Secretary's Reasoned Decision Was Not "Arbitrary Or Capricious"

ADVENTIST GLENOAKS HOSPITAL v. SEBELIUS (December 15, 2011)

The federal Medicare program reimburses hospitals for the care they provide to eligible patients. The reimbursement amount is calculated through the application of a rather complicated formula. One element of the formula is a hospital’s "wage index," which, in turn, depends on the average hourly wage in the hospital's Metropolitan Statistical Area. The average hourly wage is computed using actual hospital wage and hour data. Most hospital employees are not paid for lunchtime. Some hospitals, however, pay their employees for a half-hour lunch. All other things being equal, including a half-hour paid lunchtime in the data results in a lower average hourly wage and less Medicare reimbursement. A number of hospitals asked the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to exclude paid lunchtime hours from the formula. When she refused, the hospitals appealed to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board. The Board upheld the Secretary's decision. The hospitals sought review in the district court. Judge Guzman (N.D. Ill.) concluded that the Secretary's decision was not arbitrary or capricious or otherwise unlawful and granted summary judgment in her favor. The hospitals appeal.

In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Cudahy, Manion, and Sykes affirmed. The Court first noted that its review was quite limited. The Secretary's decision will stand unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." The Court conceded that there was some logic in the hospitals’ position -- as did the Secretary. Indeed, the Secretary supported her decision principally on administrative convenience grounds. She decided to include not only paid lunchtime, but also other paid leave time such as military leave, jury duty, sick leave, etc. The last time the Secretary solicited public comment, there was significant disagreement among the commentators over how to treat things like paid lunchtime. Given that the Secretary has considered her alternatives and adequately explained her decision, the approach is reasonable and legal and will stand.

2010 Statute Provides Answer To Fiscal Year 1996 Medicare Question

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO MEDICAL CENTER v. SEBELIUS (August 25, 2010)

Prior to 1980, the federal Medicare program treated teaching hospitals and non-teaching hospitals the same for reimbursement purposes. Teaching hospitals, however, had higher service costs. The Secretary established an adjustment for teaching hospitals in 1980. The adjustment was based on the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) residents employed on a particular date. When Congress further amended the Medicare reimbursement program in 1983, it included an indirect medical education (IME) adjustment to replace the Secretary's 1980 directive that also was based on the number of FTEs. The regulations in effect in 1996 required a resident to be assigned to the outpatient department of a hospital or the "portion" of the hospital subject to the 1983 program. Further amendments in 2001 excluded time spent in research not associated with treatment or diagnosis even if the resident was assigned to one of those two departments. The University of Chicago Medical Center included pure research time in calculating its residents' FTE count for fiscal year 1996. The Medicare program Administrators excluded that time. The district court disagreed. Judge Andersen (N.D. Ill.) concluded that "outpatient department" and "portion" are geographic areas, not spheres of operation as argued by the Administrator. The Secretary appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Evans, and Sykes affirmed. Although the Court agreed that the plain language of the regulation referred to a resident's geographic location, it also conceded that the answer to the ultimate question was not clear. If the regulation was ambiguous, the Court would have to address the degree of deference owed to the Secretary. In any event, the Court concluded that legislation enacted after oral argument provided the answer. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, enacted in March of 2010, allowed the inclusion of non-patient care activities in the IME FTE count retroactively to 1983. It also provided that pure research activities should not be counted after 2001. Although the 2001 provision specifically stated that no inference should be drawn regarding pre-2001 calculations, the Court concluded that pure research was a subcategory of "non-patient care activities" and therefore specifically included in the Act's retroactive language.

Agency Cannot Divest District Court Of Jurisdiction By Unilaterally Reopening Its Proceedings

DOCTORS NURSING & REHABILITATION CENTER v. SEBELIUS (July 16, 2010)

Doctors Nursing & Rehabilitation Center (“DNRC”) is a nursing home located in Salem, Illinois. The Medicare program reimburses DNRC for certain procedures on a per procedure basis. DNRC has a dispute with the program regarding the proper rate at which it was reimbursed for pulse-oximetry tests. A pulse-oximetry test is a noninvasive procedure for measuring blood oxygen levels, usually by placing a sensor on a patient's fingertip. DNRC presented its claims through the proper administrative channels, first through a fiscal intermediary and then through a “Qualified Independent Contractor.” Both levels of review rejected DNRC's challenge. It brought suit for underpayment of benefits. Health and Human Services, the agency that administers the Medicare program, decided to reopen the administrative proceedings. In the district court, it moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that there was no longer final agency action. Judge Scott (C.D. Ill.) granted the motion and dismissed the case. DNRC appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Manion, and Hamilton reversed and remanded. A party may seek judicial review of a "final decision" in any case that arises under the Medicare Act. Here, the dismissal by the Qualified Independent Contractor satisfies that final decision requirement. For several reasons, the Court concluded that an agency is not able to divest a court of its jurisdiction by simply reopening an administrative proceeding. First, it relied on the general rule that jurisdiction is analyzed at the time of filing. Second, it noted that the controlling statute contains a specific provision allowing an agency to request a court, before answering and for good cause, to remand the case to the agency. The provision would make no sense if an agency had that power on its own. Finally, the Court noted that an inferior tribunal generally transfers authority over a matter at the time of an appeal. The Court also rejected the agency's request to remand the case to the district court with instructions to remand the case to the agency. The Court left that decision to the district court in the first instance.