Arbitration Award Can Be Set Aside Only For A Federal Arbitration Act Enumerated Reason
AFFYMAX v. ORTHO-MCNEIL-JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICALS (October 3, 2011)
Affymax and Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals created a joint venture in 1992 to develop peptide compounds. Their agreement assigned ownership based on development efforts. If a compound was jointly developed, it was jointly owned. If a compound was solely developed by either company, that company owned it. The parties also agreed to arbitrate all ownership disputes. Affymax brought suit in 2004 with respect to the ownership of the so-called '940 family and '078 family. After arbitration, a panel concluded that Ortho owned the ‘078 family and that the parties jointly owned the ‘940 family. Judge Kennelly (N.D. Ill.) confirmed most of the arbitration ruling but vacated the award with respect to its conclusion that Ortho owned the foreign patents in the ‘078 family. Ortho appeals (Affymax also appealed, but to the Federal Circuit).
In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Wood and Tinder reversed. The Court first addressed appellate jurisdiction. Patent controversies that arise over a contractual dispute, as this one does, arise under the contract, not the patent. Therefore, the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction over patent disputes has not been triggered. The Court concluded that it was the proper forum, with jurisdiction over the district court's order vacating a part of the panel's award. On the merits, the Court noted that the Federal Arbitration Act gives four reasons a district court may rely on in vacating an arbitration award. The reason given by the district court here – the panel’s disregard of law -- is not one of those four reasons. The court's order was therefore error, if in fact that was the only basis for its conclusion. Before finding error, the Court considered whether the panel exceeded its powers, which is one of the four reasons permitting the vacation of an award, and is somewhat related to the district court's rationale. The Court concluded that the panel resolved the dispute pursuant to the 1992 contract’s directions and did not exceed its powers in doing so.

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Glenn Williams was a wastewater treatment operator for Illinois-American Water Company ("IAWC"). IAWC discovered that Williams was operating without a required Illinois EPA license. Because it was Williams' second offense, it was punishable by termination. Instead of firing Williams, however, IAWC offered him a Last Chance Agreement ("LCA"). Under the LCA, Williams was suspended without pay for 30 days, he was required to obtain his license within six months, and he was required to repay the extra compensation he received as a result of IAWC's belief that he was licensed properly. The LCA also provided that failure to comply would result in Williams' immediate termination and any disputes regarding the agreement would be resolved through the collective bargaining agreement’s arbitration procedure. The United Food and Commercial Workers Union, which represented Williams, filed a grievance contesting the LCA's validity. When Williams failed to make repayment arrangements, IAWC terminated his employment. The union filed a second grievance. The grievances were consolidated and brought before an arbitrator. The arbitrator ruled against the union on the validity of the LCA but ordered Williams reinstated. He concluded that the termination was improper because of the pending, good faith challenge to the LCA itself. On review, the district court confirmed the arbitration award. The union appeals.
Clear Channel Outdoor ("CCO ") owns and maintains hundreds of billboards in and around Milwaukee. Patrick Rogney was a CCO crew chief. In April of 2003, Rogney was working with a crew on a billboard in Milwaukee. They were on a platform about 18 feet off the ground. At some point, he disconnected his safety harness from the cable. A company official, conducting a field inspection, observed Rogney at work without the connected harness. After observing for about eight minutes, he notified the operations manager by phone. CCO suspended Rogney that afternoon, and later discharged him. The union filed a grievance, alleging that the termination was without good cause. Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, the parties submitted the matter to an arbitrator. After an evidentiary hearing, the arbitrator determined that Rogney's discharge was without just cause and that an appropriate penalty was a six-month suspension without pay. The arbitrator interpreted "just cause" to require CCO to not only consider whether an offense allowing termination was committed but also to consider whether termination was warranted under the circumstances. CCO brought an action to vacate the arbitrator's award. The district court confirmed the arbitrator's decision. CCO appeals.