Supervisor Can Be A "Similarly Situated Employee"
RODGERS v. WHITE (September 2, 2011)
The Illinois Secretary of State employed Mark Rodgers as a lawn maintenance worker for over 20 years. He was the only black employee on a 27-person crew. He was fired in 2006 by Donna Fitts, the Department director and a white woman, and Stephen Roth, the personnel director and a white man. The termination arose from two or three incidents. First, a late 2005 Inspector General report concluded that Rodgers and his supervisor, Dave Rusciolelli, who is white, allowed their crewmembers to use state-owned equipment on personal time. The department recommended a 3-day suspension for Rusciolelli and an 18-day suspension for Rodgers, although neither suspension was ever implemented. Second, in early 2006, Fitts discovered that Rogers, Rusciolelli, and a third man, a white crew supervisor, were recording overtime off the books. The Department had imposed a moratorium on overtime. This off-the-books system allowed crewmembers to work overtime in return for later, equivalent personal time off. Third, Rodgers skipped a meeting that Fitts called because he was not told it was mandatory and because Fitts had not approved overtime for the meeting. In mid-2006, Fitts recommended Rodgers' termination. Her termination memorandum cited as grounds only the abuse of state equipment and the improper overtime but her letter to Rodgers also included his failure to attend the meeting. Following arbitration, Rodgers was reinstated with back pay. Nevertheless, he brought suit against the Secretary of State under Title VII and against Fitts and Roth under §§ 1981 and 1983. Chief Judge McCuskey (C.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to the defendants. He concluded that Rodgers had no direct evidence of discrimination and that, under the indirect method, Rodgers failed to identify a similarly situated coworker. Rodgers appeals.
In their opinion, Seventh Circuit Judges Bauer, Cudahy, and Tinder vacated and remanded. The Court agreed with the district court with respect to the direct method. It disagreed, however, with respect to the indirect method. The Court conceded that supervisors generally are not good comparators under the similarly situated analysis. But here, it found Rusciolelli a good comparator. Rodgers and Rusciolelli were accused of the same things, were equally responsible, and were disciplined by the same supervisor. The only substantial difference is the accusation that Rogers failed to attend a meeting but there are at least material fact questions regarding that meeting. Rodgers has therefore identified a similarly situated white individual who was treated more favorably -- summary judgment should not have been granted.
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In 2007 and 2008, a number of related entities (the "Chicago Debtors") borrowed in excess of $150 million to build a .jpg)
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David Bourke was tried and convicted of murder in 1998. His attorneys, Scott Conger and Wayne Brucar, argued self-defense. The appellate court reversed his conviction on the grounds that the state did not disprove his self-defense claim. Bourke brought suit in federal court alleging that certain state officials suppressed evidence in violation of the Constitution and that his attorneys committed malpractice. He later dismissed all federal claims but the District Court retained is discretionary supplemental jurisdiction over the malpractice claim. The only surviving claim is that his attorneys did not adequately 
Jonathan Peabody joined the Rock Island Corporation, a closely held operation, in 1998. He first invested in the company’s pension plan in 1999 when he rolled over a $167,000 IRA into the Plan. Almost all of the rolled over funds were used to purchase Rock Island stock. There was no market for, and therefore no easy way to value, the stock. The Plan's trustee issued valuation statements periodically. At different times between 2000 and 2004, it was assigned values of $757, $500, $625 and $550 per share. Peabody left Rock Island in 2004. At the time he had 835 Rock Island shares. Peabody and Rock Island entered into a loan agreement pursuant to which Rock Island agreed to purchase the stock and to pay $350 per share in one year. However, when the loan became due, Rock Island was unable to pay. It went out of business in 2005. Peabody brought suit against the company, the Plan trustees, and two insurance companies that had issued policies protecting Rock Island against employee dishonesty. Judge Coar (N.D. Ill.) held a bench trial and ruled that: a) Peabody had waived any fiduciary duty claim with respect to the initial rollover or the defendants' failure to diversify his account, b) the Plan and the trustee's violated their fiduciary duties by maintaining the Rock Island investment and by failing to distribute the benefit, c) one trustee breached his fiduciary duty by offering the loan, d) ERISA prohibited the loan transaction, e) Rock Island itself was not liable, and f) Peabody did not have standing to assert a claim against the insurance company defendants. The court awarded damages based on a $500 per-share valuation in reliance on the fact that the Plan purchased shares for Peabody's account at that price in 2001. Peabody and the defendants appealed..jpg)
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Prior to 1980, the federal Medicare program treated teaching hospitals and non-teaching hospitals the same for reimbursement purposes. Teaching hospitals, however, had higher service costs. The Secretary established an adjustment for teaching hospitals in 1980. The adjustment was based on the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) residents employed on a particular date. When Congress further amended the Medicare reimbursement program in 1983, it included an indirect medical education (IME) adjustment to replace the Secretary's 1980 directive that also was based on the number of FTEs. The regulations in effect in 1996 required a resident to be assigned to the outpatient department of a hospital or the "portion" of the hospital subject to the 1983 program. Further amendments in 2001 excluded time spent in research not associated with treatment or diagnosis even if the resident was assigned to one of those two departments. The .jpg)
Gina Purvis was a high school teacher in 
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In the spring of 2007, a 
In 2003, Mitchell Rosin pleaded guilty in New York to a charge of sexual abuse in the third degree, a Class B misdemeanor. The prosecutor agreed to strike from the standard plea agreement a paragraph that would require Rosin to register as a sex offender and otherwise comply with the Sex Offender Registration Act. At the time of the plea agreement, Rosin was actually a resident of 
In 2001, individuals entered into a mortgage on an Indiana property with LaSalle Bank's predecessor. The mortgage was recorded -- but the acknowledgment had a technical defect. In 2007, the individuals petitioned for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. The Trustee initiated an adversary proceeding against La Salle to avoid the mortgage. Indiana law provides that a "properly acknowledged" mortgage is constructive notice of the mortgage to later bona fide purchasers (BFPs). Prior to 2007, Indiana courts held that a mortgage with a technical defect in the acknowledgment did not amount to constructive notice. The Indiana legislature amended the statute in 2007 to overrule the case law and allow constructive notice even with certain technical defects. The legislature amended the statute again in 2008 to provide that the statute applied to all mortgages, regardless of the date of recording. The dispute in the adversary proceeding centered on whether, prior to the 2008 amendment, the 2007 amendment applied to mortgages recorded prior to 2007. The bankruptcy court concluded that the 2007 amendment applied only to mortgages recorded after its effective date. The district court reversed. The Trustee appeals..jpg)
Larry Storie purchased a truck from the Duckett Truck Center in June of 2004. Unbeknownst to Storie, the truck had quite a history. Duckett purchased the truck from West Side Auto Parts in February, who purchased it from Randy's Auto Sales in January, who purchased it from St. Paul Mercury Insurance Company, also in January. St. Paul acquired the truck after it was involved in an accident -- an accident in which its driver was killed -- and declared a total loss. St. Paul applied for a certificate of title in Tennessee. The title was issued to St. Paul and forwarded to Randy's -- and to Westside -- and to Duckett. No one applied for a salvage title. Storie learned of his truck's checkered past only after 18 more months and 200,000 more miles. He brought suit against Randy's. He alleges that Randy's violated an Indiana statute that requires a person who obtains a wrecked vehicle without a salvage title to apply for one within 31 days of his receipt of title. The district court granted summary judgment to Randy's, concluding that it could not have obtained a salvage title since it no longer owned the vehicle by the time it received the title from St. Paul. Storie appeals.
Anna Darchak, a native of Poland, worked for several years in the Chicago public school system as a teacher of English as a Second Language. In 2005, she was hired as a full-time teacher at the Princeton Alternative Center on a one-year contract. It was not a good year. Almost immediately, Darchak complained that Hispanic students were being treated more favorably than Polish students. Darchak alleges that Princeton's principal made several disparaging remarks in reference to Darchak's heritage. Later in the year, the principal assigned Darchak to a classroom with a large number of Spanish speaking students. Darchak complained – and she received a negative evaluation. The principal chose not to renew Darchak's contract at the end of the year. Darchak filed suit, alleging retaliatory discharge, First Amendment retaliation under § 1983, and national origin discrimination under Title VII. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Darchak appeals.
King & Larsen, Lord & Essex and Lay-Com are all in the development or construction business. Mike King is the owner of King & Larsen. Lord & Essex and Lay-Com are both owned directly or indirectly by members of the Popp family. King & Larsen had a collective bargaining agreement that required it to make contributions to the plaintiff fund. When it ran into financial difficulty, Lord & Essex and Lay-Com came to its rescue. They loaned money and paid some bills. The companies then entered into a complex series of transactions that resulted in the transfer of most of King & Larsen's assets to a new company, M. A. King. The tax and union pension fund liabilities of King & Larsen remained behind, in an otherwise empty shell. The pension fund sued King & Larsen, M. A. King and Mike King for the unpaid contributions. After obtaining default judgments, the funds added Lay-Com, Lord & Essex, the Lay Trust and John Popp as defendants. The district court found Lay-Com, Lord & Essex and the Lay Trust liable on a veil-piercing theory and dismissed John Popp. All parties appeal.
CenTra, Inc. is a family-owned holding company with several subsidiaries, including the Detroit International Bridge Co. (“DIBC”), which operates the Ambassador Bridge between Detroit and Windsor. Prior to 1995, two of the other subsidiaries were Central Cartage Company and Central Transport, Inc. Each of those subsidiaries had labor agreements with unions and contributed to the defendant's pension fund. The company reorganized in 1995. It created two new subsidiaries to take on the union-trucking operations of Cartage and Transport and a third subsidiary to engage in non-union operations. It then merged Cartage and Transport into the holding company. Those companies ceased to exist. Shortly thereafter, the holding company contributed selected assets and liabilities of the former subsidiaries into the newly formed union-trucking subsidiaries. The stock in the new subsidiaries was sold the following year to U.S. Truck, a company controlled by members of the same family. The new companies did not do well and U.S. Truck was liquidated within a few years. DIBC still had union agreements and contributed to the defendant's pension fund until 1997. Under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA), an employer withdrawing from a multi-employer pension plan must pay a "withdrawal liability," a proportionate share of the plans underfunded, vested benefits. A complex formula for calculating the withdrawal liability is based for the most part on an employer's history of contributions. Here, defendant assessed in excess of $14 million in withdrawal liability against CenTra, including in its calculations the contribution history of Cartage and Transport, the two subsidiaries that ceased to exist in 1995. CenTra challenged the assessment in arbitration and was successful in getting it reduced to under $1 million. The district court reinstated the assessment. CenTra appeals.
Police officers from the City of Wheaton and several neighboring jurisdictions conducted a major law enforcement operation targeting a drug conspiracy in August of 2003. Several Wheaton police officers were given the task of arresting Robert Ptak. Ptak was considered armed and dangerous and had a history of resisting arrest. The officers were dispatched to a local motel where Ptak was believed to be staying. They had a photograph and a physical description and had been told that he was seen riding a yellow sport motorcycle. The officers located an individual that met Ptak’s physical description on a yellow sport motorcycle in the vicinity of the motel. Unbeknownst to the officers, however, the individual was not Ptak. It was Jonathan Catlin. According to Catlin, the officers jumped out of their vehicle while they were stopped at a traffic light and ran toward him. They grabbed him, threw him down, and eventually handcuffed him. They did not identify themselves as police officers until after the arrest. They soon realized their mistake and released Catlin within 20 minutes. Catlin brought an action for false arrest and excessive force under § 1983. The district court found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and granted summary judgment. Catlin appeals.
A lawsuit was filed in 1984 challenging an Illinois statute requiring parental notice of an abortion of a minor. The Court affirmed a district court order that held the act unconstitutional because it failed to provide for anonymity and an expedited appeal. The district court later concluded that an Illinois Supreme Court Rule did not cure the defect and continued an injunction in force. In 1995, the Illinois General Assembly repealed the act and replaced it with the Illinois Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995 (the "Act"). The Act requires a doctor to provide 48 hours notice to an adult family member of his or her intention to perform an abortion on a minor or incompetent person. In a judicial bypass procedure, a court can order notice waived if it determines by a preponderance of the evidence that a) the petitioner is sufficiently mature to intelligently decide whether to have an abortion, or b) that notification would not be in the best interest of the petitioner. The parties agreed to continue the injunction until the Supreme Court promulgated rules relating to the Act’s bypass procedure. The Supreme Court did so -- 10 years later, in 2006. On the defendants’ motion to dissolve the injunction, the district court concluded that the Act was unconstitutional because the bypass procedure failed to provide a mechanism for consent for a petitioner who failed to establish the requisite maturity level but who successfully established that it was in her best interest to waive notice. The defendants appeal..jpg)
Material Sciences Corp. ("MSC") is a large liquid-coating company. It pre-paints raw material used in commercial and industrial applications. During the 1990s, MSC began working with Terronics Development Corporation ("TDC"), a small research and engineering company that had developed a process for coating materials with a powder-based paint. In 1998, the parties entered into a technology agreement. Under the agreement, TDC assigned certain patents to MSC and MSC promised to purchase equipment and consulting services from TDC. By its terms, the agreement would expire in 2002 but could be renewed. After some initial successes, the technology did not pan out as expected. TDC covered some of its cost overruns by borrowing from MSC against its future profit expectations. The relationship of the parties came to an end in 2002. TDC sought millions in damages and a reassignment of its patents. The district court granted MSC's motion for summary judgment. TDC appeals.
Systems Division, Inc. ("SDI") sought and obtained a judgment for patent infringement against Teknek LLC (“Teknek”) and Teknek Electronics “(Electronics”). During the pendency of the patent infringement suit, the shareholders of Teknek and Electronics created Teknek Holdings ("Holdings") and transferred the assets of Teknek and Electronics into Holdings. Following the judgment, SDI added Holdings and the shareholders as defendants under an alter ego theory. Meanwhile, Teknek filed for bankruptcy. SDI filed a notice of its claim in the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy trustee filed an adversary proceeding against the alter egos, alleging fraudulent transfers and breach of fiduciary duty. The complaint also sought relief against the shareholders personally for Teknek's obligation to SDI. The bankruptcy court enjoined SDI from attempting to collect its judgment outside of bankruptcy. The district court vacated the injunction. The shareholders paid SDI in full on the judgment. The trustee appeals.
Friends of Milwaukee’s Rivers (“FMR”) filed a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) against the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District (“MMSD”). FMR alleged that MMSD sewer overflows violated the CWA and MMSD’s permit. Wisconsin sued the MMSD the very same day. MMSD and Wisconsin settled their case soon thereafter. The settlement provided that MMSD would spend over $900 million in upgrades to its sewer system. On MMSD’s motion, the court dismissed FMR’s suit on two bases: the CWA itself and res judicata. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The Court held that the CWA did not bar the suit because FMR filed first. With respect to res judicata, the Court held that the privity requirement depended on whether the settlement constituted “diligent prosecution,” defined as whether it was “calculated to result in compliance.” The Court remanded to the district court for that determination. After an evidentiary hearing and briefing, the district court found for the MMSD and dismissed the complaint on res judicata grounds. FMR appeals.
Gerald Saltzman, owner and sole employee of AA Sales, and Coni-Seal started working together in the early 1980s. Coni-Seal manufactured automotive parts. Saltzman was a sales representative. Early successes led to a written agreement in 1987. The contract provided AA Sales with a 6% commission on sales to approved accounts and with 5 years of post-termination commissions on accounts previously sold by AA Sales. AA and Coni-Seal later agreed to negotiate commissions on an account-by-account basis. In 1994, Coni-Seal approved AA to solicit AutoZone, a large retailer of automotive parts. Shortly thereafter, their relationship began to sour. In 1995, Coni-Seal reassigned several accounts away from AA. In return for releasing the accounts, AA agreed to a monthly fee and a 2% commission on sales to the accounts it released. Coni-Seal authorized a second sales representative for AutoZone in 2003. Coni-Seal began selling to AutoZone in 2004. It paid no commissions to AA on these sales. AA filed suit for breach of contract and violation of the Illinois Sales Representative Act (“ISRA”). The district court granted summary judgment to Coni-Seal. AA appeals.
Virginia Viilo was enjoying a quiet August evening in her backyard, accompanied by several family members and 
On the evening of April 8, Frederick Grady was in a serious accident in his van. He escaped with minor injuries but his van flipped and was badly damaged. Despite the warnings of emergency personnel, Grady reached into his van to retrieve some carpentry tools. He cut his hand badly. The on-scene emergency personnel treated the wound and recorded its occurrence. Later that evening, Grady trespassed on the lot where his damaged van had been taken, in another vain attempt to retrieve his tools. He was arrested. The arresting officer noticed his bandaged hand but did not mention it in his report. The report prepared at the lockup also neglected to mention a hand injury. He was photographed and taken to jail. The photograph showed no signs of injury to his head. The prisoner in the adjacent cell noticed the bandage on his hand. Jail guards noticed Grady sitting in his cell at about 1:30 the next afternoon. A few minutes later, the prisoner in the adjacent cell heard an unusual noise. Shortly thereafter, jail personnel found Grady on the floor of his cell, unconscious. He was pronounced dead at the hospital. An autopsy determined that he died of a heart attack. It also revealed a number of injuries to his body. His estate filed an action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, claiming that various officers and jail personnel deprived Grady of his constitutional rights by using excessive force and depriving him of medical care. The case was based almost exclusively on inferences drawn from the nature of the injuries to Grady’s body. After seven days of testimony from almost every individual who interacted with Grady after his accident, the jury found for defendants. Plaintiffs appeal the denial of their motion for a new trial.
National Lacquer operated a paint and coatings business on Chicago’s south side for years. Hazardous materials were used, stored, and spilled at the site. When National Lacquer fell on hard times and lagged on its property taxes, the county made five of the seven separate parcels comprising the site available at a tax scavenger sale. Capital Tax Corporation (“Capital”), which buys and sells distressed properties, acquired tax certificates to the five parcels. The certificates did not pass title but gave Capital the option, if the parcels were not redeemed by the owner, to petition for a tax deed. Capital then (it is alleged) entered into an oral agreement for the sale of the parcels to Dukatt. Capital obtained the tax deeds only after receiving a payment from Dukatt, ostensibly a partial payment for the property. Beginning in 2002, the local and federal environmental authorities became interested and inspected the property. The EPA ordered Capital to clean up the property. After Capital refused, the EPA conducted its own cleanup. It sued Capital (and the owners of the other two parcels) to recover the costs of cleanup, civil penalties, and punitive damages. The district court granted summary judgment to the government on liability and damages. It found Capital jointly and severally liable for response costs in excess of $2.6 million and assessed civil penalties of $230,250. Capital appeals.