. The students involved in these two incidents were all suspended. After the school year, the School hired a new English teacher, a white male. The school assigned the new teacher to 12th grade English and reassigned Lucero to 7th grade English. Lucero sued the School, challenging her reassignment under theories of retaliation, discrimination, hostile work environment and breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment to the School. Lucero appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Flaum and Evans affirmed. The Court addressed each of Lucero’s legal theories in turn. With respect to her retaliation claim, the Court noted that she was required to establish that she suffered a materially adverse employment action. The Court addressed the reassignment in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Burlington Northern. Burlington Northern tells us that a court should apply an objective standard for assessing whether the reassignment might have dissuaded a reasonable person from making a charge of discrimination. Here, Lucero was reassigned to teach the same subject in the same building under the same conditions. The Court concluded that her reassignment was not a materially adverse action. The Court similarly found that Lucero failed to demonstrate a materially adverse employment action with respect to her discrimination claim, albeit under a different test. Since her compensation and work conditions were unchanged, Lucero attempted to establish that her reassignment was an adverse employment action by asserting that it would negatively impact her career prospects. The Court found that she failed to submit adequate evidence of a negative career impact and upheld the lower court on the discrimination claim. Next, the Court concluded that Lucero's allegations of hostile work environment failed as a matter of law. Although depicting inappropriate behavior, the Court concluded that they were isolated incidents, were not related to her gender or national origin, and did not support employer liability. Finally, the Court summarily rejected Lucero's breach of contract claims.

Evidence Of Retaliatory Motive Was Not Overwhelming But Was Sufficient To Affirm A Jury Award For FMLA Retaliation And Interference

RYL-KUCHAR v. CARE CENTERS, INC.(May 11, 2009)

Kathleen Ryl-Kuchar began working as a dishwasher at Care Centers, Inc. (“CCI”) at the age of 15. Seventeen years later, she held the salaried position of dietary consultant. Ryl-Kuchar became pregnant with triplets in 2002. She continued working on site until May of 2003, at which time she began working from home. She performed her normal duties with the blessing of CCI management, although her total hours dropped below 35 hours a week. With the help of her family, Ryl-Kuchar returned to work full-time shortly after she gave birth. Her return was short-lived, however. She soon commenced FMLA leave and never returned, deciding instead to resign. In mid-November, CCI’s employee benefits arm determined that Ryl-Kuchar had become a part-time employee in June and had therefore lost her eligibility for medical benefits. It retroactively canceled her health insurance effective the month before she delivered the triplets. Ryl-Kuchar brought an action under the FMLA, arguing that CCI interfered with her right to health insurance and retaliated against her for her decision to take FMLA leave. The jury awarded her damages. CCI appeals from the district court's denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Evans and Williams affirmed. The Court noted the heavy burden necessary to overturn a jury verdict. It reviewed the evidence – CCI’s inconsistent positions, the timing of its decision, and its concern about rising health care costs -- and found it sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that Ryl-Kuchar met her burden of proof on both the retaliation and interference claims. The Court remanded for calculation of a fee award.

Defendants' "Compelling" Evidence Of Lawful Reasons For Firing And Refusing To Hire Reservist Justifies Summary Judgment

MADDEN v. ROLLS ROYCE CORP. (April 29, 2009)

Rick Madden, a member of the U.S. Air Force Reserve, was hired as a temporary employee at Rolls-Royce Corporation. He represented, falsely, that he was a graduate of Purdue's engineering program. He did not impress his supervisor with his skills. At the end of the temporary period for which she had been hired, Rolls-Royce let him go. He then applied for a job with Data Systems and Solutions (DS&S), without success. Madden brought suit against Rolls-Royce and DS&S, alleging that both violated the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) by discriminating against him on the basis of his military service. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Madden appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Posner and Rovner affirmed. Even if a plaintiff under USERRA establishes that his military service was a motivating factor in his discharge or failure to be hired, the defendant is given the opportunity, and the burden, to show that its actions would have been taken even in the absence of military obligations. Here, the defendants’ evidence is compelling and barely contested. Madden’s performance at Rolls-Royce was unsatisfactory. The company was not going to retain him when it had to lay off someone and his co-worker was a better performer. With respect to DS&S, the Court concluded that the company surely would have checked his record and his resume before offering him a job. His poor performance at Rolls-Royce and his resume fraud would justify its refusal to hire.

Driving Is Not A "Major Life Activity" Under The Americans With Disabilities Act

WINSLEY v. COOK COUNTY (April 22, 2009)

Marsalette Winsley, an African-American woman, worked for the Cook County Department of Public Health. In December 2003, she was a Family Case Manager, which required her to drive to her clients' homes. In early 2004, she was injured in a car accident. After a leave of absence, she was approved to return to work part-time, conditioned on minimal driving. For more than three years, the County attempted to accommodate her limitations, assigning and reassigning her to different tasks at different locations. Winsley took several more leaves of absence during that time. Her supervisors evaluated her poorly during those years for her problems with attendance and timeliness. Eventually, in May of 2007, Winsley's supervisor asked for improvement in her timeliness and absenteeism rates. Winsley quit her job without notice and never returned. She filed an action alleging that the County violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Title VII and engaged in retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to the County on all counts. Winsley appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Ripple and Wood affirmed. The Court stated that the ADA requires that the claimant have a disability - defined as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities." Although the statute does not contain a definition of "major life activity," an EEOC regulation does. The Court noted that driving, Winsley’s only potential impairment, is neither on the list nor does it share much in common with the items on the list (e.g., walking, seeing, hearing, breathing, etc.). The Court therefore concluded that driving did not qualify as a major life activity. The Court recognized that Winsley's inability to drive could impair a different major life activity (e.g., working), but concluded that she did not meet her burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact on that claim. Therefore, her ADA claim failed. With respect to her Title VII claim, the Court concluded that she failed to meet her burden for several reasons: a) her only direct proof were her own bare assertions, b) she was unable to identify a similarly situated employee, and c) she was unable to rebut the County’s evidence that she was not meeting its legitimate expectations. Finally, with respect to her retaliation claim, the Court concluded that her evidence fell far short of the "hostile and abusive working environment" standard.

Court Affirms Denial Of Work Visa Where Employer Fails To Show That It Can Afford The Alien's Wages

CONSTRUCTION AND DESIGN CO. v. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (April 21, 2009)

Construction and Design Co. (CDC), a small construction company with three employees, is organized as a Subchapter S Corporation. As such, its income is taxed directly to its shareholders. CDC petitioned to obtain a visa to add a Ukrainian carpenter to its staff. The Department of Homeland Security denied the petition, ruling that CDC could not afford the proposed $50,000 salary for the carpenter. The district court affirmed. CDC and the alien appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Flaum and Wood affirmed. In order to obtain a visa, an employer must demonstrate to the Department of Labor that no U.S. citizen is qualified to do the work and must satisfy the Department of Homeland Security that it can afford the proposed salary of the alien. The Court pointed out that tax returns, relied on by the government, are not reliable indicators of a company's ability to afford another employee, particularly with respect to a Subchapter S company. Tax considerations can frequently influence the way income is treated. Nevertheless, the employer has the burden of proof with respect to its ability to pay. Here, the company's gross receipts in the year in question were only $400,000, the alien was already working for CDC in a temporary capacity for $23,000 less than his proposed permanent salary, there was no evidence of new business or a new contract with which to pay the new salary, and there was very little cushion in the company’s expenses. Although the Court hypothesized several scenarios under which the hiring might make economic sense, the employer never established an evidentiary record that met its burden.

Labor Union Has An Implied Cause Of Action Under ยง 501 Of The Labor-Management And Reporting Disclosure Act Of 1959

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL 150 v. WARD (April 16, 2009)

Local 150 represents over 22,000 union members in Illinois, Indiana and Iowa. Joseph Ward was its treasurer 1986 until 2007. In 1994, the president of the local asked Ward to purchase property adjacent to the local’s headquarters. Instead of purchasing the property for the union, however, Ward participated in the purchase of the property by an investment group. The group sold the parcel several years later at a substantial profit. Local 150 filed a complaint against Ward, alleging violations of § 501 of the Labor-Management and Reporting Disclosure Act of 1959 (the “Act”) and breaches of fiduciary duty. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that § 501 does not allow a labor union to bring a private cause of action. Local 150 appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Williams and Sykes reversed and remanded. The Court started with the language of the Act. Section 501(a) imposes fiduciary duties, including a duty of loyalty, on a union’s officers and agents. Section 501(b) creates a federal cause of action for individual union members. Damages recovered under § 501 (b) inure to the benefit of the union itself. Before a union member may sue, she must make a demand that the union take appropriate action and then must receive the court’s permission, on a showing of good cause, to proceed. The Act is silent on a union’s ability to bring an action. On that threshold question, the Court first found no express cause of action under a plain reading of the Act. With respect to whether the Act contains an implied cause of action, the Court noted a split of authority between the Ninth in Eleventh Circuits. Relying on the Supreme Court’s holding in Alexander, the Court concluded that its task was to determine whether Congress intended to create both a private Right and a private remedy. The Court's analysis of the text and structure of § 501 led it to conclude that Congress did intend to create both a federal right and a federal remedy for a union.

Summary Judgment Was Proper In FMLA Retaliation Case Where Plaintiff Presented No Evidence Of Discriminatory Intent

COLE v. STATE OF ILLINOIS (April 7, 2009)

Dynetta Cole was a receptionist for the State of Illinois. Her first year on the job was marked with many complaints about her performance, attendance and personality. After she was injured in a car accident, she took FMLA medical leave. She returned to work on a part-time basis after several weeks. Her performance and attendance issues continued. Cole’s supervisors ultimately presented her with an "employee improvement plan." The plan identified her attitude, her attendance and her performance as targeted areas for improvement. The plan required her to communicate more frequently about her schedule, become more aware of her tone and plan her daily schedule more efficiently. Her supervisors told Cole that she would be fired if she did not sign the plan. Cole refused to sign the plan -- Cole was fired. Cole brought suit against the State and her supervisors alleging retaliation for exercising her FMLA rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Cole appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Evans and Tinder affirmed. The FMLA, stated the Court, makes it unlawful to terminate an employee for using FMLA leave. Cole chose the direct method of proof which required either an admission of discrimination or a "convincing mosaic" of circumstantial evidence that would allow the jury to infer discrimination. The Court agreed with the district court that Cole presented no evidence to suggest that her termination was anything more than her supervisors’ response to her refusal to sign the plan. Although her termination followed shortly after her leave, the Court noted that proximity in time by itself is rarely enough to create a material fact dispute. The court also rejected Cole's argument that the improvement plan itself constituted an adverse employment action. An adverse employment action must be one that would dissuade a reasonable employee from exercising her rights under the FMLA. Here, the improvement plan was merely her employer’s reasonable approach to improve her attitude and performance.

The NLRA Completely Preempts A State Law Antitrust Claim Relating To A Secondary Boycott And Converts The Claim Into A Federal One

SMART v. LOCAL 702 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS (April 7, 2009)

Ronald Smart’s non-union electrical company was awarded a contract to perform electrical work at a sports complex. He claims that Local 702 threatened the owner of the sports complex and coerced him to replace Smart’s company with union electricians. Smart brought an action against the local under the Illinois Antitrust Act. He also brought state law unwarranted prosecution and malpractice claims against the union’s lawyers (claims arising from earlier legal actions against Smart by the union). The district court dismissed the antitrust claim, concluding that it was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. It also dismissed the state law claims, holding that the malpractice claim could not be brought against a lawyer who had never represented Smart and that the unwarranted prosecution claim required that he prevailed in the underlying litigation (he did not). Smart appeals

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Kanne and Tinder affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The Court first addressed its jurisdiction. The Court observed that there was an apparent lack of diversity and lack of a federal question in the complaint. Although the union raised a federal preemption defense, federal preemption does not normally provide a basis for asserting jurisdiction. One exception to that rule is the "complete preemption" doctrine. When an area is completely preempted by federal law and Congress substitutes a federal cause of action, a claim purportedly based on state law is considered a federal claim. Here, the Court first concluded that Smart's state antitrust claim was preempted by federal law. Next, it noted that Congress provided a cause of action in 29 U.S.C. § 187 with respect to injuries resulting from a secondary boycott. The Court found "ample evidence" that Congress intended to convert state common-law antitrust complaints into federal claims. The Court therefore concluded that § 187 completely preempted Smart’s state law antitrust claim and provided an exclusive federal remedy. The Court remanded that part of the case to the district court for further proceedings. The Court agreed with the lower court's analysis of the state law unwarranted prosecution and malpractice claims.

Unambiguous Waiver Is Enforced As Written To Bar Title VII Cause Of Action Even When Claimant Asserts That She Did Not Intend To Waive The Claim

HAMPTON v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY (April 6, 2009)

Collette Hampton worked the night shift Ford's Chicago assembly plant. In the summer of 2004, she allegedly experienced sexual harassment and discrimination on her job. She filed a charge of discrimination in late 2005. While awaiting a resolution of her charge, she learned that Ford was offering a buyout package to eligible employees. The program was system wide, with the goal of reducing Ford's hourly workforce. The buyout came with a lump sum payment of $100,000 in exchange for a waiver of "all rights or claims" against Ford and a promise "not to institute any proceedings of any kind" against Ford. Hampton, knowing that she was scheduled to be laid off in 2006 anyway, applied for the package. She received a written description of the program, was invited to an informational meeting, and was instructed to consult with the company or her union if she had any questions. Hampton received and cashed Ford's check and left Ford's employ. Meanwhile, however, after she applied for the program and signed the release but before she received the check, she brought an action against Ford, alleging sexual discrimination and harassment in violation of Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment to Ford, holding that Hampton had released her Title VII claims as a matter of law. Hampton appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Evans and sites affirmed. The Court first addressed Hampton’s argument that she never intended to waive her Title VII claims. The Court found no ambiguity in the waiver language. Relying on the principle, that an unambiguous contract must be enforced as written, the Court concluded that both the waiver language and the covenant language covered and barred her Title VII claims. Next, the Court addressed Hampton’s argument that her waiver was not knowing and voluntary. The Court agreed that the release of a federal right must be knowing and voluntary but concluded that Hampton failed to present enough evidence in support of her assertion. The Court relied on Hampton’s education, the clarity of the document, the time she had to consider it, her concurrent representation by counsel and the explanations provided or offered in concluding that her waiver was knowing and voluntary.

State Agency's Use Of A Review Panel For Disciplinary Decisions Does Not Give An At-Will Employee A Constitutionally-Protected Property Interest In Continued Employment

RUJAWITZ v. MARTIN (April 2, 2009)

Mark Rujawitz was an at-will employee of theIllinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) for thirteen years. When he violated an injunction requiring him to keep his distance from his ex-girlfriend, IDOT fired him. A disciplinary panel reviewed the discharge and recommended a lesser level of discipline. Rujawitz was reinstated and his discipline was changed to a suspension without pay. Rujawitz brought a § 1983 action against the secretary of IDOT, alleging that he was denied his substantive due process rights. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Rujawitz had no property right in continued employment. Rujawitz appeals

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Posner and Rovner affirmed. In order to establish a due process claim, the court stated, Rujawitz had to demonstrate a constitutionally protected property interest. The Court looked to state law for that determination. The Court could locate no ordinance, law or employment agreement that changed Rujawitz's status from an at-will employee to one with an expectation of continued employment. The Court rejected Rujawitz 's position that the presence and use of the disciplinary procedures established a property interest protectable under the Fourteenth Amendment.

USERRA Requires An Employer To Treat An Employee On Military Service The Same As An Employee On Leave For Another Reason - But It Does Not Require An Accommodation

SANDOVAL v. CITY OF CHICAGO (March 30, 2009)

Juan Sandoval and Sidney Pennix were Chicago police officers. They were also in the military reserve and on active duty in El Salvador and Iraq, respectively. When Chicago scheduled the examination for candidates for sergeant, Sandoval and Pennix requested an opportunity sit for the test. Chicago accommodated their requests by offering them the opportunity to take the test in, respectively, San Salvador and Frankfurt. They both took the test, passed and were placed on the eligibility list. They then filed suit pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”). They both allege that they should have been offered locations closer to where they were stationed and also seek compensation for the transportation cost to the testing locations. The district court granted summary judgment to the City of Chicago. Sandoval and Pennix appeal.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Kanne and Evans affirmed. The Court focused on the language of USERRA. It provides that a person serving in the military may not be denied a benefit of employment because of that service. In other words, said the Court, the Act requires an employer to treat persons on active duty the same as other employees. Here, Sandoval and Pennix seek an accommodation - not equal treatment. Chicago treated Sandoval and Pennix the same as it would have treated any other employee who was on leave for a non-military reason. The City did not violate USERRA.

Employer Is Entitled To Deny FMLA Leave To An Employee Who Alters Certification Form To Add A Diagnosis Without The Physician's Knowledge

SMITH v. THE HOPE SCHOOL (March 30, 2009)

Tanum Smith was an aide at the Hope School, a residential facility for developmentally disabled children. On two different occasions in 2006, Smith was injured by students. After the second incident, Smith took some time off and received medical attention. Although an independent medical examination approved her return to work without restrictions, her primary care physician restricted her to light-duty and to assignments that did not require her to interact with the school's residents. The school assigned Smith to its dietary department so that she would not interact with residents. Later, she complained that a student approached her in the kitchen. She informed the school that she was leaving and would not return until the school provided her with a safe work environment. There is significant disagreement in the record over what happened next. What is not disputed is that Smith was absent from work many days and, when she submitted her FMLA paperwork, she had altered the physician’s certification form to add a diagnosis for "previous depression." The school found out about the alteration, denied her request for FMLA leave, and began disciplinary proceedings because of her absences. Ultimately, Hope School terminated Smith's employment because of the absences. Smith brought this action alleging that the school interfered with her FMLA rights and that they terminated her employment in retaliation for requesting FMLA leave. The district court granted summary judgment to Hope School. Smith appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Williams and Kapala affirmed. The Court first addressed her interference claim. In order to prevail, the Court indicated that she must demonstrate that she was eligible for FMLA protection, that she was covered, that she was entitled to leave, that she provided notice, and that her employer denied her benefits. Here, the only issue is whether an employer can deny FMLA leave because an employee submits false paperwork. The Court agreed with the district court that an employer can deny a request for FMLA leave when an employee adds a diagnosis to the physician’s certification form without the physician's knowledge. The Court concluded that her retaliation claim was closely linked to the interference claim. Because Hope School was entitled to deny her request for leave, they were entitled to terminate her employment on account of her unexcused absences.

Injunction Against City Specifying Detailed Process For Handling Compensatory Time Off Requests Was Improper - There Is An Adequate Remedy At Law

HEITMANN v. CITY OF CHICAGO (March 25, 2009)

The City of Chicago and the police officers' union have agreed to a procedure for police officers to take compensatory time off in lieu of overtime pay. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, a public employee who has accrued compensatory time off and has requested to use it is permitted to "use such time within a reasonable period after making the request if the use of the compensatory time does not unduly disrupt the operations of the public agency." Several officers with accumulated compensatory time off brought a suit against the City. They contend that they should be allowed to take a particular days of their own choosing unless their absence at that time would result in a shortage of available officers. Conversely, the City contends that it is the department's choice. In their view, an officer may submit a generic request for compensatory time off. The City then decides what days, if any, to allow. The magistrate judge below concluded that the City had no set procedure. The lack of procedure failed to ensure the rights of the officers. He issued a detailed injunction specifying the process the City must use in response to future applications. The City appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Rovner and Williams vacated the injunction and remanded. As an initial matter, the Court noted that the Fair Labor Standards Act only allows injunctions in suits by the Secretary of Labor and only when the remedy at law is inadequate. Here, any failure of the City to honor the officers' time off rights is compensable by money. The unavailability of an injunction, however, does not mean that the officers are not entitled to a remedy. The Court concluded that the statutory language was not clear and included such open-ended words as "reasonable" and "undue." But the Court looked to an agency regulation that does address the issue. The agency's approach is not unreasonable and is thus entitled to deference under Chevron. The regulation defines "reasonable period" and "unduly disrupt" - and it does so in the same way that the officers do. The Court vacated the injunction and remanded for an award of non-injunctive relief to be determined by the magistrate judge.

Employer Is Not Liable For Retaliation Under The "Cat's Paw" Theory Unless The Decisionmaker Is Wholly Dependent On A Non-Decisionmaker

STAUB v. PROCTOR HOSPITAL (March 25, 2009)

Vincent Staub was a technologist at Proctor Hospital - and also a member of the Army reserves. Although he managed to balance the two obligations for years, things began to deteriorate in 2000. One of his supervisors was clearly irritated with him because of his reserve obligations. She was very vocal about her dislike of the reserve and her desire to “ get rid of him." Staub, unfortunately, already had a checkered employment history at the hospital. In January 2004, she gave Staub a written warning. She accused him of failing to assist other members of the hospital staff and of leaving his work area. As a result, Staub was instructed to keep his supervisors advised of his whereabouts and schedule at all times. A few months later, a similar incident occurred. Staub was fired immediately by the Vice President of Human Resources. She fired Staub for not only failing to follow the earlier warning, but also for his past issues. Although Staub filed a grievance insisting that the original incident was fabricated by his colleague who did not like him, the HR VP did not investigate. Staub filed an action against the hospital under the Uniformed Services Employment and the Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). The jury found for Staub and awarded damages. The district court denied Proctor’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. Proctor appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Evans and Tinder reversed and remanded. The Court stated that USERRA prohibits adverse action based on military status. In order to recover, however, a plaintiff must show that the decision-maker, and not just any coworker, harbored the animus. Here, the HR VP was the decision-maker. There is no evidence in the record that she harbored any animosity against Staub or his military responsibilities. Realizing this, Staub relies on the “cat's paw” theory. Under this approach, the discriminatory animus of a non-decisionmaker is imputed to a decisionmaker when the non-decisionmaker exerts singular influence over the decisionmaker to cause the adverse employment action. The Court emphasized that the employer is not liable unless the decisionmaker relies exclusively on the information provided and fails to conduct any investigation. Here, the Court found that the evidence did not support that conclusion. The evidence was clear that the decisionmaker did not rely exclusively on any information provided by other employees. In fact, the Court criticized the district court for even sending the issue to the jury. Instead, the Court suggested an approach whereby the trial judge makes a threshold determination on whether a reasonable jury could find this exclusive influence before even admitting into evidence the animus of a non-decisionmaker.

Indefinite Two-Weeks-A-Month Business Travel Is Not Relocation Under An Employment Contract

VENDETTI v. COMPASS ENVIRONMENTAL, INC. (MARCH 24, 2009)

Ronald Vendetti was an accountant in Stone Mountain, Georgia. His employer was acquired by Compass Environmental, Inc. ("Compass"), which was located in Chicago. Vendetti negotiated an employment agreement that provided that: a) he could continue to be located near Stone Mountain, b) he was entitled to one year severance if Compass relocated him, c) he could terminate the agreement with one year severance on 30 days notice for a material breach, and d) he could terminate the agreement without severance on 90 days notice for no cause. Within months, Vendetti's duties necessitated occasional travel to Chicago, to which Vendetti did not object. Later, Compass asked Vendetti to be in Chicago for two weeks of every month for the "indefinite future." Vendetti sent a 30-day notice letter, asserting the position that the company's request violated the agreement’s “location clause”. When Compass refused to provide severance, Vendetti brought an action for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment to Vendetti, holding that Compass violated the agreement. Compass appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Posner and Rovner reversed. The Court disagreed with the district court in many respects -- most importantly with respect to whether there was a violation of the location clause in the agreement. The Court concluded that business travel, at least to a point not reached here, did not constitute relocation as that term was used in the agreement. In reaching its conclusion, the Court noted: a) relocation was not defined in the agreement, b) it must have been obvious to Vendetti at the time he signed the agreement that travel to Chicago would be required, c) the company paid for all Vendetti’s travel expenses, and d) there were better ways to provide a party a veto over business travel. Since Vendetti did not identify any triable issues of fact, the Court not only reversed the district court's award of summary judgment to Vendetti but also reversed its denial of summary judgment to Compass.

Absence Of Evidence Linking Her Termination To Her Leave Dooms FMLA Interference Plaintiff

SIMPSON v. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WILL COUNTY (March 23, 2009)

Laura Simpson was the Director of the River Valley Juvenile Detention Center. In late 2002, Simpson began a period of paid sick leave. During her leave, the county auditor released a report that concluded that Simpson engaged in misconduct. The auditor recommended that she be fired. The report, which was initiated before Simpson went on leave and was initially focused on another county employee, concluded that Simpson a) allowed a psychologist under her authority to defraud the county, b) maintained an improper relationship with a juvenile detainee, and c) acted negligently in handling an attempted suicide. The Chief Judge fired Simpson. Simpson brought an action for interference with her FMLA rights and for retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. Simpson appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Kanne and Tinder affirmed. On the interference claim, the Court noted that the only element in dispute was whether the defendants denied Simpson a benefit of the FMLA. The FMLA does not require an employer to reinstate an employee after leave if he would have terminated her regardless of whether she took the leave. The Court concluded that Simpson failed to provide any evidence that the termination of her employment was related to her leave. The Chief Judge relied on the conclusions contained in the audit report and its recommendation to terminate Simpson's employment. The Court addressed Simpson’s FMLA discrimination claim under both the direct and indirect methods. The Court concluded that the evidence did not support a retaliation claim, for much the same reason that it did not support an interference claim.
 

Complaint Should Be Dismissed For Failure To Exhaust EEOC Remedy When Plaintiff, After Her EEOC Complaint, Was Conditionally Reinstated And Ultimately Dismissed For Failing To Meet The Condition Of Reinstatement

TEAL v. POTTER (March 20, 2009)

Joanne Teal had been employed by the U. S. Postal Service for almost 20 years when, during an altercation, she struck her supervisor's hand. Although the Postal Service attempted to discharge her, a grievance arbitrator determined that she should be suspended instead. Before she could be reinstated, however, Teal had to demonstrate her physical and mental fitness to resume her duties. For over eight months, the Postal Service went to great lengths to accommodate Teal's needs in scheduling the examinations. Finally, in July of 2003, the Postal Service advised Teal that they were terminating her employment. In the meantime, Teal filed an EEOC complaint in January of 2003, complaining that the original termination of her employment was discriminatory. Teal sued the Postal Service pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act. The district court concluded that she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies and granted summary judgment to the Postal Service.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Rovner and Evans vacated and remanded. The Court that the Rehabilitation Act, like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, requires a plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing an action. Additionally, a plaintiff cannot complain of conduct that was not the subject of an EEOC charge. Here, Teal's EEOC charge complained of discrimination prior to her original discharge in March of 2002. The district court complaint, on the other hand, complains of her July 2003 dismissal. The 2003 dismissal was based on Teal's noncompliance with the conditions of her reinstatement, not the incident with her supervisor. The Court concluded that Teal had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The Court remanded the case for a dismissal without prejudice.

Termination Of Employee Upon Return From FMLA Leave Is Not Sufficient Evidence Of Causation When Employer Discovers Evidence Of Performance Problems During The Leave

CRACCO v. VITRAN EXPRESS, INC. (March 17, 2009)

Kevin Cracco was a truck terminal manager at Vitran Express. In late 2006, he was hospitalized with a serious health condition and went on FMLA leave. Cracco's duties were performed by other employees during his absence. The replacement employees discovered a host of problem’s during Cracco’s absence: damaged freight, safety lapses and general disorganization. Vitran's further investigation also discovered falsified freight records. The company terminated Cracco's employment upon his return from leave. Cracco filed suit, alleging that the company violated his FMLA rights. The district court entered a default order when Vitran failed to respond. The court later vacated the default and granted summary judgment to Vitran. Cracco appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Manion and Sykes affirmed. The Court first affirmed the district court's order vacating the default. It found Vitran’s statement in its motion that Cracco was fired for cause sufficient to meet the liberal meritorious defense requirement of Rule 55. The Court also rejected Cracco's argument that the district court improperly deemed admitted a paragraph of Vitran’s Rule 56.1 statement of material facts. The paragraph contained multiple statements relating to the problems discovered at the terminal during Cracco’s leave. The Court conceded that the lower court could have required Vitran to unbundle the allegations. It concluded that the court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Cracco to respond to the paragraph, however. The Court then addressed the summary judgment ruling. With respect to the direct method of proof, Cracco attempted to establish a causal connection between his protected activities and his termination. He relied on the fact that he was terminated immediately upon his return from leave. The Court rejected the argument, concluding that the discovery of the performance problems during his leave negated any inference of causal connection. The Court concluded that Cracco was unable to establish two prongs of the indirect method of proof test: a) that he met his employer’s expectations and b) that he was treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee. Finally, because Cracco presented no evidence that he would have retained his job had he not taken FMLA leave, his interference claim failed as well.

Whistle-Blower's Inability To Demonstrate Both Objective and Subjective Belief That Supervisor Acted Unlawfully Defeats Her Retaliation Claim

HARP v. CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (March 16, 2009)

Mary Harp was a supervisor in the audit department at Charter Communications, Inc. ("Charter"). She was responsible for ensuring that Charter’s outside contractors performed the services for which they were retained. In early 2004, she concluded that one of Charter’s outside contractors sought payment for services it did not perform. Harp was unhappy with the way Charter treated the situation. She complained to the company that her direct supervisor violated the company's ethics code by authorizing full payment to the contractor. Shortly thereafter, the entire audit department was eliminated as part of a reduction in force. Harp brought an action against Charter under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, alleging that her termination was in retaliation for her whistle-blowing. The district court granted summary judgment to Charter. Harp appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple and Rovner affirmed (Tinder dissenting). In order to prevail, the Court noted that Harp had to prove a) that she engaged in protected activity, b) that Charter knew she was engaged in protected activity, c) that she suffered an unfavorable personnel action, and d) that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the personnel action. In order to meet the “protected activity” element, Harp must have actually believed that her supervisor’s conduct was unlawful and her belief must have been reasonable. The Court concluded that Harp's allegation that her supervisor authorized full payment to a contractor for services not performed had no subjective or objective basis for belief. The Court noted that Harp relied on conversations with a coworker in coming to her conclusion and that her own conduct was inconsistent with the belief. Thus, Harp was unable to establish even the first element of the test. The Court added that her claim would fail even if she met that element. The fact that the entire department was eliminated as part of a reduction in force would prevent her from establishing that her complaint was a contributing factor in her termination.

Judge Tinder dissented. Judge Tinder agreed with the legal test laid out in the majority opinion but disagreed with the majority's analysis and application of the facts to the law. He believed that Harp had a subjective belief that the company was a victim of fraud at the time she submitted her complaint and that her complaint could be reconciled with her deposition testimony. He also thought the circumstances behind the reduction in force were questionable enough to allow Harp to proceed with her complaint. For example, Charter argued that the reduction in force was necessary to save $800,000 a month -- yet the salaries of the entire department amounted to less than $200,000 per month. Also, Harp's severance form indicated that she would not be eligible for rehire -- a fact Judge Tinder thought atypical of a reduction in force. Finally, Charter began rehiring for the audit department within two months of the reduction. Judge Tinder thought that Harp had presented enough evidence to allow her claim to go to the jury.

Arbitrator's Decision Which "Drew Its Essence" From The Collective Bargaining Agreement Is Upheld

CLEAR CHANNEL OUTDOOR, INC. v. INTERNATIONAL UNIONS OF PAINTERS AND ALLIED TRADES (March 12, 2009)

Clear Channel Outdoor ("CCO ") owns and maintains hundreds of billboards in and around Milwaukee. Patrick Rogney was a CCO crew chief. In April of 2003, Rogney was working with a crew on a billboard in Milwaukee. They were on a platform about 18 feet off the ground. At some point, he disconnected his safety harness from the cable. A company official, conducting a field inspection, observed Rogney at work without the connected harness. After observing for about eight minutes, he notified the operations manager by phone. CCO suspended Rogney that afternoon, and later discharged him. The union filed a grievance, alleging that the termination was without good cause. Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, the parties submitted the matter to an arbitrator. After an evidentiary hearing, the arbitrator determined that Rogney's discharge was without just cause and that an appropriate penalty was a six-month suspension without pay. The arbitrator interpreted "just cause" to require CCO to not only consider whether an offense allowing termination was committed but also to consider whether termination was warranted under the circumstances. CCO brought an action to vacate the arbitrator's award. The district court confirmed the arbitrator's decision. CCO appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Rovner, Wood and Williams affirmed. The Court emphasized its limited role in reviewing a labor arbitrator's decision -- only to determine whether the arbitrator exceeded the powers delegated to him. Here, the Court looked to whether the arbitrator's decision had a plausible foundation in the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The Court noted that it did not necessarily agree with the arbitrator's construction of the contract. In fact, the collective bargaining agreement gave CCO discretion to fire an employee for a violation of the very safety rule that Rogney violated. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the arbitrator "without question" interpreted the agreement. Since his decision drew its essence from the agreement, the Court let it stand and affirmed the district court.

Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act Affords No Relief To Union's Appointed Business Agent Who Was Released By Appointed Union Leadership

VOUGHT v. THE STATE OF WISCONSIN TEAMSTERS JOINT COUNCIL NO. 39 (March 10, 2009)

Daniel Vought and Daniel Alexander were business agents for their local union. James Newell was its Secretary – Treasurer. In mid-2003, Newell fired Robert Russell from his position as a union business agent for allegedly misrepresenting the nature of the union’s health plan. The termination was reversed by the union’s Executive Board. Charges and countercharges were exchanged between Newell and Vought on the one hand and three of the union’s other board members . The matter was submitted to the Joint Council. The Council decided against Newell and removed him as a union officer and suspended him from union membership or employment. His replacement fired Vought the next day. After Alexander showed his support for Vought in later disciplinary proceedings, union leadership showed its displeasure by making his job more unpleasant. He soon resigned. Alexander and Vought brought an action under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”), alleging that they were forced out of their jobs in retaliation for identifying union impropriety. The District Court dismissed Vought’s claim on the merits and Alexander's on the ground that he failed to exhaust union remedies. Vought and Alexander appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Evans and Tinder affirmed. The Court first indicated its agreement with the lower court’s conclusion on exhaustion. It agreed with Alexander that exhaustion is not required when it would have been futile. Nevertheless, it concluded that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that a union hearing would not have been an empty formality for Alexander. With respect to the LMRDA claim, the Court cited Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent supporting the proposition that the act does not restrict the freedom of a union leader to choose a staff with compatible views. The union leaders in the cited cases were all elected, and the union leader who terminated Vought was not. The Court did not view that distinction as one that would support a different conclusion.

Railway Labor Act Suit Is Timely When It Alleges Conduct That Began More Than Six Months Before Filing But Which Continued To Occur And Continued To Cause New Harm

UNITED AIR LINES, INC. v. AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION (March 9, 2009)

United Air Lines, Inc. ("United") and the Air Line Pilots Association ("ALPA"), the collective bargaining representative for the pilots, have a long and contentious history of labor negotiations. The events of September 11, 2001 put additional pressure on that relationship. Their current collective bargaining agreement was negotiated in 2003 and amended in 2004 and 2005. In late 2006, ALPA attempted to reopen contract negotiations. According to United, ALPA took a number of coordinated measures in an attempt to pressure United. United sued ALPA in July of 2008 under Section 2, First of the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”). Shortly thereafter, ALPA agreed to direct its members not to engage in the disruptive activities. The district court, after an evidentiary hearing, granted United's request for a preliminary injunction. ALPA appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Rovner, Wood and Sykes affirmed. The Court addressed the four main issues on appeal: a) that the claim was barred by the six-month statute of limitations, b) that ALPA had made reasonable efforts under the RLA, c) that United failed to satisfy the requirements of Section 6 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act ("NLGA"), and d) that United failed to satisfy the requirements of Section 7 of the NLGA. With respect to the statute of limitations, the Court noted that the RLA borrows the six-month statute of limitations from the National Labor Relations Act. Although the court agreed that the conduct of ALPA began long before the suit was filed, it concluded that the action was not time-barred. ALPA engaged in unlawful action both before and during the six-month period and their actions created new injuries within the six-month period. The Court found no merit in ALPA'S argument that it made reasonable efforts to halt its members’ unlawful conduct. It relied on the district court's thorough findings of fact and accorded them substantial deference. With respect to the Section 6 requirement -- that United is required to prove that ALPA participated in or ratified the unlawful conduct -- the Court again relied heavily on the thorough findings of fact by the district court. It concluded that United’s statistical evidence, in combination with ALPA's coded communications, were sufficient to meet its burden. Finally, the Court rejected ALPA’s argument that the injunction was not necessary to prevent a violation of Section 2, First of the RLA. The Court conceded the general prohibition in the NLGA barring injunctions against labor unions, but noted an exception when there is a specific violation of a provision of the RLA. Even though ALPA had entered into an agreement to voluntarily cease its wrongful conduct, the district court found that it's conduct was inconsistent with its agreement. The Court concluded that the lower court was within its discretion to find that an injunction was the only way to ensure compliance with the RLA.

Plaintiff's Evidence That Establishes Nondiscriminatory Reason For Employment Action Justifies Entry Of Judgment As A Matter Of Law During Her Case-in-Chief

GREENE v. POTTER (March 5, 2009)

Mary Alice Greene worked for the post office. She worked five days a week and was allowed to volunteer for overtime on her days off. Each quarter, the post office generated a list of employees who wanted overtime. The assignments were supposed to rotate according to seniority, but the post office was not required to schedule an employee for more than one overtime shift a week. Greene’s off days were Sunday and one weekday. She always requested overtime on both of her off days, although she preferred Sunday overtime. During a two-year period, Greene was offered 22 overtime shifts, only five of which were Sundays. Greene brought an action against the post office for gender discrimination. She claimed that her supervisor favored his male friends to the detriment of the female employees in scheduling the more desirable Sunday overtime. During Greene's case-in-chief, the court granted the post office's motion for judgment as a matter of law. Greene appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Ripple and Evans affirmed. The Court first addressed Greene's argument that the entry of judgment in the middle of her case-in-chief was improper. The Court noted that FRCP 50 allows a court to grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law once "a party has been fully heard." The Court recognized that the common practice may be to wait until a party has concluded its case-in-chief. Nevertheless, it concluded that it is proper to enter judgment prior to the close of the plaintiff's case if it has become apparent that the plaintiff cannot prove her case. Here, on the merits, Greene relied on the indirect method of proving illegal discrimination. The Court assumed, for purposes of the appeal, that Greene could have satisfied the elements of the indirect method. It proceeded to address whether Greene presented a genuine issue regarding the post office’s reason for its actions. In order to prevail, Greene had to show that the post office reasons were a pretext for gender discrimination. Greene presented evidence that her supervisor did not schedule overtime according to the post office's policies. The evidence in fact demonstrated that the supervisor manipulated the system to benefit a few of his friends. Greene’s evidence showed conclusively that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for her supervisor's decisions. Since her own evidence that was submitted and that she planned to submit actually defeated her claim, the court acted properly in entering judgment as a matter of law during her case-in-chief.
 

Employee Who Was Truthful During Misconduct Investigation Not "Similarly Situated" To Terminated Employees

ANTONETTI v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES  (April 21, 2009)

Five technicians employed by Abbott Laboratories left in the middle of their shift one Saturday and went to breakfast. On the following Monday, Scott Antonetti (a white male), Jerald Fuhrer (a white male), Cindy Nadiger (a white female) and Marvin Gloria (a Filipino male) each told a supervisor that he or she had not taken a meal break. Relying on these statements, the supervisor overrode Abbott’s payroll system so that they would be paid as if they had not taken an unpaid break. Juan Luna (a Hispanic male), the fifth employee, did not work on Monday and did not have any communication that day with the supervisor regarding his Saturday shift. Nevertheless, the supervisor overrode the payroll system for Luna as well.

A few months later, Abbott began to investigate instances of employees leaving their weekend shifts for meals. When asked, Luna admitted that the five of them had left Abbott’s campus on that Saturday for breakfast. When the investigators questioned the other four, they stated they did not remember going to the off-site breakfast that day. Because working the Saturday overtime shift and leaving Abbott’s premises in the middle of a shift was unusual, the investigators found it implausible that the four employees did not remember going off-site for a meal during a Saturday overtime shift. In addition, they could remember other details about the Saturday overtime shift. Furthermore, one of them later changed his story and confessed, supposedly on behalf of all of them, to attending the off-site breakfast. Antonetti, Fuhrer, Nadiger and Gloria were terminated for time card fraud. Luna was not terminated. Antonetti, Fuhrer and Nadiger filed suit, claiming they were terminated on account of their race (Caucasian) and national origin (United States). Nadiger also claimed that she was terminated in retaliation for her complaints of sex discrimination. Gloria did not file suit. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Abbott, finding the plaintiffs could not establish a prima facia case of race or national origin discrimination. The plaintiffs appealed.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Posner and Williams affirmed. The Court first addressed the elements necessary to present a prima facie case of discrimination under both Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Court stated that plaintiffs must prove that: 1) they are members of a protected class; 2) they were performing their jobs satisfactorily; 3) they suffered an adverse employment action; and 4) similarly situated employees outside of their protected class where treated more favorably. Focusing on the fourth element of the discrimination claim, the Court found that the non-terminated employee, Luna, was not similarly situated to the plaintiffs for two reasons. First, Luna never told his supervisor that he did not take a break on the Saturday in question. Second, and most importantly, Luna told the truth when he was approached by the investigator about the off-site meal. Since the plaintiffs could not point to a similarly situated employee who was treated more favorably, their claim failed.

Addressing Nadiger’s Title VII claims that she was terminated in retaliation for her past and possible future complaints of sex discrimination in relation to being denied a promotion, the Court stated that there must be a causal link between her complaints of sex discrimination and her termination. The Court found that even if Abbott was partially motivated by Nadiger’s complaints of sex discrimination, it would have nonetheless fired her for time card fraud. Since Abbott had an independent and legitimate reason for firing Nadiger, her separate claim fails as well.

Failure To Produce Evidence That Defendants Knew of Plaintiff's Political Activity Dooms ยง 1983 Claim For Political Firing

ZERENTE v DELUCA (February 9, 2009)

Maria Zerente was employed by the City of Chicago Heights from 1995 until 2003, during the two terms of Mayor Ciambrone. Several candidates vied for the mayoral position in 2003, after Ciambrone announced that he would not run for reelection. Anthony DeLuca won on a fiscal responsibility platform. DeLuca hired Dan Proft as Chief of Staff. They both concluded that one of the City’s biggest fiscal problems was a bloated workforce. They fired seventeen employees and did not fill another seventeen open positions. Proft also came to believe that Zerente’s department was underperforming. DeLuca fired Zerente and replaced her with the man who had been his campaign treasurer. Zerente brought a § 1983 action against DeLuca and Proft, alleging that her firing was due to her political affiliation. The district court granted summary judgment to DeLuca and Proft. Zerente appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Bauer and Sykes affirmed. The Court laid out the elements of a prima facie case of political discrimination – constitutionally protected conduct and evidence that the conduct was a substantial and motivating factor in the firing decision. Zerente established the first prong with evidence of her support of Ciambrone, her involvement in the primary campaign of a DeLuca opponent, and her decision to remain neutral in the general election. The Court held that she failed to meet the second prong, however. She presented no evidence that DeLuca or Proft were even aware of her political activity. Her fallback position that it was her political inactivity (i.e., her neutrality during the general election) that resulted in her firing also fails. Although her neutrality is protected, she brought forth no evidence, other than that her replacement was not neutral, to establish that her neutrality was a motivating factor. That her replacement was involved in DeLuca’s campaign simply does not support her claim.

Alteration of State Employee's Job Duties Was Not a Demotion Under State Law and Therefore Not a Deprivation of a Property Interest

AKANDE v. GROUNDS (February 9, 2009)

Adetunji Akande was employed by the Illinois Department of Corrections. He served as a clinical casework supervisor in the clinical services division at the Robinson Correctional Facility (“RCF”). His job was subject to the Illinois Personnel Code. The Code provided that he could not be fired or demoted except for cause. The division was responsible for counseling and disciplinary activity at RCF. The division was run by a clinical services supervisor. The casework supervisors were intermediate managers. Their responsibilities included: resolving and reporting on serious disciplinary matters, supervising the delivery of services by the correctional counselors, evaluating correctional counselors, and performing other like duties. As of late 2003, Akande was the only supervisor. A new warden, Randall Grounds, arrived in early 2004. He came to doubt Akande’s job performance, particularly as it related to inputting disciplinary reports. He instructed Akande to personally input all data at the end of each day. Akande delegated the task. Grounds repeated his instructions. Akande continued to delegate the task. Ground referred Akande for discipline. His position that he was allowed to delegate the assigned tasks notwithstanding Grounds’ instructions was rejected. He received oral and written reprimands and a three-day suspension. In early 2004, Grounds removed Akande’s supervisory responsibilities. Shortly thereafter, Grounds presented Akande with a formal memorandum of responsibilities stating that all data entry for serious discipline was the supervisor’s responsibility. Akande left RCF with a “headache,” went on disability and never returned. Akande brought this action, alleging that he was effectively eliminated from his position, in which he had a property interest. The court granted summary judgment to defendants, holding that they were entitled to qualified immunity. Akande appealed.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Wood and Williams affirmed. The Court identified the threshold question as whether Akande has been deprived of a constitutionally protected property interest. The Court agreed that state law gave Akande a property right not to be removed from his job or demoted without cause. Under the Illinois Code, “demotion” is defined as the assignment of an employee to a job of a lower grade because of the employee’s performance in the higher grade job. Here, Akande was not terminated, not told to leave, not assigned to a different job – his duties were simply altered. Therefore, he was not deprived of a property interest. Since he failed to show the deprivation of a property interest, the Court did not need to the “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity test.

Specific Discriminatory Remarks, Without Other Evidence Of Intent, Are Insufficient To Establish a Prima Facie Case Of Race Discrimination

NAGLE v. VILLAGE OF CALUMET PARK (February 4, 2009)

William Nagle, a white male in his fifties, is a police officer with the Village of Calumet Park and has been for almost thirst years. He has been active in union matters for most of that time. The Village hired a new Police Chief (Davis, a black male in his fifties) and Assistant Chief (Rockett, a white female in her forties) in 2002. Nagle claims that Davis discriminated against him on racial and age bases. The incidents he complains of include: a) Davis asked Nagle when he was going to retire, b) Davis referred to Nagle and his peer group on several occasions as “old white mother f*****s,” c) Davis selectively disciplined Nagle in comparison to younger officers, d) Davis said he might be getting “too old” for the job, e) Davis suspended Nagle for failing to assist another officer but did not discipline another officer for the same conduct, and f) Davis reassigned Nagle to duties that Nagle considered undesirable. Nagle also contends that Davis discriminated against him because of his speech. Nagle had spoken up publicly at a meeting in opposition to Davis’ manpower reduction plans. Davis later criticized him for doing so. A few days later, Nagle was suspended for violating a new sick-leave policy. Nagle filed charges with the EEOC. A few weeks later, Davis again suspended Nagle, this time for preparing a union grievance while on-duty. The suspension was overturned and Nagle was paid for the time. He nevertheless filed a second EEOC charge alleging that his suspension was on account of his age and race and in retaliation for the earlier EEOC charge. After being suspended again for violating the sick-leave policy, Nagle filed a third charge alleging that that suspension and an earlier reassignment were made due to his age and race and in retaliation for his complaints. Nagle brought an action, alleging age discrimination under ADEA and race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. He also brought a § 1983 action, alleging a violation of the First Amendment. The court granted summary judgment for defendants on all counts. Nagle appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Evans and Williams affirmed. The Court first addressed Nagle’s race and age discrimination claims. The Court noted the lack of direct evidence of discriminatory intent. But the direct method of proof also allows a plaintiff to rely on circumstantial evidence. That evidence could include a) suspicious timing, b) ambiguous statements or conduct directed at the protected group, c) evidence of better treatment of those outside the group. or d) evidence that a qualified employee was passed over in favor of a person outside the group. The Court refused to disregard Davis’ race and age-based remarks simply because they were not close in time to the complained of discrimination. A determination must be made on all the facts. Here, Nagle tried to buttress his claim by showing that Davis generally hired non-white or non-male applicants and that he treated non-white and non-male officers better. The Court found that Nagle failed to produce enough evidence on either point. In addition, most of Nagle’s complaints did not refer to adverse employment actions. None of the reassignments he complained of changed the terms or conditions of his employment or affected his career prospects. The Court concluded that Davis’ comments were the only evidence under the direct method and insufficient to establish a prima facie case, given their lack of proximity to the complained-of conduct. The Court addressed Nagle’s claims under the indirect method. Under that method, among other things, a plaintiff must show adverse employment actions and that similarly situated individuals were treated better. The Court’s analysis of these same issues under the direct method show the lack of claim under the indirect method. The Court proceeded to address Nagle’s retaliation claim, again under a direct and indirect method. Nagle failed to carry the day on his retaliation claim because, on most, he failed to prove that he suffered materially adverse employment decisions and on one other, he failed to prove that Davis even knew of his EEOC charge when Davis suspended him. Finally, with respect to Nagle’s First Amendment claim, the Court found the record sparse with respect to the particulars of the speech. Without more information about content, form, and relationship of the speech to his job as a police officer and his role as a union representative, the Court was unable to determine whether his speech was protected.

Employer in Illinois is Entitled to Wait Until Verdict Establishes Liability and Employer's Degree of Fault Before Deciding Whether to Waive Its Workers' Compensation Lien on Employee's Recovery

BALTZELL v. R&R TRUCKING (February 4, 2009)

"Skeeter" Baltzell worked for Ensign-Bickford Company (“Ensign”) as a truck loader. R&R Trucking (“R&R”) had a contract with Ensign to provide specialized tractor-trailers and drivers. Baltzell was the victim of an unfortunate accident in May 2000, when one of his Ensign co-workers backed up and crushed him between the trailer and the dock. Baltzell was severely injured in the accident and still requires constant care. Baltzell filed a claim with the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission and he and his wife filed this lawsuit. The Baltzells claimed damages arising from Baltzell’s injuries and his wife’s loss of consortium, naming R&R and the manufacturers of the tractor and trailer. The defendants brought contribution claims against Ensign. The jury awarded almost $14 million dollars and allocated fault 30% to Ensign and 70% to the other three defendants. Ensign moved to waive its workers’ compensation lien and to dismiss the contribution claims. The court denied its motion. Ensign appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Evans and Williams reversed and remanded. The Court first reviewed Illinois’ workers compensation scheme (in relevant part): a) an employer compensates an employee for injuries on the job regardless of fault, b) an employee cannot sue an employer for the injuries, c) an employee can sure a third party who may be at fault, d) the third party can seek contribution from an employer, e) an employer has a lien on third party recovery, and f) the lien is the amount of recovery less the amount equal to the employer’s pro rata share of the common liability (up to its workers’ compensation obligation). It is possible under this scheme for the employer to be liable for more than its workers compensation obligation, a result disfavored by the workers’ compensation policy. Illinois has provided two safeguards. First, the Illinois Supreme Court in Kotecki v. Cyclops Welding Corp. capped an employer’s contribution liability at its workers’ compensation liability. Second, to allow for the possibility that an employer would rather be liable under the workers’ compensation statute than for contribution, even if the amount is the same, Illinois allows an employer to waive its lien on third party recovery and be protected from contribution. Here, the court below did not allow Ensign to waive its lien. The court believed that Ensign’s delay in waiving until it knew the amount of the verdict and the jury’s assessment of its share frustrated the purposes of the Contribution Act. Ensign could have decided not to waive if the jury found its share of fault low or non-existent. The Court appreciated the lower court’s concern but noted that the Illinois Supreme Court in LaFever v. Kemlite Co. had approved the very strategy employed by Ensign. The Court also rejected the distinction that LaFever dealt with a situation where the employer had completed its compensation payments. The court should have allowed the waiver. The Court did agree with defendants that they are entitled, vis-a-vis Baltzell, to a setoff for the payments already received by Baltzell from Ensign. It declined, however, to either grant a setoff for estimated future payments or to order some form of trust to distribute the future payments. It did recommend that the parties voluntarily set up a mechanism to distribute future payments to the defendants according to their shares of liability

Rehearing Denied in AIDS Employment Discrimination Case

EEOC v. LEE’S LOG CABIN (February 2, 2009)

Korrin Stewart was diagnosed as HIV-positive when she was just fourteen years old. Shortly thereafter, she learned that it had actually developed into AIDS. At the age of eighteen, she applied for a wait-staff position at Lee’s Log Cabin (“Lee’s”). Lee’s found out that Stewart was HIV+. In fact, the manager wrote the notation “HIV+” on her application. The EEOC filed suit when Lee’s did not hire Stewart. Shortly before trial, the EEOC presented affidavits from Stewart and her doctors describing how AIDS affected her daily activities. The district court rejected the affidavits because the EEOC had never pleaded the presence of AIDS and, the court found, AIDS and HIV-positive were not synonymous. The court granted summary judgment for Lee’s. The panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Court thought that the EEOC “complicated the inquiry” by attempting to refashion its claim as AIDS claim late in the case. The Court called it a “major alteration” of the EEOC’s case. Relying on significant symptomatic differences at different stages of the disease, the Court thought it was highly relevant whether Stewart was HIV-positive or had AIDS. The EEOC sought rehearing and rehearing en banc.

In their opinion, the full Court denied the petition.

Judge Williams, joined by Judges Rovner, Wood and Evans dissented. Judge Williams echoed the content of her dissent to the panel opinion. She thought that the majority imposed a higher pleading threshold on individuals with complex, multi-level diseases. Such a requirement is inconsistent with the notice pleading requirement. The exact stage of a disease, including HIV, is an irrelevant detail, and should not be a pleading requirement. Judge Williams also disagreed with the majority’s alternate ground – that an employer has to have specific knowledge of how far an employee’s disability has advanced to be liable. It should be enough if the employer knows about the existence of the impairment, even if unaware of its specific stage.

Charging Party's Withdrawal of EEOC Complaint as Part of Individual Settlement Does Not Preclude Further Investigation by the EEOC

EEOC v. WATKINS MOTOR LINES (January 23, 2009)

Watkins Motor Lines (“Watkins”) experienced three episodes of employee-on-employee murder or attempted murder. It decided it would no longer employ persons who had been convicted of a crime of violence. A few months after Watkins adopted its new policy, Lyndon Jackson applied for a job. Jackson had a criminal record. Watkins declined to hire him for that reason. Jackson filed a complaint with the EEOC. The EEOC initiated an investigation. It sought to determine whether the policy had a disparate impact on minorities and, if so, whether it was a business necessity. In April 2005, the EEOC issued a subpoena to Watkins. Watkins and Jackson reached a settlement in January 2006, contingent on the EEOC abandoning the investigation. Jackson withdrew his charge – but the EEOC pressed on. It sought to enforce the subpoena in the district court. The court dismissed the EEOC’s action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that no valid charge was pending because the EEOC should have allowed Jackson to settle and withdraw his charge. The EEOC appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Evans and Tinder reversed and remanded. Once an EEOC charge is filed, the agency determines the direction of the investigation. A charge can be withdrawn only with the consent of the agency and only when it will not defeat the purposes of Title VII. Here, the Court noted that a valid charge was filed and that the agency sought to continue the investigation even after Jackson wanted to withdraw. The agency did not commit error when it decided to continue the investigation of Watkins’ employment policy for the benefit of other applicants. The Court analogized the situation to those in which a representative class plaintiff settles with the defendants or in which settling parties want to vacate earlier judicial decisions in their case. The Supreme Court has rejected those arguments in Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, and U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership. Watkins’ argument that forcing the EEOC to accept Jackson’s withdrawal will facilitate his settlement ignores the interests of the unrepresented persons. Watkins and Jackson are free to settle – and the EEOC is free to continue its investigation.

Failure to Promote Was Not Discriminatory When Plaintiff Failed to Show Existence of an Open Position or Evidence Supporting an Early Promotion Requirement

JONES V. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD (January 26, 2009)

The police department of Springfield (the “City”) uses a promotion eligibility list to determine which officers can be promoted to sergeant. The list takes into account written and oral test scores, seniority and military service. The list is typically updated every two years but its life can be extended by a year. A list was due to be updated in October 2003 but was extended a year. At least one reason for the extension was to help one particular black officer (Ralph Harris) obtain a promotion. A few days before the new expiration date, the top three officers on the list were promoted, including Harris. Alan Jones, a white male, was fourth on the list. Once the new list was created, he dropped to twelfth place. He was not promoted until December 2006. Jones sued the City, claiming a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. He alleged that he was passed over for promotion because of his race. Jones conceded that there were no open positions but asserts that the City knew there would be a vacancy in a very short time and could have promoted him early – and would have promoted him early if he were black. The district court granted summary judgment to the City. Jones appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Posner and Manion affirmed. The Court noted that Jones elected to proceed under both the direct and indirect methods of proof. Under the direct method, the plaintiff must prove that the adverse employment action was taken based on a discriminatory reason. The Court rejected Jones’ argument that he and Harris were similarly situated and Harris was treated more favorably. Since Harris was ranked higher on the list, they were not similarly situated. The Court also rejected Jones’ argument that the jury could have found that the City would have promoted him early had he been black. The Court referred to the absence of any evidence regarding the early promotion practice other than that the practice existed. Under the indirect method, Jones must show that there was an open position. The Court criticized the district court for treating the availability of an open position as part of a pretext argument. The Court emphasized that a plaintiff must make a prima facie case before any pretext argument even arises – and a prima facie case requires proof of an open position. Jones’ inability to show that an open position existed precludes him from establishing a prima facie case.

Balance of Ten-Factor Restatement Test Weighs in Favor of Independent Contractor Status

ESTATE OF SUSKOVICH v. ANTHEM HEALTH PLANS (January 22, 2009)

Anthony Suskovich was a computer programmer and analyst. From 1996 until his unfortunate and sudden death in 2006, he provided services to WellPoint. WellPoint retained Suskovich on many projects with limited duration, although frequently one project rolled over into another. He billed WellPoint on an invoice, was paid by the hour, and his income was reported on a 1099. WellPoint adopted a preferred vendor program around 2000 under which it could only avail itself of Suskovich’s services if they were provided by a preferred vendor. Suskovich began a relationship with Trasys. Suskovich would send an invoice to WellPoint, which in turn would refer them to Trasys for payment to Suskovich. Suskovich’s income was still reported on a 1099. In 2001, Suskovich signed an “independent contractor” agreement. Suskovich worked on many different projects, sometimes on more than one at once. He usually worked at WellPoint’s offices with a computer supplied by WellPoint. In 2005, WellPoint informed Suskovich that they would not be using him anymore and asked him to train a replacement. Later, Suskovich and WellPoint had discussions about the possibility of Suskovich becoming an employee of WellPoint but nothing ever came of them. Before his death, the IRS began an investigation of Suskovich for not filing tax returns. The investigation led to his filing of returns for several years in which he listed himself as self-employed. He still had remaining tax liability when he died. His estate brought an action against WellPoint and Trasys, seeking a declaratory judgment that Suskovich was an employee of WellPoint and Trasys and for compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), benefits under ERISA, and tax indemnity. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that Suskovich was an independent contractor. The Estate appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Flaum and Sykes affirmed. First, the Court held that the district court did not give improper weight to the “independent contractor” agreement. The Court held that the court below properly followed the law of the Circuit that parties can define their relationship as long as the other factors do not lead to the opposite conclusion. The district court gave primary weight to the contract but did consider and weigh other factors. Next, the Court held that the district court properly resolved the ambiguity in the contract by considering the language of the contract as well as extrinsic evidence. The Court proceeded to the meat of the appeal – whether Suskovich was an independent contractor or an employee. The Court decided to approach the question under the 10-factor Restatement test, even though the asserted claims have different tests. ERISA claims use a 12-factor common law test. FLSA claims use a broader 6-factor test. The Supreme Court has held that the ERISA test is similar to the Restatement test and the Estate relied on the Restatement test. The Court evaluated and weighed the ten factors: a) extent of control, b) whether the worker is engaged in a distinct occupation, c) whether the type of work is generally done without supervision, d) skill required, e) who supplies the tools and workplace, f) length of employment, g) whether the payment is by time or job, h) whether the work is the regular business of the employer, i) the parties’ belief, and j) whether the principal is in business. The Court concluded that only two factors weighed at all in Suskovich’s favor: who supplied the tools and whether the work was the regular part of the business. The former is a relatively unimportant factor and the latter only favors Suskovich as against Trasys. All of the other factors weighed against Suskovich. The district court was correct in awarding summary judgment to WellPoint and Trasys.

Under Ledbetter, Past Discrimination in Training Opportunities Cannot Be Used To Support Current Claim of Non-Discriminatory Act

JACKSON v. CITY OF CHICAGO (January 13, 2009)

George Jackson was a carpenter in the Public Works Department in the City of Chicago from 1987 until 2003, when he was promoted to foreman. In 2004, the City announced the availability of two jobs as general foreman of general trades – one each in the Departments of Transportation and General Services. Jackson applied for both jobs. He was offered neither. The City promoted Michael Blake to the Department of Transportation job. Blake had more experience as a carpenter, had more experience estimating the material and manpower needs of a project, and significantly outscored Jackson on a written test of communication skills. The City promoted Kevin O’Gorman to the Department of General Services job. O’Gorman received the highest combined score for the interview and work sample. Jackson did not even submit a work sample. Jackson brought an action against the City. He alleged race and age discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The court granted summary judgment to the City. Jackson appeals the Title VII race discrimination judgment.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Evans and Sykes affirmed. The Court noted that Jackson was proceeding under the indirect method of proof. The first requirement of that indirect method is to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The Court recited the elements of the prima facie case: a) he is a member of a protected class, b) he is qualified for the position, c) he was rejected, and d) the position was given to a person not in the protected class who was less or similarly qualified. Thus, if a job is given to a better qualified individual, the plaintiff’s case must fail. The Court concluded that both promotions were awarded to better qualified individuals. Jackson argued that his qualifications suffered in comparison to the others because the City had discriminated against him in the past by denying him training opportunities. The Court rejected Jackson’s approach. First, Jackson never filed an EEOC charge involving training opportunity discrimination, a prerequisite to a Title VII action. Second, to the extent Jackson argued that the discrimination in training opportunities was not an independent claim but merely support for his primary claim, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear disposes of that theory. The 2004 acts were not discriminatory. Under Ledbetter, a new violation does not occur at the time of later non-discriminatory acts, even if they have adverse effects resulting from past discrimination.

Employee Cannot Succeed on a Failure To Promote Claim When He Fails to Establish His Qualifications For the Promotion

LLOYD v. SWIFTY TRANSPORTATION (January 9, 2009)

Gerald Lloyd is a truck driver. Unfortunately, Lloyd lost much of his left leg in a motorcycle accident. Fortunately, he adapted fairly well to a prosthetic leg. He does experience some difficulties with the lining and develops occasional infections. He was able to get a limb waiver from the State of Indiana to return to his career as a truck driver. Swifty Transportation (“Swifty”) hired Lloyd as a night-shift driver in June 2008. Swifty delivers gasoline in its fleet of twelve trucks. Each truck has one lead driver on the day shift and two night-shift drivers. The lead drivers are generally paid more and have some additional responsibilities. In 2001, Swifty filled a lead-driver position without interviewing Lloyd, even though Lloyd had expressed his interest in the job. Lloyd filed an EEOC charge, alleging that Swifty denied him the job because of his disability. Swifty and Lloyd resolved the charge. Lloyd agreed not to bring suit. Swifty agreed to notify and interview Lloyd for any open lead-driver position. On three later occasions, Swifty filled open lead-driver positions with other applicants. In June 2003, they interviewed Lloyd but hired a more experienced driver. Lloyd filed a second EEOC complaint. In January 2004, Swifty again filed a lead driver position with a more experienced driver, this time without interviewing Lloyd. Lloyd was disciplined for the first time in January 2005 – for loading gasoline from the wrong supplier. Lloyd filed his third EEOC complaint. Subsequent to his last EEOC complaint, Lloyd was disciplined twice more. In May 2005, Lloyd resigned. He filed a complaint, alleging that Swifty a) failed to promote him, disciplined him, and paid him less than others, all on account of his disability and in retaliation for his EEOC charges and taking FMLA leave, b) created a hostile work environment, and c) breached the settlement agreement by not interviewing him for every job opening. The court granted summary judgment to Swifty.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Ripple and Rovner affirmed. The Court concurred with the district court’s holding that Lloyd’s claims regarding the 2001 and 2003 openings were time-barred and that his FMLA claims were barred because Lloyd did not establish that Swifty had more than fifty employees. With respect to the ADA promotion claims, the Court noted that Lloyd proceeded under the “indirect” method of proof. That requires proof that a) he is disabled, b) he was meeting Swifty’s legitimate expectations, c) he suffered adverse employment action, and d) similarly situated employees without a disability were treated more favorably. The Court concluded that Lloyd never even established that he was a “qualified individual” under the ADA – i.e., that he was actually qualified to be a lead driver. Swifty established that a lead driver needed mechanical knowledge and a positive attitude. The uncontradicted testimony was that Lloyd had a negative attitude. With respect to the claims arising from Swifty’s discipline of Lloyd, the Court stated that the written reprimand was not an adverse employment action, the suspension came after and was unrelated to his final EEOC charge, and Lloyd had no personal knowledge that similarly situated drivers were not disciplined. The Court also affirmed the grant of summary judgment on Lloyd’s lower pay, hostile work environment, and breach of contract claims.

Title IX Claim For Damages Against School District For Teacher's Misconduct Requires Proof of Actual Notice of and Deliberate Indifference to Misconduct

HANSEN v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES (December 23, 2008)

Hamilton Southeastern High School (“HSHS”) hired Dmitri Alano as a teacher and assistant band director in 1988. Prior to his hiring, the Hamilton Southeastern School Corporation (“HSSC”) conducted its normal pre-hire process, which included an application and questionnaire, interviews, reference checks, and license and background checks. Alano began a sexual relationship with a student in 2000. The student concealed the relationship from her family and friends. A couple of years after the relationship ended, the student revealed the relationship to her therapist. Her parents and the police were informed. HSHS suspended Alano; he ultimately resigned. The student’s parents (the Hansens) brought federal claims under Title IX and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and several state law claims against Alano and HSSC. The court granted summary judgment on two of the seven counts with respect to Alano. The court granted summary judgment on all seven counts with respect to HSSC and entered a Rule 54 (b) final judgment. The Hansens appeal the dismissal of the Title IX claim and the state law claims.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Kanne and Tinder affirmed. The Court first addressed the Title IX claim. In order for the Hansens to establish a Title IX claim against HSSC for Alano’s conduct, it must prove that an official with authority to adopt corrective measures either had actual knowledge of the teacher’s misconduct or was deliberately indifferent. The Court concluded that the evidence did not establish that any HSSC official had such knowledge. The Court next rejected the Hansens’ claim that the district court should have declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims once it had dismissed the federal claims. The Court found that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction in the first place – the claims are all based on a common set of facts. The court’s discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) was never triggered since it maintained jurisdiction over the federal claim against Alano. Even if it had, the lower court considered a balance of the proper factors (judicial economy, convenience, fairness, comity).

The Court considered the state law claims in two categories: direct claims against HSSC for its own negligence and respondeat superior claims under which HSSC could be responsible for Alano’s conduct. On the former, the Court noted that Indiana does recognize a cause of action for the negligent hiring, supervision or retention of an employee. Although the Court noted the confusion over whether Indiana applies an “actual knowledge” or a “knew or should have known” standard, it did not matter. Hansen failed to satisfy even the lesser standard. On the respondeat superior claims, the Court stated that HSSC would be responsible for the tortious acts of Alano if they were committed within the scope of his employment. Indiana courts have held that an employee’s sexual misconduct is within the scope of his employment only when the employment itself involves extensive physical contact. Alano’s duties did not involve any physical contact. The respondeat superior claims must fail as well. Finally, the Court held that Indiana does not recognize a non-delegable duty for the safekeeping of its students.

Illinois Labor Statute Preempted By NLRA Because It Was Narrow in Scope, Contained Formidable Enforcement Mechanisms, and Interfered With the Objectives of the NLRA

520 SOUTH MICHIGAN AVENUE ASSOC. v. SHANNON (December 15, 2008)

520 South Michigan Avenue Assoc. does business as The Congress Plaza Hotel & Convention Center (“Congress Hotel”) in Chicago, Illinois. It employs approximately 130 room attendants (the employees who clean guest rooms). Unite Here Local 1 union (“Unite Here”) represents these employees. Congress Hotel and Unite Here had a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) that expired in 2002. Congress Hotel has agreed to abide by the expired CBA while the parties negotiate a new one. During the negotiations, the Illinois legislature passed the Hotel Room Attendant Amendment (the “Attendant Amendment”) to the One Day Rest in Seven Act. In relevant part, the Attendant Amendment: a) mandates two 15-minute break periods and a 30-minute meal period each day, b) provides a penalty of three times an employee’s wages for a daily violation, c) creates a rebuttable presumption that any adverse employer action after an employee’s exercise of rights under the section constitutes retaliation, and d) provides for an award of attorney’s fees and costs to a prevailing party in an enforcement action. The Attendant Amendment applies only to employees in Cook County, Illinois. Congress Hotel filed suit for a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Attendant Amendment. It argued that the Attendant Amendment was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). The district court granted the motions of the Illinois Department of Labor and Unite Here to dismiss the case. Congress Hotel appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Kanne and Tinder reversed and remanded. The Court noted that preemption can be either express or implied. Since the NLRA contains no express preemption provision, the question is whether the state statute conflicts with federal law or frustrates a federal scheme, or whether Congress intended to occupy the field. The Court identified two different NLRA preemption doctrines from Supreme Court cases. The Court stated that Congress, in approaching collective bargaining and unions, took a multi-pronged approach. It prohibited some conduct; it protected some conduct; and it specifically left some conduct to the forces of the free market. Garmon preemption seeks to prevent conflict between local regulation and the NLRA’s scheme of regulation. In contrast, Machinists preemption seeks to prevent local regulation of conduct that Congress intended not to be regulated. The Court first addressed Machinists preemption. Three propositions have been established by the Supreme Court in its post-Machinists cases of Metropolitan Life and Fort Halifax: a) the NLRA is more concerned with an equitable bargaining process than its substantive terms, b) the NLRA does not preempt a state law that regulates a mandatory subject of bargaining, and c) the NLRA does not preempt a state law that establishes a minimum labor standard that does not intrude upon the bargaining process. The Court went on to address the defendants’ argument that the Attendant Amendment is simply a minimum labor standard. The Court decided that it is not because: a) it is not a statute of general application (it applied to only one job in one industry in one county), b) it did not provide a low-threshold (i.e., minimum) standard but rather established a term of employment that would be hard to bargain for, and c) it included provisions creating a cause of action, shifting the burden of proof and creating a presumption of retaliation that interfered with and overrode the dispute resolution mechanisms already in place. Since the Court thus found the statute preempted by the Machinists doctrine, it did not reach the Garmon doctrine or consider the Congress Hotel’s equal protection or due process arguments.

"Mosaic" of Circumstantial Evidence is Enough Under Direct Method of Proof to Survive Summary Judgment

HASAN v. FOLEY & LARDNER (December 15, 2008)

Zafar Hasan is a Muslim of Indian descent. In 2000, he joined the law firm of Foley & Lardner (“Foley”) as an associate. (The following are facts construed in a light most favorable to Hasan.) During his first year at the firm, he received mostly positive reviews and maintained high billable hours. The events of September 11, 2001 changed Hasan’s standing in the firm. Hasan’s billable hours dropped considerably and he received much less positive reviews. At a meeting in October of 2002, Foley decided to fire Hasan. The firm notified Hasan in December that he was being terminated. He filed suit in 2004, alleging that Foley violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted Foley’s motion for summary judgment. Hasan appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Coffey, Ripple and Manion reversed and remanded. The Court noted that Hasan proceeded under the “direct method” of proving discrimination. Under the direct method, a plaintiff must present evidence, direct or circumstantial, that points to a discriminatory reason for the action of the employer. Courts accept three types of circumstantial evidence in a direct method case. Hasan relies on two types: a) suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, or comments directed at others in the same group, and b) evidence that the employer’s stated reasons for its conduct is not worthy of belief. Hasan’s evidence included: a partner’s anti-Muslim comments, suspicious timing in Hasan’s downturn in billable hours, the financial health of the firm, Foley’s treatment of other Muslim associates, and a changing justification for Foley’s conduct once it located Hasan’s performance reviews. The Court disagreed with the district court’s treatment of some of the evidence. It concluded, for example, that: a) evidence of an anti-Muslim comment by a partner who was not Hasan’s supervisor was valid nonetheless because the partner attended the meeting at which Foley decided to terminate Hasan (and, in fact, may have instigated the decision), b) evidence of an anti-Muslim remark made a year before the decision to terminate may nonetheless be valid circumstantial evidence when it was made at about the time when Foley began to assign work elsewhere, which in turn became a stated reason for his termination, and c) evidence regarding Foley’s treatment of other Muslims is not per se irrelevant but may be relevant depending on how closely tied it is to Hasan’s circumstances. The Court rejected Foley’s argument that Hasan failed to produce evidence of its treatment of similarly situated employees. The direct method of proof does not require such evidence. Finally, the Court noted that Foley initially claimed that it fired Hasan for poor performance but changed its stance when early, positive performance reviews were discovered and produced. They then claimed that Hasan was fired because the firm did not have enough work to keep all associates busy. The Court held that a reasonable jury could have believed both reasons to be pretext. The Court held that the totality of the evidence and possible inferences precluded summary judgment for Foley and remanded to the district court.

ADA Does Not Require Employer to Violate Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Policy to Accommodate Disabled Employee

KING v. CITY OF MADISON (December 4, 2008)

Gail King was a city bus driver in Madison, Wisconsin (“City”). She developed some health issues and became unable to work. After she took a six-month unpaid disability leave, the City placed her on layoff status. If she became able to return to work during the layoff period, her collective bargaining agreement gave her the right to a) displace the most junior employee in her bargaining unit with an equal or lower job classification, b) fill a vacant position within her bargaining unit for which she was qualified, or c) compete for any vacant positions in other bargaining units. When she received doctor’s permission to return to work, it was qualified by a requirement that she not drive a bus. Based on her seniority and job classification, however, driving a bus was the only job which she could choose by right. King did apply for several vacant positions outside her unit but she was found not to be most qualified and was not selected. The City terminated King after two years of leave, a remedy they were entitled to under the collective bargaining agreement. King brought this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). She alleged that the City failed to accommodate her disability. The district court granted summary judgment to the City. It held that King’s medical condition did not substantially limit her major life activity and she was therefore not a qualified individual with a disability. Additionally, it held that the City provided reasonable accommodation. King appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Wood and Tinder affirmed. The Court stated the requirements of an ADA claim. To prevail, King had to establish that she is a qualified individual with a disability, that the City was aware of her disability, and that the City failed to accommodate her disability. The Court addressed only the accommodation prong. Although an employer can accommodate a disabled person by reassigning her to a different job, an employer need not do so if it would violate a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” policy of the employer. The City’s collective bargaining agreement is such a policy. The City complied with the policy in a neutral manner and was not in violation of the ADA.

First Amendment Does Not Prohibit a Firing of State Employee Based on Party Affiliation if Party Loyalty is Necessary to Perform the Job Effectively

POWERS v. RICHARDS December 2, 2008

Robert Powers was employed by the State of Illinois in 2002 as Deputy Director of the Department of Central Management Services. Powers is alleged to have been part of a scheme to help certain state employees keep their jobs. The employees had been appointed to their jobs for four-year terms. During those terms, they could not be fired but for cause. Instead of allowing their terms to expire shortly after the election of a new governor and risk being replaced, these employees voluntarily resigned before the election. They were then reappointed to new four-year terms. Powers signed the personnel forms that were necessary for the scheme to succeed. Powers did not have the authority to sign the forms and did so knowing that the Director would not. In October of 2002, Powers took a new job as Executive Secretary of the Civil Service Commission (“Commission”). The role of the Commission is to hear appeals of state employees regarding discharges and discipline, modify personnel rules, and investigate personnel violations. Powers’ role as Executive Secretary included drafting rules and regulations, making recommendations regarding resolution of disputes, and interpreting the Personnel Code, among others. When a new governor took office in January of 2003, he began an investigation into the late appointments. The governor’s office concluded that Powers was involved in the scheme and referred its findings to the Commission. The Commission suspended Powers and authorized its Chairman to conduct a hearing. The Chairman was authorized to fire Powers if he did not produce exculpatory evidence at the hearing. The Chairman notified Powers of his rights and held a hearing. The Chairman recommended that Powers be fired – and he was. Powers received a post-deprivation hearing before an ALJ. The ALJ concluded that the firing was warranted. Powers brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that his firing was a deprivation of his right to association because it was on account of his party affiliation. He also alleged a lack of pre-deprivation procedural due process. The defendants conceded, for purposes of summary judgment, that Powers was fired because he was a Republican. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants. Powers appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Rovner, and Evans affirmed. The Court stated that the First Amendment does not prohibit a firing based on party loyalty if that loyalty is necessary to properly perform the job. The considerations in determining that necessity include whether the position allows for meaningful input into government decision-making and involves political discretion. The Court reviewed Powers’ job description to decide whether the position was such a position. The Court recited the job’s numerous responsibilities and concluded that they did include broad discretion to make policy, interpret the law, and speak on behalf of the Commission. The position is therefore one into which an incoming administration can appoint someone of its own party. With respect to Powers’ procedural due process argument, the Court noted that when a person is afforded a full post-deprivation hearing, a pre-deprivation hearing satisfies due process if it includes notice, an explanation of the evidence, and an opportunity to be heard. Since Powers concedes that he had all that is required, he cannot prevail. Finally, the Court was not persuaded by Powers’ unsupported claim that the Commission had already decided to fire him before the hearing.

Whistle-Blower is Not Entitled to Exception to Employment-At-Will Doctrine in Indiana

BREGIN v. LIQUIDEBT SYSTEMS, INC. (November 19, 2008)

Donald Bregin was employed as an accounts receivable collector for North American Van Lines, Inc. (“NAVLI”) until the late 1990s. Later, he was a consultant for SIRVA , NAVLI’s parent. In this role, Bregin was involved in NAVLI’s efforts to outsource its collection services. In fact, Bregin took part in negotiations that resulted in a contract between NAVLI and Liquidebt Systems, Inc. (“LSI”), under which LSI would perform those collection services. Bregin was also instrumental in determining the standards under which LSI’s performance would be measured. The parties agreed that SIRVA would evaluate LSI’s performance on how quickly receivables were collected. LSI stood to gain or lose $150,000 depending on whether it was able to show a 10% increase compared to prior years.  LSI hired Bregin away from SIRVA to head up LSI’s delivery of services to NAVLI. Before Bregin left SIRVA, he authored a report that concluded that SIRVA’s accounts receivable were overstated because they included amounts that should be refunded to customers. LSI was not able to meet the agreed performance goal. Bregin believed that SIRVA’s accounting practices were to blame. He reported his concerns to LSI’s management. LSI’s president had Bregin’s complaints evaluated to determine their validity. He discovered that LSI was performing so poorly that it would be subject to the penalty even if SIRVA changed its accounting practices. Bregin was removed from the SIRVA account but initially kept on at LSI. He was eventually fired in December of 2003. Bregin brought suit under Indiana law against LSI and SIRVA, alleging that LSI fired him in retaliation for his reporting the SIRVA accounting practices and that SIRVA tortiously interfered with his employment. The district court granted summary judgment to LSI and SIRVA. Bregin appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Flaum, and Evans affirmed. The Court noted that the Indiana Supreme Court has recently affirmed its adherence to the employment-at-will doctrine. Under the employment-at-will doctrine, an employer and employee can each terminate an employment relationship for any (or no) reason. The Court observed that Indiana did recognize some narrow exceptions. Bregin relied on the McClanahan exception, based on a case in which the Indiana Supreme Court allowed a cause of action for a truck driver who was fired when he refused to haul an illegal load. The act would have subjected him to personal criminal liability. The Court concluded that Bregin’s claim did not fit the exception. Bregin did not identify any criminal act he was asked to perform. Bregin also asked the Court to recognize a new exception for “whistle-blowers.” The Court rejected his request, noting that an Indiana appellate court had rejected the exception in 1980 in a case in which a “vigorous dissent” raised the same argument for the exception.

With respect to Bregin’s allegation that SIRVA tortiously interfered with his employment, the Court was critical of Bregin’s vague articulation of his claim. The Court conceded that SIRVA complained to LSI about Bregin. It also noted, however, that LSI was not meeting its performance goals and was unresponsive to SIRVA’s requests for information. SIRVA’s complaints to LSI were therefore justified and did not support a claim of tortious interference. In addition, LSI’s president testified that he alone made the decisions to remove Bregin from the SIRVA account and to fire him. Bregin cannot make out a case of tortious interference.

Person Who Directs Employee's Performance is Not a Supervisor Under Title VII if He Does Not Have Authority to Affect the Terms and Conditions of Employment

ANDONISSAMY v. HEWLETT-PACKARD CO. (November 7, 2008)

Sanjay Andonissamy, a French citizen of Indian ancestry, began his employment with Hewlett-Packard (“HP”) in April of 2001. He was in the country on an HP-sponsored H-1B visa. [The following is Andonissamy’s version of the story – HP’s version differs greatly] After the events of September 11, 2001, Ken Smith, Andonissamy’s supervisor, began to make derogatory racial, ethnic, and nationalist remarks to and about Andonissamy. Andonissamy frequently complained to Smith’s supervisor. Smith placed Andonissamy on remedial performance plans, allegedly in retaliation for Andonissamy’s complaints about Smith. Andonissamy began taking medication for anxiety and depression in 2002. He was being treated, but his physician never placed him on any restricted work schedule. Andonissamy’s condition worsened in early 2003 after the deaths of his brother and nephew. In May of 2003, Smith made a false report to the company implicating Andonissamy as a security threat. HP fired Andonissamy on June 23, 2003. On September 16, Andonissamy filed an EEOC complaint alleging national origin discrimination. The EEOC dismissed his complaint and issued a right to sue letter. Andonissamy filed a complaint in federal court in April of 2004. In addition to his complaints of national origin discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Andonissamy added a Family and Medical Leave Act count. In November of 2005, Andonissamy added Smith as a defendant on an assault count. The district court dismissed Smith and granted summary judgment to HP. Andonissamy appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Williams, and Sykes affirmed. The Court first addressed Andonissamy’s Title VII hostile work environment claim. In order to survive summary judgment, Andonissamy had to show that a) he was subjected to unwelcome harassment, b) the harassment was based on his national origin, c) it was severe and pervasive enough to amount to a hostile and abusive environment, and d) there exists a basis for employer liability. The Court did not address the first three elements because it found no basis for employer liability. An employer can be vicariously liable for the conduct of a supervisor but can only be liable for the conduct of a co-worker if the company was negligent in discovering or remedying the harassment. A supervisor for purposes of Title VII is the person with the ability to affect the terms and conditions of the plaintiff’s employment. Smith, although he was Andonissamy’s “supervisor” in the sense that he directed his performance, was not a Title VII supervisor. There was no evidence that Smith was able "to hire, fire, promote, demote, discipline or transfer" Andonissamy. In order to hold HP liable for the acts of Smith as co-worker, Andonissamy had to establish that he complained or that the discrimination was so pervasive that HP’s knowledge could be inferred. Although Andonissamy did complain to Smith’s supervisor, he did not specifically complain about national origin discrimination. The Court agreed with the district court that Andonissamy therefore did not make out a Title VII claim. With respect to his companion § 1981 claim, the Court stated that a plaintiff can proceed under the direct or indirect method. The direct method requires evidence that an adverse employment action was based on the plaintiff's national origin. The Court found no such evidence in the record. Under the indirect method, a plaintiff must establish, among other elements, that he was meeting his employer’s legitimate performance expectations. The Court noted that the record contained numerous references to Andonissamy’s performance problems. The Court concluded that Andonissamy was therefore unable to establish a § 1981 claim under either method.

Andonissamy’s retaliation claim could also be established under the direct or indirect method. The indirect method for retaliation, like discrimination, contains an element that Andonissamy was meeting HP’s performance obligations. The Court rejected Andonissamy’s indirect method for establishing his retaliation claim for the same reason it rejected it for his discrimination claim. Under the direct method, Andonissamy had to establish that: a) he engaged in statutorily protected activity, b) his employer took an adverse employment action, and c) there was a causal connection between the two. The Court held that his complaints to HP did not include complaints of national origin discrimination. He was thus unable to establish the statutorily protected activity element. The Court concluded that he failed to establish a retaliation claim under either method. With respect to the FMLA count, the Court noted that Andonissamy never asked for any leave and did not exhibit any dramatic changes in behavior that would have put HP on notice of a need for leave. The Court agreed with the district court that Andonissamy failed to meet his burden under the FMLA.

Finally, the Court addressed Andonissamy’s assault claim against Smith. The assault claim was added to the case after the statute of limitations on the claim had expired. Andonissamy argued that the claim related back to the original claim and was thus permissible under FRCP 15(c). The Court affirmed the dismissal, stating that a claim against a new defendant relates back only when there is a case of mistaken identity. Since Smith supervised Andonissamy for years, that cannot be the case here.

Public Employee's Report of Her "Concerns" Fit Within Her Job Responsibilities and Was Not Protected Speech Under Garcetti

TRIGILLO v. SNYDER (October 31, 2008)

The Illinois Department of Corrections (“Department”) created a new position in 1999 dedicated to procurement matters. The Department hired Tracy Trigillo, an attorney, into the position. Her responsibilities included managing the Department’s contracting, purchasing, leasing, and inventories. She advised department officials on legal matters. She also was responsible for ensuring that contracts were properly bid and in compliance with the Illinois Procurement Act. From early in her employment, Trigillo had concerns about the Department’s procurement practices. She frequently advised her superiors of her concerns, with little effect. In late 2000, she drafted a report that summarized many of her concerns. The report was addressed to the Department of Central Management Services (“CMS”), an agency that provided procurement support to other state agencies. Trigillo also sent the report to the state Attorney General (“AG”). The report contained some allegations of misconduct, although it was principally addressed to policy disputes. Also in 2000, one of Trigillo’s staff members told her that Department officials had rigged the bid of a contract to benefit a friend of the governor. Although the incident predated Trigillo’s tenure in the Department, she was responsible for monitoring an extension of the contract. She reported the information to the FBI but did not advise her superiors that she had done so. When her term of employment was up for renewal in late 2001, the Department chose not to renew. Although she had received acceptable performance reviews during her tenure, her supervisor stated that her approach to procurement principles was “over-zealous” and that she was not a team player. Trigillo brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that she was non-renewed in retaliation for her reports of misconduct. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court separated her speech into three categories. The court held that: a) her routine communications with her superiors were part of her normal job duties and not as a citizen speaking out on matters of public interest, b) her CMS report referred principally to policy disputes and, to the extent it did raise matters of public interest, the Department’s interest in effective operations outweighed Trigillo’s interest as a citizen, and c) her report of misconduct to the FBI was constitutionally protected but there was no evidence that the person who decided not to renew her contract knew about it. Trigillo appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Rovner, Evans, and Williams affirmed. The Court first observed that the district court entered judgment just prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos. Garcetti reaffirmed the limitations imposed by the First Amendment on a public employer’s ability to restrict the “liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private citizens.” The role of the Court is to determine whether the speech is that of an employee doing her job or that of a private citizen reporting on a matter of public interest. Garcetti requires an inquiry into whether the speech in question relates to the employee’s official obligations, even the more general ones. Trigillo conceded on appeal that her routine communications did not meet the Garcetti standard. The Court addressed the other two categories. The Court rejected defendants’ argument that the CMS report was per se “official” because it was required by statute. The Court noted that the statutory duty was very broad and applied to all employees. Instead of looking at a broad duty, the Court looked at the speech at issue and the responsibilities of the employee. The Court held that the CMS report did not meet the Garcetti standard. The report: a) made no “accusations”, b) sought “guidance” on procurement issues, c) was written on Department letterhead, d) was signed by Trigillo in her official capacity, and e) offered her group’s resources to any investigation. The Court held that the report fit squarely within Trigillo’s responsibilities of managing the procurement practices of the Department. With respect to the FBI report, the Court agreed with the district court that Trigillo had presented no evidence that the decision-maker even knew that she made the report. It could not have been the reason for her non-renewal.

Appellant's Failure to Challenge One of Two Independent Grounds For a Holding Consitutes a Waiver of Any Claim of Error With Respect to the Holding

MAHER v. CITY OF CHICAGO (October 31, 2008)

Jerome Maher, a Naval Reservist, went to work for the City of Chicago in 1990. Although he alleges that he was promised an “assistant commissioner” position, his initial position involved managing accounts receivable and developing a computer system in the Aviation Department. In February of 1991, Maher was called to active duty. He alleges that his supervisor was displeased. Upon Maher’s return in September of the same year, he was named “Director of Revenue” at an increased salary. He alleges that his supervisor continued to criticize and threaten his employment because of his military obligations. He also was forced to report to a former subordinate. Maher filed, but later withdrew, a formal complaint with the Department of Labor. He alleged that he had been denied advancement and subjected to humiliation because of his military service. After an internal reorganization in 1993, Maher was named “Manager of Finance.” He received another salary increase and a larger staff. Maher alleged that his office was unusable for a week and that other supervisors harassed and were critical of him and his service. The Navy again called Maher to active duty from August 1996 to May of 1997. The City initially refused to assign Maher to his former duties upon his return. Following complaints and meetings, Maher was given his former responsibilities in July of 1997, although two former staff members were reassigned to work for his supervisor. In January, 1998, the City transferred Maher to its Landside Operations, a division of the Aviation Department that handles ground transportation at the city’s airports. In this position, Maher developed a high-speed rail system and an intermodal facility, operated the parking facilities, and supervised snow removal. Maher sued the City in 2003. He alleged that he suffered adverse employment consequences as a result of his military service on three separate occasions: a) when the City did not give him an assistant commissioner title in 1991, b) when the City named him Manager of Finance in 1993 but again did not give him an assistant commissioner title, and c) when the City transferred him to the Landside Division in 1998. He alleged a violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”). The magistrate judge granted summary judgment to the City on the 1991 and 1993 claims, concluding that Maher produced no evidence that he was hired as an assistant commissioner and produced insufficient evidence that the City’s actions were motivated solely by his military commitment. The magistrate also ruled that laches barred the 1991 action. Maher’s 1998 claim went to trial. The magistrate ruled that evidence of the 1991 and 1993 claims could not be presented at that trial. After one hung jury, a second jury found for the City. Maher appeals: a) the summary judgment on the 1991 claim, b) the exclusion of evidence of the 1991 and 1993 claim from the jury, and c) the jury verdict on the 1998 claim.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Wood, and Williams affirmed. On the 1991 claim, the Court noted that Maher challenged only the magistrate’s laches ruling. He did not challenge the magistrate’s alternative holding that there were no genuine issues of material fact and the City was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When a lower court provides more than one independent ground for a holding, the appellant’s failure to challenge one of them is a waiver of any claim of error with respect to the entire holding. Notwithstanding the Court’s finding of a waiver, it did also address the laches argument on the merits. The Court agreed with the magistrate. Laches requires an unreasonable lack of diligence and prejudice. Maher points to both his Department of Labor complaint and his internal complaints as evidence of his due diligence. The Court noted that the Department of Labor complaint was withdrawn eleven years before the suit was filed. One informal complaint was made five years into that eleven year period. The Court found that the two complaints did not amount to reasonable diligence. The Court also found prejudice to the City. The person who hired Maher testified that he had very little recollection of the circumstances of Maher's hiring.

The Court next addressed the magistrate’s exclusion of the evidence of the 1991 and 1993 incidents at the second trial of the 1998 incident. The Court found that the magistrate did not abuse his discretion. Neither incident was relevant to any alleged adverse employment action in 1998 and both took place before the 1998 decision-maker was in charge.

Finally, Maher challenged the sufficiency of the evidence at the 1998 trial. The Court concluded that Maher’s challenge was procedurally defective. Maher did not file either a FRCP 50(a) or 50(b) motion, both of which are required before challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. Maher conceded as much at oral argument. Nevertheless, the Court proceeded to analyze his argument under the “heavy burden” of a sufficiency of the evidence challenge. Under the USERRA, Maher must establish that he suffered an adverse employment action motivated at least in part by his military service. The Court found against Maher on both points. Maher relied on the facts that he lacked a staff, was not using his CPA qualifications, had a supervisor with less college education, and was responsible for snow removal. The Court held that none of these establish the existence of an adverse employment action. In his new position, he was responsible for large-scale projects involving hundreds of millions of dollars and handled millions of dollars of billing. An adverse employment action must be more disruptive than just a change in responsibilities. Maher also did not establish that a reasonable juror must have found that hostility toward his service was the reason for his transfer. Maher relied on the promotions of others ahead of him, but the person who transferred Maher to Landside was not the same person who promoted the others. When different decision –makers are involved, said the Court, one should not conclude that the difference in their actions was the result of discrimination. The jury had the opportunity to make the inferences that Maher argued – but it didn’t. They were not required to on the record in the case.

Union Members' Ignorance of Side Letter Allowing Reinstatement of Grievance Does Not Excuse Their Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

BELL v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORP. (October 29, 2008)

In the late 1970s through 1980, DaimlerChrysler Corp. (“Chrysler”) laid off hundreds of workers at its New Castle, Indiana plant. The workers were members of the United Auto Workers (“the union”). The union and Chrysler were parties to a collective bargaining agreement and over seventy side letters. The side letters were collected in a so-called “Book of Letters.” The agreement between Chrysler and the union provided laid-off workers a preference over other applicants for job openings at any Chrysler facility within fifty miles of their former work locations. Later side letters expanded the area of preference to any opening within the same state as the employee’s last work location. From 1984 to 1987, Chrysler hired over seven hundred workers at its Kokomo, Indiana plant. It did not offer these jobs to the workers who had been laid off from the New Castle plant. In 2002, Local 371 of the union filed two grievances charging that Chrysler violated their labor agreements by not offering the Kokomo jobs to the laid-off workers. The grievances were filed pursuant to a multiple-step procedure defined by the labor agreements. Chrysler denied the grievances as untimely. Local 371 continued to pursue the grievances to the Appeal Board step of the procedure. At that step, the national union representative decide to withdraw the grievances. The basis for his withdrawal was twofold. First he believed that they were untimely. Second, they also presented significant proof problems due to the deaths and retirements of many necessary witnesses. A local or an individual union member can appeal a grievance withdrawal within thirty days. No appeal was taken of the withdrawal. Two groups of Chrysler employees filed suit in federal court pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. They alleged that Chrysler breached its obligations under the labor agreements. After the two suits were consolidated, the district court granted summary judgment to Chrysler. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The plaintiffs appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Rovner, and Sykes affirmed. The Court noted the hybrid nature of a section 301 suit. Chrysler and the union have agreed to resolve their disputes privately. Union members must avail themselves of that process, up to and including binding arbitration. In a section 301 suit, the union member complains of an employer’s violation of the labor agreement but also complains of the union’s breach of its duty of fair representation with respect to that violation. A member cannot generally bring a section 301 suit until she has first exhausted all her available administrative appeals. There is no dispute in the case that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust available appeals. The Court noted that the Supreme Court, in Clayton v. UAW, has identified situations where that failure can be excused. They are: a) futility – where the union has displayed such hostility to the grievance that further appeals appear futile, b) inadequacy – where the procedure cannot lead to reinstatement of the grievance or result in full relief, and c) undue delay – where exhaustion of all appeals will result in undue delay. The plaintiffs take the position that futility and inadequacy excuse their failure to exhaust.

The Court first addressed plaintiffs' inadequacy argument. The plaintiffs argued that Chrysler should not be allowed to rely on one of the side letters because: a) Chrysler failed to raise it until its reply brief, and b) the collective bargaining agreement contained an integration clause. The Court rejected the arguments. It stated that: a) Chrysler’s reference to the side letter was in response to plaintiffs’ argument and properly appeared in their reply, and b) the plaintiffs could have filed a surreply to Chrysler’s reply, if they wanted an opportunity to address the document. The Court further held that the plaintiffs waived the integration clause argument by not raising it in the district court. The Court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that they are excused from further appeals because the appeals could not have provided them with full relief. The second Clayton factor of inadequacy excuses exhaustion only if neither reinstatement nor full relief is possible. Further appeals could have resulted in a reinstatement of the grievance. Plaintiffs’ final argument on the inadequacy factor is that they did not even know of the existence of the side letter. The Court conceded that plaintiffs did lack knowledge of the side letter. The Court concluded, however, that there was an insufficient record to excuse them from that knowledge. They knew of the existence of several side letters and made no showing that, with due diligence, they could not have discovered the letter.

With respect to the futility factor, the plaintiffs simply rely on one union representative’s comment that the appeal was a “dead issue” and the general lack of support or direction they received from the union. The Court noted that it had “repeatedly rejected” those kinds of statements as demonstrating the pervasive hostility required by the first Clayton factor. The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment.

Failure to Comply With Settlement in Federal Civil Rights Case Does Not Amount to Retaliation

KAY V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (October 27, 2008)

Gail Kay taught in the Chicago public school system. After she retired in 1994, she brought a § 1983 action against the Board of Education (“Board”). She alleged that the Board penalized her on account of her speech. The parties settled the litigation in 1996 and her case was dismissed. In the settlement, the Board offered to rehire Kay into an available future position. In 1997, she was offered an opportunity to return to her former school. She taught for seven more years – yet she never received another paycheck. After retiring again in 2004, she brought suit against the Board in federal court to enforce the 1996 settlement, alleging that her seven years of teaching without pay was a breach of the settlement. The district court dismissed the case on its own accord for “lack of venue” because Kay was governed by a collective bargaining agreement that required arbitration. Kay appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Sykes and Tinder vacated the judgment of the court and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. First, the Court listed several reasons why the court erred in dismissing the suit because of the collective bargaining agreement’s arbitration clause: a) only the union and employer can invoke the clause, b) a settlement of a dispute is not arbitrable as a claim arising under the agreement, c) a collective bargaining agreement cannot require the arbitration of civil rights claims, and d) the Board cannot compel arbitration with a volunteer, which they claim is Kay’s status. The panel also criticized the court below for acting independently, without benefit of the views of the parties.

Although the Court held that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint, it identified (and asked for supplemental briefing on) a different problem. The Supreme Court’s decision in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. makes clear that the vehicle for enforcement of a settlement of a federal case is a contract claim, which cannot be brought in federal court unless it qualifies independently under diversity principles. Apart from a settlement, a state’s wage-payment statute is the proper vehicle for a claim for unpaid wages. Kay conceded that she has no federal claim to enforce the settlement or for unpaid wages. She asserted, however, a claim that the Board’s failure to abide by the settlement is further retaliation for her assertion of constitutional rights. The only assertion of rights she maintains, however, are those that pre-dated the settlement. The Court noted that the Board’s failure to pay cannot be deemed a revived retaliation claim under Kokkonen. Finally, the panel did consider whether the Kokkonen rule applied in the context of a state actor defendant. It held that the Constitution does not require a state actor to keep its promise; it only requires some process before depriving a person of property. Kay’s opportunity to litigate her case in state court is process enough.  

Employee's Termination Three Months After Threat of EEOC Complaint Does Not Give Rise to Inference of Retaliation

AMRHEIN v. HEALTH CARE SERVICE CORP.  (October 20, 2008)

Kitsy Amrhein was a group specialist in Health Care Service Corp.’s (“HCSC”) Springfield office. Her principal duty was to service employers that have Blue Cross/Blue Shield Insurance. Amrhein and Scott Redpath became group specialists at the same time. In addition to Amrhein and Redpath, the group consisted of six other women. The group all reported to Benner, who reported to Marquedant, who reported to Woods. In late 2002, Amrhein became convinced that Redpath was performing at a lower level than she but receiving preferred treatment. She made her opinion known to others, including Benner, and continued to do so throughout 2003. HCSC disciplined Amrhein twice in 2003, once for disclosing competitive information and once for excessive personal phone use. After the discipline for the telephone use, things started to heat up.

  • Amrhein, Brenner, and Marquedant met in early December to discuss the telephone issue. At that meeting, Amrhein first said that she was considering filing an EEOC complaint.
  • In December, Marquedant initiated a human resources investigation in response to an Amrhein e-mail complaint. In January of 2005, Amrhein met with Marquedant and the human resources representative. The human resources representative reported that the investigation revealed no evidence of gender discrimination towards Amrhein. Again, Amrhein said she was going to file an EEOC complaint.
  • In January, Marquedant monitored a phone conversation where Amrhein revealed what Marquedant believed was confidential information.
  • In early February, Woods asked her supervisor for help in dealing with Amrhein. She referred to Amrhein as a “huge challenge,” “disruptive,” and “costing a huge amount of time and resources.”
  • At a meeting in February regarding personal time, Amrhein complained about her inability to use some accrued time. Marquedant told Amrhein that she had opened a “can of worms” and that she should not have “made the complaint.” Witnesses stated that Amrhein became very argumentative with Marquedant, but Amrhein denies it.

HCSC terminated Amrhein on March 1 for her insubordination at the February meeting and the improper confidential information disclosure in January. Amrhein brought an action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. She alleged that HCSC discriminated against her on the basis of gender and that HCSC retaliated against her because of her complaints about the discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment for HCSC. Amrhein appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer and Wood affirmed. Judge Rovner dissented. Amrhein did not appeal the judgment on the discrimination itself so the Court addressed only the retaliation claim. The majority observed that an employee can establish discrimination for opposing an unlawful business practice in two ways. In the first (the direct method), she must show a) a statutorily protected activity, b) the employer’s materially adverse action, and c) a causal connection. The majority concluded that Amrhein’s circumstantial evidence was insufficient to support an inference that her termination was related to her threat to file an EEOC complaint. The Court agreed that the timing of events can provide that inference, but found that the almost three month period between Amrhein’s first “threat” to file a complaint and her termination was too attenuated to do so. In the second (the indirect method), an employee can show a) a protected activity, b) her performance meeting legitimate employment expectations, c) an adverse employment action, and d) less favorable treatment than a similarly situated employee who did not engage in the protected activity. The Court concluded that Amrhein did not identify a similarly situated individual. Such an individual need not be identical, but must be comparable in material respects. None of the three individuals suggested by Amrhein had comparable disciplinary histories. The Court added that even if Amrhein had met her indirect method burden, there was ample evidence to support HCSC’s proffered reasons for the termination.

Judge Rovner dissented, admitting that it was a close case. She focused on the statements of Woods and Marquedant in February, just before the decision to terminate. She believed that they implied a retaliatory intent and that the Court should treat the case as a mixed motive case. In such a case, the employer must prove that it would have made the same decision had it not considered the protected activity. Judge Rovner noted that mixed motive cases are rarely summary judgment cases. Because of the questions of fact regarding whether HCSC would have fired Amrhein absent their unlawful motive, she would remand the case for trial.

Employee's Allegation That Employer Denied Him a Raise Every Year Survives Ledbetter Challenge

CHAUDHRY v. NUCOR STEEL  (October 15, 2008)

Subhash Chaudhry has worked at Nucor, which manufactures rolled steel sheets, since 1988. In 2007, he worked as a Quality Control Inspector (“QCI”). [The following are allegations of the complaint, taken as true.] His responsibilities included inspecting the rolled steel sheets produced at the temper mill. Nucor increased the pay grades of some QCIs in 2003, but not those, like Chaudhry, who worked at the temper mill. Chaudhry’s complaints fell on deaf ears. Chaudhry complained that some of his co-workers made fun of him and called him names. Those complaints were ignored as well. Chaudhry also tried to improve his salary through a program in which QCIs who attended a training session and made four customer visits in a year could qualify for a pay grade increase. Chaudhry frequently asked for opportunities to make a customer visit.  Nucor controlled the visits and never gave him such an opportunity. On July 28, 2006, Chaudhry filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. He alleged that Nucor’s failure to give him the pay raise that they gave other QCIs amounted to discrimination against him on account of his race, religion, and national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. He further stated that Nucor had prevented him from making customer visits and qualifying for a pay grade increase. In a later letter to the EEOC, he complained of the harassment. On February 7, 2007, Chaudhry filed suit alleging that Nucor violated Title VII by: a) raising the salaries of other QCIs whose jobs required less effort, b) informing other QCIs of customer visit opportunities, and c) failing to control the employees’ harassment of him. Nucor initially answered the complaint. A few months later, however, the Supreme Court decided Ledbetter. Nucor, relying on Ledbetter, asked the district court to dismiss the complaint. The court agreed and dismissed the pay discrimination claim. It also dismissed the harassment claim, holding that it was not a part of the EEOC charge and Chaudhry’s letter did not expand the scope of the charge. The court then dismissed the case and entered final judgment (the same day) without addressing the customer visit charge. Chaudhry attempted to amend his complaint to add a § 1981 claim. Nucor objected because judgment had already been entered. In his reply, Chaudhry asked the court to treat his motion as a motion to amend the judgment. The court apparently did so but treated the date of the reply brief as the date of the motion and denied it as untimely. Chaudhry appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Flaum, and Williams reversed and remanded. The Court began its analysis with Title VII and Ledbetter. Before filing a Title VII complaint, an employee must file a charge with the EEOC. The charge must be filed within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. The alleged unlawful employment practice, under Ledbetter, is the single, discrete unlawful act at issue, even if the effects of the act continue with each paycheck. The Court agreed with the conclusion of the district court that the discrete act with respect to the raise claim was Nucor’s June, 2003 decision to give raises to the other QCIs. Since Chaudhry did not file his charge within 300 days of that date, the district court correctly dismissed this claim.

With respect to the customer visit claim, however, the same analysis produced a different result . The Court observed that Chaudhry’s EEOC charge and complaint alleges that Nucor denied him a raise every year by preventing him from participating in customer visits. Each of those decisions was a new violation. Since Chaudhry filed his charge within 300 days of the last of those acts, his customer visit claim is not time-barred by Ledbetter. The Court also rejected Nucor’s claim that its alleged failure to notify Chaudhry of a customer visit opportunity was not a materially adverse employment decision. The failure to notify deprived Chaudhry of compensation which he would have earned, at least as the complaint reads, but for the failure.

The Court commented on the pleading amendment dispute as well, although the remand eliminated any need to decide the issue. The Court criticized the district court, referring to its actions in entering judgment on the same day it granted the motion to dismiss as “unorthodox” and its handling of the motion to reopen as “hyper-technical.”

"Clear Hostility" Toward Union Leads to Entry of Preliminary Injunction; Broad Injunction Limited to Violations Similar to Those Already Committed is Acceptable

LINEBACK v. SPURLINO MATERIALS  (October 8, 2008)

Spurlino Materials (“Spurlino”) produces and sells concrete. In 2005, several employees began a union representation effort. Spurlino management allegedly campaigned heavily against the union. Notwithstanding those efforts, the company employees voted to be represented by the union. The NLRB certified the union and it began negotiating its first contract with Spurlino in early 2006. The parties continued to negotiate through early 2007, but were unable to agree on contract terms (and apparently still have not). Attendance at union meetings declined during this period, possibly because of fears of retaliation by Spurlino. Spurlino management allegedly continued an intense harassment campaign against the union.

Spurlino historically used a seniority-based dispatch procedure. Spurlino sent out each of its drivers in order of seniority until each had been given one assignment. The rest of the assignments for each day were dispatched in order of each driver’s return from his or her original assignment.  In December of 2005, Spurlino was awarded a large contract to provide concrete for the construction of a new football stadium for the Indianapolis Colts. A separate labor agreement covered the stadium project. Stadium contractors paid higher wages under the separate agreement than Spurlino normally paid its employees. Thus, Spurlino drivers preferred the stadium work over other Spurlino assignments. The union alleges that Spurlino used the opportunities provided by the stadium contract to retaliate and discriminate against the leaders of the union movement. It claims that Spurlino a) manipulated the seniority dispatch system to keep the union leaders from the preferred jobs at the stadium, b) changed the way work was assigned when it built a temporary, portable plant, and c) instituted a thirteen-factor performance review to discriminate against union leaders. In August of 2006, the union filed a series of unfair labor practice charges against Spurlino. They were consolidated into an NLRB complaint that alleged that Spurlino: a) discriminated against union leaders because of their activities, b) changed pre-existing work assignment policies without negotiation, and c) implemented an evaluation procedure without negotiation. The ALJ commenced a hearing. During a hearing recess, in May of 2007, the NLRB requested injunctive relief from the district court pending a final Board decision. In June, the court entered an order enjoining Spurlino from a) retaliating against union members, b) acting unilaterally to change the terms and conditions of employment, c) refusing to bargain in good faith, and d) interfering with employees’ exercise of their rights. Spurlino appeals. Shortly after Spurlino’s appeal, the ALJ issued its order. It concluded that Spurlino had discriminated against union leaders and had unilaterally changed the terms and conditions of employment. That order is on appeal before the NLRB.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Ripple, and Manion (concurring) affirmed. The Court noted that the National Labor Relations Act authorizes injunctive relief, pending resolution of an NLRB claim, in “just and proper” circumstances. The factors are the same as those that apply to injunctive relief in other contexts: a) no adequate remedy at law, b) irreparable harm that outweighs harm to the employer, c) the public interest, and d) likelihood of success on the merits. The Court addressed each in turn. NLRB proceedings are frequently slow, potentially allowing time for employers to “chill” union activities. Especially in the case of new union representation, there is a risk that no remedy at law will adequately address the harm. On the issue of irreparable harm, the lower court had clear evidence of Spurlino’s hostility toward the union and continued discrimination toward the union and its leaders. The public interest was served by an order prohibiting an unfair labor practice. The district court had found “strong showings” of likelihood of success on the discrimination and unilateral changes in the terms of employment charges and “at least a substantial showing” on the good faith bargaining charge. The Court concluded that the district court considered the right factors and it found no error in its evaluation of them. It did not abuse its discretion.

The Court next addressed the scope of the injunction entered by the district court. Spurlino argued that each of the four paragraphs of the injunction was overbroad. The Court addressed each paragraph in turn under the FRCP 65(d) requirement that injunctions be specific and “describe in reasonable detail” the acts enjoined. The Court also noted that a court may enjoin acts a) which are similar to acts it has found to be unlawful and b) whose commission, if not enjoined, can fairly be anticipated from the defendant’s past conduct. Spurlino argued that paragraphs 1 and 2 were overbroad. Paragraph 1 enjoins retaliation against “all” union members, even though the complaint alleges retaliation against a few named leaders. Paragraph 2 enjoins “all” unilateral actions to change terms and conditions of employment, though the complaint’s allegations were less broad. The Court relied on the district court’s finding of a “continuous and deliberate” effort by Spurlino to undermine the union in holding that these paragraphs were not overbroad. Paragraph 3 enjoins Spurlino from refusing to bargain in good faith. The complaint’s allegation of refusal to bargain was limited to the portable plant. The Court also upheld this paragraph, relying on the district court’s finding that Spurlino engaged in a pattern of refusals to bargain and that further refusals were likely to occur, if not enjoined. Paragraph 4 of the injunction broadly enjoined Spurlino from “in any like manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees’ exercise of their rights.” The Court observed that the provision was similar to a provision struck by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Express Pub. Co.. However, it relied on the addition of the word “like,” not present in the Express injunction, to uphold the paragraph as within the power of the court to enjoin related unlawful acts.

Judge Manion concurred. He wrote separately to emphasize that the injunction against refusing to bargain in good faith does not enjoin “any” refusals to bargain. It only enjoins refusals that are similar to the refusals alleged by the NLRB and found by the district court.

Employee's Protest of Supervisor's Conduct for Personal Reasons Does Not Support a Title VII Retaliation Claim

TATE v. EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT SERVICES  (October 10, 2008)

Alshafi Tate started working for Executive Management Services (“EMS”) as a commercial building cleaner in August, 2002. Dawn Burban was his immediate supervisor. Tate alleges, and Burban denies, that he and Burban began a long, consensual sexual relationship almost immediately. Tate also alleges, and Burban denies, that when he tried to end the relationship in late 2003, Burban threatened that he would lose his job if he did so. They both agree that they had a heated argument in Burban’s office in January 2004. Tate claims that it occurred when he finally insisted that he was ending the relationship. Burban claims it resulted from Tate’s refusal to perform a proper work assignment. Burban called her supervisor, who told Burban to tell Tate to go home. Burban also called her district manager and reported Tate for insubordination. Tate tried to reach both the supervisor and district manager the next day to relate his side of the story. Instead, he was told he was fired for insubordination. Tate filed suit, alleging both sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The jury found for EMS on the sexual harassment claim and in Tate’s favor on the retaliation claim. The district court denied EMS’ FRCP 50(b) motion on the retaliation claim. EMS appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Posner, and Williams reversed. The Court laid out the elements of Tate’s Title VII retaliation action: a) a statutorily protected activity, b) the employer’s adverse action, and c) a causal relationship. To show he engaged in protected activity, the Court stated that Tate had to show a reasonable belief that he opposed a practice that violated Title VII. There is a split in the circuits on the issue of whether the rejection of a supervisor’s sexual advances could amount to protected activity. The Court decided that it did not have to take a position on the issue. Instead, it found no evidence that Tate actually believed Burban’s conduct was unlawful. The Court recognized that Tate protested Burban’s actions. But it found that the evidence supported the conclusion that his protests were personal, not because he believed that Burban’s behavior was unlawful. Title VII exists to protect employees from retaliation for protesting discrimination they, in good faith, believe they have suffered. Tate does not meet the protected activity element.

Financially Independent State Lottery is Not a State Agency For Sovereign Immunity Purposes

BURRUS V. STATE LOTTERY COMMISSION  (October 6, 2008)

Indiana created the State Lottery Commission of Indiana (the “Commission”) in 1989 to operate lottery games in the state. The legislature set it up to operate as a “separate body politic and corporate” from the rest of state government. The legislature authorized up to $18 million in start up costs. The Commission only used $6 million and repaid that within the year. The lottery has been quite successful. It has generated over $3 billion in profits since its inception. The governor appoints the director and five commissioners who operate the lottery. The Commission has the authority to sue and be sued. It operates independently of the state, although it is heavily regulated by the state.  The Commission deposits all of its revenue into a fund separate from the state’s general revenue fund. The funds are first used to pay for the prizes and operating costs. Each quarter, the remaining funds are disbursed to the credit of the state teachers’ retirement fund ($7.5 million) and the pension relief fund ($7.5 million). Any quarterly surplus is transferred to a fund which is used to support local and state capital projects.

Between January and May of 2005, seven employees of the Commission were fired. They all sued the Commission under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Each alleged that he or she was fired as a result of his or her race. The Commission moved to dismiss the § 1981 claims on the grounds of sovereign immunity. The district court denied the motion. The Commission appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Ripple, and Manion affirmed. The appeal raised only one issue – whether the Eleventh Amendment shields the Commission from the §1981 claims. The Court began with the basic proposition that unconsenting states, and their agencies, are immune from federal lawsuits under the Eleventh Amendment. Here, the parties simply disagreed over whether the Commission is a state agency. The Court listed the two factors that generally determine that issue. The first, and most important, is the degree of financial autonomy from the state. The other factor is the general legal status of the entity. The Court observed that the Commission’s complete lack of financial reliance on the state and the total lack of responsibility by the state for any of the Commission’s obligations strongly weighed against finding the Commission to be an agency of the state. While it is true that a judgment against the Commission would deprive the state of revenues it otherwise would have received but for the judgment, the panel noted that the Supreme Court had rejected that “state-benefit” theory of financial dependence.

The second prong of the test, general legal status, also supports the Court’s conclusion that the Commission is not an agency of the state. The Court pointed to a number of factors to support its conclusion: a) it sets its own budget, b) it controls its day-to-day operations, c) it sues in its own name, and d) it enters into contracts in its own name. The fact that the governor appoints the commissioners was given little weight by the Court given the Commission’s financial independence. Finally, the Court noted that the fact that the lottery is the subject of much state regulation does not change the result that the Commission is not an agency of the state and not immune from suit.

District Court Properly Ignored Affidavits of Effects of AIDS When EEOC Brought ADA Case Based on HIV

EEOC v. LEE’S LOG CABIN  (October 6, 2008)

Korrin Stewart was diagnosed as HIV-positive when she was just fourteen years old. Shortly thereafter, she learned that it had actually developed into AIDS. At the age of eighteen, she applied for a server position at Lee’s Log Cabin (“Lee’s”). She was aware that the job had a 25-30 pound lifting requirement. Nevertheless, she stated on her application that she could lift no more than 10 pounds and that there were no accommodations that would allow her to perform that requirement of the job. After some time went by without a response from Lee’s, Stewart visited the restaurant and spoke with Zastrow, an assistant manager. In response to Zastrow’s question, Stewart admitted that she was the same person who had alleged that a prior employer had fired her when the employer learned that she was HIV-positive. Stewart also saw a copy of her application, on which appeared the notation “HIV+.” Lee’s did not offer the position to Stewart, ostensibly on the ground that she had no server experience and could not meet the lifting requirement. The EEOC filed suit, alleging that Lee’s violated the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The EEOC alleged that Lee’s failed to hire Stewart because it learned that she was HIV-positive. About one month before trial, in response to Lee’s motion for summary judgment, the EEOC presented affidavits from Stewart and her doctors describing how AIDS affected her daily activities. The EEOC presented no separate evidence that HIV affected her daily activities. The district court refused to consider the affidavits because the EEOC had never pleaded the presence of AIDS. Without the affidavits, there was no evidence in the record of the effect of HIV on Stewart’s daily activities. The court granted summary judgment for Lee’s, also noting that a) there was no evidence that Lee’s knew Stewart had AIDS, and b) there was a question whether she met the “qualified individual” element of the statute because of the lifting requirement. EEOC appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne and Sykes affirmed, Judge Williams dissenting. The majority started with the fundamentals. The ADA prohibits employment discrimination “against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability.” Whether an individual is disabled is an individual inquiry into whether the impairment “substantially limits” the individual’s major life activities. The Court commented that the EEOC “complicated” the inquiry by attempting to refashion its claim as an AIDS claim late in the case. The Court called it a “major alteration” of the EEOC’s case. The Court focused on the Supreme Court’s Bragdon decision and its description of the development of the disease. Noting that there are significant symptomatic differences at different stages of the disease, the Court thought that whether Stewart was HIV-positive or had AIDS was highly relevant to the case. Once the Court concluded that the district court had not abused its discretion in disallowing the affidavits, it had little difficulty agreeing with the proposition that the record was devoid of evidence of the effect of HIV on Stewart’s major life activities.

The Court went on to address, as an alternative ground for affirming summary judgment, the issue of whether Stewart was a “qualified individual.” A “qualified individual” is a person who can perform the essential functions of the job, either with or without reasonable accommodations. The Court held that Stewart was not a “qualified individual,” given her statement in her application that she could not meet the lifting requirement of the job, even with an accommodation.

Judge Williams dissented. She pointed out that HIV and AIDS are not different conditions. Rather, AIDS is simply the final stage of a single disease – HIV. Different stages of the disease are also not necessarily accompanied by different symptoms. Stewart never ceased being HIV-positive. The evidence of the effect of AIDS on Stewart’s daily activities also described the effect of HIV on her activities. Judge Williams compared it to a cancer patient progressing through different stages of the disease. She believed that the EEOC had sufficiently presented evidence that Stewart’s disease substantially limited her major life activity. She also believed that there were questions of fact with respect to the “qualified individual” issue. There was a dispute as to whether the lifting requirement was truly an essential function of the job. Stewart’s testimony that her lifting restriction was temporary also raised a question of fact with respect to her application answers.