A Section 1983 Claim Of Unlawful Search Borrows Its Survivability From The State False Imprisonment Tort, Not Trespass
BENTZ v. CITY OF KENDALLVILLE (August 14, 2009)
The local police arrived at the home of Dr. Bernard Leonelli, responding to reports of a domestic dispute. An officer observed a large fire on the front lawn and was told by bystanders that a fight was taking place inside the home. The officer approached Leonelli, who was standing on his front porch, and asked to speak with him. Instead, Leonelli walked into the house, where the officer observed him reaching for something. The officer entered the house, arrested Leonelli and searched the premises for a possible victim of domestic abuse. Leonelli brought an action against the city under § 1983, alleging that both the arrest and the search were unreasonable and unlawful. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Leonelli appealed -- but died before the appeal was heard. His personal representative seeks to continue the appeal on his behalf.
In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Posner and Kanne granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the appeal. Section 1983 is silent on whether a claim survives death. Instead, the Court stated, the state’s survival statute applies. A court must first characterize the § 1983 claim and decide which state tort is most analogous. With respect to the arrest claim, the Court noted that the plaintiff had to establish the fact of a seizure and its unreasonableness. The Court concluded that the closest Indiana tort was false imprisonment, the elements of which are almost identical to those for false arrest. Since an Indiana tort of false imprisonment does not survive the death of the plaintiff, neither does Leonelli's false arrest claim. With respect to the unlawful entry and search, the Court stated that the facts of the case were closely analogous to both a state trespass claim, which does survive, and a state invasion of privacy claim, which does not survive. The proper analysis, however, focuses on the elements of the federal claim, not the specific facts of the case. Looking at it from that perspective, the Court concluded that an expectation of privacy is the core of the unreasonable search claim. The federal claim is more analogous to invasion of privacy than it is to trespass. The claim does not survive.
Dytaniel McBride owns and operates a clothing store in Peoria. One day, McBride got into a disagreement with one of his employees. She began calling him names and generally creating a scene. McBride summoned the police by activating an alarm. Instead of waiting for the police to arrive, however, he physically removed his employee from the store. She called the police and met them when they arrived in response to the alarm. A police officer interviewed both of the individuals and reviewed some portion of a security tape -- and then arrested both of them. After the charges against McBride were dismissed, he filed a lawsuit alleging that his constitutional rights were violated because of his arrest without probable cause. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. McBride appeals.
Police officers from the City of Wheaton and several neighboring jurisdictions conducted a major law enforcement operation targeting a drug conspiracy in August of 2003. Several Wheaton police officers were given the task of arresting Robert Ptak. Ptak was considered armed and dangerous and had a history of resisting arrest. The officers were dispatched to a local motel where Ptak was believed to be staying. They had a photograph and a physical description and had been told that he was seen riding a yellow sport motorcycle. The officers located an individual that met Ptak’s physical description on a yellow sport motorcycle in the vicinity of the motel. Unbeknownst to the officers, however, the individual was not Ptak. It was Jonathan Catlin. According to Catlin, the officers jumped out of their vehicle while they were stopped at a traffic light and ran toward him. They grabbed him, threw him down, and eventually handcuffed him. They did not identify themselves as police officers until after the arrest. They soon realized their mistake and released Catlin within 20 minutes. Catlin brought an action for false arrest and excessive force under § 1983. The district court found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and granted summary judgment. Catlin appeals.
Terence Brooks was arrested, allegedly without probable cause, in May 2004 by two Chicago police officers. The charges were dropped and he was released after about three weeks in custody. A few months later, he was indicted as a result of evidence seized at the time of the arrest. A warrant was issued when he failed to appear in court on the indictment. Brooks was arrested on the warrant by different police officers in May of 2007. Again, the charges were dismissed and Brooks was released. Brooks brought an action against the City of Chicago and the police officers who were responsible for the 2004 arrest. He brought due process and false arrest claims under § 1983, as well as claims under state law. The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that, although it purported to complain of the 2007 arrest, it depended entirely on the 2004 arrest. Claims based on the 2004 arrest were barred by the statute of limitations. Brooks appealed.