Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Commentary : In Their Opinion : Lawyer & Attorney Michael E. Rigney : Kelley Drye & Warren Law Firm

ROBINSON v. CITY OF HARVEY (August 6, 2010)

In 2002, Archie Robinson prevailed in his claim against the City of Harvey and police officer Manuel Escalante. A jury awarded him $25,000 in compensatory damages (jointly and severally) and $250,000 in punitive damages against Escalante. Two years later, the district court ordered the defendants to pay approximately $500,000 in attorneys' fees. Escalante settled. After the Seventh Circuit affirmed the fee award, the City paid the compensatory damages and the attorneys’ fees. Almost a year later, Robinson sought additional fees for: a) defending against Escalante's post-verdict motions, b) defending against Escalante's attempts to stay enforcement of the judgment, c) prosecuting the original motion for fees, and d) prosecuting the appeal. Judge Lefkow (N.D. Ill.) awarded an additional $277,000. The City appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Bauer and Tinder reversed. The Court identified two distinct problems with the district court's award. First, the first two items related to effort undertaken by Robinson with respect to the punitive damage award against Escalante. The City is not, and never was, liable for that award. The City is therefore not responsible for any of those fees incurred. The second problem with the award is its timing. The first appeal, from the 2004 fee award, presumed that the $500,000 fee award was complete and final. In fact, if it was not, the Court would not have had jurisdiction to consider it and would have dismissed the appeal. Robinson represented at the time that the fee award was final. He cannot have it otherwise. The Court did note that the last item, fees incurred in defending the 2004 fee award on appeal, could constitute a separate request not affected by the finality of the district court's ruling. But a party has only 90 days within which to seek such an award. Robinson waited much longer without good reason and without seeking an extension. Although the district court accepted his untimely request, the Court concluded that it had no good reason to do so.

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IN RE: MCKINNEY (June 23, 2010)

When Lonnie McKinney fell behind on the property taxes for his Peoria County duplex, the county sold the tax debt to Salta Group. McKinney had two years within which to pay the debt after the sale. He did not and was notified that the property had been sold. He still had several months to redeem the property before Salta Group would receive a tax deed to the property. One day before the end of the redemption period, McKinney filed for bankruptcy. He proposed a bankruptcy plan that allowed an additional five years to pay off the tax debt. Salta Group filed an objection to the plan. The bankruptcy court denied the objection and Judge McDade (C.D. Ill.) affirmed. Salta Group appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Rovner and Tinder dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Court first addressed its -- and the district court's -- jurisdiction. The jurisdictional statute grants jurisdiction over "final" decisions and orders of the bankruptcy court. The Court conceded that the concept of finality is murkier in the bankruptcy arena than it is elsewhere because of the frequent existence of numerous discrete disputes within a single bankruptcy case. The test the Court applied was whether the order resolves a dispute that, but for the bankruptcy, would have been a discrete lawsuit. It concluded that Salta’s claim was not such a dispute. The order did not resolve any part of Salta's claim -- it merely resolved one issue.

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ROSS-TOUSEY v. NEARY (December 17, 2008)

Marvin Ross-Tousey and his wife Deborah (the “debtors”) filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Because their household income was above the median income level, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”) subjected their petition to a means test. The means test is used to distinguish those debtors who can repay a portion of their debts from those who cannot. A debtor who has enough disposable income to pay at least $166.67 per month to his creditors is expected to file under Chapter 13. A Chapter 7 filing is presumptively abusive in that circumstance. The debtors claimed a vehicle ownership expense allowance of over $800, although they had no debt or lease payments. With that deduction, they had no disposable income and met the means test. The United States Trustee (“UST”) moved to dismiss their petition for abuse. The UST first asserted abuse based on a totality of the circumstances. The UST later amended the motion to include presumptive abuse on the grounds that they should not have taken the vehicle ownership allowance. The bankruptcy court denied the motion. The district court reversed, holding that a debtor cannot claim a vehicle ownership allowance for vehicles he owns outright. The district court remanded for proceedings to determine whether the debtors could rebut the presumption. The debtors appealed. The UST moved to dismiss for absence of finality because the bankruptcy court had not ruled on whether the presumption could be rebutted. The debtors conceded that they could not rebut the presumption.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Rovner and Williams reversed and remanded. The Court first considered two jurisdictional issues: whether there was a “final order” to review and whether the time period for the UST’s amendment of the motion to dismiss was jurisdictional. On the first issue, the Court found that both the bankruptcy court’s order and the district court’s order were final. In the case of the bankruptcy order, the only remaining act was to distribute the debtors’ assets. In the district court’s reversal and remand, the only obligation of the bankruptcy court was to either dismiss the petition or convert it to a Chapter 13 proceeding, at the option of the debtors. The presence of these continued ministerial acts did not divest the Court of jurisdiction. On the timing issue, the Court stated that the statute set a deadline for filing a motion to dismiss. The UST’s original motion met the deadline but the amendment to add the presumptive abuse ground did not. The Court appreciated that the Supreme Court’s decision in Bowles seems to say that filing deadlines found in statutes are jurisdictional, while those found elsewhere are not. Nevertheless, relying on the Supreme Court’s later decision in John R. Sand & Gravel and the fact that much case law would be overturned by such a reading of Bowles, the Court found a different path. In John R. Sand & Gravel, the Supreme Court distinguished between statutes of limitations designed to protect defendants from stale claims from those that that sought to achieve a “system-related goal,” with only the latter classified as jurisdictional. Since the bankruptcy deadline existed principally to protect a debtor from delay and not to achieve some broader system goal, the Court held that it was not jurisdictional and any objection was waived by the debtors.

The Court proceeded to the merits. The means test in the BAPCPA includes, in the definition of monthly expenses, “applicable" monthly expenses specified by the National and Local Standards found in the Internal Revenue Manual (“IRM") and “actual" monthly expenses for other defined expenses. The vehicle ownership allowance at issue is one of two transportation components found in the Local Standards. The Court noted that the issue it faced has been litigated frequently but never decided by a circuit court. Two approaches have emerged, depending on the treatment of the word “applicable” in the statute. The IRM approach treats “applicable” as meaning “relevant” and concludes that a debtor with no lease or debt payment on a vehicle has no “relevant” cost of ownership. The Plain Language approach, on the other hand, treats “applicable” as that number “applied” by the Local Standards for the debtors’ region and number of vehicles. The Court was persuaded by the Plain Language approach. It decided that, to give effect to all the words of the statute, “applicable” could not mean the same as “actual.” Since it could not refer to the debtors’ actual expense, it must refer to the deductions listed in the Local Standards. The Court found additional support for its holding in: a) the inconsistency in the statute’s disallowance of debt as an expense and the IRM approach’s conditioning the transportation allowance on debt, b) Congress’ specific language throughout other sections of the means test to describe allowable deductions, c) an absence of any indication that Congress intended the IRM methodology to be used in the means test, d) the avoidance of an unfair result if the allowance is limited to debtors with car payments, and e) the recognition that allowing the deduction only avoids a presumption of abuse – abuse can be shown independently.  

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