Prisoner Adequately Alleged Religious Exercise Infringement

MADDOX v. LOVE (August 24, 2011)

The Illinois Lawrence Correctional Center is a medium-security adult prison facility in Sumner, Illinois with approximately 2,000 inmates. Those inmates proclaim numerous different religious affiliations (46 as of May 2009). When Mannie Maddox arrived as an inmate in early 2004, he was a member of the African Hebrew Israelite (AHI) faith. AHI was one of the 17 religious affiliations for which Lawrence offered regularly scheduled services. Maddox attended services for about six months, until they were terminated. Maddox filed a grievance, asserting a denial of his right to exercise his religion. The prison denied the grievance on the grounds that Lawrence canceled the services for budgetary reasons. Maddox appealed the decision through two more stages of review without success. The prison chaplain also denied Maddox’ request to allow the AHI inmates to meet without a formal service. The prison requires that such meetings be supervised and the chaplain's schedule could not accommodate another religious gathering. Maddox filed a § 1983 complaint against the chaplain and the prison wardens alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Judge Gilbert (S.D. Ill.) restructured the pro se complaint into four counts. He dismissed for failure to state a claim the counts relating to discrimination in the allocation of the prison budget. He granted summary judgment on the two counts alleging failure to provide reasonable access to religious materials and failure to provide worship services, concluding that Maddox failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Maddox appeals.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Sykes, Tinder, and Hamilton affirmed in part and reversed and vacated in part. The Court first addressed its jurisdiction, since the district court dismissed the two counts on exhaustion grounds without prejudice. Normally a dismissal without prejudice would preclude appellate jurisdiction. Here, however, Maddox cannot cure the complaint’s defects. That makes the decision a final judgment for appellate jurisdiction purposes. On the merits, the Court first addressed the free exercise and religious discrimination counts. The Court understood the district court's dismissal of these counts, as they were restructured, given the principle that prisons need not provide identical resources to every faith within the prison population. An allegation of a disproportionate allocation of resources does not state a claim. The Court did find fault, however, with the district court's restructuring of Maddox' allegations and explored the substance of those allegations. Maddox alleged a disproportionate allocation of resources to other religions, a singling out of AHI for budget cuts, and refusal to pursue alternatives for AHI members. The Court found that those allegations did, in fact, state a claim for relief. Prisons cannot discriminate against particular religions. Although it is premature to conclude that they did here, Maddox is allowed to make his case. The Court turned to the access to religious materials claim. Since Maddox concedes that he did not grieve that complaint, the Court concluded that the district court properly dismissed that count. Finally, on the group worship claim, the district court dismissed because Maddox failed to exhaust administrative remedies. He did not name the individuals he complained of, as required by the then-current Illinois Administrative Code. The Court disagreed. First, prison officials never raised this procedural infirmity during any of the three grievance stages. Instead, they rejected the grievance on the merits at each stage. When the prison addresses a grievance on the merits without addressing any procedural defect, the grievance has obviously served its purpose in notifying prison officials of the prisoner's complaint. They cannot later rely on that procedural defect to make out an exhaustion defense. Second, the procedural infirmity here was caused by prison's own error. Maddox was given a form that complied with a prior version of the administrative code. It did not require the same degree of factual particularly as did the code in effect at the time of the grievance. Maddox provided all the information that was requested on the grievance form.

Plan's Refusal To Consider Late Appeal Not Arbitrary And Capricious

EDWARDS v. BRIGGS & STRATTON RETIREMENT PLAN (April 29, 2011)

Briggs & Stratton employed Augusta Edwards until November of 2005. She stopped working because of several nerve conditions, including carpal tunnel and cubital tunnel syndromes. Edwards' doctor believed that she was totally and permanently disabled. She filed a claim with the Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan in August 2007. The Plan’s physician rendered an opinion that she was not permanently disabled. The Plan denied her claim on September 29 and advised her that she had 180 days to appeal the denial. The Plan received Edwards’ appeal on April 11, 2008, 195 days after she received the denial. She offered no explanation for her tardiness. The Plan refused to consider her appeal. Edwards filed suit under ERISA against the plan. Magistrate Judge Goodstein (E.D. Wis.) granted summary judgment to the Plan. Edwards appeals.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Tinder and Hamilton and District Judge Murphy affirmed. The Court noted that its review was under the arbitrary and capricious standard because the Plan gave its administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility. The Court further noted that it has interpreted ERISA to require exhaustion of administrative remedies. That requirement, however, rests with the discretion of the district court and can be excused where, for example, an appeal would have been futile. Here, Edwards does not dispute that her appeal was late. But she does not claim that an appeal would have been futile. The Court rejected her attempt to excuse the tardiness because of the "substantial compliance" doctrine. It noted that the doctrine had never been used in such a way. The Court also rejected her arguments based on the Wisconsin "notice-prejudice" statute, interpreting her earlier letters as notices of appeal, and the Plan's conflict of interest. Here, the Plan adopted a reasonable appeal deadline, included the deadline in the Plan documents, and gave Edwards specific notice at the time it denied her claim. Although the Plan could have exercised its discretion to entertain the appeal, it was not arbitrary and capricious for it not to do so.

Prison Litigation Reform Act's Exhaustion Requirement Is Not Excused When Emergency Grievance Procedure Is Available

FLETCHER v. MENARD CORRECTIONAL CENTER (October 28, 2010)

Anthony Fletcher is an inmate at Menard Correctional Center in Illinois. He claims that prison guards used excessive force while they were transferring him to a new cell. He further claims that he suffered significant injuries and that he was denied medical treatment for those injuries and for his asthma and diabetes. He brought suit asserting those constitutional violations and attempted to proceed in forma pauperis. Unfortunately, he had three "strikes" (prior frivolous suits) and thus could not proceed in forma pauperis without relying on the "under imminent danger of serious physical injury" exception. Even more unfortunately, his judge had presided over one of those earlier "strikes" in which Fletcher alleged a failure to treat his asthma and diabetes. Fletcher's medical records in that case showed that he did not have asthma or diabetes. Judge Baker (C.D. Ill.) ruled that he therefore did not come within the exception and dismissed his complaint. Fletcher appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Posner, and Wood affirmed. Although the Court affirmed the dismissal, it did so on different grounds. On the imminent danger exception to the three strike rule, the Court concluded that the district court erred. Although Fletcher did not have asthma or diabetes, the district court did not consider his additional allegation that he was denied treatment for injuries suffered from the excessive force. Untreated injuries could pose as much a threat as untreated illnesses and could qualify as an “imminent danger.” Nevertheless, the Court found an alternative ground to affirm the dismissal. The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a prisoner to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing suit. The Court imagined a scenario in which a prisoner would not be required to exhaust administrative remedies -- if he is in imminent danger and no administrative remedy is available to avert that danger. Here, however, Illinois has an emergency procedure under which a grievance is directed immediately to the warden. Fletcher took advantage of that procedure but waited only two days before filing his suit. Under these circumstances, the Court concluded that he was not excused from the exhaustion requirement of the Act. 

Taxpayer's Failure to Perfect Administrative Claim For Tax Refund Deprives District Court of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

GREENE-THAPEDI v. UNITED STATES December 3, 2008

In 1996, Llwellyn Greene-Thapedi filed a tax return for tax year (“TY”) 1992. The government challenged her reported tax liability. Ultimately, the U.S. Tax Court determined that she owed an additional ≈$10,000. In December 1997, the IRS assessed a deficiency for the amounts owed plus interest and asserts that it sent Green-Thapedi a notice of deficiency. Green-Thapedi claims that she never received the notice. When the U.S. threatened to levy assets, Green-Thapedi paid the ≈$10,000 and interest through December 1997 but refused to pay the additional interest on the ground that she did not receive the notice. She also brought suit in tax court to recover a ≈$10,000 overpayment on her tax for TY1999. While her suit was pending, the government applied the TY1999 overpayment to the claimed TY1992 deficiency. Green-Thapedi brought an action in federal district court to recover the TY1999 overpayment. The district court stayed the action pending the outcome in the tax court. The tax court held that her TY1999 claim was moot because the government had credited her claimed overpayment to TY1992. The government moved to dismiss in the district court for Green-Thapedi’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies in that she never made a refund claim with the IRS. The district court denied the motion. It held that Green-Thapedi’s petition in the tax court constituted an informal claim for refund. Green-Thapedi then amended her complaint to add a claim for a refund of ≈$10,000 for TY1992. The court below found that the government properly calculated Green-Thapedi’s taxes and penalties and found that Green-Thapedi did not present sufficient evidence to rebut the government’s position on the notice. Green-Thapedi appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Wood and Tinder vacated and remanded. The Court did not address the tax computation and notice issues decided below. Instead, it found that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Once the government applied Green-Thapedi’s TY1999 overpayment to TY1992, the case became about TY1992. `The Court disagreed with the district court that the informal claim doctrine conferred subject matter jurisdiction. It held that the informal claim doctrine excuses non-compliance with certain formal administrative requirements only when those deficiencies are later corrected. Here, Green-Thapedi never filed an administrative claim for TY1992. The Court vacated and remanded with instructions to the district court to dismiss the complaint.