Class-of-One Equal Protection Plaintiff's Failure to Allege Facts Negating Any Rational Basis For Government Classification Results in Dismissal of Complaint
FLYING J INC. v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN (December 5, 2008)
Flying J develops and operates travel plazas for truck drivers and other travelers. It purchased 50+ acres in New Haven, Indiana (the “City”) to develop a new travel plaza. The City opposed the development and took the position that it was not allowed under the then-current zoning. Flying J ultimately prevailed in the Indiana state courts on its challenge to the City’s position. Undaunted, the City amended its zoning ordinance to limit developments of this type to two acres. The Flying J development was the only parcel affected by this limitation. The City held several public meetings on the amendment but never gave Flying J specific notice of them. In August of 2007, the City advised Flying J that its development must comply with the two acre rule. Flying J filed suit in September, alleging violations of its rights under the U.S. and Indiana Constitutions. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. Flying J appeals.
In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Flaum and Williams affirmed. The Court first addressed the City’s position that the Court lacked jurisdiction under the principles of Williamson County. The Supreme Court in Williamson County held that takings claims in land use cases are not ripe until the local authority has reached a final decision, including a decision on a variance application and compensation. Courts have applied the doctrine to takings claims even when they are labeled as due process or equal protection claims. The Court noted that it has created an exception for claims alleging the malicious conduct of a government agent unrelated to a legitimate state objective. Flying J’s allegations of the City’s protracted litigation, its covert amendment to the ordinance, the ordinance’s application only to Flying J, and the potential conflicts of interest of several commission members fit its claim within that exception.
The Court next addressed whether Flying J stated a claim. Relying on its precedent in Wroblewski and Lauth, the Court identified the pleading standard for a class-of-one equal protection claim. In those cases, the plaintiff must negate any set of facts that provides a rational basis for the classification challenged. Animus of the defendant comes into play only after the plaintiff has pled facts that show the irrationality of the government’s conduct. Flying J does allege facts that would show that the City took its actions in response solely to Flying J’s development but it does not allege facts to establish that the zoning amendment was irrational. Flying J’s allegations therefore do not overcome the presumption of rationality the government enjoys in cases of this nature.
David Johnson obtained a certificate of purchase for a tax-delinquent piece of land in Cook County (the “County”). The certificate allowed him to acquire the property by following certain notice requirements and by then petitioning the court. He complied with the notice requirements. Before he petitioned the court, the County realized that its determination of delinquency was in error. The County and Johnson agreed to an order, entered by the court, declaring the tax sale in error and directing the cancellation of the certificate and return of the purchase price. Notwithstanding the order, Johnson petitioned the state court for a deed. Johnson later filed suit in federal court. He alleged that the County’s failure to issue the deed violated his constitutional rights and the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, as well as various other state statutory and common laws. The court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the complaint sought review of a state court decision in violation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that jurisdiction was barred by the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”). Johnson appeals.