Court Lacks Appellate Jurisdiction Over Immunity Denial If It Cannot Resolve the Question On Undisputed Facts

Posted on December 1, 2010 by Michael Rigney

HILL v. COPPLESON (November 22, 2010)

Eighteen-year-old Harold Hill was arrested in early 1992. While in custody, two detectives began questioning him about a sexual assault and murder that happened almost 2 years earlier. According to Hill, they questioned him for hours and abused him both physically and mentally. At some point, Assistant State's Attorney Rogers also began questioning Hill. Hill eventually confessed to the crime and implicated two other men. Those two men were arrested and also eventually confessed to the crime -- although one was never charged because, even though he gave a detailed confession, he was in jail at the time of the crime. In late 1994, Hill was convicted of the crime and sentenced to life in prison. Over 10 years later, Hill was exonerated through DNA testing and his conviction was vacated. Hill filed suit against the two detectives, Rogers, and the City of Chicago alleging that the defendants violated his Fifth Amendment rights by coercing the confession and that they engaged in a civil conspiracy in violation of § 1983. Judge St. Eve (N.D. Ill.) denied the individual defendants' motions for summary judgment, including Rogers' claim that he was entitled to both absolute prosecutorial immunity as well as qualified immunity. Rogers appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Ripple, Williams, and Tinder dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Court has jurisdiction of an appeal from the denial of summary judgment on either absolute or qualified immunity grounds only if they can decide the questions presented based on undisputed facts. Here, there is a dispute in the record over the timing of Rogers' arrival at the police station. Rogers claims that he arrived only after Hill's confession -- Hill claims that he did not confess until after meeting with Rogers. Rogers' success on his absolute immunity claim depends on whether he was acting as a prosecutor or investigator. The answer to that question depends on whether probable cause existed prior to his arrival. Rogers' success on his qualified immunity claim depends on whether there is evidence that he was involved in the coerced confession. The probable cause and the coercion questions depend on the timing of Rogers' arrival at the police station and thus cannot be decided on a record of undisputed facts. Because the Court cannot resolve the question on undisputed facts, it lacks jurisdiction.

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§ 1983 Plaintiff Fails To Prove His Post-Acquittal Brady Claim (If One Even Exists)

Posted on August 3, 2010 by Michael Rigney

MOSLEY v. CITY OF CHICAGO (July 29, 2010)

It was mid-summer 1999 when Jovan Mosley and three other individuals were standing near the porch of a friend when Howard Thomas walked by. The four of them ran at Thomas. Thomas was beaten to death and the four of them left the area together. All four were arrested and charged with murder. The police took statements from them as well as several eyewitnesses. One eyewitness, Anton Williams, viewed Mosley in a lineup and identified him as a person who was on the scene. The lineup was not documented until 15 months later and the report does not what Williams said about Mosley's particular role in the murder. Another eyewitness, Gregory Reed, implicated all four of the defendants in the beating and specifically identified Mosley as having participated. Reed never testified at trial because he admitted to the prosecutor just before trial that he was quite drunk the night of the incident and had no independent recollection. Mosley remained in jail for over five years until he was tried and acquitted by a jury (see this for commentary on that delay). He brought a § 1983 action against the City of Chicago and several individual police officers who were involved in the investigation. He alleged a due process denial for the withholding of exculpatory evidence, malicious prosecution, and civil conspiracy. Judge Coar (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the defendants. Mosley appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Rovner, and Wood affirmed. The Court first addressed the main issue, the failure to produce exculpatory evidence under Brady. The claim has two parts: a) that the prosecutors did not inform Mosley that Williams told the police at the lineup that Mosley did not participate in the beating, and b) that the prosecutors did not tell Mosley that Reed admitted to being drunk on the night of the incident. The Court noted the "logical tension" in a Brady claim when the case results in an acquittal. The normal test for a Brady claim is that the non-disclosed evidence could put the case in a different light and undermine confidence in the verdict. That test makes no sense when the verdict is an acquittal. In fact, the Court noted that several circuits have concluded that a Brady claim cannot exist after an acquittal. The Court has reserved answering that question in the past and did so again. In Bielanski, the Court concluded that the elements of a post-acquittal Brady claim, if one even exists, are a) the withholding of material and favorable evidence, and b) that would have changed the prosecutor’s decision to try the case. Since Mosley cannot meet either element, his Brady claim fails. With respect to the lineup, the Court concluded that there was literally no evidence in the record that Williams told police that Mosley did not participate in the crime. Other than a one-word answer to a leading question on cross-examination, his testimony was inconsistent with that conclusion. In addition, even if it was said, the prosecutors approach would not have changed. It did not have to prove that Mosley actually participated to prevail on the accountability theory it was pursuing. With respect to Reed being drunk, the prosecutor had no obligation to disclose the statement since Reed never testified at trial. The Court next addressed the state malicious prosecution claim, one of the elements of which is the lack of probable cause. The Court had no difficulty in concluding that the district court's finding that probable cause existed was correct. Finally, with respect to the civil conspiracy claim, the Court pointed out that Mosley offered no evidence of the common scheme element of the conspiracy claim. At the summary judgment stage, Mosley cannot rest on the allegations of his complaint but must come forward with evidence.

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