Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Commentary : In Their Opinion : Lawyer & Attorney Michael E. Rigney : Kelley Drye & Warren Law Firm

CREATIVE MONTESSORI LEARNING CENTERS v. ASHFORD GEAR LLC (November 22, 2011)

Lawyers from a firm that specializes in bringing class-action suits under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act obtained information about advertising faxes from a fax broadcaster, in return for a promise of confidentiality. The information they obtained revealed that Ashford Gear had sent almost 15,000 advertising faxes. The Creative Montessori Learning Center was (or may not have been) one of the recipients. The firm communicated with the Center, indicating that a class action already existed. The Center became the named plaintiff in a suit filed by the firm. Plaintiffs sought class certification. Defendants opposed certification on the grounds that the lawyers' misconduct (in breaching their confidentiality promise and in misrepresenting to the Center the status of the action) demonstrated that the lawyers would not adequately represent the class. Judge Gettleman (N.D. Ill.) agreed that there had been misconduct but concluded that the misconduct was a subject for bar authorities and certified the class. Ashford Gear sought permission for leave to appeal from the class certification.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Cudahy and Posner vacated and remanded. The Court, as it has on several occasions recently, commented on the dangers of class actions, particularly in situations with statutes like the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. The Act provides for $500 in statutory damages for the recipient of an unsolicited fax advertisement (trebled if willful or knowing). But, in bringing it as a class action, counsel has turned it into a case worth over $11 million. The Court also emphasized the need for trustworthy class lawyers, given the incentives for class lawyers and defendants' lawyers to recommend settlements that reward the class lawyers at the clients' expense. Here, lawyers for the class have already exhibited their lack of integrity. Although the district court recognized that fact, it concluded that "only the most egregious misconduct" by class counsel was grounds for denial of class certification. The Court noted that that was an erroneous standard. Instead, any misconduct that casts serious doubts on class counsels’ loyalty is grounds for denial of certification. The Court remanded for a reevaluation of whether class counsel will adequately represent the class, given the misconduct.

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DAMASCO v. CLEARWIRE CORPORATION (November 18, 2011)

Jerome Damasco brought a class action suit in state court against Clearwire Corporation. He alleged that Clearwire sent unsolicited text messages in violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. He sought both injunctive relief and damages for the more than 1,000 people he estimated received the text messages. Clearwire offered to settle the case by paying Damasco (and up to 10 additional people) the maximum statutory penalty ($1,500) and agreed to stop sending the unsolicited messages. Damasco never responded. A few days later, Clearwire removed the case to federal court. Damasco moved for class certification almost immediately. Within a day, Clearwire moved to dismiss on the grounds that its settlement offer rendered the case moot. Judge Zagel (N.D. Ill.) agreed with Clearwire and dismissed, concluding that the Seventh Circuit's Holstein decision controlled. A complete settlement offer before a class certification filing moots the named plaintiff’s claim. Damasco appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Manion, Rovner, and Tinder affirmed. Article III of the Constitution requires federal courts to hear only live cases and controversies. As such, a party must maintain a personal stake in the litigation. Here, once Clearwire expressed its willingness to give Damasco everything to which he may have been entitled under the law, there is no more controversy. The Court has held in the past that a plaintiff cannot avoid mootness simply by moving to certify the class after the offer. Although the Court recognized that several other circuits have allowed plaintiffs to seek class certification after such a full offer, the Court reiterated its belief that such a rule violated Article III and declined to adopt it. A simple solution exists to any concern that defendants could frustrate class actions by simply offering each named plaintiff a full settlement. That solution is to move for class certification at the time the complaint is filed. The filing of the motion protects the plaintiffs and the class. The Court also noted that a plaintiff, to the extent he believes he is not ready to place the class certification issue to the court, can seek additional time for further investigation or discovery.

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GOMEZ v. ST. VINCENT HEALTH (August 15, 2011)

St. Vincent Health operates a number of hospitals and health care facilities in central Indiana and employs thousands of people. Federal law obligates it to give timely notice to any qualified person who leaves it employ of his or her right to extended health insurance coverage under COBRA. St. Vincent uses a third-party administrator to manage the process of sending out these COBRA notices. To monitor and ensure its compliance with this requirement, St. Vincent also established an oversight system, pursuant to which an outside accounting firm audited its program, and a call center, where current and former employees can get benefits questions answered. Notwithstanding these safeguards, three former employees filed a class-action against St. Vincent in February of 2006 alleging that many employees received their COBRA notices late or not at all. St. Vincent conducted an internal investigation and concluded that over 200 individuals in the preceding 21 months failed to receive timely notices. It provided notices to each of those individuals, allowed a retroactive benefits selection, and even offered a payment plan if the individual had trouble becoming current with premium payments. Meanwhile, the district court declined to certify the class for several reasons, including inadequate class counsel, and granted summary judgment to St. Vincent on the individual claims. The plaintiffs filed an appeal, but later withdrew it. Undaunted, plaintiffs' counsel solicited new class representatives from information it acquired in the first case and filed a new, almost identical, class action. The two named plaintiffs are Blanca Gomez and Joan Wagner-Barnett. Gomez received her COBRA notice 17 months late but she testified that she would not have elected to extend her benefits. Wagner-Barnett also received notice 17 months late, testified that she would have extended coverage, and contends that she incurred almost $1000 in out-of-pocket expenses that she would not have otherwise incurred. Judge Barker (S.D. Ind.) denied class certification on inadequacy of counsel grounds. On the individual claims, the district court concluded that the circumstances did not warrant a statutory penalty, that Gomez suffered no damage since she would not have elected extended coverage anyway, and awarded Wagner-Barnett $396 in damages, the difference between her out-of-pocket prescription costs and the premium she would have paid. Gomez and Wagner-Barnett appeal.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Cudahy, Kanne, and Tinder affirmed. The appeal raises three issues: the amount of Wagner-Barnett’s damages, the propriety of a statutory penalty, and class certification. The Court first questioned the propriety of any damages. ERISA’s enforcement provision does not authorize compensatory damages -- only equitable relief and "such other relief" as is proper. Here, the district court followed a practice used by other district courts (and at least condoned by Courts of Appeals) to include, as "such other relief," a party's medical expenses less the premiums that would have been paid. Although "reticent" to condone such an approach, the Court found no error. The amount was small, it did not contradict ERISA’s plain language, and St. Vincent did not appeal on that ground. With respect to Wagner-Barnett’s request for additional medical expenses, the Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying those expenses. The Court turned to statutory penalties. Under the statute, the district court could have imposed as much as $110 a day in statutory penalties. The Court found no error in the district court's approach. It considered the right factors, including any prejudice to the former employee and the nature of the company’s conduct. There is no evidence of bad faith or gross negligence on the part of St. Vincent. Furthermore, there is no evidence of any prejudice to the plaintiffs. When same Vincent discovered its noncompliance, it contacted the former employees, provided notice, allowed for a retroactive election, and even offered a payment plan to catch up on the unpaid premiums. Finally, the Court turned to the class certification issue. Again, it found no error. It noted that counsel did not even address much of the district court's rationale with respect to his diligence, respect for judicial resources, and promptness. 

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RANDALL v. ROLLS-ROYCE CORP. (March 30, 2011)

Rolls-Royce Corporation sets its employee compensation in three stages. First, it sets up compensation categories with broad pay ranges into which it assigns classes of employees it thinks are of equal value to the company. Second, within each compensation category, it creates narrower pay ranges for each job based on market conditions. Third, the company authorizes supervisors to adjust compensation individually. Female employees of one of the Rolls-Royce's Indiana facilities brought a class action pursuant to the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, alleging that Rolls-Royce engaged in sex discrimination by paying male employees more than female employees and by denying female employees promotions. Judge Barker (S.D. Ind.) denied class certification and granted summary judgment to Rolls-Royce. Plaintiffs appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Flaum, and Sykes affirmed. The Court noted that the average male employee compensation was approximately 5% higher than female employee compensation in the same compensation categories throughout the complaint period. But is that differential the result of sex discrimination, which would violate Title VII? The company's expert testified that the differential disappeared when adjustments were made for differences in the jobs performed. The plaintiff's expert failed to rebut this testimony. Plaintiffs’ Title VII base pay claim must therefore fail. Their Equal Pay Act claim also fails. Although that claim does not require proof of discrimination, the Court concluded that the district court was correct in finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet the statutory comparator requirement. The named plaintiffs' promotion claims also fail. Again, the company's expert corrected the data to account for male employees with the same title but substantially different responsibilities and found that females are, in fact, much more likely to be promoted that males. Again, plaintiffs failed to rebut the testimony. The Court also affirmed the district court's denial of class certification. It concluded that the named plaintiffs were not adequate class representatives because their promotion claims were weaker than many other class members and because they had a conflict of interest. They are supervisors and have some control over the compensation of both male and female employees. In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected plaintiffs' attempt to style its action as a Rule 23(b)(2) claim (under which they might avoid the adequacy issues). The request for monetary relief and the need for individual calculations and hearings make the case inappropriate for Rule 23(b)(2) treatment.

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KARTMAN v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY (February 14, 2011)

In early 2006, a severe hailstorm hit the Indianapolis, Indiana area, causing extensive property damage. Almost 50,000 area residents filed insurance claims under homeowners insurance policies with State Farm Fire and Casualty Company. State Farm adjusted and paid over $263 million on hose claims. The following year, however, several State Farm policyholders filed suit for breach of contract, bad faith denial of benefits, and unjust enrichment. The suit was brought as a class action and alleged that State Farm underpaid claims and failed to use a uniform standard for evaluating the hail damage. The class sought damages and an injunction ordering State Farm to reinspect the roofs under a uniform standard. Judge Lawrence (S.D. Ind.) refused to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) damages class because of the need for individual underpayment determinations. He did certify, however, a Rule 23(b)(2) class to address whether the class was entitled to an injunction requiring the uniform reinspections. State Farm sought interlocutory review of the certification order.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Wood, and Sykes granted the petition of review, reversed, and remanded with instructions to decertify the class. The Court’s problem with the district court's approach was a basic one – what are the claims? An insurance policy is a contract. For its part, the insurer agrees to pay for covered losses. It does not agree to use a particular standard in evaluating any alleged damage. An insurance policy also implicates tort law as a result of the bad faith denial of benefits claim. But again, tort law does not consider the failure to use a uniform standard a breach of a duty of good faith. Neither contract law nor tort law imposed a separate duty on State Farm to use a particular method to evaluate an insured's loss. The district court’s treatment of the uniform standard claim as a separate claim was error. Having clarified the claims, the Court turned to Rule 23. Rule 23(b)(2) requires that class-wide injunctive relief be both appropriate with respect to the class as a whole and final. The Court found both requirements absent here. First, with respect to appropriate, the Court noted that the class could not even satisfy the most basic of equitable relief requirements -- irreparable harm. Whatever their loss, it can be adequately satisfied with damages. The balance of hardships is also inequitable. The cost of compliance would be enormous, with little benefit. The Court also found that the injunction would be an administrative challenge and impractical. Second, the injunction did not meet the Rule 23 finality requirement. The plaintiffs are not seeking uniform roof inspections as their final remedy. Even in their view, the inspections are merely stepping stones to further proceedings on liability. The injunction does not meet the Rule 23(b)(2) requirements -- the class should not have been certified.

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The "Stainless Steel Dryer That Wasn't" Saga Continues

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has issued three opinions in Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck and Company, an action brought on behalf of a class allegedly harmed because Sears marketed a "stainless steel" clothes dryer that was not 100% stainless steel. It reversed the district court's certification order (opinion and intheiropinion), it affirmed the dismissal of the case as moot after Sears made an offer of judgment that exceeded the plaintiff's possible individual damages (opinion and intheiropinion), and it recently reversed and remanded to the district court for the entry of an injunction under the All Writs Act barring the continued prosecution of a mirror class action in California (opinion and intheiropinion). In its All Writs opinion, the panel made some fairly strong comments about potential for abuse in class actions, including a characterization of counsels' tactics as "close to settlement extortion." Class counsel took exception to several of the panel's remarks in its petition for rehearing and for rehearing en banc, at one point characterizing the panel as the "Simon Cowell of the Circuits.” The panel voted to deny the petition, and no judge requested a vote on rehearing en banc. But the "over the top" accusations in the petition prompted a six page response from the panel instead of the more typical one-liner. The panel stood quite firm on the merits, pointed out the many instances where class counsel actually ignored the points made in the opinion, and repeated and expanded upon the potentials for abuse inherent in class action litigation. The bottom line is that the Seventh Circuit believes the stainless steel dryer class action litigation is a classic example of class action abuse. Only time will tell if class counsel accepts the message.

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SCHLEICHER v. WENDT (August 20, 2010)

Conseco was a large financial services company traded on the New York Stock Exchange. It filed for bankruptcy in 2002 and successfully reorganized. This securities-fraud claim was filed against Conseco managers who are alleged to have made false statements prior to the bankruptcy. Then-District Judge Hamilton (S.D. Ind.) certified a class. Defendants appeal.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Bauer and Rovner affirmed. The Court began by noting that securities-fraud claims are regularly litigated as class actions. Common questions generally include falsehood, intent, causation, and materiality. Individual questions, such as an individual investor's extent of loss, can frequently be addressed mechanically. Prior to 1988, defendants fought class certification by focusing on the reliance element. But the Supreme Court that year, in Basic, concluded that the stock price conveys the same public information to each investor if the stock is frequently traded in an efficient market. The Basic doctrine, called fraud on the market, replaced the reliance element. Here, the defendants argued that the fraud on the market doctrine does not apply because, notwithstanding the alleged false statements, Conseco's stock was falling during the relevant period. The Court found that fact to be irrelevant and concluded that the case met the Basic requirements. The Court also rejected defendants’ arguments that certification was improper because the class included short sellers and because the court failed to determine falsity and materiality. On the former, the Court noted that both long and short sellers are affected by news related to the value of a stock. The fact that short sellers may not realize a loss as a result of a false statement affects computation of damages, not the propriety of a class. On the latter, the Court stated that falsity and materiality are elements to be decide on the merits – not at the class certification stage. In doing so, it specifically expressed its disagreement with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Oscar Private Equity that reads Basic to allow a tightening of class certification requirements. Congress has spoken on the issue in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act. The Court declined to legislate other changes.

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IN RE: BURLINGTON NORTHERN SANTA FE RAILWAY CO. (May 19, 2010)

A number of residents of the town of Bagley, Wisconsin filed a class-action suit in state court against Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway (BNSF). They allege that BNSF's failure to maintain its railroad trestle resulted in a flood and damage to their property. BNSF removed the case to federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). After Judge Crabb (W.D. Wis.) denied the class' motion to remand, the class moved to amend the complaint to withdraw all class allegations. The court granted the motion and remanded the case to state court. It analogized the situation to one in which class certification is denied and noted that district courts were divided on the impact of denial of class certification on CAFA jurisdiction. BNSF requested leave to appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Wood, and Sykes granted the petition, vacated the remand order, and remanded. The Court noted the general rule that jurisdiction is determined at the time of removal. It then cited its recent decision in Cunningham Charter Corp. (see intheiropinion), which was decided after the district court's remand. In Cunningham Charter, the Court concluded that the denial of class certification did not require remand of a case removed under CAFA. The same considerations that lead to that conclusion should apply when class action status is amended away voluntarily.

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AMERICAN HONDA MOTOR CO. V. ALLEN (April 7, 2010)

American Honda Motor Co. ("Honda") manufactures motorcycles. One such motorcycle, the Gold Wing GL1800, is the subject of a class action lawsuit. The plaintiffs, purchasers of the GL1800, allege that the motorcycle has a design defect. The defect, they allege, results in excessive shaking of the steering assembly. The plaintiffs moved for class certification. They relied on a report prepared by Mark Ezra for support for their allegation of the predominance of common issues. In his report, Ezra had developed a standard for the dissipation of steering oscillation in motorcycles. He tested one GL 1800 and concluded that it did not meet this standard. Honda argued that the report did not meet the Daubert standard. The district court expressed its concern that the standard was not supported by empirical evidence and was not generally accepted by the engineering community and that his sample size of one was inadequate. Nevertheless, it refused to strike the report and granted the motion for class certification. Honda petitioned for leave to appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Evans, and Tinder granted the petition, vacated the denial of the motion to strike and the order certifying a class, and remanded. The Court acknowledged that it had not yet considered the specific question of whether a Daubert challenge must be resolved prior to class certification. It has, however, held that a district court must make all legal and factual determinations necessary to ensure that class requirements are met. The Court thus held that a district court must conclusively resolve challenges to an expert report if the report is critical to class certification. Here, the district court started the correct analysis but never actually decided the question. Instead, it simply decided not to exclude the entire report at what it referred to as the "early stage of the proceedings." The district court abused its discretion in doing so. In fact, the Court went on to conclude that the Ezra report should have been excluded under a Daubert analysis. Applying the Daubert factors, the Court noted the lack of evidence that the standard has been generally accepted or that any tests have been performed to support it. The Court also stated that the sample size of one would rarely be sufficient to extrapolate its results to an entire fleet of motorcycles. Without the report, the plaintiffs cannot meet the predomination requirement of class certification.

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WRIGHTSELL v. COOK COUNTY (March 31, 2010)

Lance Wrightsell is a former prisoner of the Cook County Jail. He brought an action against the County pursuant to § 1983. He alleged that the County's practice of making only one dentist available to the 10,000 inmates of the jail constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. After the district court denied his request for class certification, he agreed to an offer of judgment of $10,000 and renounced his right to appeal. John Smentek, another former inmate, also had a class action pending in the district court -- against the same defendant, alleging the same constitutional violation, and represented by the same attorney. Wrightsell, notwithstanding his renunciation, appeals the district court's denial of class certification. Smentek petitions for leave to intervene in the appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Wood, and Tinder denied the petition to intervene and dismissed the appeal. The Court addressed some of the complexities involved in class actions and appeals -- for example, the distinction between the named plaintiff as plaintiff and as class representative and the distinction between voluntary and involuntary settlements. Here, the named plaintiff, after denial of class certification, settled his individual claim and waived his right to appeal as class representative. The Court noted competing policy considerations but concluded that Wrightsell resigned his representative status when he waived his right to appeal. Thus, his appeal should be dismissed. The fact that Wrightsell settled, however, does not affect the rights of the other potential class members, including Smentek. But a potential class member who wishes to appeal the denial of class certification must first seek to intervene in the district court and must do so within the time period for filing a notice of appeal. Smentek did not -- his petition to intervene should be denied.

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THOROGOOD v. SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO. (February 12, 2010)

Stephen Thorogood filed a state court class-action on behalf of the purchasers of stainless steel dryers in multiple states. He alleged that the defendant’s representation that the dryers were made of stainless steel violated the consumer protection acts of those states. The defendant removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). Although the district court certified a class, the Seventh Circuit reversed and ordered the class decertified (intheiropinion.com post). The Court thought the case was not only a weak candidate for class certification, but also flimsy on its own merits. On remand, the defendant made an offer of judgment, inclusive of attorneys fees, of $20,000. Finding that that offer exceeded plaintiff's maximum recovery under state law of $3,000 and therefore the amount in controversy, the district court dismissed the case as moot. Thorogood appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Kanne, and Evans affirmed. The Court first rejected plaintiff's argument that the case should have been remanded upon class decertification, relying upon its decision in Cunningham Charter (intheiropinion.com post) just three weeks earlier. Then, the Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the case was not moot because of his entitlement to significant attorneys’ fees. First, an award of fees for value conferred beyond the relief obtained must generally be relief ordered by the court. Second, the court was within its discretion in deciding that no fees were warranted. Finally, the Court noted that most of the fees were incurred pursuing the failed class action, not the $3,000 individual action.

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CUNNINGHAM CHARTER CORP. v. LEARJET (January 22, 2010)

Cunningham Charter Corp. brought a breach of warranty and products liability class action against Learjet in state court. Learjet removed the case to federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). After the district court denied class certification for failure to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23, it remanded the case to state court. The district court concluded that the denial of certification deprived the court of federal jurisdiction under CAFA. Learjet sought leave to appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Coffey, and Flaum granted leave to appeal and reversed and remanded. CAFA, said the Court, grants federal jurisdiction to certain class actions. A class action is defined as "any civil action filed under rule 23." The statute also specifically provides that it applies before or after a class is certified. Based on these and other provisions of CAFA, as well as the principles that jurisdiction is determined at the time of filing and is generally not affected by later developments, the Court concluded that CAFA jurisdiction does not depend on class certification.
 

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MURO v. TARGET CORP. (August 31, 2009)

Christine Muro held a Target "Guest Card" for a few years. In late 1999, she paid off the balance and requested that her account be closed. In 2004, Target sent her an unsolicited Visa Card. Muro never used, or even activated, the card. She brought an action under §§ 1637 and 1642 of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). With respect to § 1642, which prohibits the unsolicited issuance of a credit card, the court denied class certification. It concluded that Muro's claims were not typical of the claims of most of the proposed class (because most of the class members had an open “Guest Card” account) and that she had failed to establish numerosity with respect to the claims for which her claims were typical. Muro settled her individual § 1642 claim, reserving the right to appeal the denial of class certification. The court granted summary judgment to Target and denied class certification on the § 1637 claims. Muro appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Rovner and Evans affirmed. With respect to § 1642, the Court noted that the narrow issue was whether a named plaintiff in a putative class action could settle her individual claim and still appeal an adverse decision on class certification. Referring to the Supreme Court's decisions in Geraghty and Roper, the Court stated that a plaintiff has to have a personal stake in the adjudication of the certification issue to maintain an appeal. The Court recognized a difference of opinion among courts as to whether a mere reservation of a right to appeal is sufficient interest to maintain an appeal. Upon reflection, the Court concluded that a voluntary settlement by a putative class plaintiff strips the plaintiffs of any personal interest in the litigation sufficient to support an appeal. Here, although Muro accepted the settlement with a reservation of her right to appeal, she retains no stake in the litigation and no right to appeal. As an aside, the Court indicated its agreement with the district court on the merits of its denial of class certification. With respect to § 1637, which requires certain disclosures before "opening" an account, the Court also agreed with the lower court. The issue on the § 1637 claim was when an account is "opened." The TILA is silent but the Federal Reserve Board regulations require the disclosures before the first transaction. Concurring with the regulation's approach, the Court noted that Muro had never activated or used her card. She had no § 1637 claim.

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HERSHEY v. PACIFIC INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT CO. (JULY 7, 2009)

A number of investors sold 10-year U.S. Treasury notes short and, between May 9 and June 30, 2005, bought futures contracts in settlement of their obligations. These investors brought a class action against Pacific Investment Management Co. (PIMCO), alleging that PIMCO violated the Commodity Exchange Act by cornering the market in certain Treasury notes. The class alleges that PIMCO increased its ownership of the notes to the point where it created a monopoly price, resulting in losses to the class of more than $600 million. PIMCO challenged the class definition. It pointed out that many class members did not lose money because of the net effects of multiple trades. The district court certified the class. PIMCO appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Evans and Tinder affirmed. The Court rejected PIMCO's argument that a district court had to determine which class members suffered damages before certifying a class. The standing requirement is satisfied as long as one member of the class has a plausible damage claim. The fact that a class member ultimately is shown to have not been injured does not preclude class certification. The Court cautioned, however, that a class should not be certified if it appears that many class members have suffered no injury. Although the Court did not believe that to be the case, it invited PIMCO, on remand, to find out through a random sample of depositions. The Court also rejected PIMCO's argument that a conflict of interest existed among class members because they purchased the notes at different times. The conflict was only hypothetical and may never materialize.

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