Equitable Reformation Is An Available Remedy Under ERISA § 502(a)(3)

YOUNG v. VERIZON'S BELL ATLANTIC CASH BALANCE PLAN (AUGUST 10, 2010)

In 1996, Bell Atlantic replaced its Bell Atlantic Management Pension Plan, a defined annuity pension plan, with the Bell Atlantic Cash Balance Plan. The old pension plan included a lump sum option for certain employees that used an enhanced discount rate. The new Plan contained provision for converting employees' benefits from the pension plan to the new Plan. One key to the conversion was an employee's "transition factor." The transition factor was a multiplier that increased as an employee's age and years of service increased. Unfortunately for Bell Atlantic, the Plan's formula for computing an employee's opening balance contained the transition factor twice. The Plan Summary and all communications to employees described the formula correctly -- using the transition factor only once. The company also recognized the error and corrected it in a 1998 version of the Plan. Cynthia Young retired in 1997 after 32 years of service. After receiving her lump sum benefit, Young sought administrative review. She made two claims: that the company failed to apply the transition factor twice and that the company improperly applied the enhanced discount rate from the earlier pension plan. The company denied Young's claim. Young filed suit pursuant to ERISA § 502(a). The company counterclaimed for equitable reformation to correct the "scrivener's error." Magistrate Judge Denlow (N.D. Ill.) upheld the company's denial of the discount rate claim as not arbitrary and capricious and granted the equitable reformation counterclaim. Young appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Flaum, and Tinder affirmed. The Court first addressed both party's statute of limitations arguments. The parties and the Court agreed that Pennsylvania's four-year limitations period applies. At issue was when the claims accrued. The Court concluded that the complaint and counterclaims were both timely. Young's claim did not accrue until she had a "clear repudiation" of her demand, which occurred in 2005. Although the company knew about the drafting mistake in 1997, the Court concluded that its claim for reformation did not accrue at that time. It was not on notice of the need to reform because it had always treated the second transition factor inclusion as a mistake. It paid benefits and communicated with its employees on that basis. It corrected the mistake and no one complained until Young brought suit. On the merits, the Court noted that § 502(a)(3) of ERISA permits "appropriate equitable relief." Although the Court has never addressed the propriety of equitable reformation, other circuits have and have either concluded that it is available or at least not foreclosed. Relying on those cases and the Court's own cases on ambiguous plan language, the Court concluded that equitable reformation is permitted when there is clear and convincing evidence of a scrivener’s error that does not reflect participants' reasonable expectations. The Court found such evidence present here. It relied on the drafting history, the communications and course of dealing between the company and its employees, the plan statements to participants, and the lack of any complaint until Young. The Court then considered and rejected the traditional equitable defenses raised by Young (good faith, unclean hands, and laches). Finally, the Court used principles of contract construction and interpretation, particularly that specific provisions control general provision, to reject Young's enhanced discount rate claim. The Court found that the most reasonable reading of the Plan required the enhanced rate.

Techinical Legal Term In Contract Is Given Its Technical Meaning

BANDAK v. ELI LILLY AND COMPANY RETIREMENT PLAN (November 18, 2009)

Stephen Bandak was employed by an Eli Lilly company in England, his native country, from 1978 to 1995. He participated in the company's retirement plan. He was transferred to the United States in 1995. The company told him, upon his enrollment in the U. S. company's plan, that his benefits in that plan would be based on years of employment retroactive to 1978. The plan also provided that benefits would be reduced by the actuarial equivalence of any other benefits under a “qualified defined benefit plan” maintained by an Eli Lilly company. When Bandak retired in 2004, the company took the position that his benefits under the English company's plan were benefits under a qualified defined benefit plan and were thus properly deducted from his U.S. pension benefits. Bandak sued the company under ERISA. Judgment was entered in his favor for both damages and an injunction relating to future benefit payments. The court also concluded that Lilly's position was not substantially justified and awarded attorneys’ fees. Eli Lilly appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Rovner and Williams affirmed. The Court focused on the language "qualified defined benefit plan" in the plan document. The term is a technical term and it refers to a plan that has been afforded favorable tax treatment by the Internal Revenue Service. The Court concluded that it had no meaning outside that context. The Court applied the presumption that, when a technical legal term is used in the contract, it is given its technical legal meaning. If it had no meaning outside the United States, the English plan was not such a plan and it should not have reduced his benefits. Substantial evidence in the record supported the Court's conclusion. The Court also concurred in the district court's conclusion that the company's position was not justified.

Pension Plan Properly Construed Plan Language In Denying Benefits

PERRY v. SHEET METAL WORKERS' LOCAL NO. 73 PENSION FUND (October 27, 2009)

Donald Perry and William Wilk both participated in their union's Pension Fund. Neither was awarded pension credit for the eight years they each worked in a training program at Washburne Trade School (now demolished). When they sought an adjustment, the Pension Fund explained that the school had been their actual employer during the period in question and was not a "contributing employer" under the terms of the Plan. The Fund further explained that the reason another union member who taught at the school at the same time did receive credit was because he was an employee of a "contributing employer" that made contributions in his name. Perry and Wilk filed suit under ERISA, alleging a denial of benefits. The district court granted summary judgment to the Pension Fund in a memorandum opinion dated March 24, 2008. Perry and Wilk appeal (on April 24).

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Williams and Sykes affirmed. The Court first addressed the timeliness of the appeal, given that more than 30 days had passed between the time of the memorandum opinion and the notice of appeal. An appeal must be filed, however, within 30 days after the judgment is entered. Rule 58(a) requires a separate document for the entry of the judgment upon the granting of a motion for summary judgment. Pursuant to Appellate Rule 4, judgment is thus entered upon the earlier of the date on which the separate document is issued or 150 days have run from the entry of the order. Here, there was no separate order. The judgment is therefore not considered entered until 150 days have run. The appeal is timely, since an appeal filed after a decision but before the entry of a judgment is considered to be filed on the date of the entry of the judgment. On the merits, the Court's inquiry was limited to whether the Fund complied with the Plan's provisions in determining the members' pension credits. The Plan specifically provides that members receive pension credits for hours of work for which contributions are required to be paid by an employer. Since it is undisputed that no employer made or was required to make such contributions on behalf of Perry or Wilk, the Court concluded that the Fund acted in accordance with the Plan.