Specific Allegations Of Lengthy Delay In Receiving Dental Treatment Survives Section 1915A Screening

MCGOWAN v. HULICK (July 20, 2010)

Michael McGowan was incarcerated in an Illinois prison in 2006. He filed a pro se lawsuit pursuant to state law and § 1983 against a dentist and the prison's dental director alleging the following facts: In November of 2006, his tooth began to hurt. His pleas for assistance finally resulted in an appointment with a dentist in late January 2007. The dentist refused to provide a filling but agreed to extract the tooth. The procedure did not go well. McGowan was in severe pain, the tooth broke apart, and the dentist had to remove pieces of the tooth from his mouth with an ice pick. After the procedure, the pain increased, a mass of tissue developed, and he developed a sinus perforation. Other than pain relievers and temporary fixes, McGowan received no treatment until August, months after the extraction. The complaint alleges detailed facts regarding his requests for treatment and the delay occasioned at least in part by the prison dental director. Judge Herndon (S.D. Ill.) dismissed the case with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to the § 1915A screening. The court acknowledged the long delay in treatment but concluded that it did not amount to deliberate indifference. The court did not address the state law negligence claims. McGowan appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Posner and Wood vacated and remanded. The Court noted the "well-established" Eighth Amendment test -- that deliberate indifference to serious medical (or dental) needs can amount to a violation. Delay itself can equal deliberate indifference in circumstances where it made conditions worse. Here, the Court concluded that the allegations against the prison dental director were erroneously dismissed. It noted the very specific complaint allegations of significant delays before McGowan was able to see the dentist, the oral surgeon, and finally the specialist. At this screening stage of this proceeding, the Court concluded that the allegations were sufficient to proceed. The Court reviewed the allegations against the dentist quite differently. It saw that as a dispute over which procedure was used and the competence with which it was performed. Although the ice pick allegation gave the Court the most pause, it decided that the allegation was simply that some instrument that looked like an ice pick was used. Although possibly supporting a negligence or gross negligence conclusion, the Court concluded that the allegations cannot support a finding of deliberate indifference. With respect to the state law negligence claims, the Court reinstated the claim with respect to the dental director and instructed the district court to modify its dismissal of the dentist to be without prejudice.

Acceptance of Offer of Judgment From One Defendant Did Not Moot Other Claims

MINIX v. CANARECCI (February 26, 2010)

While on leave from a mental hospital where he was a patient, Gregory Zick was arrested and incarcerated in the St. Joseph County Jail. The jail provided medical and mental health services through contracts with third-party vendors Memorial Home Care and Madison Center. Jail personnel became aware during Zick's booking that he had attempted suicide in the past and was taking medications to treat his suicidal thoughts. Zick was originally put in medical segregation and on suicide watch. He was transferred into the general population, however, a few days later after he denied having suicidal thoughts. About a month later, he was placed back in medical segregation after he refused to take his medication and a jail officer noticed a razor blade missing. Again, after a few days, he was released from medical segregation because he was alert and denied thoughts of suicide. Later that night, he hanged himself with a bed sheet. Cathy Minix, his personal representative, brought an action pursuant to § 1983 against the Sheriff, the medical providers, and several jail employees. She alleged violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments based on the defendants' display of deliberate indifference. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants except the Sheriff. Minix then accepted an offer of judgment from the Sheriff. She appeals the summary judgment rulings in favor of Memorial Home Care and its employee Dr. David, Madison Center and its employee Christine Lonz, and the supervisor of the nursing staff, Jeanne James.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Kanne, and Tinder affirmed. The Court first addressed its jurisdiction, in light of the offer of judgment and its acceptance. Since the claim against the Sheriff was against him in his official capacity, and therefore could not have included punitive damages under § 1983, the punitive damage claims against the other defendants present a live controversy, even if the acceptance of the offer of judgment limits additional compensatory damages. On the merits, the Court first identified the two elements of an inadequate medical care claim under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment: a substantial risk to one's safety because of an objectively serious harm, and deliberate indifference to that risk. A jail suicide case automatically satisfies the first element. The second element requires that each defendant know that there is a substantial risk of suicide -- and intentionally disregard it. The Court addressed each defendant under that standard and found summary judgment proper in each case: a) Lonz was unaware of Zick’s suicidal history or thoughts, b) there was no evidence that Madison Center adopted or condoned any unconstitutional policy and there was no causal link between any Madison Center practice and the suicide, c) Zick's behavior in segregation did not provide Nurse James with actual knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide, d) Dr. David was not directly involved in Zick's treatment, and e) there was a lack of evidence that Memorial Home condoned or adopted an unconstitutional practice.

"Deliberate Indifference" Requires Actual Knowledge Of Serious Medical Condition

KNIGHT v. WISEMAN (December 22, 2009)

Shortly before Rick Knight began serving a prison term, he had surgery on his shoulder. Although he had no medical work restrictions, he did advise prison personnel of the surgery and some lingering pain. Nevertheless, several months later, he was transferred to a work camp. Prison inmates at the work camp participate in the work gangs, typically trimming trees and picking up roadside logs. At the camp, Knight participated in several work details without complaint, although he was generally successful in finding the less-strenuous tasks. On February 16, Knight was assigned to a work gang with Officers Wiseman and Wiedau. Although Knight again selected easier tasks, the officers insisted he do more. They were unaware of his shoulder complaints. The result -- he re-injured his shoulder throwing a log. A third officer returned Knight to the camp, although he took a short detour to run an errand on the way. Knight was diagnosed with a torn rotator cuff. He brought suit against the two officers pursuant to § 1983, alleging violations of this Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers, concluding that they did not act with deliberate indifference. Knight appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Manion and Wood affirmed. Two elements are required to state a claim for an Eighth amendment violation. There must be a serious medical condition and the plaintiff must demonstrate deliberate indifference on the part of the prison official to that condition. Deliberate indifference requires a showing that the defendant was actually aware of the serious medical condition. Here, there is no evidence in the record that the officers were aware of Knight's condition when they first ordered him to work. Although one of the officers ordered Knight back to work after his first complaint of pain, he quickly retracted his order when he realized the seriousness of Knight's injury. Finally, the Court rejected Knight's argument that the few hour delay in receiving treatment, including the brief detour, amounted to deliberate indifference. Such a claim would require medical evidence that showed his condition deteriorated due to the delay, which does not exist here.

Prisoner Entitled to Trial in § 1983 Claim Against Prison Physician For Failure to Treat His Condition; Non-Medical Staff Defendants Are Entitled to Rely on Physician's Professional Judgment

HAYES v. SNYDER  (October 9, 2008)

Floyd Hayes, a Vietnam War veteran, was serving a ten-year sentence at the Hill Correctional Center (“Hill”) in Illinois. In 2000, Hayes developed testicular cysts. Tests revealed that the cysts were benign. A Hill physician determined that neither a biopsy nor urological referral were indicated. Hayes’ condition worsened and he began to experience more pain. He requested a urology referral in 2001. Hill personnel declined. In September, he began receiving an antibiotic and over-the-counter pain medication. Beginning in October, he saw Dr. Hamby twice and then started seeing Dr. Shute. Dr. Shute wanted to refer Hayes to a urologist and administer prescription pain medication but Hamby refused to approve. Hayes complained to Hill personnel. He sent letters to the Director and to his staff. He described in significant detail his condition and the extreme swelling and pain he experienced. He complained that he needed to see a specialist but that Hamby would not approve. The Hill staff investigated Hayes’ complaint by seeking information from the medical staff. Hamby himself responded to the inquiry by the staff with a lengthy e-mail. He confirmed that Hayes had two cysts but concluded that they were stable but for “self-reported swelling and occasional tenderness.” Hayes and the non-medical staff continued their correspondence. The staff continued to base its responses to Hayes on communications from Hamby that nothing further needed to be done. Hayes filed a formal grievance complaining of inadequate treatment for his pain. The grievance officer denied his grievance, relying on Hamby’s assurance that Hayes was “treated and tested” appropriately.

Upon his release from Hill, Hayes went directly to a nearby VA hospital. Although he complained of testicular pain, the hospital referred him to the psychiatric ward. They allowed Hayes only a few minutes with a urologist. It seems that the Hill staff had called the hospital to warn them that Hayes might be coming and to advise them that his problems were principally psychiatric. Hayes was released after ten days. He went to his home in Kentucky where he visited the local VA hospital there. He received an evaluation, an ultrasound, and a urology referral. Hayes was diagnosed with Peyronie’s disease, a connective tissue disorder that is often painful. The disease is not easily recognized or well understood, even by urologists. Hayes was referred to and is still being treated by a pain management specialist.

Hayes filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Dr. Hamby for his failure to treat his condition and against the non-medical staff at Hill for their failure to respond to his condition properly. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the merits and on the basis of qualified immunity. Hayes appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Ripple, and Wood reversed in part and affirmed in part. The Court started with the rule and the test. The defendants are liable if they displayed “deliberate indifference” to Hayes’ medical needs. Hayes must establish that the condition itself, objectively, is sufficiently serious. Then he must establish that the prison officials knew of and disregarded an excessive health risk. The Court first addressed the objective prong of the test. In finding that a reasonable trier of fact could find in Hayes' favor on the objective test, the Court relied on Hayes’ complaints of extreme pain and swelling and Hamby’s refusal to refer Hayes to a specialist. It disregarded the fact that the disease was quite rare and hard to diagnose, given Hamby’s refusal to even make a referral.

The analysis of the subjective element of the test required separate approaches for Dr. Hamby and the non-medical defendants. The Court relied on several facts in the record to conclude that Hayes could meet the test with respect to Hamby.  Hamby a) refused to approve the urology referral, b)may have stopped minimal treatment of ice-packs and non-prescription pain medication in retaliation for Hayes' complaints, c)  testified that he would never prescribe pain medication for a prisoner, and d) was dismissive of Hayes' needs in his deposition testimony. The Court found these to be sufficient facts to establish that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Hamby’s conduct constituted deliberate indifference.

Addressing the non-medical personnel, the Court stated that non-medical personnel are generally justified in believing that a prisoner is being adequately cared for if he is in the hands of medical personnel. Here, the non-medical personnel investigated Hayes’ complaints. They were entitled to rely on the professional judgment of the medical professionals. The Court held that Hayes could not establish his claims against the non-medical personnel.