Good Moral Character Exclusion Requires The Conduct, Not The Conviction, During Statutory Period

UNITED STATES v. SUAREZ (December 16, 2011)

José Suarez, a Mexican native, became a permanent resident of the United States in 1978. Over the course of the next 20 years, he was arrested on a few occasions but the charges were always dismissed. In mid-1996, Suarez was engaged in marijuana distribution but was not immediately charged. In December of that year, he applied for naturalization. He disclosed his earlier charges but not the marijuana distribution activity just months earlier. He eventually became a United States citizen in May of 1998. A few months later, he was charged and convicted for marijuana trafficking. He was sentenced to 87 months in prison. A few years after his release, the United States sought to revoke his naturalization on the grounds that he lacked the good moral character required for citizenship and had illegally procured his naturalization. Judge Dow (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the United States. Suarez appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Kanne, Rovner, and Sykes affirmed. Good moral character is required for citizenship. The relevant statute lists several qualities that would disqualify a person under the moral character requirement. One of those is a conviction for a controlled substance offense if the offense was committed during the five-year period prior to the application filing. The Court concluded that the conviction for the offense need not occur prior to the application. Suarez’s citizenship was therefore properly revoked. However, because the Government did not share the Court's view on the conviction’s timing and argued, instead, that the statute’s catchall provision applied, the Court addressed it. Federal regulations, which here are entitled to Chevron deference, provide that an applicant lacks good moral character if he violates a controlled substance law during the statutory period. The regulation does not speak to a conviction. Therefore, the Court concluded that Suarez was ineligible for citizenship under the catchall provision as well. Finally, the Court provided a third route under which Suarez would be barred from citizenship. Another federal regulation provides that an applicant lacks good moral character if, absent extenuating circumstances, he committed unlawful acts and was later convicted. The Court noted its concurrence with the Eleventh Circuit that a conviction during the statutory period was not required. Since Suarez raised no issues of material fact guarding the "extenuating circumstances" exception, he is ineligible for citizenship and his citizenship was properly revoked.

Motion To Reopen Citizenship Application After Termination Of Removal Proceedings Eliminates The §1503(a) Bar

ORTEGA v. HOLDER (January 15, 2010)

Angie Ortega was the target of removal proceedings brought by the government in 2001. She asserted as a defense in those proceedings that she was a United States national. While the proceeding was pending, she filed an application for citizenship with the Immigration and Naturalization Service. When her application was denied, she appealed to the Office of Administrative Appeals (AAO). Meanwhile, the Immigration Judge in the removal proceedings dismissed with prejudice, concluding that she had in fact proven her citizenship. Months later, the AAO denied her appeal. She filed a motion to reopen and to reconsider, in which she referred to the ruling of the Immigration Judge. The AAO, four years later, denied her motion. It concluded that her motion was untimely in that it had been filed with the wrong office. It also concluded that it was at best a motion to reconsider rather than a motion to reopen. Although the regulations permit consideration of untimely motions to reopen upon a showing of reasonableness, they do not allow such discretion for a motion to reconsider. Ortega brought an action in federal court seeking a declaration of nationality under 8 U.S.C. §1503(a). On the government's motion, the district court dismissed the action on the ground that her citizenship arose in connection with her removal proceeding and her claim therefore fell within the §1503(a) exclusion. Ortega appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Ripple and Sykes reversed and remanded. The Court began with the language of the statute. It provides that a person who is denied a right or privilege of citizenship on the ground that she is not a national may bring an action for a declaration of citizenship. The statute contains an exception. It prohibits an action if the issue of the person’s status as a national arose "by reason of, or in connection with" a removal proceeding. The Court emphasized that its interpretation of the words of the statute must also consider its context and its relationship to other provisions. In doing so, the Court stated that the exceptions were designed to prevent judicial interference into removal proceedings and to maintain a single, exclusive opportunity to challenge a removal order. Examining the various options for obtaining a declaration of citizenship, the Court concluded that Congress failed to consider the scenario in which worked Ortega found herself. A judicial declaration of citizenship, when it is pursued through the removal route, is available only when there is an order of removal that can be reviewed under §1252. Since Ortega prevailed at her removal proceeding, there was no order of removal to challenge. The Court was quite certain that Congress did not purposefully leave those in Ortega's situation without a remedy. The proper approach in such a case is to begin the application process anew after the termination of the removal proceedings. Although the government suggested a resubmission of one's application was required, the Court preferred a motion to reopen the citizenship proceedings on the “new fact” of the termination of removal proceedings. That re-instituted matter would no longer be burdened with the “arose by reason of” exclusion of §1503. Here, Ortega already filed a motion to reconsider after the removal proceedings had been terminated. She was then denied relief. Her status as a national is no longer considered to have arisen in the removal proceeding. She can avail herself of the declaratory judgment relief available under §1503.