District Court's Erroneous Dismissal Results In Disaster For Title VII Plaintiffs And Their Lawyer

LEE v. COOK COUNTY (March 22, 2011)

Twelve African-American Cook County employees believed that the County discriminated against them on account of their race in making promotions. They filed a charge with the EEOC. The EEOC issued right-to-sue letters in March 2008. The employees brought suit pursuant to Title VII in May of 2008, well within the 90-day window. Judge Castillo (N.D. Ill.) did not think that the twelve plaintiffs belonged in the same suit. So, in a September 18 order, he dismissed the complaint without prejudice and gave each individual plaintiff 40 days within which to file an individual action. But three of the plaintiffs waited over seven months before filing their individual actions. Judge Kendall (N.D. Ill.) and Judge St. Eve (N.D. Ill.) dismissed the individual actions as untimely. Plaintiffs appeal.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Cudahy and Posner affirmed -- and issued sanctions. The Court first pointed out that there was nothing improper about the original filing. Rule 20 only requires multiple plaintiffs to share a common question of law or fact, which we have here. It does not require that a common question predominate, as do the class action rules. The district court therefore erred when it dismissed the complaint. The plaintiffs should have appealed, but they did not. Instead, the plaintiffs waited several months, refiled, and appeal the dismissal of the refiled complaints. So the Court turned to the merits of the actual appeal and agreed with the district courts that refiled actions were untimely. First, the district court's order directing the plaintiffs to file individual actions within 40 days did not extend the statute of limitations or the EEOC filing window. Second, equitable tolling requires a litigant to pursue his rights diligently. Plaintiffs' lawyer did anything but. Third, the Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the defendants either waived or waited too long to assert the limitations defense. Having resolved the merits of the case against the plaintiffs, the Court turned to their lawyer. It noted his "calamitous handling" of the case in the district court, the "sloppy performance" in the appellate court, his several procedural gaffes, his failure to file required pleadings, his grossly inadequate response to the Court’s order to show cause, and his numerous violations of the Circuit Rules. The Court reprimanded the attorney, fined him $5000, and ordered him to send a copy of the opinion to his clients.

Discrimination Claims Are Barred When They Were Either Untimely Or Not Raised In The EEOC Charge

JONES v. RES-CARE, INC. (July 16, 2010)

Tamika Jones, an African-American female, has several complaints about the way she was treated during her employment at Res-Care. She claims she was promoted in both 2003 and 2004 and acquired increased job responsibilities without an increase in compensation -- unlike several non-African-American employees. She claims she had to specially request time off and that she was denied tuition reimbursement -- unlike several non-African-American employees. She claims she was passed over for promotions in April and November of 2005 and June of 2006 – in favor of non-African-American employees. She filed an EEOC charge in August of 2006, referring to the November 2005 failure to promote and the tuition reimbursement treatment. In 2007, while under specific orders not to vary her work schedule without permission, she returned from her honeymoon three days early. She was given corrective action for the incident. She brought suit under Title VII in June of 2007. She filed a second EEOC charge in November of that year, claiming that the corrective action from the honeymoon incident was in retaliation for the first EEOC charge. She also amended her complaint accordingly. Testimony was elicited during discovery that the Executive Director, after an internal investigation established that Jones improperly charged her employer for some lunches, called her either a "rat" or a "fink" and referred to her as "untrustworthy" to another employee. Jones added a state law slander claim. Judge Lawrence (S.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to Res-Care on all claims. Jones appeals.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Manion and Williams and District Judge Darrah affirmed. One of the principal issues on appeal was the timing of the acts of discrimination and the content and timing of the EEOC charge. The Court concluded that the retaliation claim was the only claim that was both mentioned in an EEOC charge and occurred within the 180 days prior to the date of the charge. Jones struck out on each of her three attempts around the ruling: Strike 1) the Court rejected Jones' arguments of continuing violation (they were all discrete acts), Strike 2) the Court rejected her equitable tolling argument (she failed to meet the "aware of the possibility" standard), and Strike 3) the Court rejected her “closely related” argument ("part of a pattern" is not enough). On the merits of the honeymoon incident retaliation claim, the Court concluded both that the corrective action imposed did not amount to an adverse employment action and that Jones failed to establish a causal link between the corrective action and the EEOC charge. The Court also agreed with the district court on the defamation count. Indiana law grants a qualified privilege to alleged defamatory statements if they relate to the fitness of employee and are contained in intra-company communications. The privilege can be lost in certain circumstances, including if it was motivated primarily by ill will. The record established that the statements at issue met the definition of qualified privilege and Jones offered no evidence of ill will other than the offensiveness of the terms themselves -- which is not enough.

After Lulling Pro Se Plaintiff Into Thinking The Procedure Was Proper, District Court Erred In Denying Motion To Reopen On The Last Day Of The Limitations Period

 PRINCE v. STEWART (September 2, 2009)

The Chicago Teachers Union fired Earl Prince from his job. Prince filed an administrative discrimination charge. He then brought an action pro se for employment discrimination under Title VII before he received any response from the Illinois Department of Human Rights or the EEOC. The district court dismissed the complaint because Prince had not yet received a right-to-sue letter. Several months later, after Prince had received the letter, the district court granted his motion to reopen the case. The court vacated the order, however, a few days later at Prince's request. Months later, on the last day to sue, Prince again moved to reopen the case. This time, the judge turned him down -- and it was too late to file a new complaint. Prince appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Coffey and Manion reversed and remanded. The Court recognized Prince's mistake when he followed up the first order reopening his case with a request to reinstate the dismissal. He was simply going to be out of the jurisdiction for a short time and need not have worried about his temporary unavailability. However, the Court also recognized that no one was prejudiced by his mistake. If the second motion to reopen was filed in a timely fashion, the Court could not see any reason why it should not have been granted. The Court concluded that the district court’s lulling of the pro se litigant into believing that he did not have to refile his complaint amounted to equitable tolling.