Shareholders of Shell Corporation Are Not Liable As "Alter Egos" If Plaintiff Was Not Deceived

FUSION CAPITAL FUND II v. HAM (August 2, 2010)

In 2004, Sutura, Inc. was a privately-held medical device manufacturer in search of new equity capital. Millenium Holding Group was an insolvent publicly-held company with no business and few assets. The companies entered into a merger agreement under which Sutura was to merge into the Millenium shell followed by a name change of the shell back to Sutura (known as "going public by the back door"). Fusion Capital Fund II agreed to provide equity capital for the new enterprise. Fusion agreed with Millennium to invest $15 million, conditioned on the consummation of the merger. When the merger was not consummated by October of 2004, Fusion withdrew. Sutura terminated the merger agreement. Millennium brought suit against Fusion in Nevada for tortious interference with the merger agreement. Fusion prevailed. Fusion then brought suit in Illinois for its attorney's fees in defending the Nevada suit. Fusion added as defendants Richard Ham and Carla Aufdenkamp, Millennium's sole board members and majority shareholders. Judge Shadur (N.D. Ill.) found for Fusion and awarded $1.2 million. He also found the shareholders personally liable. Ham and Aufdenkamp appeal.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Posner and Kanne reversed. Under Nevada law, a shareholder or director is not liable for a debt of the corporation unless it acts as its alter ego. The statutory alter ego test has three parts: a) the person must influence and govern the corporation (Ham and Aufdenkamp concede this point), b) there must be a unity of interest (the Court found this point amply supported), and c) adherence to the corporate fiction would "sanction fraud or promote a manifest injustice." It is on this third point that the Court found error in the district court's analysis. There was no fraud. As the Court put it, Fusion always knew that Millennium was a "husk without any corn inside." In fact, it was Millennium's financial position that made the merger attractive. The more advisable course of action for Fusion would have been to get a personal guarantee from the shareholders -- and they did not even ask for one. The district court relied on the questionable financial maneuverings between Millennium and Ham and Aufdenkamp. But none of that made any difference to Fusion.

Bare-Bone Pleadings Sufficiently Allege Fair Housing Act Discrimination

SWANSON v. CITIBANK (July 30, 2010)

Gloria Swanson, an African-American, brought suit against Citibank and its appraiser alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act and common law fraud. She alleged the following facts: She applied for a home equity loan at a local Citibank branch. She became suspicious that the bank was trying to discourage African-American applications when a bank representative told her she had to be accompanied by her husband (a joint owner of the property). She was also told that Citibank's loan standards were stricter than those of a competing bank which had already denied her a loan. Nevertheless, she returned the following day and completed the application process. Based in large part on Swanson's statement that the home was worth $270,000, Citibank conditionally approved a $50,000 loan. However, when an independent appraiser retained by Citibank appraised the home at only $170,000, Citibank rejected the application. Swanson later ordered her own appraisal, which came in at $240,000. Judge Zagel (N.D. Ill.) granted defendants' motions to dismiss. Swanson appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Posner (dissenting in part) and Wood affirmed in part and reversed in part. The dismissal gave the Court the opportunity to review the pleading standards in light of the recent Supreme Court decisions in Twombly, Erickson, and Iqbal. First, the Court noted that none of the decisions questioned the validity of Rule 8's requirement of a "short and plain statement of the claim." Nevertheless, Twombly and Iqbal referred to a "plausibility" requirement. The Court viewed that requirement as one in which a court asks if whether it could happen, not whether it did happen. Applying those principles to Swanson's allegations against Citibank, the Court concluded that her bare-bone allegations of the type of discrimination, the discriminator, and the setting of the discrimination were sufficient to state a Fair Housing Act claim. Her fraud claim, however, implicated the "state with peculiarity" requirement of Rule 9(b) and an actual damages pleading requirement. Since Swanson did not plead any damages, her fraud claim was properly dismissed. Applying the principles to Swanson's claims against the appraiser, the Court again concluded that her bare-bone allegations that the appraiser understated the value of her home because of her race stated a claim under the Fair Housing Act. The Court affirmed the dismissal of the fraud claims for the same reason as it did those against Citibank.

Judge Posner agreed with the majority's treatment of the fraud claims but dissented from their treatment of the housing discrimination claims. He believed that the complaint set out an "obvious alternative explanation" for the actions of both the bank and the appraiser. With respect to the bank, Judge Posner cited the economic downturn, the fact that Swanson had already been denied a loan by another bank, and the fact that the appraisal suggested any loan would be undersecured. With respect to the appraiser, he noted the inexact nature of the business and the fact that errors are frequently made. Iqbal teaches us that if there is an "obvious alternative" to the invidious discrimination alleged by the plaintiff, the discrimination alternative is not a plausible one.

Fraudulent Inducement To Forbear Collection Of Loan Results in Non-Dischargeable Debt Under Section 523(a)(2)(A)

OJEDA v. GOLDBERG (March 25, 2010)

Gail and Ronald Goldberg were in the business of making high risk loans. They made such a loan in the amount of $600,000 to Ernest and Beverly Ojeda. The Ojedas provided stock valued at $800,000 as collateral. The original loan agreement was executed in August of 1998, with an original maturity date of October of 1998. The maturity date was extended many times, and the Ojedas continued to pay monthly interest until January of 2006. In late 1999, the company whose stock secured the original loan executed a reverse stock split, significantly reducing the number of shares and value of the collateral. At the time of one of the loan extensions in late 2001, two entities owned by the Ojedas, both of which owned McDonald's restaurants, guaranteed the note. Another maturity date came and went – and the Ojedas continued to make the monthly interest payments. In 2004, the Ojedas sold their interest in the McDonald's restaurants and used the proceeds to pay off creditors and to buy a pizza franchise. The Ojedas ultimately defaulted on the note in January of 2006, the pizza franchise failed a month later, and the Ojedas entered bankruptcy. In the bankruptcy proceeding, the Goldbergs asserted that the Ojedas’ liability on the $600,000 loan should be non-dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). The bankruptcy court concluded that the Goldberg's were not justified in relying either on the value of the stock or the ownership in the restaurants and further concluded that, if there was reliance, the only amount excluded from discharge would be attorney's fees and unpaid interest. The district court reversed, concluding that reliance on the restaurant ownership was justified and that the entire amount was excepted from discharge. The Ojedas appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Rovner, and Williams affirmed. The Court first set forth the elements of a discharge exception under § 523(a)(2)(A): a debtor’s false representation, the debtor's knowledge of the falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, an intent to deceive, and justifiable reliance. The first three elements were not seriously contested. With respect to justifiable reliance, the Court noted that it is a lower standard than reasonable reliance, and only requires that one not rely "blindly" on a false representation if the falsity would have been obvious upon cursory investigation. Applying that test, the Court found no clear error in the bankruptcy court's determination that the Goldberg's reliance on the stock shares was not justified. Ronald Goldberg was an experienced businessman and he was aware of the company's troubles. He therefore should have made inquiry before continuing to extend the note. The Court found error, however, in the bankruptcy court's conclusion that the Goldberg's reliance on the Ojeda’s restaurant ownership was not justifiable. The Court concluded that the Goldbergs had no information that would have alerted them to the sale of the restaurants. Even though the restaurants did not secure the debt, the companies that owned the restaurants did guarantee the note. The sale of the restaurants materially affected each company's ability to perform as guarantors. Next, the Court concluded that the fraudulently induced forbearance fit within the definition of an "extension" or "renewal" of credit under § 523. Finally, the Court addressed the issue of the extent to which the forbearance was obtained by false pretenses. The test is whether the creditor: a) had collection remedies at the time of the false representation, b) did not take advantage of the remedies because of the false representation, and c) the remedies lost value during the extension period. The Court concluded that the Goldbergs met the test since the Ojedas had significant assets in 2004 that no longer existed at the time of default. Since the Goldberg's forbearance applied to the entire debt, the Court concluded that the entire debt was excepted from discharge, notwithstanding that the original loan involved no deception.

References To Due Date And Default Provisions In A Demand Note Do Not Make It Ambiguous

REGER DEVELOPMENT v. NATIONAL CITY BANK (January 20, 2010)

Reger Development is an Illinois real estate development company. In 2007, the company opened a $750,000 line of credit with National City Bank. The company signed a promissory note and provided the personal guarantee of its principal, Kevin Reger. In several places, the note makes reference to the fact that it is payable "on demand." The company made its payments in a timely manner for the first year. Nevertheless, the bank asked it to pay down $125,000 of principal. Reger did so. A month later, the bank advised Reger that it was reducing the amount of the line of credit and also wanted to restructure some of the principal and secure it with a mortgage. The bank told Reger that it was possible that they would demand payment of the entire amount if he did not agree to the modifications. Reger brought suit, alleging breach of contract and fraud. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. Reger appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Williams, and Sykes affirmed. The Court noted that Illinois law generally implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a contract. It does not apply, however, to demand notes. Reger argued that general references to due dates and default provisions in the note were inconsistent with a demand instrument. The Court noted the repeated and explicit references in the instrument to National City's right to demand payment at any time. The note is clearly and unambiguously a demand note, concluded the Court. Since it is a demand instrument, the bank's insistence on modifications did not amount to a breach. With respect to the fraud count, the Court focused on the intent element. It stated that Reger must establish that the bank intended to and did induce him. In order to meet that element, Reger asked the court to infer that the bank intentionally drafted ambiguous documents so as to mislead him. The Court had already considered the ambiguity of the document with respect to the breach of contract claim. Not only had it not found it ambiguous, it found it rather straightforward. Reger failed to allege the element of intent with the particularity necessary in a fraud count -- the dismissal of that count is affirmed.

Replacement Of Lamp With Virtually Identical Product Results In No Damages

NIGHTINGALE HOME HEALTHCARE v. ANODYNE THERAPY (December 21, 2009)

Anodyne Therapy manufactures and sells infrared lamps designed to improve circulation. The FDA approved it for that purpose. But Anodyne allegedly marketed the lamps as a treatment for peripheral neuropathy, which the FDA never approved. Nightingale purchased several of the lamps. The FDA sent Anodyne a warning letter about their marketing claims. Several months later, Nightingale stopped using the lamps, returned them to Anodyne with a demand for a refund, but then replaced them with almost identical devices. Nightingale brought a fraud case in state court. Anodyne removed the case to federal court on diversity jurisdiction grounds. Nightingale then added a federal Lanham Act claim. The court granted summary judgment to Anodyne on the Lanham Act claim, and later granted summary judgment to Anodyne on the fraud claim. The court relied on a contractual disclaimer of warranties as well as Nightingale’s failure to establish proof of damages. Nightingale appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Kanne and Rovner affirmed. On the merits, the Court disagreed with the warranty holding. It concluded that the only contractual limitation of liability related to a breach of warranty claim – not, as here, a fraud claim. The Court agreed with the district court, however, on the damages holding. Nightingale replaced the lamps with a virtually identical product. Both products served the same purpose, performed comparably and carried similar FDA approvals. The replacement of the lamps did not result in any damage to Nightingale.

The lack of any damage not only doomed the case on the merits – it showed that the jurisdictional threshold for diversity jurisdiction was not met. Ordinarily, the Court concluded, the lack of a good faith basis for meeting the threshold would result in a case being dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, even at a late stage of the case. Here, however, the fact that Nightingale added a federal claim after removal brought the case within the court’s federal question jurisdiction. The state claims were covered by supplemental jurisdiction. Even though the federal claim was later dismissed, the court had discretion to retain the state claims.

Florida Resident May Not Maintain An Illinois Consumer Fraud And Deceptive Business Practices Act Suit In Illinois Against An Insurance Company With Its Principal Place Of Business In Indiana

CRICHTON v. GOLDEN RULE INSURANCE COMPANY (August 5, 2009)

For almost ten years, John Crichton purchased group health insurance from Golden Rule Insurance Co. He did so as a member of the Federation of American Consumers and Travelers ("Federation"). He filed a class action in 2002, alleging violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act ("ICFA"), class allegations under other states’ consumer fraud statutes, RICO and common law fraud. The basis of each of the claims was that Golden Rule failed to disclose, when it sold its insurance, that renewal premiums escalated dramatically. The district court dismissed the claims for failure to state a cause of action. Crichton appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Evans and Sykes affirmed. With respect to the ICFA count, the Court relied on the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Avery. Avery held that a non-resident of Illinois did not have a cause of action under the ICFA unless the transaction at issue occurred primarily and substantially in Illinois. Crichton lives in Florida and Golden Rule has its principal place of business in Indiana. Golden Rule is incorporated in Illinois and maintains an office in Illinois but that is not enough to support an ICFA claim. The Court also agreed with the district court that, to the extent Crichton was asserting a claim under Florida's statute, it failed because Florida does not allow suits against insurers. The Court then held that an element of the common law claim of fraudulent concealment was a duty to disclose. No such duty existed on the part of Golden Rule, either through its relationship with Crichton or its partial disclosures. Finally, the Court concluded that the RICO claim was properly dismissed. A RICO claim must identify the "enterprise." Crichton simply describes the marketing relationship between Golden Rule and the Federation. That relationship is insufficient to amount to an enterprise on which a RICO claim can be based. 

Defendants Were Not Guilty Of Fraud When They Allowed Departing Employee To Keep Stock Options As Part Of A Package But Did Not Warn Him That The Company Was In Economic Trouble

SMITH v. DUFFEY (August 3, 2009)

Jack Smith sold his company and its intellectual property to Dade Behring, Inc. He received, as part of the consideration, options to purchase 20,000 shares of Dade Behring stock. He soon left the employ of the company. He agreed to accept $1.4 million in cash, while retaining his options. A few months later, the company entered bankruptcy. Smith's options were extinguished as part of its reorganization. Smith sued several officers of the company, alleging that they had a duty to disclose at the time of this termination agreement the fact that the company would soon enter bankruptcy. The district court dismissed his fraud claim for failure to state a cause of action. Smith appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Posner and Kanne affirmed. The Court stated that when the fraud alleged is the failure to disclose something, the plaintiff must establish the presence of a duty. A duty can arise in a fiduciary relationship. In the absence of relationship, it can arise when silence would be misleading because of some other statement made by the defendant. Here, the Court concluded that the defendants did not say anything that lulled Smith into thinking the company was doing well. In fact, the Court noted that the defendants advised Smith that the company was in trouble and was seeking an "exit strategy." The Court concluded that Smith's claim was without merit.

Specific Evidence That A Party Secured A Business Benefit Is Required To Establish Contract Performance - Speculation Is Not Enough

TRADE FINANCE PARTNERS, LLC v. AAR CORP. (July 16, 2009)

Trade Finance Partners ("TFP") is, in essence, a broker that arranges business relationships for its clients. It charges a fee on any business it secures. AAR, an aviation support company, was a TFP client. The companies began working together in late 2004, and entered into a contract in January 2005. The contract allowed TFP to secure business from any "target accounts" which were identified by AAR in a written Request for Information ("RFI"). Just prior to and separate from its relationship with TFP, AAR responded to a Northwest Airlines Request for Proposal for an aircraft maintenance and repair contract. TFP alleges that AAR identified Northwest as a target account, even though they did not complete an RFI. Northwest and TFP did communicate in early 2005. In February, Northwest reissued its Request for Proposal and AAR updated its submission, all without the knowledge or involvement of TFP. Northwest selected AAR for the maintenance contract. TFP filed suit, alleging that its efforts caused Northwest to award the contract to AAR. The district court granted summary judgment to AAR. TFP appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Wood and Sykes affirmed. The Court rejected each link in TFP's argument chain: a) the initial overtures between TFP and Northwest related only to a landing gear proposal and are not relevant to the maintenance contract inquiry, b) the record does not support TFP's assertion that there was a “barrier” of some sort between Northwest and AAR before its intervention, c) the record evidence does support the conclusion that Northwest rejected TFP's business model and independently awarded the maintenance contract to AAR, and d) the record does not support TFP's claims that it was responsible for Northwest's visit to AAR's facility or that the visit was relevant to the award of the contract. The Court conceded that it must construe the evidence and its inferences in TFP's favor -- but it found nothing but speculation. The Court also rejected TFP's claims that AAR's failure to complete an RFI was a breach of the contract, that AAR's intention not to fulfill its promise constituted fraud, or that it could recover in quantum meruit.

A Party's Failure To File A Post-Verdict Rule 50(b) Motion Forfeits An Insufficiency Of The Evidence Claim

CONSUMER PRODUCTS RESEARCH & DESIGN v. JENSEN (July 16, 2009)

Consumer Products Research & Design ("CPRD") holds a patent for a wireless smoke detector. CPRD entered into contracts with two companies owned, respectively, by a father and his son. One company, owned by the father, agreed to develop and market the product. The other, owned by the son, was responsible for its manufacturing. Unhappy with of the relationship, CPRD filed a complaint alleging fraudulent inducement and breach of contract. A jury awarded over $700,000 in damages. Defendants appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Flaum and Rovner affirmed. The Court rejected the defendants’ first argument, that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, because none of the defendants filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law after the verdict. The defendants did move for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 (a) after the liability phase of the bifurcated trial. The Court held, however, that a party's failure to comply with Rule 50 (b) after the verdict forfeits any claim on appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The Court also rejected defendants’ jury instruction argument. The defendants accepted the jury instructions without complaint in the court below and forfeited their objection. 

The Resolution Of An Employee's Personal Employment Suit Does Not Preclude A Later Qui Tam Action

UNITED STATES v. ROLLS-ROYCE CORPORATION (June 30, 2009)

Curtis Lusby was an engineer at Rolls-Royce Corp. He became suspicious that the company was falsely certifying that one of its aircraft engines met government specifications so he informed his superiors. He claims that the company fired him for doing so. He brought suit under the False Claims Act, alleging that the company punished him for preparing to bring an action under the statute. The parties jointly dismissed the suit in 2003. However, two months earlier, Lusby had filed a qui tam action under seal. The court dismissed the action for failure to plead fraud with particularity and because of the claim preclusion effect of the earlier lawsuit. Lusby appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Posner and Wood affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court first addressed claim preclusion. It noted its 2007 decision in Cole. In Cole, the Court held that a person who did not prevail on a Title VII claim cannot later bring both a personal and qui tam claim under the False Claims Act. Here, however, Lusby disputes one of the elements of claim preclusion -- that the cases involve the same parties (Cole conceded the issue). The Court noted that the United States is not an actual party to a qui tam suit unless it intervenes. It is, however, the real party in interest. In addition, the Court identified several procedural requirements for qui tam litigation that would make it very difficult to bring a personal claim in the same suit. The Court concluded that the resolution of an employee's personal suit does not preclude a later qui tam suit. With respect to the particularity issue, the Court stated that the complaint contained quite specific allegations of fraud. It rejected Rolls-Royce's argument that a specific allegation of the details of the invoices was required. The Court did affirmed the lower court with respect to Lusby's allegations that Rolls-Royce committed fraud during the earlier settlement negotiations.

Bank's Remedy For Fraud Is Limited By Its Inability To Show Reliance Or Injury

IN RE: GOLDBLATT'S BARGAIN STORES (March 18, 2009)

Before its bankruptcy, Goldblatt's operated six stores in the Chicago area. In January 2003, Great American Group agreed to buy the inventory at two of the stores at a deep discount. Shortly thereafter, Great American agreed to do the same with the inventory at the other four stores. Both sales were contingent on the independent appraisal of the inventories. Both sales were approved by LaSalle Bank, Goldblatt's principal creditor. Before the sales, Great American learned that inventory purchased for $450,000 had been moved from the four stores to the two stores. Great American did not advise the Bank of that fact. The independent appraisal of the first sale confirmed that the inventory was worth at least as much as it had been represented. The appraisal of the inventory from the four other stores, however, indicated that the inventory was worth at least $2 million less than Goldblatt's had estimated. The results of the second appraisal entitled Great American to a refund of approximately $1 million from Goldblatt's. LaSalle Bank, although required by contract to pay, refused to do so. The bankruptcy court, after a trial, concluded that Great American was legally obligated to disclose the movement of the inventory to LaSalle. The court concluded, however, that LaSalle would not have acted any differently had it known and that LaSalle had not shown that it incurred any loss from the movement. On appeal, the district court reversed. The district court agreed that Great American owed a duty of disclosure to LaSalle. However, it held that the fraud excused LaSalle Bank from any obligation to perform. Great American appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Sykes and Tinder reversed. The Court agreed that a victim of fraud is typically entitled to rescission. Here, however, LaSalle does not seek rescission. It simply wants to be excused from having to pay the deficiency based on the overestimation of the second inventory. Before LaSalle is entitled to a remedy, it must establish reliance and injury. The Court agreed with the bankruptcy judge that LaSalle had not proven neither reliance nor loss.

Fraud Victim Has Full Limitations Period From Time Of Discovery To File Suit

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM. v. KOENIG (February 26, 2009)

James Koenig was the Chief Financial Officer of Waste Management, Inc. In the early 1990s, after years of acceptable growth, the company’s financial performance began to suffer. Koenig devised several accounting strategies that made the company appear more profitable than it was. Koenig resigned in January of 1997. In October of 1997, the company disclosed in a press release that its financial statements were inaccurate and unreliable. The SEC filed a complaint against Koenig in March of 2002. At trial, the jury found that his accounting strategies were fraudulent. The court imposed a $2.1 million civil penalty, ordered the disgorgement of almost $1 million in bonuses, imposed $1.2 million in pretax interest, and enjoined Koenig from serving as a director of a public company. Koenig appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Manion and Wood affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The Court first addressed Koenig's statute of limitations argument. Although recognizing that the statute is five years and that more than five years passed between Koenig's resignation and the filing of the complaint, the Court rejected Koenig's argument. Instead, the Court noted that there has long been a special rule for statutes of limitations in fraud cases. A victim of fraud has the full statutory time to file, beginning from the date the wrong came to light or would have with due diligence. Since Koenig's accounting misdeeds were not public until the company issued its press release and Koenig never claimed that the SEC could have known earlier, the complaint was timely. The Court then addressed several trial management objections. It concluded that the lower court did not err in allowing the SEC to put on evidence of the motives of the company's new management. Although originally denying the SEC's motion in limine, the lower court admitted motive evidence after Koenig "opened the door." The court had warned Koenig that it would allow the evidence if Koenig made motive at issue. Second, the Court approved of the trial court’s practice of allowing the jurors to submit questions for witnesses and found no abuse of discretion. Third, the Court found no violation of the discovery or notice rules in the SEC's calling as its witness Koenig’s own expert, whom he did not call. Koenig also complains that the $2.1 million penalty was greater than allowed by the statute. The statute limits a penalty to no greater than the greater of $100,000 or the defendant’s pecuniary gain. The court included pre-judgment interest in its calculation of pecuniary gain. The Court approved of this formula. It held that pecuniary gain is the amount the defendant obtained as a result of his fraudulent accounting practices plus any return he could have made by investing that sum, until its disgorgement. The Court did disagree with the district court's computation of Koenig's bonuses. The company awards bonuses based on increases in the company's earnings over the prior year. Based upon the testimony of the SEC's expert, the Court concluded that the company’s corrected earnings increased from 1991 - 1992. The Court remanded for a recalculation of Koenig’s bonuses and, if necessary, a recalculation of the penalties.