Summary Judgment Was Improper When Genuine Fact Issues Remained Regarding Retaliation

MOORE v. VITAL PRODUCTS (May 25, 2011)

Raymond Moore delivered and installed medical equipment for Vital Products. He claims that other Vital employees, including his supervisor, exposed him to sexual paraphernalia and pictures and made unwelcome sexual remarks. Vital suspended Moore for poor performance in January of 2005. On February 16, shortly after his return from the suspension, Moore injured his back. He has not worked at Vital since. Vital sent a COBRA notice to Moore on February 21. The contents of the letter suggested that Moore was no longer employed at Vital. Moore filed an EEOC charge on December 7, 2005. The charge included allegations of hostile work environment based on race and gender but did not include allegations of unlawful discharge. Moore brought suit pursuant to Title VII, alleging a hostile work environment, discriminatory discharge, and retaliatory discharge. He also alleged retaliatory discharge under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act. Magistrate Judge Schenkier (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to Vital but denied its request for sanctions. Moore appeals -- Vital cross-appeals the denial of sanctions and seeks sanctions on appeal.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Kanne and Wood affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The Court first affirmed the dismissal of the hostile work environment claim. Since Moore filed his EEOC charge on December 7, he must present evidence of a hostile work environment within the 300-day window, or after February 10. He failed to present any evidence of hostile work environment between February 10 and February 16, his last day on the job. The Court next affirmed the dismissal of his Title VII discriminatory discharge claim. A Title VII plaintiff can only bring claims that were included in his EEOC charge, or at least reasonably related to the contents of the charge. Moore did not include in his EEOC charge any allegations relating to his discharge. In fact, he stated in his charge that he was on medical leave, not discharged. The Court reversed, however, summary judgment on the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act claim. It is not clear whether Moore: a) is an employee on leave, b) abandoned his job in February 2005, or c) was discharged. The Court found genuine issues of fact with respect to Moore's status and, if he was discharged, whether the discharge was motivated by his intention to file a workers' compensation claim. Finally, the Court affirmed the district court's sanctions ruling and declined to impose its own.

Discrimination Claims Are Barred When They Were Either Untimely Or Not Raised In The EEOC Charge

JONES v. RES-CARE, INC. (July 16, 2010)

Tamika Jones, an African-American female, has several complaints about the way she was treated during her employment at Res-Care. She claims she was promoted in both 2003 and 2004 and acquired increased job responsibilities without an increase in compensation -- unlike several non-African-American employees. She claims she had to specially request time off and that she was denied tuition reimbursement -- unlike several non-African-American employees. She claims she was passed over for promotions in April and November of 2005 and June of 2006 – in favor of non-African-American employees. She filed an EEOC charge in August of 2006, referring to the November 2005 failure to promote and the tuition reimbursement treatment. In 2007, while under specific orders not to vary her work schedule without permission, she returned from her honeymoon three days early. She was given corrective action for the incident. She brought suit under Title VII in June of 2007. She filed a second EEOC charge in November of that year, claiming that the corrective action from the honeymoon incident was in retaliation for the first EEOC charge. She also amended her complaint accordingly. Testimony was elicited during discovery that the Executive Director, after an internal investigation established that Jones improperly charged her employer for some lunches, called her either a "rat" or a "fink" and referred to her as "untrustworthy" to another employee. Jones added a state law slander claim. Judge Lawrence (S.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to Res-Care on all claims. Jones appeals.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Manion and Williams and District Judge Darrah affirmed. One of the principal issues on appeal was the timing of the acts of discrimination and the content and timing of the EEOC charge. The Court concluded that the retaliation claim was the only claim that was both mentioned in an EEOC charge and occurred within the 180 days prior to the date of the charge. Jones struck out on each of her three attempts around the ruling: Strike 1) the Court rejected Jones' arguments of continuing violation (they were all discrete acts), Strike 2) the Court rejected her equitable tolling argument (she failed to meet the "aware of the possibility" standard), and Strike 3) the Court rejected her “closely related” argument ("part of a pattern" is not enough). On the merits of the honeymoon incident retaliation claim, the Court concluded both that the corrective action imposed did not amount to an adverse employment action and that Jones failed to establish a causal link between the corrective action and the EEOC charge. The Court also agreed with the district court on the defamation count. Indiana law grants a qualified privilege to alleged defamatory statements if they relate to the fitness of employee and are contained in intra-company communications. The privilege can be lost in certain circumstances, including if it was motivated primarily by ill will. The record established that the statements at issue met the definition of qualified privilege and Jones offered no evidence of ill will other than the offensiveness of the terms themselves -- which is not enough.