City's Unsupported Demand For Special Use Permit Is A "Substantial Burden" Under RLUIPA

WORLD OUTREACH CONFERENCE CENTER v. CITY OF CHICAGO (December 30, 2009)

In Chicago, the World Outreach Conference Center ("WOCC") operates a community center. It is a Christian organization, one of whose goals is to assist and provide relief to the needy and suffering. WOCC purchased the center in 2005 from the YMCA. Although the land was rezoned several years ago, YMCA's operations were a legal nonconforming use. WOCC wants to operate the building by renting out its many apartments – just as the YMCA did. The Center did need a single-room-occupancy (SRO) license to operate. Apparently because an alderman had wanted a financial backer to acquire the property, the City refused to grant the license. WOCC brought suit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), challenging the City's refusal to grant the license. Although the City eventually did grant the license, the suit continued with its claim for damages. The court dismissed the complaint. WOCC appeals.

In Peoria, the Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church purchased property adjacent to its church. It wanted to raze the building in order to build a family center. The City, in response to a neighborhood group’s application, designated the building a landmark and blocked the demolition. Trinity brought suit under RLUIPA, alleging that the landmark designation imposed a substantial burden on religious activities. The court granted summary judgment to Peoria. Trinity appeals. 

In their opinion (in these consolidated cases), Judges Cudahy, Posner and Rovner affirmed in part and reversed in part in Chicago and affirmed in Peoria. RLUIPA prohibits government land-use regulation that imposes a substantial burden on religious activities unless it is in support of a compelling government interest and is the least restrictive means to the end. It also prohibits non-equal or discriminatory treatment directed at a religious assembly through land-use regulation. The Court first addressed and rejected Chicago’s argument that RLUIPA exceeds Congress’ authority, relying on the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce. On the merits in WOCC, the Court concluded that the dismissal of WOCC’s substantial-burden claim was erroneous. WOCC was entitled to operate without the special use permit demanded by the City and the City had no basis for refusing the SRO license. The burden was substantial and there was no compelling government interest. The Court also: a) affirmed the dismissal of the discrimination claim (WOCC was badly treated – but it had nothing to do with religion), b) reversed the dismissal of the equal protection claim (on a class-of-one theory), and c) affirmed the dismissal of the damages claim for violation of the Chicago Zoning Ordinance.On the merits in Peoria, the Court concluded that the burden imposed on Trinity did not reach “substantial.” The property had value and could be sold and there are suitable alternatives for the family center.

Intrastate Delivery Is Considered Part Of Interstate Commerce

COLLINS v. HERITAGE WINE CELLARS (December 21, 2009)

Heritage Wine Cellars is a wholesale wine importer and distributor. It buys wines outside of Illinois (and frequently outside of the country) and brings it to Illinois for sale to retail stores. Although it controls the wine and its shipment during the entire journey, Heritage retains independent contractor carriers to bring the wine into the state. Within Illinois, it uses its own trucks and drivers to distribute the wine. Anthony Collins is one of those truck drivers employed by Heritage. He and other drivers brought an action against Heritage pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). They allege that Heritage failed to pay required overtime. The district court ruled that Collins transported the wine in interstate commerce and Heritage was therefore exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA. Collins appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Manion and Tinder affirmed. The Court critically noted the jurisprudence surrounding the "interstate commerce" issue. It found no fewer than seventeen "unweighted technical criteria" in the cases and regulations. Although admitting that some cases may require a more complex analysis, the Court found four criteria that allowed it to dispose of the case. Those criteria were: a) although Heritage did not have a customer for all of the wine it imported, its volume of imports was determined by customer demand, b) Heritage did not process or otherwise modify the wine at its warehouse, c) Heritage maintained control over the wine, and d) the shipper bore the ultimate responsibility for transportation charges. Under those circumstances, concluded the Court, the wholly intrastate leg of a shipment is considered to be part of interstate commerce.