Unnamed Class Member Who Wants To Appeal The Denial Of Class Certification Must First Intervene In The District Court

WRIGHTSELL v. COOK COUNTY (March 31, 2010)

Lance Wrightsell is a former prisoner of the Cook County Jail. He brought an action against the County pursuant to § 1983. He alleged that the County's practice of making only one dentist available to the 10,000 inmates of the jail constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. After the district court denied his request for class certification, he agreed to an offer of judgment of $10,000 and renounced his right to appeal. John Smentek, another former inmate, also had a class action pending in the district court -- against the same defendant, alleging the same constitutional violation, and represented by the same attorney. Wrightsell, notwithstanding his renunciation, appeals the district court's denial of class certification. Smentek petitions for leave to intervene in the appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Wood, and Tinder denied the petition to intervene and dismissed the appeal. The Court addressed some of the complexities involved in class actions and appeals -- for example, the distinction between the named plaintiff as plaintiff and as class representative and the distinction between voluntary and involuntary settlements. Here, the named plaintiff, after denial of class certification, settled his individual claim and waived his right to appeal as class representative. The Court noted competing policy considerations but concluded that Wrightsell resigned his representative status when he waived his right to appeal. Thus, his appeal should be dismissed. The fact that Wrightsell settled, however, does not affect the rights of the other potential class members, including Smentek. But a potential class member who wishes to appeal the denial of class certification must first seek to intervene in the district court and must do so within the time period for filing a notice of appeal. Smentek did not -- his petition to intervene should be denied.

Acceptance of Offer of Judgment From One Defendant Did Not Moot Other Claims

MINIX v. CANARECCI (February 26, 2010)

While on leave from a mental hospital where he was a patient, Gregory Zick was arrested and incarcerated in the St. Joseph County Jail. The jail provided medical and mental health services through contracts with third-party vendors Memorial Home Care and Madison Center. Jail personnel became aware during Zick's booking that he had attempted suicide in the past and was taking medications to treat his suicidal thoughts. Zick was originally put in medical segregation and on suicide watch. He was transferred into the general population, however, a few days later after he denied having suicidal thoughts. About a month later, he was placed back in medical segregation after he refused to take his medication and a jail officer noticed a razor blade missing. Again, after a few days, he was released from medical segregation because he was alert and denied thoughts of suicide. Later that night, he hanged himself with a bed sheet. Cathy Minix, his personal representative, brought an action pursuant to § 1983 against the Sheriff, the medical providers, and several jail employees. She alleged violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments based on the defendants' display of deliberate indifference. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants except the Sheriff. Minix then accepted an offer of judgment from the Sheriff. She appeals the summary judgment rulings in favor of Memorial Home Care and its employee Dr. David, Madison Center and its employee Christine Lonz, and the supervisor of the nursing staff, Jeanne James.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Kanne, and Tinder affirmed. The Court first addressed its jurisdiction, in light of the offer of judgment and its acceptance. Since the claim against the Sheriff was against him in his official capacity, and therefore could not have included punitive damages under § 1983, the punitive damage claims against the other defendants present a live controversy, even if the acceptance of the offer of judgment limits additional compensatory damages. On the merits, the Court first identified the two elements of an inadequate medical care claim under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment: a substantial risk to one's safety because of an objectively serious harm, and deliberate indifference to that risk. A jail suicide case automatically satisfies the first element. The second element requires that each defendant know that there is a substantial risk of suicide -- and intentionally disregard it. The Court addressed each defendant under that standard and found summary judgment proper in each case: a) Lonz was unaware of Zick’s suicidal history or thoughts, b) there was no evidence that Madison Center adopted or condoned any unconstitutional policy and there was no causal link between any Madison Center practice and the suicide, c) Zick's behavior in segregation did not provide Nurse James with actual knowledge of a substantial risk of suicide, d) Dr. David was not directly involved in Zick's treatment, and e) there was a lack of evidence that Memorial Home condoned or adopted an unconstitutional practice.