Empty Threat Of Eminent Domain Proceedings Does Not Support Declaratory Relief

ROCK ENERGY COOPERATIVE v. VILLAGE OF ROCKTON (AUGUST 10, 2010)

Rock Energy Cooperative, a Wisconsin-based utility, and the Village of Rockton, Illinois were both interested when Alliant Energy announced its desire to sell certain power transmission assets. Rock Energy submitted a bid. Rockton voters approved a referendum authorizing the Village’s purchase of the assets. Rock Energy and the Village entered into an agreement that addresses a possible sale of the assets by Rock Energy to the Village. Rock Energy then purchased the assets from Alliant. On several occasions between 2007 and 2009, the Village repeated its desire to obtain the assets and even threatened to use the power of eminent domain. Rock Energy brought suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that Rockton violated state law in its referendum process and was not entitled to purchase the assets. Rockton, for its part, brought suit in state court seeking specific performance of the contract. The state court dismissed the suit with prejudice, concluding that the lack of a price term or formula in the agreement precluded an order of specific performance. Judge Kapala (W.D. Ill.) dismissed the suit, holding that Rock Energy lacked standing to challenge the referendum process. He also concluded that a forum selection clause in the agreement made venue improper for any claim Rock Energy was asserting under the agreement. Rock Energy appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Rovner, and Wood affirmed. The Supreme Court has held that Article III of the Constitution, particularly in the declaratory judgment context, requires a substantial controversy "of sufficient immediacy and reality" to warrant declaratory relief. The Court applied that principle to both threats to Rock Energy -- eminent domain and the contract. With respect to eminent domain, the Court concluded that the record contained no evidence that such a proceeding was imminent. In fact, to the contrary, the only actions the Village has taken in years are a few letters indicating their interest in condemnation. The Court also noted that the lack of any hardship to Rock Energy would stand in the way of its pre-enforcement challenge. The Court also concluded that the contract claim could not meet the Supreme Court's test. A state court has found the contract unenforceable, it contains a facially valid choice of forum clause, and Rockton has disclaimed its desire to rely on the contract. The case is not appropriate for declaratory relief under either theory.

The Proper Remedy For Breach Of Purchase Option Is The Difference Between The Option Price And The Property's Value

LOUIS AND KAREN METRO FAMILY, LLC v. LAWRENCEBURG CONSERVANCY DISTRICT (July 29, 2010)

Louis and Karen Metro Family, LLC is a limited liability company owned by Louis and Karen Metro. The company owns a number of parcels of property in Ohio and Indiana. One such parcel sat on a bank of Tanners Creek and was home to a pizza parlor. Because Tanners Creek had a long history of flooding, the City of Lawrenceburg and the Lawrenceburg Conservancy District agreed to jointly build a floodwall along the creek. The District notified Metro Family of its intent to acquire the Tanner Creek property through eminent domain. It offered $417,000 -- the appraised fair market value. Metro Family refused the offer but eventually agreed on the sale of the property for $417,000 plus an irrevocable option to purchase 1.4 acres back for $269,490. The option was exercisable for 18 months after completion of the floodwall. Unfortunately, the floodwall was never built. The City withdrew from the project and the District could not complete it on its own. The District conveyed the Metro Family parcel to the City. The property was converted to highway use. Metro Family brought suit against the City and the District for breach of contract. Magistrate Judge Hussman (S.D. Ind.) concluded that there was a breach but that Metro Family was entitled to no monetary recovery. Instead, he ordered reformation of the contract and gave Metro Family 18 additional months within which to exercise the option. The City and the District appeal. Metro Family cross-appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Wood, and Evans vacated and remanded. The only issue on appeal was the remedy for the breach. In Indiana, reformation of the contract is available when there is a mutual mistake. The Court noted that the problem was not really a mutual mistake but a failure to allocate risk in the event the underlying project was canceled. Nevertheless, the Court believed that an Indiana court would use the mutual mistake concept -- that the parties shared a common assumption regarding a fact that was the essence of the agreement -- to find for Metro Family. Therefore, the Metro Family is entitled to the value of the option. The Court opined that the magistrate judge's reformation approach would have been appropriate if the option parcel was still undeveloped. Since exercising the option is no longer a viable alternative, however, the Court concluded that the next best approach was to compare the option price ($269,490) with the appraised value of the option parcel prior to the construction of the highway. Metro Family is entitled to the excess (if any) of the appraised value over the option price.

Local Government's Eminent Domain Power Is Not Pre-Empted By Federal Housing Laws, Even If It Does Clash With Their Purpose

CITY OF JOLIET, ILLINOIS v. NEW WEST, L.P. (April 9, 2009)

The City of Joliet filed eminent domain proceedings to acquire the Evergreen Terrace Apartments. New West, the owner of the apartment complex, filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. New West sought an injunction and damages, alleging that federal law preempted Joliet's attempts to condemn the property. The district court originally put the condemnation on hold and dismissed the § 1983 action. On the first appeal, the Court reversed and directed the district court to resolve the condemnation proceedings. On remand, HUD intervened and contended that the condemnation was precluded by two different federal statutes. The district court rejected HUD’s argument and certified the case for interlocutory appeal. New West and HUD appeal.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Williams and Sykes affirmed. The court reviewed the three federal statutes in play. Section 8 of the Housing Act of 1937 provides federal rent subsidies. Section 221 of the National Housing Act creates a federal government mortgage insurance program. Finally, the Multifamily Assisted Housing Reform and Affordability Act of 1997 provides a mechanism for HUD to renegotiate mortgages under section 221. Owners who renegotiate under the 1997 Act must promise to maintain availability for low income tenants for 30 years. Evergreen Terrace participated in all three programs. The Court held in the first appeal that Section 8 does not preempt any eminent domain proceeding. HUD argues that a condemnation would interfere with the purposes of Section 221 and the 1997 Act, both of which are designed to preserve low income housing stock. The Court noted that the Supreme Court recently warned against using preemption inferred from a clash of goals and objectives. Only if an agency has issued a preemptive regulation with the force of law should that power be used expansively. The Court noted that no such HUD regulation exists with respect to eminent domain powers. In fact, the Court did not even agree that the clash of goals even existed. All three federal statutes are voluntary. Even when used, private owners can withdraw from the programs at any time. Without such a regulation, the Court concluded that the eminent domain should go forward.