Probable Cause Defeats Malicious Prosecution Claim
HOLLAND v. CITY OF CHICAGO (June 23, 2011)
In 1997, Dana Holland was convicted of sexually assaulting Dionne Stanley. At Holland's trial, Stanley positively identified Holland. She also described how she met him at a bar the night before and the particulars of the assault. Five years later, a DNA test established Holland’s innocence. His conviction was vacated. He brought suit against the City of Chicago and two police officers for Brady violations and state law malicious prosecution. At her deposition, Stanley testified that she committed perjury in her trial testimony. She testified that she told the police officers on the scene three times that Holland was not her assaulter. She stated that she identified him at the scene only after the police pointed out all the evidence against him and told her she could go home if she identified him. She also testified that she told the Assistant State's Attorney shortly before trial that Holland did not do it. Judge Zagel (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the defendants.
In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Manion, and Evans affirmed. The Court first addressed the malicious prosecution claim. Among other things, a plaintiff must prove the absence of probable cause and the presence of malice in order to prevail on a malicious prosecution claim. In testing for probable cause, one must look at the time when the charges were filed, not the time of arrest. The Court recited the "ample" evidence of probable cause; including the facts that he was found with clothing matching that of the assailant, that his wallet was in the clothing, and that he had no alibi. The Court noted that probable cause existed even without Stanley’s identification. Although the presence of probable clause itself defeats Holland's case, the Court also noted that he had no proof of malice. The Court turned to the Brady argument. A police officer can be liable under Brady if he withholds exculpatory evidence and the evidence is material. The materiality test is that there must be a reasonable probability that the proceeding would have turned out differently had the evidence been disclosed. The evidence Holland takes issue with is the police officer's failure to disclose the "pressure" they put on Stanley to identify him. They Court identified several reasons to reject the Brady claim. First, Holland's attorney had the opportunity to cross-examine Stanley at trial. Second, the Court thought it unlikely, given Stanley's explanation that she did not identify him because she was afraid and the significant physical evidence, that the outcome would have been different. Third, Stanley was a particularly strong eyewitness at trial because of her lengthy, and initially friendly, encounter with Holland.
It was mid-summer 1999 when Jovan Mosley and three other individuals were standing near the porch of a friend when Howard Thomas walked by. The four of them ran at Thomas. Thomas was beaten to death and the four of them left the area together. All four were arrested and charged with murder. The police took statements from them as well as several eyewitnesses. One eyewitness, Anton Williams, viewed Mosley in a lineup and identified him as a person who was on the scene. The lineup was not documented until 15 months later and the report does not what Williams said about Mosley's particular role in the murder. Another eyewitness, Gregory Reed, implicated all four of the defendants in the beating and specifically identified Mosley as having participated. Reed never testified at trial because he admitted to the prosecutor just before trial that he was quite drunk the night of the incident and had no independent recollection. Mosley remained in jail for over five years until he was tried and acquitted by a jury (see 
Kane County set up a Child Advocacy Center (“Center”) to coordinate the investigation and prosecution of child sexual abuse. The Child Advocacy Advisory Board (“Board”) is responsible for drafting the policies and procedures for those investigations and prosecutions. Kathryn Berg and David Byrne were a child protection investigator and police officer, respectively, assigned to the Center. [The facts that follow, given the posture of the appeal from a motion to dismiss, are taken from the complaint.] In mid-2001, Berg and Byrne interviewed a six-year old boy and his parents. The boy claimed he had been sexually abused by “Lorri.” Berg and Byrne failed to follow accepted techniques used in child victim interviews. They did not use techniques to identify the perpetrator and did not even ask the boy to describe her. Within days, Lorri Bielanski, a fifteen-year-old neighbor of the boy, was notified that credible evidence existed that she had sexually assaulted the boy. Sometime shortly after Berg and Byrne’s interview of the boy, they learned that: a) he was taking medication for Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, b) he was in special education classes, c) he was known, on two occasions, to have undressed with others and tried to get others to undress, d) his parents confronted him about the undressing incidents and punished him, and e) his parents suggested to him that he may have been sexually abused. Berg and Byrne did not disclose this information to the prosecutors or Bielanski. The county filed a Petition for Adjudication of Wardship, alleging the commission of two sexual assault felonies. As a result, Bielanski was forced to attend court hearings and an interview with a probation officer and was not allowed to travel out of the state without court permission. Bielanski was eventually acquitted of all charges and was successful in getting her record expunged. She filed a complaint against the County, the Center, the Board, Berg, and Byrne. Based on § 1983, she alleged: a) that the defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights by compelling her to attend the court hearings and restricting her movement, and b) that Byrne and Berg violated her rights to a fair trial and due process by withholding the information they had about the boy. The district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss. Bielanski appeals.