TSA Employee Has No Remedy For Disability Discrimination
JOREN v. NAPOLITANO (February 7, 2011)
Verlaine Joren was a security screener with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) at Midway Airport in Chicago. At the age of 63, Smith claimed to have a condition that limited her ability to stand or walk. She asked her supervisor for accommodations, including a relocation to Florida and schedule modifications. Her supervisor was skeptical of her complaints and refused her requests. Joren claims that he even refused to reassign her a "safe distance" from an x-ray machine when she temporarily had a heart monitor without a doctor's clarification of "safe distance." Joren resigned her position in January 2004 after her supervisor confronted her regarding a Social Security claim she had filed. Joren filed suit pursuant to Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, alleging age, gender, and disability discrimination and retaliation. Judge Bucklo (N.D. Ill.) dismissed the complaint, holding that Joren failed to state a cause of action under Title VII and that her Rehabilitation Act claim was foreclosed by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA). Joren appeals
In their opinion, Judges Rovner, Evans, and Williams affirmed. First, the Court stated that the gender and age discrimination claims were properly dismissed because Joren's complaint did not suggest that gender or age motivated her employer's actions. Instead, the complaint linked those actions exclusively to her disability. Federal employees’ disability claims are generally governed by the Rehabilitation Act, but Congress passed the ATSA after the September 11 attacks. The ATSA established the TSA and gave the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security the authority to hire and fire "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law." The Court agreed with the other circuits that have considered the question that the "notwithstanding" language meant that the Rehabilitation Act’s disability discrimination prohibitions did not apply to TSA employees.
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Norman Blanco was hired by Porsche Engineering Services in April of 2005. After one month of employment, he was covered by Porsche's benefit plan. The plan included both short and long term disability benefits. Blanco suffered a heart attack in July and, by the end of August, was no longer able to work. The long-term disability plan had a pre-existing condition exclusion. It precluded coverage for conditions for which the beneficiary, in the three months prior to his coverage effective date, had either a) received care or took medication or b) had symptoms for which a prudent person would have sought care. Pursuant to the pre-existing condition exclusion, Prudential denied Blanco's claim for long-term benefits. Blanco filed an ERISA suit. Judge McKinney (S.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to Prudential.
Jeanne Gratzl has suffered from incontinence for several years. It has interfered with her ability to perform certain jobs and undertake normal commutes. All seemed well when she was hired by DuPage County for a “control room” court reporting position. Unlike most court reporting positions that require attendance at trials and in courtrooms, her position allowed her to manage her condition well. In fact, she managed it so well that her colleagues and superiors were not aware of it. In 2006, all that changed. The Chief Judge of DuPage County redefined the position of a court reporter – and required all court reporters to do the same job. That meant that all court reporters had to rotate through the control room and the courtrooms. Gratzl disclosed her condition to the Chief Judge. The parties engaged in a series of conversations attempting to reach an accommodation. The only accommodation Gratzl would accept was a full-time assignment to the control room. The Chief Judge offered several accommodations; including no trial assignments, assignments to courtrooms nearest the restrooms, and allowing her to use a hand signal to indicate to a presiding judge that she needed a break. When she rejected these accommodations, the County terminated her employment. Gratzl brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the County on the ground that Gratzl was not disabled. Gratzl appeals.
Paul Turner was a waiter at The Saloon restaurant. After working there for several years, Turner and one of his supervisors carried on a sexual relationship that lasted for about nine months. According to Turner, the supervisor retaliated against him after she ended the relationship. He alleges that she changed his table assignments, disciplined him without cause, and sexually harassed him on a number of specific occasions. Turner also alleges that he was discriminated against because of his psoriasis. He wears no underwear as a result of that condition and therefore occasionally exposes himself while changing clothes. He claims that his supervisors failed to accommodate his condition. Instead, he was forced to change in a “vile” men’s room. One day, in the middle of a shift and with no other waiters on duty, Turner left the restaurant to run an errand. When he returned, he was fired. Turner sued the restaurant and several managers for gender and disability discrimination under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act. He also made a claim for overtime. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Turner appeals.
Renae Ekstrand had been teaching successfully at Somerset Elementary School for several years when the school reassigned her to an interior classroom without natural light. Ekstrand had a disorder which limited her ability to function in an artificial light environment. She told the principal of her condition. She repeatedly requested a transfer to a room with natural light, two of which were available. The school addressed some of her concerns but refused to change her room assignment. Her condition deteriorated to the point where she had to seek medical attention and took a medical leave of absence. She continued to request a room reassignment during her leave. Ultimately, she left the school and brought an action pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment to Somerset. Ekstrand appeals.
Nancy Love had worked at National City for over twenty years when she was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. After almost 3 years of receiving long-term disability benefits, the Plan told her she no longer fit their definition of "disabled." The controlling definition, after two years of long-term disability, is that a claimant must not be able to perform any job for which she is or could be qualified. The Plan's assessment concluded that, although she probably suffered from multiple sclerosis, she had never suffered an attack nor exhibited clinical signs. Love appealed the determination. She supported her appeal with several medical reports concluding that she had limited functional ability. The Plan denied her appeal, citing its doctor's conclusion that Love was able to do certain simple jobs. Love sued the Plan under ERISA. The district court granted summary judgment to the Plan. Love appeals.
Brian Ketelboeter was a truck driver. He claims that he was injured in 1995, although he continued working until 2003. During those eight years, he complained of several additional injuries and increasing pain. Many physicians examined Ketelboeter over those years. Most tests showed no physical problems, at least none consistent with the degree of pain Ketelboeter claimed to experience. Dr. Dickson began treating Ketelboeter in 2002. Dickson treated his pain with muscle relaxants and therapy. Dickson reported that Ketelboeter’s pain was not consistent with the objective physical findings. Ketelboeter stopped working in June of 2003 and applied for disability in September. A hearing was held in April of 2005. The record contained the medical conclusions of Dickson and a state medical expert who reviewed Ketelboeter’s records. A vocational expert opined that, although Ketelboeter could no longer perform his truck driving job, he could perform other jobs. The vocational expert relied on the testimony of the medical expert in reaching his conclusion. He admitted that Dickson’s testimony would support an opinion that Ketelboeter would not be able to perform any job. The ALJ denied Ketelboeter’s claim. The ALJ granted Ketelboeter a second hearing based on additional testimony from Dickson. Again, a state-agency expert testified. He testified that there was little objective evidence of Ketelboeter’s pain. The vocational expert identified several additional jobs that Ketelboeter could perform. Again, the ALJ denied Ketelboeter’s claim. The ALJ placed more weight on the testimony of non-treating experts than Ketelboeter’s treating physician. He did so because of the lack of objective evidence of pain and Dickson’s own conclusions that Ketelboeter’s reports of pain were not supported by physical findings. Ketelboeter appeals.