County Tax Board Members Receive Absolute Immunity

HEYDE v. PITTENGER (January 11, 2011)

Raymond Heyde owns residential property in Tazewell County, Illinois, just south of Peoria. In late 2003, Heyde received his 2004 tax assessment notice. He filed a complaint with the County Board of Review, asserting that the $207,000 assessment was too high (the proper assessment level is 33 1/3% of the property's fair cash value). The Board reduced the assessment to $140,000. He complained again after he received his 2005 notice, which increased the assessment to $149,000. The Board declined to reduce their assessment. The assessment went up again in 2006, to $153,000. Again, he complained and submitted a then-recent $435,000 property appraisal (which would result in a $145,000 assessment). The Board not only did not reduce the assessment, but increased it to $436,000 in a June 1, 2006 decision. Heyde continued to complain about his assessment each year -- the Board refused to budge. Heyde appealed the June 1 decision to the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board. Although the Appeal Board reduced the assessment, Heyde was still dissatisfied and has sought administrative review in state court. He also has additional appeals before the Appeal Board for subsequent years. In 2007, Heyde filed a § 1983 action against the members of the Board and the County Assessors. He alleged that the defendants deprived him of equal protection rights, conspired to deprive him of his equal protection rights and retaliated against him for exercising his lawful challenge rights. Judge Mihm (C.D. Ill.) concluded that the members of the Board had absolute immunity and dismissed the complaint as to them. He dismissed without prejudice as to the Assessors based on principles of comity on the grounds that Heyde had not exhausted state remedies. Heyde appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Cudahy, Rovner, and Evans affirmed. Addressing first case against the Board members, the Court noted that absolute immunity does apply to a quasi-judicial adjudicatory body when it acts in a capacity functionally equivalent to that of a judge or prosecutor. It does not, however, apply to administrative or ministerial acts. Relying on the Board’s statutory authority and the Court’s own precedent, the Court concluded that Board members were entitled to absolute immunity. They fit neatly within the factors identified by the Supreme Court in Butz. The Court turned to the claims against the Assessors. In McNary, the Supreme Court held that challenges to state tax systems must occur within the state’s courts, with final review in the Supreme Court. A § 1983 action is therefore not the proper vehicle. The Court rejected Heyde's argument that the Illinois system failed to meet the "plain, speedy and efficient" exception to the McNary rule. The Court recognized the delays inherent in the Illinois system but concluded (not for the first time) that they were not enough to avoid McNary.

Court Lacks Appellate Jurisdiction Over Immunity Denial If It Cannot Resolve the Question On Undisputed Facts

HILL v. COPPLESON (November 22, 2010)

Eighteen-year-old Harold Hill was arrested in early 1992. While in custody, two detectives began questioning him about a sexual assault and murder that happened almost 2 years earlier. According to Hill, they questioned him for hours and abused him both physically and mentally. At some point, Assistant State's Attorney Rogers also began questioning Hill. Hill eventually confessed to the crime and implicated two other men. Those two men were arrested and also eventually confessed to the crime -- although one was never charged because, even though he gave a detailed confession, he was in jail at the time of the crime. In late 1994, Hill was convicted of the crime and sentenced to life in prison. Over 10 years later, Hill was exonerated through DNA testing and his conviction was vacated. Hill filed suit against the two detectives, Rogers, and the City of Chicago alleging that the defendants violated his Fifth Amendment rights by coercing the confession and that they engaged in a civil conspiracy in violation of § 1983. Judge St. Eve (N.D. Ill.) denied the individual defendants' motions for summary judgment, including Rogers' claim that he was entitled to both absolute prosecutorial immunity as well as qualified immunity. Rogers appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Ripple, Williams, and Tinder dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Court has jurisdiction of an appeal from the denial of summary judgment on either absolute or qualified immunity grounds only if they can decide the questions presented based on undisputed facts. Here, there is a dispute in the record over the timing of Rogers' arrival at the police station. Rogers claims that he arrived only after Hill's confession -- Hill claims that he did not confess until after meeting with Rogers. Rogers' success on his absolute immunity claim depends on whether he was acting as a prosecutor or investigator. The answer to that question depends on whether probable cause existed prior to his arrival. Rogers' success on his qualified immunity claim depends on whether there is evidence that he was involved in the coerced confession. The probable cause and the coercion questions depend on the timing of Rogers' arrival at the police station and thus cannot be decided on a record of undisputed facts. Because the Court cannot resolve the question on undisputed facts, it lacks jurisdiction.

Complaint Arising From State Court Child Custody Orders Is Barred By Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

GOLDEN v. HELEN SIGMAN & ASSOCIATES (July 2, 2010)

Bruce Golden and his wife were involved in a bitter and hostile divorce. The dispute centered principally on the division of their assets and the custody of their only child. Golden added a battlefield when he brought suit in federal court. The defendants included his child’s court appointed representative and his wife’s attorneys, close friend and neighbor, and two business associates. His claims were based on federal copyright law, RICO, and § 1983 as well as several state law theories. He accused the lawyers of defamation, the lawyers and business associates of copyright infringement, the representative of defamation and failing to maintain neutrality, and the neighbor of a false 911 report. Judge Gottschall (N.D. Ill.) stayed the copyright infringement claim pending completion of the state court divorce proceedings and dismissed all other claims -- the RICO claim for failure to plead sufficiently the predicate acts and pattern of racketeering activity, the § 1983 claim because the representative had not acted under color of state law and enjoyed absolute immunity, and the state law claims by choosing not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. The lawyers, the representative, and the friend all sought sanctions under Rule 11. The district court concluded that some of the claims did violate Rule 11 and ordered Golden to pay the defendants' attorneys' fees for the offending claims. Golden settled with the attorneys and appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Wood, and Sykes affirmed. The Court first noted that the only merits decision challenged on appeal was the § 1983 claim against the representative. It identified a potentially thorny issue with respect to absolute immunity. Although a child representative is entitled to absolute immunity when carrying out its court appointed duties, it may not be when it functions in a role closer to that of the child's attorney. The complaint did allege acts relating to that role. The Court declined to resolve that issue, however, instead identifying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as a jurisdictional bar. Under that doctrine, a party may not seek redress in a lower federal court for an injury caused by a state court judgment. Here, the Court determined that the only injury Golden complained of arose directly from the state court custody orders. The Court therefore affirmed the dismissal of the § 1983 claim. With respect to sanctions, the Court first rejected Golden's argument that the Rule 11 motions were not timely -- both because he failed to raise it in the district court and because the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing them. On the fees themselves, the Court concluded that the district court was well within its discretion in identifying counts on which to impose a sanction and in its method of calculating the amount of the sanction. Finally, the Court declined to impose sanctions on Golden for the appeal. Although he raised several frivolous arguments, he did advance some positions that could not be dismissed summarily.

Conclusory Allegations Are Insufficient To Support A Conspiracy Claim

COONEY v. ROSSITER (September 30, 2009)

Deborah Cooney and her husband were divorced in 1998. The court granted her custody of their two sons. Her ex-husband later petitioned for a transfer of custody. The court appointed a lawyer to act as the children's representative. Cooney alleges that the representative arranged to have a psychiatrist appointed and then suggested to the psychiatrist that she suffered a particular mental illness. The psychiatrist's report did conclude that she suffered from the mental illness. Cooney alleges that her ex-husband received a copy of that report but that she did not. Based on the report, the court granted temporary custody to the ex-husband. She brought suit against the judge, the representative, the psychiatrist, the children's therapist and the ex-husband's lawyer. The court dismissed her complaint. Cooney appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Posner and Wood affirmed. The Court first found the state court judge absolutely immune since he was acting in his judicial capacity. Next, the Court found that the psychiatrist and representative were also entitled to absolute immunity, since the acts complained of all occurred within their official duties. Finally, the Court concluded that the factual allegations against the two private persons failed to meet federal pleading standards. Although citing Bell Atlantic and Iqbal and the heightened pleading standard established therein, the Court found that Cooney's allegations were too vague to meet even the pre-existing heightened pleading requirement for conspiracy allegations.