Court Sends Contract Claim Back For Recalculation Of Damages
SUPERL SEQUOIA LIMITED v. THE CARLSON CO. (August 11, 2010)
In preparation for a Martha Stewart promotion, Macy's solicited bids for the furniture required to create the promotion settings and its installation. Carlson Company, a Wisconsin furniture manufacturer, wanted to bid but lacked sufficient capacity. Superl Sequoia, a Hong Kong manufacturer, and Carlson agreed to work together. Sequoia agreed to provide most of the furniture -- Carlson agreed to install the furniture and to fix or replace furniture, as necessary. They also agreed to split the profits 50-50. Sequoia quoted a $3.4 million price to Carlson. Carlson marked up the quote, added its anticipated cost, and submitted a $5 million bid. Macy's accepted the bid, was satisfied with the work, and paid the invoice. Carlson only paid Sequoia $2 million, however, claiming that it spent more on replacements and repairs for late or substandard furniture than it had anticipated. Sequoia brought an action for breach of contract. Judge Crabb (W.D. Wis.) concluded that Sequoia breached the contract because of late and substandard deliveries and that Carlson could recover its replacement and repair costs. She then held a bench trial to calculate those costs. She disregarded the $3.4 million quote, instead demanding that Sequoia provide evidence of its actual costs. At trial, the court first concluded that Sequoia's costs were $2.2 million and that Carlson's were $.4 million -- entitling each to approximately $1.15 million in profit. But the court then added that Carlson was entitled to an additional $1.16 million to cover its extra expenses and entered judgment for Carlson for approximately $10,000. Sequoia appeals.
In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook, Circuit Judge Kanne, and District Judge Kennelly vacated and remanded. The Court first concluded that the district court's calculations of damage amounts were not clearly erroneous. On the other hand, the Court questioned two legal decisions of the trial court. The first was the court's allowance of the $1.16 million in replacement and repair costs to Carlson, which was calculated to include overhead and profit. Although the agreement of the parties was documented in a group of e-mails without a formal contract, the Court concluded that the parties agreed that only Carlson's out-of-pocket repair and replacement costs were recoverable. The second legal decision addressed by the Court was the district court's treatment of the $3.4 million bid. Again interpreting a number of e-mails documenting the agreement with some difficulty, the Court disagreed with that treatment. First, the Court noted that Carlson accepted the quote long before the relevant e-mail exchange. The quote was the basis upon which Sequoia joined the venture -- Carlson cannot retroactively ignore it. Second, the quote was given as a fixed amount -- both the floor and the ceiling on Sequoia's costs. The later e-mails should not be viewed as fundamentally changing the structure of the deal. The Court remanded with instructions to the district court to recalculate the judgment.
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The State of Indiana receives federal funds under programs designed to assist those with disabilities and mental illnesses. In return, it must have a system to protect and advocate for their rights. The
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The City of Chicago and the Village of Oak Park, Illinois both ban the possession of most handguns. The Supreme Court decided
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The Court denied rehearing in a case
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Cap Gemini purchased a consulting business from Ernst & Young in 2000. The Ernst & Young partners received shares in the new business in exchange for their partnership shares. The partners preferred to treat the receipt of shares as income in 2000. The company wanted to put some restrictions on the shares to ensure that the partners would remain with the new organization. They all agreed on a methodology that they thought would serve both purposes. The shares were all transferred and fully taxable in 2000 but were restricted for almost five years. One of the partners, Cynthia Fletcher, received shares with a market value of approximately $2.5 million. She reported this as ordinary income in 2000. Fletcher left the organization and collected the shares remaining in her account. Because the market price of the stock plummeted after the acquisition, it turns out that the partners would have been better off not taking the income in the first year. Fletcher filed an amended tax return for 2000 and took the position that her only income in 2000 was the $650,000 that was actually distributed from her account. Although the Internal Revenue Service processed the refund, the United States filed suit to recover. The district court granted summary judgment to the United States and ordered Fletcher to refund the refund. Fletcher appeals.
The City of Joliet filed eminent domain proceedings to acquire the Evergreen Terrace Apartments. New West, the owner of the apartment complex, filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. New West sought an injunction and damages, alleging that federal law preempted Joliet's attempts to condemn the property. The district court originally put the condemnation on hold and dismissed the § 1983 action. On the first appeal, the Court reversed and directed the district court to resolve the condemnation proceedings. On remand, HUD intervened and contended that the condemnation was precluded by two different federal statutes. The district court rejected HUD’s argument and certified the case for interlocutory appeal. New West and HUD appeal.
Juan Sandoval and Sidney Pennix were Chicago police officers. They were also in the military reserve and on active duty in El Salvador and Iraq, respectively. When Chicago scheduled the examination for candidates for sergeant, Sandoval and Pennix requested an opportunity sit for the test. Chicago accommodated their requests by offering them the opportunity to take the test in, respectively, San Salvador and Frankfurt. They both took the test, passed and were placed on the eligibility list. They then filed suit pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”). They both allege that they should have been offered locations closer to where they were stationed and also seek compensation for the transportation cost to the testing locations. The district court granted summary judgment to the City of Chicago. Sandoval and Pennix appeal.
The City of Chicago and the police officers' union have agreed to a procedure for police officers to take compensatory time off in lieu of overtime pay. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, a public employee who has accrued compensatory time off and has requested to use it is permitted to "use such time within a reasonable period after making the request if the use of the compensatory time does not unduly disrupt the operations of the public agency." Several officers with accumulated compensatory time off brought a suit against the City. They contend that they should be allowed to take a particular days of their own choosing unless their absence at that time would result in a shortage of available officers. Conversely, the City contends that it is the department's choice. In their view, an officer may submit a generic request for compensatory time off. The City then decides what days, if any, to allow. The magistrate judge below concluded that the City had no set procedure. The lack of procedure failed to ensure the rights of the officers. He issued a detailed injunction specifying the process the City must use in response to future applications. The City appeals.
Although only in existence for two years, Enterprise Trust managed more than $100 million in hundreds of accounts. Some of the accounts were custodial only, and others authorized Enterprise to choose securities. Enterprise did not honor its customers instructions and traded very aggressively in both the noncustodial and custodial accounts. It lost more than half of the money in its care before the SEC stepped in. The lower court appointed a receiver to propose a distribution plan for Enterprise’s assets. The receiver proposed a plan under which holders of custodial accounts recovered approximately 60% of their investment while holders of noncustodial accounts recovered between 25 and 50% of their investment. The receiver also proposed the use of illiquid assets to repay the noncustodial accounts, further compromising their value. The district court approved the plan. Several owners of noncustodial accounts, who were not parties to the case, appeal.
Before its bankruptcy, Goldblatt's operated six stores in the Chicago area. In January 2003, Great American Group agreed to buy the inventory at two of the stores at a deep discount. Shortly thereafter, Great American agreed to do the same with the inventory at the other four stores. Both sales were contingent on the independent appraisal of the inventories. Both sales were approved by LaSalle Bank, Goldblatt's principal creditor. Before the sales, Great American learned that inventory purchased for $450,000 had been moved from the four stores to the two stores. Great American did not advise the Bank of that fact. The independent appraisal of the first sale confirmed that the inventory was worth at least as much as it had been represented. The appraisal of the inventory from the four other stores, however, indicated that the inventory was worth at least $2 million less than Goldblatt's had estimated. The results of the second appraisal entitled Great American to a refund of approximately $1 million from Goldblatt's. LaSalle Bank, although required by contract to pay, refused to do so. The bankruptcy court, after a trial, concluded that Great American was legally obligated to disclose the movement of the inventory to LaSalle. The court concluded, however, that LaSalle would not have acted any differently had it known and that LaSalle had not shown that it incurred any loss from the movement. On appeal, the district court reversed. The district court agreed that Great American owed a duty of disclosure to LaSalle. However, it held that the fraud excused LaSalle Bank from any obligation to perform. Great American appeals.
Triumph Partnerships acquired some overdue credit card debt from a bank, including a debt owed by Marylou Hahn. Triumph sent a letter to Hahn, stating that she had an "amount due" of $1051.91 and that she had "interest due" of $82.64. Hahn filed suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Hahn alleged, and Triumph conceded, that the $82.64 represented the interest that had accrued only since Triumph acquired the debt. The $1051.91 included interest that had accrued prior to Triumph's acquisition of the debt. Hahn alleged, therefore, that the statement was a false representation of the debt and prohibited by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The District Court granted summary judgment to Triumph. Hahn appeals.
James Koenig was the Chief Financial Officer of Waste Management, Inc. In the early 1990s, after years of acceptable growth, the company’s financial performance began to suffer. Koenig devised several accounting strategies that made the company appear more profitable than it was. Koenig resigned in January of 1997. In October of 1997, the company disclosed in a press release that its financial statements were inaccurate and unreliable. The SEC filed a complaint against Koenig in March of 2002. At trial, the jury found that his accounting strategies were fraudulent. The court imposed a $2.1 million civil penalty, ordered the disgorgement of almost $1 million in bonuses, imposed $1.2 million in pretax interest, and enjoined Koenig from serving as a director of a public company. Koenig appeals.
The losers is in a contested union election sued the winners. The defendants prevailed on all counts. As discovery proceeded during the case, it became apparent that plaintiffs could not support some of their claims. Defendants demanded that some claims be withdrawn, to no avail. Defendants asked for sanctions under 28 U.S.C. §1927 and FRCP 11. The court ordered plaintiffs’ attorney, James Banks, to pay $80,000 in sanctions. Banks appeals.
Kurz and Heinzl both invested in portfolios managed by Fidelity Management & Research Co. (“Fidelity”). Apparently, some Fidelity employees placed trades with Jeffries & Co. in return for kickbacks from Jeffries. The SEC initiated a proceeding under the Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisors Act. Fidelity and the SEC entered into a consent decree. Kurz and Heinzl thereafter filed a class-action suit in state court, alleging that the employees’ conduct resulted in a breach of contract by Fidelity. Fidelity removed to federal court on the basis that their failure to disclose the employees’ misconduct was a securities law issue. The district court denied Kurz’ motion to remand and entered judgment for Fidelity. Kurz appeals.
The State of Illinois requires railroads to install walkways alongside railroad tracks in any switching yard built or renovated after February 2003. Norfolk Southern challenged the requirement in the district court, contending that it is preempted by federal law. The district court found for Illinois, first holding that federal law does not cover the subject matter and then, after a bench trial, deciding that the regulation does not conflict with a federal objective. Norfolk Southern appeals.
Watkins Motor Lines (“Watkins”) experienced three episodes of employee-on-employee murder or attempted murder. It decided it would no longer employ persons who had been convicted of a crime of violence. A few months after Watkins adopted its new policy, Lyndon Jackson applied for a job. Jackson had a criminal record. Watkins declined to hire him for that reason. Jackson filed a complaint with the EEOC. The EEOC initiated an investigation. It sought to determine whether the policy had a disparate impact on minorities and, if so, whether it was a business necessity. In April 2005, the EEOC issued a subpoena to Watkins. Watkins and Jackson reached a settlement in January 2006, contingent on the EEOC abandoning the investigation. Jackson withdrew his charge – but the EEOC pressed on. It sought to enforce the subpoena in the district court. The court dismissed the EEOC’s action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that no valid charge was pending because the EEOC should have allowed Jackson to settle and withdraw his charge. The EEOC appeals.
Jack Katz brought this action on behalf of a class of persons who contributed real property to a real estate investment trust (“REIT”). In exchange, they received an interest in the REIT. The REIT merged into a new entity in 2007. The interest-holders were offered either cash or an interest in the new entity. Katz took the cash but filed suit in state court, alleging that the offer violated the terms of their original agreement with the REIT. He based the action on the Securities Act of 1933 ( “’33 Act”). Defendants removed the suit to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”). The district court concluded that removal was not allowed by the ’33 Act. The defendants petition for appeal.
Yuming Deng was a software developer at Sears Roebuck and Co. (“Sears”). He compiled data that Sears used in making credit decisions. Unfortunately, Deng took serious issue with a 2001 performance review and erupted. Deng stopped coming to work, claiming a disability. He continued to show up at Sears occasionally, sometimes causing a disruption. On his last visit, he deleted from Sears computers much data and the software models Sears used in analyzing the data. After an internal investigation concluded that Deng destroyed the data in retaliation for the performance review, Sears reported his conduct to the local police. The police concluded that Deng had violated Illinois law and sought him out for his version of the story. Deng, however, had left the state. Charges against him were filed in his absence. A year and a half later, Deng was arrested and brought back to Illinois. When a witness did not appear at his preliminary hearing and the judge refused a request for a continuance, the prosecutor filed a nolle prosequi. Deng then brought this action for malicious prosecution against Sears. The court granted summary judgment to Sears, holding that the nolle prosequi was not a “favorable” outcome for Deng. Deng appeals.
Gail Kay taught in the Chicago public school system. After she retired in 1994, she brought a § 1983 action against the Board of Education (“Board”). She alleged that the Board penalized her on account of her speech. The parties settled the litigation in 1996 and her case was dismissed. In the settlement, the Board offered to rehire Kay into an available future position. In 1997, she was offered an opportunity to return to her former