County Tax Board Members Receive Absolute Immunity

HEYDE v. PITTENGER (January 11, 2011)

Raymond Heyde owns residential property in Tazewell County, Illinois, just south of Peoria. In late 2003, Heyde received his 2004 tax assessment notice. He filed a complaint with the County Board of Review, asserting that the $207,000 assessment was too high (the proper assessment level is 33 1/3% of the property's fair cash value). The Board reduced the assessment to $140,000. He complained again after he received his 2005 notice, which increased the assessment to $149,000. The Board declined to reduce their assessment. The assessment went up again in 2006, to $153,000. Again, he complained and submitted a then-recent $435,000 property appraisal (which would result in a $145,000 assessment). The Board not only did not reduce the assessment, but increased it to $436,000 in a June 1, 2006 decision. Heyde continued to complain about his assessment each year -- the Board refused to budge. Heyde appealed the June 1 decision to the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board. Although the Appeal Board reduced the assessment, Heyde was still dissatisfied and has sought administrative review in state court. He also has additional appeals before the Appeal Board for subsequent years. In 2007, Heyde filed a § 1983 action against the members of the Board and the County Assessors. He alleged that the defendants deprived him of equal protection rights, conspired to deprive him of his equal protection rights and retaliated against him for exercising his lawful challenge rights. Judge Mihm (C.D. Ill.) concluded that the members of the Board had absolute immunity and dismissed the complaint as to them. He dismissed without prejudice as to the Assessors based on principles of comity on the grounds that Heyde had not exhausted state remedies. Heyde appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Cudahy, Rovner, and Evans affirmed. Addressing first case against the Board members, the Court noted that absolute immunity does apply to a quasi-judicial adjudicatory body when it acts in a capacity functionally equivalent to that of a judge or prosecutor. It does not, however, apply to administrative or ministerial acts. Relying on the Board’s statutory authority and the Court’s own precedent, the Court concluded that Board members were entitled to absolute immunity. They fit neatly within the factors identified by the Supreme Court in Butz. The Court turned to the claims against the Assessors. In McNary, the Supreme Court held that challenges to state tax systems must occur within the state’s courts, with final review in the Supreme Court. A § 1983 action is therefore not the proper vehicle. The Court rejected Heyde's argument that the Illinois system failed to meet the "plain, speedy and efficient" exception to the McNary rule. The Court recognized the delays inherent in the Illinois system but concluded (not for the first time) that they were not enough to avoid McNary.

Court Certifies Home-Rule Tax Question To Illinois Supreme Court

CITY OF CHICAGO v. STUBHUB! (September 29, 2010)

 

The practice of "scalping" tickets, or selling them above face value, is generally illegal in Illinois. But there are exceptions. One is for an Internet auction site -- but only if it registers with the State, either collects and remits taxes or publishes a notice on its site advising the actual reseller of its tax obligations, and agrees to provide information about any reseller if requested by law enforcement or government official. StubHub! operates just such a site and complies with those requirements of Illinois law. It has chosen the "notice" alternative rather than the "collects and remits" alternative. The City of Chicago would rather have StubHub! collect the tax so it does not have to worry about whether each of thousands of resellers pay it – so it amended an ordinance requiring direct payment by StubHub!. The City filed suit seeking a declaration that StubHub! is responsible for the taxes. Judge Andersen (N.D. Ill.) dismissed the complaint on the ground that tickets are "tangible or personal property" and that, therefore, the Preemption Act prohibits a home-rule municipality from imposing the tax. Chicago appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Bauer and Kanne certified a question to the Illinois Supreme Court. The Court first disposed of StubHub's arguments that federal law somehow barred the tax. First, the Communications Decency Act is simply irrelevant to the issue. Second, the Internet Tax Freedom Act prohibits “[m]ultiple or discriminatory taxes on electronic commerce.” The Chicago tax is neither. Turning back to state law, the Court recognized that an intermediate state court has concluded that a ticket is "tangible or personal property" (ironically, adopting a point argued by the City). A federal court sitting in diversity will frequently follow (even though not required to) an intermediate state court's ruling, if there is no reason to believe that the state Supreme Court would rule otherwise. Even if the ruling is erroneous, later state-court cases that address the same issue can correct the error. Here, however, the Court was concerned that the state Supreme Court might never be heard on the issue. Apparently, there are only two cases that address the issue. Both started in state court but were removed to federal court – and any future-filed case will likely be removable. The Court, therefore, requested the Illinois Supreme Court to advise "whether municipalities may require electronic intermediaries to collect and remit amusement taxes on resold tickets."

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Deprives Federal Court of Jurisdiction When the Gravamen of the Complaint is That a State Court Order Was Erroneous

JOHNSON v. ORR (December 04, 2008)

David Johnson obtained a certificate of purchase for a tax-delinquent piece of land in Cook County (the “County”). The certificate allowed him to acquire the property by following certain notice requirements and by then petitioning the court. He complied with the notice requirements. Before he petitioned the court, the County realized that its determination of delinquency was in error. The County and Johnson agreed to an order, entered by the court, declaring the tax sale in error and directing the cancellation of the certificate and return of the purchase price. Notwithstanding the order, Johnson petitioned the state court for a deed. Johnson later filed suit in federal court. He alleged that the County’s failure to issue the deed violated his constitutional rights and the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, as well as various other state statutory and common laws. The court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the complaint sought review of a state court decision in violation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that jurisdiction was barred by the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”). Johnson appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Evans and Tinder affirmed. The Court first addressed the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. That doctrine deprives federal courts (except the Supreme Court) of jurisdiction to hear a party complain about the effects of a state court judgment. Although Johnson attempted to style his request for relief as something other than an attack on the state court judgment, the Court looked beyond the complaint to identify the actual injury. Johnson’s injury, the state court’s failure to grant him a tax deed, comes directly from the order entered by the court canceling the certificate. The gravamen of his complaint is that the court’s order was erroneous. The district court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction of Johnson’s constitutional claims. Johnson also alleged a violation of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (the “Act”), a federal statute. Although a claim pursuant to a federal statute would normally provide subject matter jurisdiction, the Court stated that such a claim should be dismissed if it is “wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” The Court concluded that Johnson’s claim was just that. The Act applies only to sales of real estate. Here, the County did not sell the property and Johnson did not buy the property. Even if there was a sale, the Court observed that the Act would not apply because it contains an exemption for a sale by a government body. Although it did not have to, the Court did briefly address the TIA issue. It disagreed with the district court’s conclusion that the TIA applied. The TIA only applies where the relief requested would reduce the State’s tax benefit or impede the collection of taxes. The Court found neither present in the case.
 

Tax Injunction Act Bars Federal Jurisdiction of Federal Constitutional Challenge of State Tax

SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE PROPERTIES, LLC v. COUNTY OF ST. CLAIR (November 14, 2008)

Scott Air Force Base Properties, LLC (“Scott”) entered into a 50-year lease with the United States for property located on Scott Air Force Base. The lease was entered into pursuant to the Military Housing Privatization Initiative (“MHPI”), under which private companies can lease military land for the purposes of constructing, maintaining, and operating rental housing for military personnel. The County of St. Clair, in which the property is located, added the leaseholds to its tax rolls and assessed an ad valorem tax on each parcel. Scott filed a suit for a declaratory judgment that the leasehold interest and all transactions under the MHPI were exempt from state taxation. Scott asserted that the assessment violated the U.S. Constitution, federal law, and state law. The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because of the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”). Scott appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Manion, and Sykes affirmed. The Court stated that the TIA bars federal jurisdiction of any suit in which the relief sought would reduce state tax revenue. It prevents both injunctive and declaratory relief. It applies even where the basis of the relief sought is a constitutional claim. The bar is expressly conditioned, added the Court, on the availability of a “plain, speedy, and efficient remedy” in state court. Scott has the burden of demonstrating the failure of the state remedy under the TIA test. Here, the Court found that Scott was clearly seeking to avoid paying state taxes. The TIA applied unless an adequate remedy was not available to Scott in the Illinois courts. Scott only challenged the “efficiency” of the Illinois remedy. Scott asserts that the Illinois remedy does not meet the TIA test because it requires that Scott pursue both an exemption application and a valuation protest. The Court rejected the argument, while conceding that a more efficient procedure might exist than the one provided by Illinois. The TIA does not require the most efficient remedy. The Court also noted that Scott will be able to raise its constitutional and federal statutory challenges to the tax in state court. Given a remedy in state court that meets the TIA test, the Court agreed that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.