Treating Psychiatrist's Opinion Must Be Given Proper Weight

PUNZIO v. ASTRUE (January 21, 2011)

Patricia Punzio's life has been difficult -- alcoholic parents, sexual abuse, attempted suicide, dyslexia, depression, and alcohol abuse all by the time she was 26. Although she stopped drinking at that time, she still had few job skills and had trouble maintaining employment. In 1998, at the age of 40, she sought psychiatric treatment. For the next several years, she participated in treatment and took medication. She was diagnosed with depression and bipolar disorder. Her condition and symptoms improved at times and, at other times, regressed. Her therapist, who saw her in weekly sessions in 2005 and 2006, concluded that she was incapable of holding down a job as a result of her mental illness. Punzio applied for disability benefits in 2005. At an ALJ hearing in 2007, she testified that her condition had improved with treatment but that she still had days when she could not leave the house, that she was still troubled by dyslexia and poor memory, that she mixes up numbers, that she has trouble remembering directions, and that she spends most of her time at home. In response to a question from the ALJ proposing certain limitations on Punzio's capacity to work, a vocational expert testified that Punzio could return to her prior work and would also be able to do factory work. Punzio's lawyer added additional restrictions to the question, including an inability to stay on task and to understand instructions and a likelihood to miss work three days a month. The vocational expert testified that any of those restrictions would eliminate any potential employment. The ALJ commented that the record did not support those added restrictions and asked for supplemental evidence. Punzio solicited an opinion from her treating psychiatrist. The psychiatrist submitted a report that supported the conditions suggested by Punzio's lawyer. The ALJ denied benefits, assigning no weight to the psychiatrist assessment because it was solicited by her attorney for purposes of the hearing and because it was inconsistent with other treatment notes. He also rejected the therapist’s opinion and Punzio's own testimony (as "not entirely credible"). Judge Darrah (N.D. Ill.) affirmed. Punzio appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Rovner, and Tinder reversed and remanded for the award of benefits. The Court first noted that the ALJ's failure to give any reason whatsoever for the belief that Punzio's testimony was not credible was grounds for reversal itself. The Court has commented several times recently on this unacceptable but frequent practice. (See Martinez, Spiva, and Parker). But another, more serious problem attracted the Court's attention. A treating physician's opinion is entitled to "controlling weight" if it is supported by competent evidence and not inconsistent with other evidence. Here, the ALJ rejected the treating physician's opinion, citing both that it contradicted her treatment notes and that it was solicited by her lawyer. The Court rejected both reasons. It found no contradiction between her diagnosis and her notes, when viewed as a whole, and criticized the ALJ’s “cherry-picking” the record to find an arguable, fleeting contradiction. As for the opinion being requested by the lawyer, the Court noted that the practice was endorsed by the agency's regulations and even encouraged on the agency's website. The Court recognized that sometimes treating physicians are not objective, but noted that the concern is addressed by the regulations. Given the treating physician's opinion and supporting evidence and the vocational expert's testimony that no jobs are available to someone with Punzio's mental condition, the Court concluded that a remand for further consideration was unnecessary. Instead, it remanded for an award of benefits.

Social Security ALJs Must Explain Adverse Credibility Determinations And Consider All Evidence

MARTINEZ v. ASTRUE (January 19, 2011)

Anita Martinez and her five children live in her mother's basement. Martinez suffers from depression, bipolar disorder, and severe arthritis. She is on medication for both her mental and physical complaints. An ALJ denied her claim for disability benefits. Francis Rider is 61 years old, extremely obese, has severe arthritis in her right knee, and suffers from back pain. An ALJ denied her request for disability benefits. Christine Pound is 60 years old and suffers from coronary artery disease, cartoid artery disease, back pain, and restless leg syndrome. But Pound only had Social Security coverage through the end of 2003. At that time, her conditions were under control and she used only mild medication to treat her pain. An ALJ denied her request for disability benefits. Martinez, Rider, and Pound appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Ripple, and Rovner consolidated the three appeals and reversed and remanded in Martinez and Rider and affirmed in Pound. In these consolidated appeals, the Court again (as in Spiva (opinion and intheiropinion) and Parker (opinion), both opinions also written by Judge Posner) took the opportunity to criticize the Social Security Administration and its handling of benefit claims. It specifically disapproved of the common ALJ practice of concluding a claimant's statements are not credible without explanation and also noted many ALJs’ apparent lack of familiarity with mental illness. On the merits of the appeals, the Court: a) reversed and remanded the benefits denial in Martinez because the ALJ's superficial opinion discounted Martinez' testimony as "not entirely credible" without explanation, ignored much of the evidence, overlooked the fact that she stopped taking her medication at times because of her condition, and never considered the cumulative impact of her various problems, b) reversed and remanded the benefits denial in Rider because the ALJ ignored the treating doctor's opinion that she was not capable of prolonged standing or walking, relied on contrary opinions of non-treating physicians, made findings inconsistent with the evidence, ignored the uncontroverted testimony that Rider could not afford a knee replacement, and failed to consider the impact of her obesity on her physical condition, and c) affirmed the benefits denial in Pound because, although her condition deteriorated rapidly after 2004, the ALJ conducted a thorough analysis and denied benefits in a thorough opinion that concluded that Pound could perform sedentary work (and was therefore not disabled) when her coverage expired. 

ALJ Finding That Psychotic Individual Could Work At WalMart Is Not Supported By The Record

SPIVA v. ASTRUE (December 6, 2010)

David Spiva had a very unfortunate childhood. His father was shot to death, his mother beat him, he attempted suicide in his teens, he served time in prison, and he experienced urges to hurt himself and others. At the age of 28, he was working as a stock shelver at a WalMart store in Mississippi. He checked himself into a psychiatric clinic because he continued to have thoughts of harming himself and others. He was diagnosed as having a psychotic disorder, a mood disorder, and a personality disorder. He was released after several days with a prescription for antidepressant. Within months, he returned because "evil spirits" were after him. Again, he was released after several days with prescriptions for antipsychotic and antidepressant medications. The clinic psychiatrist believed that he could maintain steady employment if he continued to take the drugs and received treatment. Spiva never returned to his job. Instead, he moved to Milwaukee in 2006 and has since lived with various relatives. He was hospitalized again in 2006 and 2007, still complaining about evil spirits. He filed for Social Security benefits. Two state mental health professionals evaluated his condition. One concluded that he could probably perform routine tasks and interact with coworkers. The other thought that he could work but that he had difficulty concentrating and interacting with other people. Spiva was the only witness at his hearing. He testified that he was unable to work because of his "evil thoughts" and "doing bad." He also testified that he sometimes babysat for his daughter, helped out at a day-care facility, and had recently attended two parties hosted by a relative. The ALJ determined that Spiva suffered from schizophrenia, depression, and attention deficit disorder but concluded that he was not totally disabled because he could still perform his last job (at Wal-Mart). Judge Stadtmueller (E.D. Wis.) affirmed. Spiva appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Posner, Tinder, and Hamilton reversed and remanded. The Court was very critical of both the ALJ and the Justice Department's lawyers. With respect to the ALJ, the Court found the opinion totally lacking in an analysis of Spiva's ability to work at WalMart. The Court wondered how a "psychotic person busy trying to cope with evil spirits" could interact with the number of customers found in a typical WalMart store. Because the ALJ found that he could continue in his old job, she made no finding with respect to any other employment he was capable of and whether such employment was available in the area. The Court also criticized her vague references to Spiva's lack of credibility. That conclusion is simply unsupported by the record. Finally, the Court questioned the ALJ's understanding of mental illness, giving her remarks about Spiva's failure to take his medication. The Court stated that keeping mental patients on medication is one of the most serious treatment problems. In short, the ALJ's opinion was unsatisfactory. Next, with respect to the Justice Department lawyers, the Court believed they overstepped their role under Chenery. That doctrine requires the court to review the product of the authorized agency, not the Justice Department lawyers' later justification for such product. Here, the lawyers argued many points from the record that were not part of the ALJ's analysis or consideration. The harmless error doctrine will allow the affirmance of an agency decision if it is overwhelmingly supported by the record even if the agency failed to adequately state its opinion with appropriate record references. The doctrine does not, however, allow affirmance simply because the agency's lawyers have cited enough record evidence to lead to the conclusion that the agency might reached the same decision on remand. The best the Justice Department lawyers can do here is the latter.

ALJ May Discount Subjective Reports Of Pain When Inconsistent With Objective Medical Evidence

JONES v. ASTRUE (October 22, 2010)

Jacklin Jones was injured in a car accident in 2001. Over the course of the next several years, she sought medical treatment as her condition worsened. She complained of lower back pain and numbness in her hands. The objective medical evidence, including the results of multiple MRIs, identified the principal problem as a mild, lower- back disc bulge. Her orthopedic surgeon advised her to discontinue the strong pain medication and instead to lose weight and begin physical therapy. She quit her job in November of 2003 because of her pain. She continued to see the orthopedic surgeon, who continued to tell her to lose weight and get into better condition. Jones sought disability benefits. At her hearing, she testified that she was in substantial pain, that she could not sit or stand for long periods, that her pain medication made her drowsy and nauseous, and that she had trouble holding onto objects. A vocational expert, responding to the ALJ's hypotheticals, testified that there were over 3000 jobs available for a person with Jones' conditions. The ALJ concluded that Jones was not disabled, finding that she could perform simple, routine, sedentary work. In reaching that conclusion, the ALJ found Jones' testimony about the intensity of her pain not credible. Judge Randa (E.D. Wis.) concluded that substantial evidence supported the decision and affirmed. Jones appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Circuit Judge Flaum and District Judge Hibbler affirmed. Jones' principal argument was that the ALJ's credibility determination was flawed. The Court noted that that determination is entitled to significant deference and would be overturned only if "patently wrong." Here, the ALJ credited a significant amount of Jones' testimony, there was substantial objective medical evidence in the record inconsistent with Jones' testimony regarding the extent of her pain, and Jones' treating physicians did not consider her disabled. An ALJ may not ignore subjective statements of pain simply because they are not supported by medical evidence. An ALJ may, however, consider subjective statements of pain as exaggerations when they are inconsistent with objective medical evidence. Here, the Court found that her testimony was inconsistent with objective medical evidence and concluded that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's findings.

ALJ Improperly Rejected Treating Psychiatrist's Testimony

LARSON v. ASTRUE (August 3, 2010)

Lynn Larson has been suffering from anxiety and depression for years. Her already fragile condition worsened in early 2004 when she was raped and suffered several additional physical injuries. Her psychiatrist continued to describe and adjust dosages of several medications throughout this time. Larson applied for Social Security benefits in June of 2004. Her troubles continued -- she was drinking, she had a "nervous breakdown," the nephew she had been raising was taken from her home, and she was arrested for driving under the influence. Her application for benefits was denied in 2004, and again on reconsideration in 2005. Her psychiatrist submitted a new questionnaire with a diagnosis of "severe, recurrent depression." A hearing was held before an ALJ in 2007. Larson testified about her employment history -- that she quit her part-time job at a gas station because she had to hide in the bathroom, she was fired from her bus driver job after a breakdown, and that she worked two hours a week at a restaurant owned by a friend. A psychologist testified that Larson met the "A criteria" but not the "B criteria." Her psychiatrist testified that Larson met all criteria. The ALJ denied the claim. Larson appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Wood, and Hamilton reversed and remanded. The Court first addressed the ALJ's consideration of the treating psychiatrist's opinion. That opinion is entitled to controlling weight if it is well supported and an ALJ must give a good reason for not giving it such weight. The Court found that the ALJ ignored and mischaracterized certain evidence in rejecting the psychiatrist's opinion. The psychiatrist had treated Larson for several years and his opinion was consistent with the other evidence in the record. The Court concluded that the ALJ would have found Larson disabled at Step 3 had he given the psychiatrist's opinion appropriate weight. The Court found support for its conclusion in the ALJ's treatment of Larson's testimony itself. The ALJ’s adverse credibility ruling was patently wrong and could not stand.