Wisconsin's Ban On Effective Treatment For Gender Identity Disorder Is Unconstitutional

FIELDS v. SMITH (August 5, 2011)

Andrea Fields, Matthew (a.k.a. Jessica) Davison, and Vankemah Moaton are all inmates in the Wisconsin Department of Corrections system and are all male-to-female transsexuals. They have each been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder, a condition in which an individual identifies with the gender that does not match his or her own physical characteristics. Prior to 2010, each had been receiving hormonal therapy. Then Wisconsin adopted the Inmate Sex Change Prevention Act, which prohibited the Department of Corrections from using any funds to provide hormonal therapy or sexual reassignment surgery. Fields and the others brought a class action challenging the Act’s constitutionality. Chief Judge Clevert (E.D. Wis.) denied class certification but conducted a trial on the individual claims. After hearing substantial expert testimony, the court concluded that the Act violated the Eighth Amendment, both as applied and on its face. Defendants appeal.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Rovner and Wood and District Judge Gottschall affirmed. The Eight Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. Prison officials violate it when they display "deliberate indifference" to prisoners' medical needs. The Court conceded that two cases, one from 1987 and one from 1997, provide some support for defendants’ views that hormone therapy and sexual reassignment surgery are not required by the Eighth Amendment. The Court noted, however, that the support came from dicta or short comments that were based on certain assumptions pertaining to cost and the availability of alternative treatments. Now, years later, the district court heard expert testimony concerning those assumptions. The defendants concede that GID is a serious medical condition, do not contend that the Act’s prohibitions are defensible on a cost savings basis, and they presented no evidence that an alternative treatment could accomplish similar results. The trial evidence established that hormone therapy was the only effective treatment for plaintiffs' condition. Denying the only effective treatment for a serious medical condition violates the Eighth Amendment. The Court also rejected the defendants’ argument that prison security was a sufficient reason to ban the treatments. Finally, the Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the Act facially unconstitutional.

Allegations Of Forced Outdoor Work In Cold Without Protective Clothing State An Eighth Amendment Claim

SMITH v. PETERS (January 19, 2011)

Anthony Smith was incarcerated in Indiana state prison. He brought suit against prison employees, alleging violations of the First and Eighth amendments. According to the allegations of his complaint, he was a) forced to work outside in freezing conditions without protective equipment (including gloves), b) forced to work in a group with axes and shovels without receiving safety instruction, and c) retaliated against for filing grievances complaining about the work conditions. Chief Judge Young (S.D. Ind.) dismissed the complaint, concluding that a) the outdoor work was merely "the usual discomforts of winter" and b) Smith's fear of dangerous working conditions was not actionable in the absence of a physical injury. He did not address the First Amendment claim. Smith appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Posner, Wood, and Williams reversed and remanded. On the protective clothing claim, the Court stated that the allegations of forcing Smith to work in freezing conditions without gloves is sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment Claim. On the dangerous conditions claim, the Court agreed that Smith was not entitled to injunctive relief (because he had been transferred to another prison) or compensatory damages (because of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)’s a physical injury requirement). However, the complaint's allegation of a reckless exposure to serious physical injury does state an Eighth Amendment claim and the Court concluded that Smith is entitled to seek remedies not precluded by § 1997e (including nominal and punitive damages). Finally, the Court noted that the complaint stated a claim for a First Amendment violation and the district court erred by not addressing it.

Specific Allegations Of Lengthy Delay In Receiving Dental Treatment Survives Section 1915A Screening

MCGOWAN v. HULICK (July 20, 2010)

Michael McGowan was incarcerated in an Illinois prison in 2006. He filed a pro se lawsuit pursuant to state law and § 1983 against a dentist and the prison's dental director alleging the following facts: In November of 2006, his tooth began to hurt. His pleas for assistance finally resulted in an appointment with a dentist in late January 2007. The dentist refused to provide a filling but agreed to extract the tooth. The procedure did not go well. McGowan was in severe pain, the tooth broke apart, and the dentist had to remove pieces of the tooth from his mouth with an ice pick. After the procedure, the pain increased, a mass of tissue developed, and he developed a sinus perforation. Other than pain relievers and temporary fixes, McGowan received no treatment until August, months after the extraction. The complaint alleges detailed facts regarding his requests for treatment and the delay occasioned at least in part by the prison dental director. Judge Herndon (S.D. Ill.) dismissed the case with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to the § 1915A screening. The court acknowledged the long delay in treatment but concluded that it did not amount to deliberate indifference. The court did not address the state law negligence claims. McGowan appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Posner and Wood vacated and remanded. The Court noted the "well-established" Eighth Amendment test -- that deliberate indifference to serious medical (or dental) needs can amount to a violation. Delay itself can equal deliberate indifference in circumstances where it made conditions worse. Here, the Court concluded that the allegations against the prison dental director were erroneously dismissed. It noted the very specific complaint allegations of significant delays before McGowan was able to see the dentist, the oral surgeon, and finally the specialist. At this screening stage of this proceeding, the Court concluded that the allegations were sufficient to proceed. The Court reviewed the allegations against the dentist quite differently. It saw that as a dispute over which procedure was used and the competence with which it was performed. Although the ice pick allegation gave the Court the most pause, it decided that the allegation was simply that some instrument that looked like an ice pick was used. Although possibly supporting a negligence or gross negligence conclusion, the Court concluded that the allegations cannot support a finding of deliberate indifference. With respect to the state law negligence claims, the Court reinstated the claim with respect to the dental director and instructed the district court to modify its dismissal of the dentist to be without prejudice.