Appellant's Argument That Local Rule 41.1 Violates Due Process Is Frivolous
SAMBRANO v. MABUS (November 8, 2011)
Cathleen Sambrano filed an EEOC charge alleging that the Department of the Navy, her employer, discriminated against her on account of her race, gender, national origin, age, and disability. Because she was a federal employee, the EEOC decided her claim on the merits and ruled against her. Sambrano filed a federal complaint repeating her allegations. Although the district court set a discovery schedule, Sambrano conducted no discovery and instead filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court denied the motion. Sambrano still took no discovery. More than a year passed. Judge Norgle (N.D. Ill.) dismissed the case for want of prosecution pursuant to Local Rule 41.1. That prompted Sambrano's lawyer to file an ex-parte motion to vacate the dismissal. The court denied the motion (under Local Rule 5.3) for failure to serve the defendant. Sambrano appeals.
In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Manion and Rovner affirmed -- and also issued a show cause order to Sambrano's counsel for filing a frivolous appeal and violating Circuit Rule 30. The Court noted that Sambrano could have argued that the district court erred in dismissing the case without any notice to the litigants. Instead, her brief contends that Local Rule 41.1 violates due process. In addition to making this frivolous argument, Sambrano violated Circuit Rule 30's requirement that an appellant include the order under review in an appendix. Counsel also submitted a false certification under Rule 30. The Court concluded that counsel's conduct implied that he is not competent to litigate in federal courts. Thus, it issued the show cause order why he should not be sanctioned, censured, suspended, or disbarred.
Rex Carr was a lawyer in southern Illinois. He and his partners had several agreements concerning the allocation of fees earned by the firm. The agreements continued in effect after the dissolution of the firm in 2003. Significant disputes arose, and a host of lawsuits were filed, with respect to those fees. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was agreed to in 2004. It was meant to control the distribution of all fees, past and future, among the partners. Notwithstanding an agreement to dismiss all pending cases, Carr actually amended a counterclaim in one of the pending actions to assert that he had been fraudulently induced to enter into the MOU. The claim was eventually dismissed and the dismissal was affirmed. While the appeal was pending, Carr brought four separate suits in state court, then brought this federal case, and then voluntarily dismissed the state cases. He brought the federal case under RICO, repeating many of the allegations of the earlier suits, including the fraudulent inducement claim. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. Carr appeals. The defendants cross-appeal from the court's denial of their motion for sanctions.