Proof Of Falsity And Materiality Are Not Required At Class Certification Stage

SCHLEICHER v. WENDT (August 20, 2010)

Conseco was a large financial services company traded on the New York Stock Exchange. It filed for bankruptcy in 2002 and successfully reorganized. This securities-fraud claim was filed against Conseco managers who are alleged to have made false statements prior to the bankruptcy. Then-District Judge Hamilton (S.D. Ind.) certified a class. Defendants appeal.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Bauer and Rovner affirmed. The Court began by noting that securities-fraud claims are regularly litigated as class actions. Common questions generally include falsehood, intent, causation, and materiality. Individual questions, such as an individual investor's extent of loss, can frequently be addressed mechanically. Prior to 1988, defendants fought class certification by focusing on the reliance element. But the Supreme Court that year, in Basic, concluded that the stock price conveys the same public information to each investor if the stock is frequently traded in an efficient market. The Basic doctrine, called fraud on the market, replaced the reliance element. Here, the defendants argued that the fraud on the market doctrine does not apply because, notwithstanding the alleged false statements, Conseco's stock was falling during the relevant period. The Court found that fact to be irrelevant and concluded that the case met the Basic requirements. The Court also rejected defendants’ arguments that certification was improper because the class included short sellers and because the court failed to determine falsity and materiality. On the former, the Court noted that both long and short sellers are affected by news related to the value of a stock. The fact that short sellers may not realize a loss as a result of a false statement affects computation of damages, not the propriety of a class. On the latter, the Court stated that falsity and materiality are elements to be decide on the merits – not at the class certification stage. In doing so, it specifically expressed its disagreement with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Oscar Private Equity that reads Basic to allow a tightening of class certification requirements. Congress has spoken on the issue in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act. The Court declined to legislate other changes.

Statement In Debt Collector's Letter, Even If True, Can Violate Fair Debt Collection Practices Act If It Is Misleading

MUHA v. ENCORE RECEIVABLE MANAGEMENT, INC. (March 10, 2009)

Charlotte Muha, representing a class of credit card debtors, brought an action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") against Encore Receivable Management, Inc. The complaint alleged that Encore violated the FDCPA by stating, in a debt collection letter, that "your original agreement with the above mentioned creditor has been revoked." Plaintiffs allege that that statement is false. The plaintiffs also claim that the statement is misleading and confusing and sought to introduce a survey to support that allegation. The lower court excluded the survey and granted summary judgment to Encore. Plaintiffs appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Kanne and Tinder affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The Court first upheld the lower court's exclusion of the survey. It concluded that the survey was improper both because the questions and answers were leading and because there was no control group that was shown the letter without the language in question. Notwithstanding the exclusion of the survey (and notwithstanding the admission at oral argument that plaintiffs could not prove damages without the survey), the Court held that plaintiffs could be entitled to statutory damages. The plaintiffs have the burden of proving that the statement was misleading. Although a survey may be the best evidence of that, is not the only potential evidence. The recipients of the letter itself may testify, allowing the judge to infer that the letter is misleading within the meaning of the FDCPA. The Court then addressed the merits of the falsity argument. The issue, it stated, was not the falsity of the statement. The Court concluded that the statement obviously meant that the credit card privileges of the recipient have been revoked. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs are entitled to attempt to prove that the statement is misleading. The Court found that the statement was confusing and noted that confusing language can have an intimidating effect on an unsophisticated consumer. It did not think the evidence was so clear on that point so as to entitle the plaintiff to summary judgment, however. It reversed and remanded for further proceedings.