Federal Arbitration Act Does Not Provide Basis For Jurisdiction To Review Denial Of Stay

SHERWOOD v. MARQUETTE TRANSPORTATION CO. (November 23, 2009)

Bluegrass Marine employs Michael Sherwood as a deckhand on one of its Mississippi River vessels. Sherwood alleged that he was injured during his employment. He brought suit under the Jones Act. Bluegrass sought a stay in favor of arbitration, invoking a clause in Sherwood's employment contract that required all disputes to be arbitrated under the Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act. The court denied the stay, concluding that the Federal Arbitration Act (which does not apply to seamen) preempted the Illinois Act. Bluegrass appealed.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Evans and Williams dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Court noted that Bluegrass relied on § 16 of the FAA, which authorizes interlocutory review of a refusal to stay an action under § 3 of the FAA. The Court concluded that § 16 could not provide a basis for jurisdiction since the FAA does not apply to seamen and because Bluegrass never sought or was denied a stay under § 3 of the Act. The Court also rejected Bluegrass' reliance on both the collateral order doctrine and § 1292 (as the denial of an injunction) as bases for an appeal. Although the Court denied the appeal, it did express its doubt regarding the correctness of the district court's preemption conclusion.

A Party Forfeits Its Objection To The Appointment Of An Arbitrator To Fill A Vacancy If It Does Not Raise Its Objection Under Section 5 Of The Federal Arbitration Act

WELLPOINT, INC. V. JOHN HANCOCK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (AUGUST 7, 2009)

In 1996, WellPoint and John Hancock Life Insurance Company (Hancock) entered into a complex business transaction. The transaction was documented with a series of contracts, each of which contained an express arbitration clause. A dispute arose. WellPoint and Hancock both demanded arbitration. Pursuant to the arbitration procedure agreed upon, each appointed its own party arbitrator. When the party arbitrator’s could not agree on a third arbitrator, the AAA made the appointment, again as provided in the agreements. After over two years of extensive discovery and procedural disputes, WellPoint's party arbitrator resigned. Hancock objected but the panel, including Hancock's party arbitrator, approved the resignation. Hancock again objected when WellPoint proposed specific names for the vacancy. Hancock's party arbitrator proposed a compromise that WellPoint accepted -- and Hancock supported. Under the proposal, the panel suggested several candidates from which WellPoint could choose. Again, Hancock objected but also agreed that the replacement arbitrator met the prerequisites for service. The panel awarded WellPoint almost $30 million. WellPoint filed a petition to confirm the award -- Hancock cross-petitioned to vacate the award. The district court confirmed the award. Hancock appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Ripple and Wood affirmed. The Court rejected Hancock's argument that the panel "exceeded their powers" under § 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act when they selected a third arbitrator in a manner not provided for in the agreement. Although the Court conceded that the party's agreements did not provide a process for filling a vacancy, it noted that § 5 of the Act does. Section 5 expressly provides that a district court can appoint an arbitrator in the event of a vacancy were no provision exists in the party's agreement. Given the express remedy in § 5, the Court was unwilling to interpret the act in a way that would allow a party to forgo its § 5 remedy but get the same relief under § 10 after the arbitration is complete -- and it loses. Hancock's failure to avail itself of the remedy under § 5 amounts to a forfeiture of its challenge to the third arbitrator.

Arbitrator's Award Based On An Interpretation Of The Contract, Even If Wrong, Is Enforced

 UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS v. ILLINOIS-AMERICAN WATER COMPANY (June 26, 2009)

Glenn Williams was a wastewater treatment operator for Illinois-American Water Company ("IAWC"). IAWC discovered that Williams was operating without a required Illinois EPA license. Because it was Williams' second offense, it was punishable by termination. Instead of firing Williams, however, IAWC offered him a Last Chance Agreement ("LCA"). Under the LCA, Williams was suspended without pay for 30 days, he was required to obtain his license within six months, and he was required to repay the extra compensation he received as a result of IAWC's belief that he was licensed properly. The LCA also provided that failure to comply would result in Williams' immediate termination and any disputes regarding the agreement would be resolved through the collective bargaining agreement’s arbitration procedure. The United Food and Commercial Workers Union, which represented Williams, filed a grievance contesting the LCA's validity. When Williams failed to make repayment arrangements, IAWC terminated his employment. The union filed a second grievance. The grievances were consolidated and brought before an arbitrator. The arbitrator ruled against the union on the validity of the LCA but ordered Williams reinstated. He concluded that the termination was improper because of the pending, good faith challenge to the LCA itself. On review, the district court confirmed the arbitration award. The union appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Kanne and Wood affirmed. The Court identified its limited role in reviewing arbitrator's awards. As long as an arbitrator bases his decision on an interpretation of the agreement, the court will enforce the award. Here, the arbitrator confronted a situation that he thought was not covered by the agreement. One provision gave IAWC the absolute right to terminate Williams' employment. Another provision gave the union the right to challenge the validity of the LCA. The arbitrator concluded that the agreement contained an implied term – that Williams' employment could not be terminated during the pendency of a good faith grievance over the validity of the agreement itself. Since his award was based on an interpretation of the agreement, the Court affirmed.