Indiana State Advocacy Agency Has An Implied Right Of Action Under The Protection And Advocacy For Individuals With Mental Illness Act To Seek Injunctive And Declaratory Relief
INDIANA PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SERVICES v. INDIANA FAMILY AND SOCIAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION (April 22, 2010)
.bmp)
In 1986, Congress enacted the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (the "Act"). The general purpose of the Act was to protect the rights of individuals with mental illnesses and specifically to assist states in operating protection and advocacy systems for those individuals. States are entitled to federal funds if they create such a protection and advocacy system. The system can be either a private entity or an independent state agency. Indiana created Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services ("Services"), an independent agency. The Act gives Services the authority to investigate instances of abuse and requires that Services have access to patient records. In 2006, Services opened investigations into two instances of possible abuse or neglect at the LaRue Carter Memorial Hospital. LaRue Carter is a psychiatric hospital operated by the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration ("FSSA"). In both investigations, Carter withheld patient records requested by Services. Services brought an action against the State of Indiana, FSSA, and three state officials in their official capacities. The complaint sought only injunctive and declaratory relief. The district court granted the relief. A panel of the Seventh Circuit reversed. The panel concluded that Services did not have a private right of action under the Act, could not sue under § 1983 because it was not a "person" under that section, and that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit. Services sought rehearing en banc.
In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook (dissenting) and Judges Posner (concurring), Flaum, Kanne, Rovner, Wood, Williams, Sykes, and Hamilton affirmed the judgment of the district court as modified to provide relief only against the named state officials. The Court first held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar the suit. Although that amendment typically prevents a state or its agencies and officials from being sued in federal court by its own citizens, there are exceptions. Under the Ex parte Young exception, a state official who violates a federal law is considered to be acting outside his or her authority and not immune from suit. The required inquiry is whether the complaint seeks prospective relief for an ongoing violation of federal law. The Court found that inquiry satisfied with respect to the individually named state officials, although not with respect to the state and FSSA. Next, the Court concluded that the Act authorized Services’ suit. The Court undertook an analysis of whether Congress intended to create a private right and private remedy in the Act. Citing several provisions of the Act and interpreting the language, structure and purpose of the Act, the Court concluded that Congress did create a private right of action for access to patient records for protection and advocacy systems such as Services. In doing so, it rejected the defendants' arguments that the Act is simply an exercise of Congress's spending power, that the obligation to provide access to patient records is simply a condition inherent in accepting federal funding, and that the only remedy for the violation is to cut off the funding. Finally, on the merits, the Court had little difficulty in rejecting defendants' argument that the peer review records sought by Services were not "records" under the Act. It simply adopted the unanimous treatment given the question by the four circuits that have addressed the issue.
Judge Posner joined the Court's opinion "without reservation" but wrote separately on whether the Act provided a private cause of action. He wrote of several practical considerations that he believed supported the conclusion that the Act contained a private right of action.
Chief Judge Easterbrook dissented. Although he agreed with the conclusion that the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity applied, he disagreed with the conclusion that Services had a private cause of action. With respect to § 1983, Services is not a "person" and therefore cannot sue under that section. With respect to the Act itself, Chief Judge Easterbrook concluded that the Supreme Court's cases do not support the conclusion that a right of action can be implied in the Act.
.jpg)
Local 150 represents over 22,000 union members in Illinois, Indiana and Iowa. Joseph Ward was its treasurer 1986 until 2007. In 1994, the president of the local asked Ward to purchase property adjacent to the local’s headquarters. Instead of purchasing the property for the union, however, Ward participated in the purchase of the property by an investment group. The group sold the parcel several years later at a substantial profit. Local 150 filed a complaint against Ward, alleging violations of § 501 of the Labor-Management and Reporting Disclosure Act of 1959 (the “Act”) and breaches of fiduciary duty. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that § 501 does not allow a labor union to bring a private cause of action. Local 150 appeals.