Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Commentary : In Their Opinion : Lawyer & Attorney Michael E. Rigney : Kelley Drye & Warren Law Firm

EDGENET, INC. v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A. (September 2, 2011)

When Home Depot wanted a classification system for its inventory database, it went to Edgenet. Home Depot and Edgenet entered into a contract for the creation of the taxonomy. The contract provided that Edgenet owned the intellectual property and that Home People had a no-cost license as long as Edgenet continued to provide services. If Home Depot terminated its service contract with Edgenet, the license terminated and Home Depot had to either purchase a $100,000 perpetual license or stop using the taxonomy. In early 2009, Home Depot gave notice that it would no longer be needing Edgenet’s services and tendered $100,000 for the perpetual license. Edgenet filed suit alleging that Home Depot infringed its copyright on the taxonomy. Judge Stadtmueller (E.D. Wis.) dismissed the claim, concluding that Home Depot had a right to use the taxonomy under the contract. Edgenet appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Sykes and Tinder affirmed. The Court first addresses its jurisdiction and satisfied itself that the case really arose under the copyright law and was not merely a breach of contract case. On the merits, the Court criticized the lower court for relying on Rule 12(b)(6) instead of Rule 56 when it relied on matters outside the pleadings but nevertheless affirmed its result. The Court concluded that: a) Home Depot never used the taxonomy in any prohibited way, b) Home Depot had the perpetual license option on the taxonomy's current version, not just the original one, and c) Home Depot exercised its option while its license was still in effect.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

NOVA DESIGN BUILD, INC. V. GRACE HOTELS, LLC (July 26, 2011)

Grace Hotels entered into a contract with Nova Design Build to provide architectural services in connection with its construction of a Holiday Inn Express in Waukegan, Illinois. In addition to the architectural fees, Grace promised to pay a $15,000 penalty if it did not use Nova's construction affiliate to build the hotel. The parties' relationship soured during the design phase and Grace did not use Nova's affiliate to build the hotel. Nova completed the design and registered a copyright for it. Because its computers had been stolen, Nova had to create a duplicate of its designs to satisfy the Copyright Office’s requirement of submitting a copy of the designs. Nova then sued Grace, alleging federal copyright infringement as well as state law claims. The gist of Nova's allegations is that Grace infringed its copyright when it used Nova’s designs to construct the hotel. Judge Der-Yeghiayan (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to Grace on the ground that Nova's design re-creation did not satisfy the Copyright Office requirements.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Kanne and Wood affirmed. The Court first addressed federal jurisdiction. Under the doctrine set forth in T.B. Harms Co., a federal court has jurisdiction under the Copyright Act only if the complaint seeks a remedy granted by the Act, as opposed to a contract remedy. In Harms, the issue concerned the ownership of the copyright, not its infringement. Here, however, Nova clearly alleges infringement and seeks a Copyright Act remedy. The fact that Grace has set forth a state contract law defense is immaterial. On the merits, the Court disagreed with the district court's resolution. The Copyright Act requires the registrant to submit a complete copy of the designs seeking to be registered. The submission must be "virtually identical" to the original designs. The Court concluded that the record supported Nova's claim that the submitted designs met the requirement and did not support the district court's speculation that Nova had to resort to employees’ memories to re-create its designs. Notwithstanding its disagreement with the district court on the registration requirement issue, the Court nevertheless affirmed. Before inquiring into whether the completed hotel infringed Nova's design, a court must identify the aspects of Nova's design that he can be protected. The only design aspects that can be protected are those that have originality. Here, Nova's designs were based on a Holiday Inn Express model. Although Nova added some features and changed others, there was not enough originality or creativity in the changes to qualify for Copyright Act protection. Grace was entitled to summary judgment.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

HYPERQUEST v. N'SITE SOLUTIONS (January 19, 2011)

Safelite Group owns the copyright for a claims processing software program. Its predecessor granted a non-exclusive license to N’Site Solutions in 2001 limited to in-facility use only. A dispute arose between the parties in late 2003 regarding agreement terms and fees. Attempts to renegotiate the agreement in early 2004 were unsuccessful. At about the same time, Safelite entered into a licensing agreement with HyperQuest. The HyperQuest agreement granted significantly greater rights than the N’Site agreement did. However, Safelite retained certain rights and the agreement recognized the then-ongoing renegotiation efforts with N’Site. HyperQuest filed a Copyright Act suit against N’Site and Unitrin Direct Insurance Company. It alleged that N’Site infringed its copyright by using the software outside of its own facilities, by modifying and creating derivative works, and by selling the software or derivative works to Unitrin. Judge Shadur (N.D. Ill.) dismissed the case with prejudice, concluding that HyperQuest lacked standing to sue. The court also awarded fees and costs to N’Site. HyperQuest appeals both the merits and the fee award -- Unitrin cross-appeals the reduction of its requested fees.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Flaum, Wood, and Evans affirmed. Under the Copyright Act, only a person with enforceable rights may bring an action. That person must be a "legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right." The Act lists six exclusive rights - the right to: a) reproduce the work, b) prepare derivative works, c) distribute copies, d) perform the work publicly, e) display the work, and, f) perform the work digitally. The Court noted that a copyright owner could convey various rights to different parties and that HyperQuest need only show its ownership of one of the exclusive rights. HyperQuest claims to own three of the six identified rights -- the rights to reproduce, prepare derivative works, and distribute copies. The Court turned to the language of the license agreements and the rights held by each of the parties to resolve the claim. It noted that N’Site had a limited right to use the software in its own facilities and no rights to reproduce, prepare derivative works, or distribute copies. But HyperQuest's license was not only subject to N’Site actual rights but was also subject to any rights that would have been granted to N’Site in the renegotiated license. In addition, Safelite itself retained substantial rights with respect to derivative works. The Court concluded that the lines of ownership were "blurry at best" and that HyperQuest failed to meet its burden of showing ownership of an exclusive right. Turning to the fee award, the Court first addressed a jurisdictional issue. The original judgment on the fee award ran in favor of Unitrin only. Two days later, the district court on its own motion amended the judgment to add N’Site. Unitrin's notice of appeal is timely only if the amended judgment started anew the period within which to appeal. The Court concluded that the change was not a clerical error correctable under Rule 60(a) but that it was akin to a new trial order under Rule 59(d) and that the notice of appeal was timely. The Court found no abuse of discretion in either the award of fees or the reduction in the amount requested.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

FM INDUSTRIES v. CITICORP CREDIT SERVICES (July 22, 2010)

FM Industries brought a copyright infringement suit against Citicorp Credit Services. Judge Conlon (N.D. Ill.) found material disputes with respect to FM’s prospective relief and Citicorp’s ongoing infringement and set the case for trial. FM's lawyer, Wayne Rhine, was late in his obligation to prepare a draft pretrial order. When he did so, it was "egregiously noncompliant." Despite extensions of time and cooperation from the defendants, Rhine never fixed the problem. Eventually, the court dismissed the case for want of prosecution. The district court awarded approximately $750,000 in attorneys’ fees to the defendants under the copyright statute. The court also found that Rhine and his co-counsel William McGrath had vexatiously multiplied the proceedings under § 1927 and imposed a joint and several sanction of $35,000. FM, Rhine, and McGrath appeal.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Wood and Tinder affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court first noted that any argument on the merits was irrelevant. The only reason the case did not go to trial was the dismissal sanction. On that issue, the Court had no difficulty in finding it proper. The non-compliant pretrial order with was, in the Court's words, the "straw that broke the camel's back." The Court recited the delays, the warnings, the absurd damage demands, the missed time limits, the overreaching discovery demands -- the list went on. The dismissal sanctioned was permissible under Rule 16 and was proportionate to the conduct. With respect to the statutory award of fees, the Court stated that a prevailing defendant is presumed entitled to fees under the statute and FM presented no reason to reverse that presumption. Finally, with respect to § 1927 sanctions, the Court concluded that Rhine's litigation behavior was vexatious and deserving of sanctions. McGrath, however, presented a different story. Although he did file an appearance and signed five pleadings, he was not accused of any direct misdeeds. He cannot be sanctioned under § 1927 for the misdeeds of his co-counsel or even for his failure to prevent them. The Court reversed the award of sanctions against McGrath.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

SCHROCK v. LEARNING CURVE INTERNATIONAL (November 5, 2009)

Learning Curve International ("LCI"), a producer and distributor of toys, has a license to market toys based on the "Thomas & Friends" properties. It hired Daniel Schrock to take photographs of those toys for use in promotional materials. LCI paid Schrock more than $400,000 for his effort. Although LCI stopped using Schrock's services in 2003, it continued to use some of his photos. Schrock registered the photos for copyright protection in 2004 and brought an infringement action against LCI and LCI’s licensor. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. It ruled that Schrock needed LCI's permission to copyright the photos, which he did not have. Schrock appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Williams and Sykes reversed and remanded. The Court first noted that the copying element of an infringement action was not disputed – only whether Schrock had a valid copyright. Then, the Court briefly discussed the subject of derivative works but ended up assuming without deciding that each photo qualified as a derivative work. Next, the Court concluded that the photos met the requisite threshold of originality for copyright protection. That threshold is rather low – and the Court specifically rejected LCI’s argument that the threshold is higher for derivative works. If photographs are distinguishable from the underlying works, they qualify for derivative-work copyright. Schrock’s are and therefore do. In order to be copyrightable, a derivative work must itself not be infringing – that is, the owner of the copyright in the underlying work must have given permission to make the derivative work. The owner need not, however, have given actual permission to copyright the derivative work. The Court specifically rejected dicta in Gracen that suggested otherwise. Although Schrock’s right to copyright his work therefore arises by operation of law without the need for permission, Schrock is entitled to contract away his rights. The Court concluded that the record was insufficient to determine the merits of defendants’ arguments that he did just that. It remanded for further development of the record.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

JANKY v. LAKE COUNTY CONVENTION AND VISITORS BUREAU (August 3, 2009)

Cheryl Janky and Henry Farag were members of the musical group Stormy Weather. They learned that the Lake County Convention and Visitors Bureau (Bureau) was looking for a song to use in marketing the county’s resources. Janky wrote the music and lyrics for a song and obtained a copyright for it. Her band-mate Farag made several specific recommendations regarding the song’s lyrics. Janky adopted the recommendations and filed for a new copyright listing Farag as the co-author of the song. The Bureau liked the song and began using it in its promotions. Farag issued a non-exclusive license to the Bureau. Some time later, Janky filed yet another copyright registration to correct what she termed a mistake in listing Farag as a co-author. Janky notified the Bureau that she was the exclusive owner of the song. The Bureau, however, did not stop using the song. Janky filed suit. The court entered partial summary judgment in her favor and a jury awarded her $100,000. The Bureau appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Ripple (dissenting) and Evans reversed and remanded. The principal issue before the Court was whether Janky held the copyright by herself or whether she shared it with Farag. The legal standard is that individuals are co-authors when they intend to create a joint work and both contribute independently copyrightable material. The majority elaborated on the intent prong by stating that it does not focus on the party's intent to recognize each other as co-authors but on their intent to create a single product together. The majority concluded that the evidence supported a finding that Farag and Janky intended to create a joint work. They relied significantly on Janky's original copyright registration. The majority also found the independently copyrightable prong met in this case. They noted that the changes, although only 10% of the final lyrics, were significant not only to the sound but to the commercial viability of the song. The Court remanded for partial summary judgment to be entered for the Bureau.

Judge Ripple, dissenting, agreed with the majority's statement of the standard and, in fact, agreed with the majority that the district court improperly granted summary judgment to Janky. He disagreed, however, with the majority’s conclusion to enter partial summary judgment in favor of the Bureau. Particularly with respect to the evidence of intent, Judge Ripple concluded that the record did not support entry of judgment for either party.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

BROOKS-NGWENYA v. INDIANAPOLIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS (April 15, 2009)

While a classroom assistant in the Indianapolis Public School system ("IPS"), Angela Brooks-Ngwenya developed a program she called Transitioning Into Responsible Students (“TIRS”). When IPS did not offer Brooks-Ngwenya a permanent job, she brought suit for race discrimination. She and IPS settled the suit in 2004. She later brought a second suit, alleging that IPS infringed her copyright in TIRS, to which she added a claim for employment discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to IPS. Brooks-Ngwenya appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Williams and Tinder affirmed. The Court first addressed the issue of copyright registration. The district court granted summary judgment to IPS because the Copyright Office had rejected Brooks-Ngwenya's application for trademark registration. Federal law requires a rejected applicant to notify the Register of Copyrights when suing for infringement. Brooks-Ngwenya presented no evidence that she had given such notice. The Court concluded that the notice requirement was, although not jurisdictional, a prerequisite to suit. Given that the Register was aware of the suit, the Court concluded that no purpose would be served by insisting on notification and proceeded to the merits. The Court held that Brooks-Ngwenya’s copyright claim must fail because she could not show that IPS used any of her words or materials, only possibly her idea. As for the discrimination claim, the Court had no difficulty in affirming the district court. The party’s earlier dismissal barred the claim. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link