Substantial Evidence Of Pretext Is Enough To Affirm An EEOC Award

MARION COUNTY CORONER'S OFFICE v. EEOC (July 27, 2010)

Kenneth Ackles, an African-American male, was elected Marion County, Indiana coroner in November 2004. Two deputy coroners -- white male John Linehan and African-American female Alfarena Ballew -- sought the position of chief deputy coroner. The chief deputy coroner is responsible for the day-to-day management of the office. Ackles chose Linehan because he was currently serving in that position on an interim basis. Very early on, Ackles made it clear to Linehan that he wanted to increase the number of African-American employees (particularly deputies) in the office. The relationship between Ackles and Linehan did not go well: Ackles complained that Linehan received a salary increase without his knowledge, Ackles and Linehan disagreed over disciplining Ballew, Ackles instructed Linehan not to report Ballew's tardiness, Ackles told Linehan not to file a police report concerning a missing $3000, and Ackles instructed Linehan not to discipline the janitor who allegedly took the $3000. Finally Linehan filed a hostile work environment complaint with the human resources department. On that very day (November 14), Ackles told Linehan that he was going to make a change in the chief deputy position but that Linehan was to continue performing his duties. Some of those duties were later reassigned but Linehan continued to receive the same salary. A few weeks later (December 2), Linehan received a letter terminating his employment. Although the letter provided no reason for the termination of employment, Ackles testified later that he had "lost confidence and trust" in Linehan. Ackles named Ballew the new permanent chief deputy coroner. Shortly thereafter, Ackles and Ballew canceled an outsourcing contract for autopsies and hired directly several of the company's employees. They hired only African-Americans -- none of the white employees were offered positions. Linehan filed an EEO charge against the coroner's office. He alleged race, sex, and age discrimination as well as retaliation for protected activity. His charge was processed administratively at the EEOC pursuant to the Government Employee Rights Act (GERA). The ALJ found that Ackle's testimony was incredible (among other things), that his reason for terminating Linehan's employment was pretextual, and that Linehan was demoted and fired on account of his race and in retaliation for his complaint. The ALJ awarded front and back pay, attorney's fees, and compensatory damages in the amount of $200,000. The EEOC affirmed. The Coroner's Office petitions for review.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Evans, and Sykes granted in part, denied in part, vacated in part, and reversed and remanded. The Court noted, under GERA, that it should uphold the decision of the EEOC if it is supported by substantial evidence. Here, the heart of the case is the pretext analysis. Although the Court admitted that this analysis looks only to whether the employer’s explanation was "honestly believed," it nevertheless found a wealth of evidence that the "lost confidence and trust" rationale was pretextual. It cited the testimony concerning the discipline of Ballew, the janitor theft, and Linehan’s raise in support of its conclusion. Next, it considered the issue of the EEOC’s jurisdiction. GERA applies only to policymaking employees chosen by an elected official. The coroner’s office argued that Linehan was not a policymaking employee when he was fired because of the November 14 demotion. The Court rejected the argument. Linehan was certainly stripped of some duties before he was fired but he was never formally demoted, he continued to receive his salary, and the December 2 letter advised that he was being terminated from the position of “Chief Deputy Coroner.” Finally, the Court addressed the $200,000 award of compensatory damages. The Court concluded that the award bore no rational relation to the very scant evidence of Linehan’s suffering and was excessive compared to similar cases. It offered a remittitur of $20,000 or a new hearing on damages.

Movant Failed To Establish "Excusable Neglect" In Motion For Extension Of Time

MURPHY v. EDDIE MURPHY PRODUCTIONS (July 1, 2010)]

Eddie Murphy Productions and the other defendants were involved in the creation of The PJs, an animated television show. In its three seasons on the air, the show won three Emmy Awards. Daryl Murphy (unrelated to Eddie) brought suit in 2004, asserting that the defendants used his copyrighted material for the show. The district court judge viewed videotapes of Murphy's material and The PJs and granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court concluded that the works were not substantially similar, there was evidence of prior creation, and there was no evidence of defendants' access to Murphy's material. While that decision was on appeal, Murphy filed another similar complaint. The district court promptly dismissed it. In 2008, Murphy filed a pro se pleading styled as a Rule 60 motion. Counsel for Murphy then appeared, withdrew the motion, and asked for leave to file an amended complaint. Several days after missing a second deadline, Murphy asked for another extension. Judge Darrah (N.D. Ill.) denied the request on the grounds both that he already missed two deadlines and that an amendment would be futile. Murphy appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Posner, and Evans affirmed. The Court noted the different standards governing a request for extension of time made before the deadline and one made after the deadline. The former may be granted for "good cause" while the latter should be granted only upon a showing of "excusable neglect." Here, the Court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion in finding no "excusable neglect." Both factors, prejudice to the defendant and reason for the delay, favored the defendants. The Court also concurred in the independent rationale for denial of the motion that an amendment would be futile.

Hobbs Act Jurisdictional Inquiry Takes Precedence Over Chevron Step-One Analysis

CE DESIGN v. PRISM BUSINESS MEDIA (May 27, 2010)

Prism Business Media publishes trade magazines and sponsors tradeshows. CE Design subscribes to several Prism publications. When Prism sent an unsolicited fax to CE Design in 2004, CE Design filed a putative class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The TCPA prohibits the sending of unsolicited advertisements to fax machines. Prism moved for summary judgment, arguing that an FCC implementing order allowed the sending of unsolicited advertisements to the fax machines of companies with which the sender had an "established business relationship (EBR)." Judge Pallmeyer (N.D. Ill.) granted summary judgment to Prism. CE Design appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Kanne, and Evans affirmed. The Court describes the issue before it as the classic “chicken-and-the-egg” dilemma. On the one hand, the Hobbs Act reserves to the courts of appeals the power to determine the validity of an FCC order -- and requires a petition for reconsideration with the FCC before a request for relief from a court of appeals. Here, the district court relied on the Hobbs Act and refused to consider the validity of the FCC order creating the EBR exemption. On the other hand is the familiar Chevron analysis used to review an agency's construction of a statute. In the first step of that analysis, a court determines whether the statute is silent or ambiguous on the issue which is the subject of the agency's order. Only if it is silent or ambiguous does the court examine the reasonableness of the agency action. CE Design asserts that the TCPA is unambiguous on the meaning of "unsolicited advertisement" so the court need not consider the FCC order. The Court rejected CE Design's position. An Article III court's first obligation is to ensure its jurisdiction -- before any consideration of the merits. Thus, if the Hobbs Act and the Chevron analysis were really analogous to the "chicken-and-the-egg," the Court would have to address the jurisdictional question in the Hobbs Act before engaging in the Chevron analysis. Alternatively, the Court concluded that the two approaches were not really in conflict. The result of CE Design's own Chevron argument would have been the invalidation of the FCC order by the district court -- exactly the result that the Hobbs Act prohibits. On the merits of the EBR exemption itself, the Court had no difficulty in agreeing with the district court that the exemption applied on the facts of the case.

Treatment For Heart Condition Met Pre-Existing Condition Exclusion

ESTATE OF BLANCO v. PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE CO. (May 21, 2010)

Norman Blanco was hired by Porsche Engineering Services in April of 2005. After one month of employment, he was covered by Porsche's benefit plan. The plan included both short and long term disability benefits. Blanco suffered a heart attack in July and, by the end of August, was no longer able to work. The long-term disability plan had a pre-existing condition exclusion. It precluded coverage for conditions for which the beneficiary, in the three months prior to his coverage effective date, had either a) received care or took medication or b) had symptoms for which a prudent person would have sought care. Pursuant to the pre-existing condition exclusion, Prudential denied Blanco's claim for long-term benefits. Blanco filed an ERISA suit. Judge McKinney (S.D. Ind.) granted summary judgment to Prudential.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Flaum, and Evans affirmed. Before addressing the core issue, the Court noted that a) Blanco had a long history of heart problems, including congestive heart failure (CHF), for which he was being treated and b) pre-existing condition exclusions were regularly upheld. On the merits, the Court found that he failed to qualify under either prong of the exclusion. He was taking heart medication. The fact that he was taking it for hypertension as well as CHF does not matter. Even if it did, the hypertension and CHF are related and taking medication for the hypertension would disqualify him. The Court also found that Blanco was excluded under the second prong of the policy. He had an episode of high blood pressure for which a prudent person would have sought treatment.

Seven to Ten Month Gap Between Allegedly Discriminatory Statements And An Adverse Job Action Is Too Long To Support An Inference Of Discrimination

EGONMWAN v. COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT (April 22, 2010)

Iyare Egonmwan was a black male jail guard at the Cook County Jail. In 2001, he was transferred into the women's division. The following year, the female superintendent of the division disciplined him for conduct that had occurred prior to his transfer. Several days later, Egonmwan accused the superintendent of sexual harassment. The claim was investigated and determined to be unfounded. In 2003, during a general investigation into allegations of sexual misconduct between guards and prisoners, a female detainee informed the investigators that she and at least one other prisoner had had a sexual encounter with Egonmwan. Although Egonmwan was acquitted of criminal charges in 2004, an administrative hearing board terminated his employment in January of 2005 for violation of institutional rules. Egonmwan brought suit against, among others, Cook County and the Sheriff's Department. He alleged § 1981 race discrimination and § 1983 gender and race discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Egonmwan appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Evans, and Sykes affirmed. The Court first affirmed the summary judgment on the gender discrimination claim. Egonmwan proceeded under the direct method but presented only a few isolated remarks by the women's division superintendent. The Court noted that isolated remarks may be sufficient to establish a discriminatory motive, but they must be made by the decision-maker, at the time of the decision, and regarding the decision. Here, the Court doubted (but did not decide) that the superintendent could be considered the decision-maker. It upheld the summary judgment because of the seven to ten month lag between the remarks and the action and the fact that the remarks did not refer to Egonmwan's termination. With respect to the race discrimination claim, the Court concluded that Egonmwan was unable to show that similarly situated non-blacks were treated more favorably or that the defendants' reasons for his termination were not legitimate.

De-deputization And Transfer Do Not Amount To Constructive Discharge

SWEARNIGEN-EL v. COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT (April 22, 2010)

Swearnigen-El was a black male guard in the women's division at the Cook County Jail. He had a run-in with the head of the division, who wanted the correctional staff in the women's division to be comprised totally of women. Swearnigen-El thought that belief was discriminatory and he reported his concerns to other supervisors. Shortly thereafter, Swearnigen-El found himself in trouble when a female prisoner's allegations that male guards were engaged in sexual activity with female prisoners launched an investigation. The Sheriff's Police conducted the initial investigation, followed by an investigation by the State's Attorney’s office. Several prisoners reported that Swearnigen-El was having sex with a female prisoner. The prisoner herself admitted the activity. Swearnigen-El was de-deputized and transferred for violating a General Order that forbids "activities unbecoming" an employee. He was later charged with sexual misconduct and suspended with pay. Before he had a termination hearing with the merit board, Swearnigen-El resigned. After he was acquitted of the criminal charges, he filed a complaint alleging gender discrimination, race discrimination, Title VII retaliation, First Amendment retaliation, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed the Title VII retaliation claim and granted summary judgment to the defendants on all other claims. Swearnigen-El appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Wood, Evans, and Sykes affirmed. The Court first upheld summary judgment on all gender and race discrimination claims because there was no adverse employment action. Swearnigen-El was de-deputized and transferred after a internal investigation demonstrated evidence of misconduct. His pay was not affected and there was no evidence that the conditions were intolerable. The Court concluded that no reasonable jury could find a constructive discharge under those circumstances. Alternatively, the Court found that Swearnigen-El a) failed to establish sufficient evidence of race or gender discrimination to create a triable issue, and b) was not meeting his legitimate job expectations. Next, the Court considered the First Amendment retaliation claim. The principal speech at issue was Swearnigen-El's disagreement with his superior regarding the staffing of the women's division and his subsequent complaints to other officials that her actions constituted discrimination. The Court concluded that the speech was not protected -- Swearnigen-El was speaking not "as a citizen" but as a public employee under Garcetti. Again, the Court came to the alternative conclusion that no reasonable juror could find the defendants' actions pretextual. On the claim of malicious prosecution, the Court found sufficient evidence of misconduct after the investigation to establish probable cause. Since the absence of probable cause is an element of a malicious prosecution claim, Swearnigen-El's claim must fail. Finally, the Court agreed that there was no "outrageous" conduct that would amount to an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and upheld the district court's dismissal of the Title VII retaliation claim on the ground that Swearnigen-El failed to include it in his EEOC charge.

Appellant's Failure To Respond To Alternative Basis To Uphold The Judgment Results In Forfeiture

TRUHLAR v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE (April 12, 2010)

Kenneth Truhlar was injured while working as a letter carrier for the United States Postal Service. He was required to periodically submit a form to the Department of Labor (DOL) in order to collect his partial disability payments. On the forms, he reported that he had no other job during the period for which he was claiming disability. In fact, Truhlar was a bass guitarist in a rock band and earned several thousand dollars during the period in question. The Service suspended him -- his union filed a grievance and, when it was denied, appealed. After the Service completed its investigation and concluded that Truhlar violated several rules, it notified Truhlar of its decision to terminate his employment. Again, the union grieved -- again, it appealed the denial of the grievance. Meanwhile, the DOL sought repayment of the benefits he had already received and a federal prosecutor considered criminal charges. The union and the Service agreed to a stay of the grievances pending the disposition of those actions. Truhlar appealed the DOL forfeiture order. The prosecutor decided not to prosecute. When a newly appointed postmaster inquired into the status of the pending grievances, she was provided with the Service's and the Department's reports concluding that Truhlar had knowingly failed to report outside income. She was also told, though incorrectly, that Truhlar had not appealed the forfeiture order. The postmaster met with the union representative and passed that accurate information to him. Based on the internal investigation, the Department's investigation, the prosecutor's rationale for declining to prosecute, and his belief that the DOL proceedings were complete, the union representative decided to withdraw the grievances. The Service terminated Truhlar's employment. A few months later, the Department's forfeiture order was reversed. The Appeals Board decided that the form did not put Truhlar on notice that he had to report his bass guitarist earnings. Truhlar filed suit under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. He alleged that the Service violated the collective bargaining agreement by terminating him without cause and alleged that the union breached its duty of fair representation by not pursuing the grievances. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. Truhlar appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Manion and Evans affirmed. In a § 301 "hybrid" action, a plaintiff must prevail on both his claims against his employer and his union. Here, the district court concluded that the Service did not violate the collective bargaining agreement. Since that conclusion was enough to grant summary judgment to the Service, the district court did not address Truhlar's claim against the union. On appeal, the union renewed its argument that it did not breach its duty of fair representation. Truhlar never responded to that argument, explaining at oral argument that he did not think he was required to address a position he had not lost below. The Court explained that an appellee may defend the district court's judgment on any ground raised below. The Court concluded that Truhlar had therefore forfeited any opposition to the union's position on fair representation. Notwithstanding that conclusion, the Court reviewed Truhlar's district court submissions on the topic and concluded that Truhlar would lose on the merits as well. Truhlar's burden was to show that the union's actions were arbitrary and discriminatory or in bad faith. The Court noted that the union representative met with the postmaster, reviewed the internal investigation, reviewed the Department's report and decision, and considered the actions of the prosecutor before reaching his decision to withdraw the grievances. Far from arbitrary, the Court considered the representative's decision rational.

Court Upholds Multimillion Dollar False Arrest And Malicious Prosecution Verdict -- But Reverses Substantive Due Process Verdict

FOX v. HAYES (April 7, 2010)

Kevin and Melissa Fox and their children, six-year-old Tyler and three-year-old Riley, lived in a small town in Will County, Illinois, about 60 miles from Chicago. On June 6, 2004, Tyler woke his father up at about 8:00 a.m. and told him Riley was missing -- Melissa had spent the night in Chicago. Riley's lifeless body was found in a nearby forest preserve several hours later. Although the parties’ versions of the investigation vary wildly, the jury could have found the following. Will County detectives, including Scott Swearengen, conducted the investigation. At some point, Swearengen began to suspect Kevin. On October 26, the Foxes were asked to come to the station to talk about the case. Although they thought they were about to receive new information about the murder, they were mistaken. They were immediately separated. Melissa was locked in a waiting area and told that an officer would be with her shortly. Instead, she was left alone for almost 4 hours. Meanwhile, Kevin was taken to an interrogation room where Swearengen accused him of killing Riley. The officers falsely told Kevin that they had fiber evidence implicating him and a surveillance tape showing him driving his SUV during the night. Kevin took a polygraph examination, which the officers told him that he failed. When Melissa offered her love and support to Kevin, Detective Hayes started screaming. He screamed at his fellow officers to remove Melissa from the room, he screamed at Kevin that he was a "f***ing murderer," and he screamed at Melissa. Continuing to use a lot of profanity, he screamed at Melissa that Kevin was a liar and a murderer, that he never loved her, that he killed her daughter, and that she had to "get over it." After that episode, the detectives continued the interrogation of Kevin. Hayes told Kevin that if he did not confess, he would make sure that Kevin was raped every day he was in prison. At one point, Swearengen told Kevin that the state's attorney would give him a deal if he admitted that he accidentally killed his daughter. He told him he would be out on bond the very next day and wood only have to serve 3-5 years in prison. Kevin decided to go along with the story and "confessed." He immediately renounced the confession the next morning when he was allowed to meet with a lawyer. Months later, his defense team had the DNA evidence tested. The test results showed conclusively that the DNA found on Riley's body did not come from Kevin. Kevin was released the next day, after 243 days in jail. Kevin and Melissa brought suit under both § 1983 and Illinois law against several Will County detectives. Kevin's allegations included due process violations, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and punitive damages. Melissa's claims include loss of consortium, IIED, and punitive damages. After a six-week trial, a jury awarded Kevin $9.3 million and Melissa $6.2 million. The trial judge struck some of the punitive damage award and dismissed the case against a detective whose estate had settled. The end result was an award of $12.2 million. The detectives appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Evans, and Williams affirmed in part and reversed in vacated in part. The central issue on appeal is defendants' argument that they had probable cause to arrest Kevin and are therefore entitled to qualified immunity on all the counts except the IIED claim. In order to resolve that issue, the Court had to identify the earliest time that the jury could have found Kevin to be under arrest and then assess whether a reasonable jury could have found that the defendants lacked probable cause to arrest Kevin at that time. On the first question, the Court had little difficulty identifying a time early in the interrogation when Kevin tried to leave the room and was told to sit down. The fact that he did not specifically ask to leave is only one factor in the analysis. Here the other factors --whether he knew he was a suspect of a crime, whether his movement was limited, whether the officers were engaged in a course of conduct, and whether he was in a private location -- all support a conclusion that he was under arrest. With respect to the second issue, the Court examined the long list of facts that the defendants argued supported probable cause. After it eliminated from the list facts that were disputed, irrelevant, or mischaracterized, the Court concluded that a reasonable jury could have concluded that they fell short of probable cause. On the merits of the defendants' argument that the substantive due process claim could not stand, the Court agreed with the defendants. It is well settled that a substantive due process claim cannot prevail where state law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. The state law false arrest and malicious prosecution claims do exactly that here -- the jury verdict on the due process claim must be set aside. The Court next upheld the verdict on Melissa's IIED claim. Although it agreed that the evidence of Melissa's distress was weak, it concluded that Hayes' abuse of authority in a particularly emotional environment was enough to uphold the claim. Finally, the Court addressed certain damage awards. Although it upheld a $2.7 million award for Melissa's loss of consortium because it found a rational connection between the award and the evidence, it concluded that the $1 million award on the IIED claim was excessive because there it lacked such a connection. The Court also concluded that the $1.6 million false arrest award to Kevin was not supported by the evidence since the false arrest award only covered the period of time between his arrest and the first issuance of process (36 hours). Instead of a new trial, however, the Court ordered a remittitur to $150,000 on Melissa's IIED claim and $16,000 on Kevin's false arrest claim.

Drug Manufacturer Fails To Meet The Levine "Clear Evidence" Preemption Test

MASON v. SMITHKLINE BEECHAM (February 23, 2010)

Two days after twenty-three year old Tricia Mason began taking an antidepressant drug manufactured by defendant, she committed suicide. Mason's parents sued the manufacturer, alleging that it was negligent for not warning of an increased suicide risk. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding that the claims were preempted by federal law. The Masons appeal.

In their opinion, Circuit Judges Evans and Sykes and District Judge Simon reversed and remanded. The Court noted that conflict preemption was the type of preemption at issue in the case. The Supreme Court addressed conflict preemption in Levine, which was decided a year after the district court granted summary judgment. In Levine, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that state law failure-to-warn claims were generally preempted as a result of the FDA's drug labeling responsibilities. The Supreme Court stated that preemption could exist if a drug manufacturer presented "clear evidence" that the FDA would have rejected the proposed warning in the label but held that preemption did not exist in Levine. Since the Supreme Court did not clarify what it meant by "clear evidence," the Court simply compared the administrative history of the defendant's drug with the drug at issue in Levine. After that comparison, the Court concluded that the defendant had not met the burden established by Levine.

Plan Administrator's Interpretation That Contravenes Plain Language Of Plan Is Arbitrary And Capricious

GREEN v. THE UPS HEALTH AND WELFARE PACKAGE (February 10, 2010)

UPS negotiates collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) covering its employees who are members of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (“IBT”). It actually negotiates with the international union and also directly and separately negotiates with some large locals, including Local 705. Under the 2002-2008 CBA with Local 705, UPS agreed to provide health care to Local 705 retirees. The benefit was outlined in the Summary Plan Description (SPD), which applied to all IBT retirees. The SPD set a monthly contribution for each retiree and provided that, if the cost of coverage exceeded a certain threshold, each retiree would share in the excess cost “by making an additional contribution.” It also stated that additional contributions would not be implemented until after the “current” CBA expired. The cost threshold was exceeded in 2006. In October 2007, UPS issued a Summary of Material Modification (SMM) advising all IBT retirees of that fact and imposing an additional contribution for each retiree effective January 1, 2008. Before implementing the additional contribution, however, UPS agreed with both the international and local unions to delay implementation until their respective CBAs expired. UPS sent a revised SMM to Local 705 retirees in December 2007 advising that increased contributions “well be effective” after the expiration of the “current” CBA. After the Local 705 CBA expired in mid-2008, UPS notified Local 705 retirees that it would implement an additional contribution effective February 2009. Local 705 retirees brought a class action, alleging that the collection of additional contributions violated the Plan and ERISA because a) the retirees were not sharing equally since the international retirees were not yet contributing, and b) the SPD stated that contributions would not be implemented until the expiration of the “current” plan and the Local 705 current plan now expired in 2013. The district court agreed with Local 705 on the first argument but agreed with the Plan on the second – and enjoined further collection of contributions until further order of the court. The retirees and the Plan appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Wood, and Evans affirmed. The Court agreed with the district court that the collection of contributions from Local 705 retirees only controverted the plain language of the Plan and was, therefore, arbitrary and capricious. The Court rejected UPS’ contrary interpretation of the “share equally” language and rejected its plea to consider extrinsic evidence under the doctrine of extrinsic ambiguity. Although the Court was more receptive to the use of the extrinsic ambiguity doctrine with respect to the meaning of “current” in the SPD, it concluded that it need not. Instead, it held that the December 2007 revised SMM modified the SPD and made it clear that the “current” CBA referred to was the 2002 CBA.

CAFA's Home-State Exception Requires Evidence, Not Intuition

IN RE: SPRINT NEXTEL (January 28, 2010)

Sprint Nextel, a Kansas corporation, was sued in Kansas state court for allegedly conspiring with its competitors to impose artificially high prices for text messaging. The suit was brought as a class action on behalf of "all Kansas residents" who purchased the relevant services from Sprint Nextel or any of its competitors and a) who had a Kansas cell phone number and b) who received their cell phone bill at a Kansas address. Sprint Nextel removed the case to federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The district court remanded the case to the Kansas state court under CAFA's home-state exception. Sprint Nextel petitioned for leave to appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Evans, and Sykes granted the petition to appeal, vacated the order, and remanded. Under the home-state exception in CAFA, a district court must decline jurisdiction if both the defendant and two-thirds of the proposed class members "in the aggregate" are citizens of the state in which the action was originally filed. The Court first addressed Sprint Nextel’s argument that the "in the aggregate" language meant that two-thirds of proposed class members in this suit and in suits with similar allegations (of which there are many) must be Kansas citizens. Relying on the inclusion of identical language in a separate section under which Sprint Nextel's argument makes no sense, the Court joined the First Circuit in rejecting that interpretation. Instead, the Court concluded, the language simply refers to the possibility of multiple subclasses. The Court next reviewed the district court's conclusion that the plaintiffs' careful definition of the class left "little doubt" that two-thirds of the class members were Kansas citizens. The Court noted the plaintiffs had the burden to establish they were entitled to remand under the home-state exception. Yet they actually presented no evidence. The Court agreed with the district court’s “sensible guesswork” in concluding that the class met the two-thirds threshold through the use of Kansas cell phone numbers and mailing addresses in the definition of the class. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that it should not draw such conclusions without actual evidence and vacated the order of remand. It suggested the plaintiffs could present statistical evidence based on a representative sampling of potential class members or it could even limit the class to Kansas citizens (instead of residents) by definition.

No Evidence Supports Employee's Pretext Argument

SENSKE v. SYBASE, INC. (December 3, 2009)

Robert Senske joined Sybase as a Strategic Account Manager in 2002. He was 55 years old at the time. For two years, Senske's performance was marginal at best in most areas. He did outperform his financial goal in 2004, but only because he got partial credit for two large deals on which he had little input or contribution. He was particularly criticized for excessive tardiness and incomplete paperwork completion. In early 2005, he was put on a performance improvement plan. He was told to improve his business skills, to be more responsive, and to complete his paperwork in a timely manner. Instead of showing improvement, Senske's performance deteriorated during the performance improvement period -- and he was fired. Senske sued Sybase under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, alleging that he was fired as a result of his age. The district court granted summary judgment to Sybase. Senske appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Kanne and Evans affirmed. Instead of enumerating the elements of a prima facie case under the indirect method, the Court proceeded directly to address the question of pretext. If Senske is unable to show that Sybase's stated reasons for his termination are pretextual, he also would not be able to establish that he was meeting his employer's legitimate expectations. The Court reviewed, in some detail, the evidence in the record of Senske's history of performance and Sybase's stated reasons for his termination. The Court concluded that Senske failed to present any evidence that the reasons given by Sybase for his termination were not sincere.

Voter Registration Form Is Not A Motor Vehicle Record Under The Driver's Privacy Protection Act

LAKE v. NEAL (November 6, 2009)

Joseph Lake applied for a drivers license with the Illinois Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”). The National Voter Registration Act permits a citizen to register to vote at the same time he or she applies for a driver’s license -- so Lake filled out a voter registration form. After he allegedly learned that someone acquired his personal information from the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners, Lake filed suit. He alleges that the Board violated the Driver's Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”) when it disclosed his personal information. The district court granted a motion to dismiss. Lake appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Bauer and Evans affirmed. The DPPA does provide a private cause of action against one who discloses information "from a motor vehicle record." The statute defines "motor vehicle record" as any record that pertains to any one of several documents issued by the DMV. The Court concluded that the voter registration form does not pertain, in the common sense of that word, to any document issued by the DMV. Although it can be filled out as part of the same process, it is not a part of and has nothing to do with any DMV documents. Since it is not a “motor vehicle record,” there is no cause of action for the wrongful disclosure of information contained therein.

Unambiguous Contract Terms Are Enforced As Written

LEWITTON v. ITA SOFTWARE (October 28, 2009)

ITA Software offers information technology and services to online travel agents. ITA began the development of a new product that would allow the agents to make reservations and purchase airline tickets online. Derrick Lewitton joined the organization in 2005 to supervise the development and marketing of the new product. In his employment contract, ITA granted Lewitton options to purchase up to 200,000 shares of ITA stock. Up to 150,000 of the options could be forfeited, however, based on a formula that was to be applied during an assessment period after product rollout. The assessment period was scheduled to run from mid-2006 through May 2007, but was to be deferred if the rollout of the new product was delayed. The product development turned into a failure and was scaled back considerably. In fact, it was never rolled out. Lewitton left ITA in mid-2007. Shortly thereafter, he sought to exercise the full amount of his vested options. ITA took the position that most of the options were forfeited as a result of the product failure. Lewitton brought an action for the options. The court granted summary judgment to Lewitton. ITA appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Kanne and Evans affirmed. The Court stated that its primary goal was to give effect to the terms of the agreement. If it is unambiguous, the Court noted that it would enforce it as written. The Court agreed with the district court that the "deferred" term in the contract was unambiguous. Since it is not a technical term, it should be given its ordinary meaning -- significantly delayed. The Court found no dispute that the program had been delayed. In fact, the rollout of the new product had never occurred. Under the unambiguous terms of the contract, the assessment period never occurred and the forfeiture provision was never triggered. The Court rejected ITA's position that such a conclusion ignored the principal objective of the contract -- that Lewitton would be rewarded with options if he generated significant revenue. ITA's position relied on extrinsic evidence, which the Court would not allow given the unambiguous nature of the contract.

Officer's Sworn Statement Of His Inability To Perform His Job During Pension Hearing Dooms His ADA Claim

BUTLER v. ROUND LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT (October 27, 2009)

Patrick Butler was a sergeant on the police force of a small community north of Chicago. Beginning in 2003, Butler's health began to deteriorate rapidly. He experienced fatigue, night blindness and trouble breathing. In May of 2004, he was diagnosed with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. After a short time off, his physician permitted him to return to the force on "light duty." Because of the size of the force and the number of sergeants, no light duty assignment was available. The village advised Butler that he could return to work only when he had clearance to work any possible assignment. Shortly thereafter, Butler applied for a disability pension. He testified at his pension hearing that his physical condition prevented him from performing the required duties of his job. Three physicians also completed certificates of disability for Butler. The pension board found him disabled and awarded him disability benefits. He then brought suit against the village under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment to Round Lake.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Manion and Evans affirmed. In order to succeed on an ADA claim, the Court stated that one must show that he can "perform the essential functions" of his job. Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel, a party cannot prevail in one proceeding and then deny the very ground on which he prevailed in a subsequent proceeding. Here, Butler's sworn testimony that his physical condition prevented him from performing his job would appear to negate an element of his ADA claim. Although the Court noted that a disability pension claim (based on one's inability to perform one's job) and an ADA claim (based on one's ability, at least with accommodation, to perform one's job) are not necessarily mutually exclusive, they do require a satisfactory explanation of their consistency. For example, the passage of time or a change in one's disability can render seemingly inconsistent positions consistent. Here, however, Butler offered no explanation -- his ADA claim must fail.

Even Assuming A Prejudicial Supervisor, Two Layers Of Bias-Free Analysis Defeats Plaintiff's "Cats-Paw" Theory Of Age Discrimination

MARTINO v. MCI COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, INC. (July 28, 2009)

MCI hired Guy Martino in 2005 at the age of 54. He was hired as a business solutions consultant and provided support to the company's sales force. Although he was not directly responsible for sales, he did receive commissions on the sales to which he was assigned. Martino was assigned to and received commissions for one blockbuster deal in mid-2005. Other than that one deal, however, Martino's performance was generally lacking. In fact, even the lead salesman on the large deal was quite critical of his individual contribution. MCI merged with Verizon in early 2006. As a result, Steve Rumstein, his group head, was asked to come up with a list of individuals least likely to be strong contributors in the future. Rumstein identified six employees, including Martino. He based his selection on geography, ability, credibility with sales staff and sales performance. With respect to ability, Rumstein focused on a new service being offered by Verizon with which Martino was not well-versed. The five employees on the list other than Martino ranged in age from 33 to 45. Rumstein submitted the list to Ed Franklin, his superior. Franklin decided to fire Martino for all the same reasons that led to his inclusion on the list. Martino brought an action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court granted summary judgment to MCI. Martino appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Cudahy, Evans and Tinder affirmed. The Court noted that the sole evidence of age discrimination was Martino's allegations that his direct supervisor, Bob Gross, sometimes use "old-timer" to describe him. Under the direct method of proof, Martino relied on the cat's paw theory since Gross was not the decision maker. The Court rejected the theory: there was weak evidence of discriminatory intent to begin with, there were two layers of bias-free decisions, and Rumstein and Franklin both considered a host of legitimate factors. The Court concluded that Martino did not come close to the "singular influence" standard necessary to establish a cat's-paw case. With respect to the indirect method, the Court concluded that Martino failed with respect to two of the elements: that he met the company's performance expectations and that the company treated similarly situated employees under 40 more favorably. First, the record was replete with evidence of Martino's performance limitations. Second, a number of younger employees were let go along with Martino. Although the company did keep several employees under 40, the Court had no trouble concluding that they were not similarly situated.

An Attorneys' Fee Award Should Not Be Reduced Just Because The Plaintiff's Recovery Is Small Compared To The Amount Requested, As Long As The Recovery Is Not Nominal

ESTATE OF ANGELA ENOCH v. TIENOR (June 29, 2009)

Angela Enoch committed suicide while a prisoner in a Wisconsin state prison. Her estate brought a lawsuit alleging violations of her rights. The plaintiffs accepted the defendants' $635,000 offer of judgment. The offer of judgment did not include attorneys’ fees. On the plaintiffs' request for fees in excess of $300,000, the court awarded only $100,000. The court's rationale was that the plaintiffs recovered only a small fraction of the $10 million sought in their complaint. The Estate appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Bauer and Evans reversed and remanded. The Court held that the lower court erred in relying on the Supreme Court’s Farrar decision. Farrar deals with fee awards for plaintiffs who prevail but receive only nominal damages (Farrar asked for $17 million and received $1). Here, although the Court believed the $10 million sought was absurdly high, it concluded that a recovery of $635,000 in prison litigation is significant. A fee award need not be proportional to the recovery or to the amount recovered versus the amount requested. The Court remanded for a recalculation of the award using the lodestar as a starting point and also considering the result obtained, any claims on which plaintiffs did not prevail, the adequacy of the documentation, and any social benefits obtained.

Without Evidence Of Pretext, Employer's Firing Is Non-Discriminatory When Employee Admits To The Conduct At Issue

FARR v. ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CENTERS (June 29, 2009)

David Farr was a respiratory therapist at St. Francis Hospital. In 2000, he was the only male among the seven respiratory therapists in his department. There was a single computer in the department for the use of all the therapists. Although the hospital policy was for each therapist to log on with a unique password before each use, the practice was quite different. Typically, the first user of the day logged on with his or her password and all later users piggybacked on that login. When one of the therapists discovered inappropriate material on the computer, the hospital conducted an investigation. It found that: a) pornographic and hacking sites were accessed at the computer, b) Farr was logged on to the computer at the time the sites were accessed, and c) that Farr was the only one working on one particular day when a substantial amount of the activity took place. Farr eventually admitted that he was responsible for visiting some of the sites and that the others may have been generated by a computer virus during his use of the computer. The hospital terminated Farr's employment. Farr sued the hospital, alleging gender discrimination and a breach of implied covenant of fair dealing based on the employee handbook. The court granted summary judgment to the hospital. Farr appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Bauer and Evans affirmed. Although Farr asserted that he could prove his claim by both the direct and indirect methods, the Court disagreed. Neither test resulted in a conclusion that Farr was the victim of gender discrimination. In fact, the Court stated, the hospital's investigation convinced it that he was the one responsible. He even admitted he accessed the inappropriate sites. Nothing in the record showed that the hospital's reasons were pretextual. The Court also affirmed with respect to the state law claims. Farr's covenant of fair dealing claim is inconsistent with Indiana law. His defamation claim fails because the hospital's report was privileged, in that it was used during the grievance proceedings that he himself initiated. 

"Tax Shelter" Exception To The Tax Practitioner- Client Privilege Is Broad Enough To Encompass Any Plan Who Significant Purpose Is To Avoid Taxes

VALERO ENERGY CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (June 17, 2009)

Valero Energy Corp., a large U.S. refiner, acquired Ultramar Diamond Shamrock Corporation ("UDS”) in 2001. Prior to the transaction, Valero received relevant tax advice from Arthur Andersen. With Arthur Andersen's help, Valero initiated a complex set of transactions that resulted in tax deductible losses in excess of $100 million. The size of the deduction caught the eye of the IRS, which issued a summons to Arthur Andersen seeking documents relating to its tax analysis for Valero or UDS. Valero moved to quash the summons, in part based on the tax practitioner-client privilege. The government argued that the tax practitioner-client privilege did not apply because of the statutory exception for documents made in connection with the promotion of a tax shelter. The district court originally upheld Valero’s claim of privilege, concluding that the government failed to meet its burden. On a second round of document production, however, the government again challenged the privilege and supported its challenge with a detailed affidavit. This time the district court concluded the government met its burden with respect to some documents and ordered them produced. Valero appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Rovner, Evans and Tinder affirmed. The Court noted that Congress created the tax practitioner-client privilege in 1998 as a limited shield of confidentiality. It is no broader than the attorney-client privilege and does not protect general accounting advice, even if provided by an attorney. The Court first rejected Valero’s arguments that the bulk of the documents were even covered by the privilege. Although some of the documents contained legal analysis, the Court concluded they were not privileged because they contained the type of information generally collected in the process of preparing a return. With respect to the small group of documents that the district court found were protected, the Court agreed with the government that they fell within the exception for communications in connection with the promotion of a tax shelter. Under the statute, a "tax shelter" includes any plan or arrangement a "significant purpose" of which is the avoidance of income tax. Because the privilege is an exception to the broad summons power of the IRS, the Court declined to broaden the privilege through a narrow interpretation of the exception. Given that the Valero documents addressed the structure of the transactions that resulted in a large tax deduction, the Court concluded that they fit within the exception and were not covered by the privilege.

Federal Court Has No Jurisdiction Of Suit Against State College Officials For Wrongfully Withholding Degree

TURPIN v. KOROPCHAK (June 5, 2009)

Christi Turpin thought she obtained a Ph.D. from Southern Illinois University. She completed all her coursework and she wrote and defended her thesis. She alleges that each member of her dissertation committee approved the defense of her thesis. Years later, she learned that the school had not recorded her degree. When she made inquiry, several members of the committee allegedly denied that they approved the thesis. Turpin brought suit against the thesis committee members for specific performance to confer her degree and damages. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It held that the suit was actually against the State of Illinois and belonged in the Court of Claims. Turpin appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Evans and Dow affirmed. Sovereign immunity, stated the Court, precludes federal jurisdiction of the action if the allegations of misconduct arise out of a breach of a duty imposed on the defendant solely because of his or her state employment. Here, the only duties of the defendants with respect to Turpin's degree arise out of their employment by the state university. The case belongs in a Court of Claims.

A Valid Warrant To Search A Single-Family Residence Does Not Support The Continued Execution Of The Search Once The Officers Are Aware That The Building Is A Multiple-Unit Building

GUZMAN v. CITY OF CHICAGO (May 13, 2009)

Sgt. Bonnstetter of the Chicago Police Department met with an ex-convict who wanted to share information regarding gang activity with the police. The informant provided valuable information and identified pictures of known gang members. He specifically advised Sergeant Bonnstetter that he was aware of the location of gang member Ruben Estrada. He told Bonnstetter that Estrada lived with his family in a single-family residence at an address on the west side of Chicago. He advised that he had seen Estrada at the residence with a handgun. He even drove by the house with an FBI agent and confirmed the location. Although there was a small sign in the front window, the agent assumed that it was a single family residence. Based on this information, Bonnstetter obtain an affidavit to search the premises and Estrada's person. When the officers arrived to execute the search warrant, they realized there was a separate door leading to a business and another door leading to a stairway to the second floor. At some point, it became clear that the building contained a first floor office, a first floor apartment, and a second floor apartment. The officers broke into the second-floor apartment and encountered Maira Guzman. With guns drawn, the officers searched the apartment -- but found nothing. Guzman brought a lawsuit against the City and several officers under 42 U.S.C § 1983, alleging that the search was unreasonable and a violation of her constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the City. Guzman appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Rovner and Evans reversed and remanded. The Court identified the two different ways of evaluating an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment. A court must look at both the issuance of a warrant and the execution of the warrant. Here, with respect to its issuance, the Court determined that there was sufficient indicia of reliability with respect to the informant to support probable cause. The informant provided information known to the police and identified a number of known gang members. With respect to the execution of the warrant, however, the Court disagreed with the district court. The Court specifically noted the "not uncommon" problems that arise with multiple living units. In executing the warrant in this case, the Court concluded that the officers were aware early in their search that the building was not a single-family residence, as expected and as described in the warrant. The proper course at that stage was to have called off the search. By continuing the execution of the warrant, the police violated Guzman's constitutional rights.

Judge Rovner wrote separately and concurred in the holding and reasoning. She did not join in that part of Judge Evans’ opinion in which, in dicta, he discussed Fourth Amendment rights in the context of civil actions as opposed to criminal suppression motions.

Evidence Of Retaliatory Motive Was Not Overwhelming But Was Sufficient To Affirm A Jury Award For FMLA Retaliation And Interference

RYL-KUCHAR v. CARE CENTERS, INC.(May 11, 2009)

Kathleen Ryl-Kuchar began working as a dishwasher at Care Centers, Inc. (“CCI”) at the age of 15. Seventeen years later, she held the salaried position of dietary consultant. Ryl-Kuchar became pregnant with triplets in 2002. She continued working on site until May of 2003, at which time she began working from home. She performed her normal duties with the blessing of CCI management, although her total hours dropped below 35 hours a week. With the help of her family, Ryl-Kuchar returned to work full-time shortly after she gave birth. Her return was short-lived, however. She soon commenced FMLA leave and never returned, deciding instead to resign. In mid-November, CCI’s employee benefits arm determined that Ryl-Kuchar had become a part-time employee in June and had therefore lost her eligibility for medical benefits. It retroactively canceled her health insurance effective the month before she delivered the triplets. Ryl-Kuchar brought an action under the FMLA, arguing that CCI interfered with her right to health insurance and retaliated against her for her decision to take FMLA leave. The jury awarded her damages. CCI appeals from the district court's denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Evans and Williams affirmed. The Court noted the heavy burden necessary to overturn a jury verdict. It reviewed the evidence – CCI’s inconsistent positions, the timing of its decision, and its concern about rising health care costs -- and found it sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that Ryl-Kuchar met her burden of proof on both the retaliation and interference claims. The Court remanded for calculation of a fee award.

Although Not Unanimous Or Conclusive, Several Professional Opinions and Significant Evidence Supporting A Plan Administrator's Decision To Terminate Benefits Is Adequate Support To Affirm

JENKINS v. PRICE WATERHOUSE LONG TERM DISABILITY PLAN (May 4, 2009)

Charles Jenkins went to work for PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP ("PwC") in 1989. He started experiencing health problems related to HIV in 1993. He suffered from fatigue, nerve damage, decreased sensation, dexterity limitations, and infections. By the end of 1993, he was no longer able to work. He filed a claim under PwC’s long-term disability plan. The plan administrator agreed that he met the definition of "total disability" and paid him benefits from 1994 until 2006. Beginning in 2004, the plan administrator began to review Jenkins' file. After two medical record reviews and an independent medical examination, the plan administrator terminated Jenkins' benefits. The more recent reviews concluded that Jenkins' condition was fairly stable and that he may be capable of performing some jobs. In fact, a rehabilitation specialist identified certain specific positions that fit within Jenkins’ limitations. Jenkins' treating physician disagreed with the conclusion and maintained that he was unable to work. After an unsuccessful internal appeal, Jenkins brought an action under ERISA. The district court granted summary judgment to the plan. Jenkins appeals.

In their opinion, Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judges Kanne and Evans affirmed. The Court noted that its review is highly deferential and looks only for "rational support" in the record. The Court found that support. Admittedly, the opinion was not unanimous, the evidence was not conclusive, and the result was not required. However, four medical professionals and significant medical evidence supported the plan's determination. That support was enough to affirm the judgment for the plan.

Pension Fund Violated Automatic Stay When It Withheld Benefits Of Debtor To Apply Them To Unpaid Default Judgment Against Debtor

IN RE: RADCLIFFE (April 23, 2009)

Barry Radcliffe owned Glass Service, Inc. The company made pension contributions as part of a labor agreement. When the company became delinquent, Radcliffe provided his personal guarantee. When he failed to perform on his guarantee, the pension fund sued and obtained a default judgment. Radcliffe requested his own pension benefits from the fund and, shortly thereafter, declared bankruptcy. The fund refused to turn over his benefits. Instead, they said they would apply the money to the default judgment. Radcliffe filed an adversary action in the bankruptcy court. The court ordered the fund to pay damages, interest, punitive damages and attorney's fees. The district court affirmed. The pension fund appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Rovner and Evans affirmed. The first issue the Court addressed was whether the fund violated the automatic stay. The automatic stay takes effect immediately upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition and prevents creditors from taking any action to collect on a debt. The Court agreed with the district court that the fund’s refusal to pay the benefits violated the automatic stay. The Court also agreed that the fund’s conduct was intentional, taken with full knowledge of the existence of the bankruptcy proceeding, a requirement for punitive damages. The next issue was whether the court should have lifted the stay. One of ERISA's goals is to safeguard pension benefits. One way in which it does that is to prevent benefits from being assigned or alienated. As such, Radcliffe's pension benefits never became part of the bankruptcy estate. The Court found no abuse of discretion in the lower court’s refusal to lift the stay.

In The "Unique Circumstances" Of The Case, Court Approves Release In Bankruptcy In Favor Of Non-Debtor From Claim By Non-Creditor

IN RE: INGERSOLL, INC. (April 15, 2009)

Winthrop Ingersoll founded the Ingersoll Cutting Tool Company (ICTC) in the late 1800s. It remained a family- owned leader in its industry through the year 2000. In 2001, Iscar, Ltd. acquired ICTC. The then-owners and descendents of Winthrop Ingersoll, the Gaylords, alleged that they never intended to sell but were duped into it by outside directors. They contacted attorney Marshall Miller to assist them in blocking the sale. He agreed to do so and enlisted the help of David Margules. The Gaylords reached an agreement to pay Miller and Margules $100,000 for the representation. The litigation proceeded apace. Miller soon asked for an retainer increase to $250,000. The litigation was unsuccessful, the sale was consummated and the Gaylords paid the $250,000. Then things got interesting: a) the attorneys sent invoices totaling $390,000, b) Miller and the Gaylord's submitted their fee dispute to arbitration, c) the arbitrator apparently ruled that the Gaylords did not owe any more to Miller and didn't decide whether they owed anything to Margules, d) the D. C. Superior Court ordered the Gaylords to pay an additional $83,000 to Miller (which they did), and e) Margules brought an action in Delaware to recover the $60,000 he claimed he was owed, which was denied. In the meantime ICTC's parent, Ingersoll International Inc., petitioned for bankruptcy. Although the Gaylords were not debtors in that case, the bankruptcy court confirmed a liquidation plan that released the Gaylords from claims "arising from" or "relating to" their original case to enjoin the sale of the company. The Gaylords sought relief in the bankruptcy court from another claim filed in the D. C. Superior Court by Miller. Although recognizing that the Gaylords were not debtors and that Miller was not a creditor, the bankruptcy court held that the release was valid because it was key to the ultimate negotiation and success of the plan. The district court, after a remand for clarification, affirmed the bankruptcy court. Miller appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Evans and Williams affirmed. First, the Court agreed with the lower court that the release was broad enough to cover Miller's claim. Since the claim related to a breach of the arbitration award, which arose out of a fee dispute in the identified litigation, the Court concluded that it was clearly covered. As for the validity of the release, the Court noted that releases of non-debtors should rarely be approved. Here, however, the release was narrowly tailored, only covered claims relating to two cases, and was, according to the bankruptcy court, essential to the success of the plan. Although the Court approved the use and validity of the release in this case, it warned that releases like it will usually not pass muster.

Employer Is Not Liable For Retaliation Under The "Cat's Paw" Theory Unless The Decisionmaker Is Wholly Dependent On A Non-Decisionmaker

STAUB v. PROCTOR HOSPITAL (March 25, 2009)

Vincent Staub was a technologist at Proctor Hospital - and also a member of the Army reserves. Although he managed to balance the two obligations for years, things began to deteriorate in 2000. One of his supervisors was clearly irritated with him because of his reserve obligations. She was very vocal about her dislike of the reserve and her desire to “ get rid of him." Staub, unfortunately, already had a checkered employment history at the hospital. In January 2004, she gave Staub a written warning. She accused him of failing to assist other members of the hospital staff and of leaving his work area. As a result, Staub was instructed to keep his supervisors advised of his whereabouts and schedule at all times. A few months later, a similar incident occurred. Staub was fired immediately by the Vice President of Human Resources. She fired Staub for not only failing to follow the earlier warning, but also for his past issues. Although Staub filed a grievance insisting that the original incident was fabricated by his colleague who did not like him, the HR VP did not investigate. Staub filed an action against the hospital under the Uniformed Services Employment and the Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). The jury found for Staub and awarded damages. The district court denied Proctor’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. Proctor appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Evans and Tinder reversed and remanded. The Court stated that USERRA prohibits adverse action based on military status. In order to recover, however, a plaintiff must show that the decision-maker, and not just any coworker, harbored the animus. Here, the HR VP was the decision-maker. There is no evidence in the record that she harbored any animosity against Staub or his military responsibilities. Realizing this, Staub relies on the “cat's paw” theory. Under this approach, the discriminatory animus of a non-decisionmaker is imputed to a decisionmaker when the non-decisionmaker exerts singular influence over the decisionmaker to cause the adverse employment action. The Court emphasized that the employer is not liable unless the decisionmaker relies exclusively on the information provided and fails to conduct any investigation. Here, the Court found that the evidence did not support that conclusion. The evidence was clear that the decisionmaker did not rely exclusively on any information provided by other employees. In fact, the Court criticized the district court for even sending the issue to the jury. Instead, the Court suggested an approach whereby the trial judge makes a threshold determination on whether a reasonable jury could find this exclusive influence before even admitting into evidence the animus of a non-decisionmaker.

RICO Statute Of Limitatins Begins To Run When Plaintiff Discovers, Or Should Have Discovered, That He Has Been Injured

THE CANCER FOUNDATION v. CERBERUS CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (March 19, 2009)

In the late 1990s, Martin Lapides and his corporate empire were suffering. He obtained a $23 million line of credit from the Gordon Brothers Group and others. Soon after, Gordon Brothers, working with Lapides' chief financial officer, began to wrest control of one of the corporations away from Lapides. Once Gordon Brothers and the others obtained control of the corporation, they placed it in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy triggered a whole host of financial troubles for Lapides. One of the victims of these troubles was the Cancer Foundation, when one of Lapides’ companies was unable to fulfill an $80 million pledge. Several individual investors in Lapides’ corporations filed suit and obtained a $7 million judgment against Lapides personally. The Cancer Foundation, Lapides and others who suffered harm from the conduct of Gordon Brothers filed suit in 2007 under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO). The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it was barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Manion and Evans affirmed. The Court noted the "generous" four year statute of limitations for a RICO cause of action runs from the time when a plaintiff discovers the harm. A plaintiff does not have to know that the harm is actionable to begin the limitations period. The Court agreed with the district court in holding that the complaint was barred. The conduct complained of was complete an entire decade before the suit began. The Court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the statute did not begin to run until an article in Forbes alerted them to the alleged conspiracy. The plaintiffs were clearly aware of their injury, even if they were not aware of all of its particular elements, well outside of the limitations period.

Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act Affords No Relief To Union's Appointed Business Agent Who Was Released By Appointed Union Leadership

VOUGHT v. THE STATE OF WISCONSIN TEAMSTERS JOINT COUNCIL NO. 39 (March 10, 2009)

Daniel Vought and Daniel Alexander were business agents for their local union. James Newell was its Secretary – Treasurer. In mid-2003, Newell fired Robert Russell from his position as a union business agent for allegedly misrepresenting the nature of the union’s health plan. The termination was reversed by the union’s Executive Board. Charges and countercharges were exchanged between Newell and Vought on the one hand and three of the union’s other board members . The matter was submitted to the Joint Council. The Council decided against Newell and removed him as a union officer and suspended him from union membership or employment. His replacement fired Vought the next day. After Alexander showed his support for Vought in later disciplinary proceedings, union leadership showed its displeasure by making his job more unpleasant. He soon resigned. Alexander and Vought brought an action under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”), alleging that they were forced out of their jobs in retaliation for identifying union impropriety. The District Court dismissed Vought’s claim on the merits and Alexander's on the ground that he failed to exhaust union remedies. Vought and Alexander appeal.

In their opinion, Judges Manion, Evans and Tinder affirmed. The Court first indicated its agreement with the lower court’s conclusion on exhaustion. It agreed with Alexander that exhaustion is not required when it would have been futile. Nevertheless, it concluded that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that a union hearing would not have been an empty formality for Alexander. With respect to the LMRDA claim, the Court cited Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent supporting the proposition that the act does not restrict the freedom of a union leader to choose a staff with compatible views. The union leaders in the cited cases were all elected, and the union leader who terminated Vought was not. The Court did not view that distinction as one that would support a different conclusion.

Time To Appeal From Post-Judgment Proceedings Runs From Final Order Deciding All Post-Judgment Proceeding Issues

SOLIS V. CURRENT DEVELOPMENT CORP. (March 5, 2009)

George Klein is the president and sole shareholder of Current Development Corporation (CDC). CDC sponsored two employee benefit plans. The Department of Labor objected to the way Klein ran the plans and filed suit in District Court. In a settlement by consent order, Klein agreed to terminate both plans and distribute their assets -- a vacant parcel of land and almost $900,000 in cash. Klein allowed the plan participants to choose to take their shares in cash or in an ownership interest in the property. Almost everyone selected the cash option. Klein and his wife, themselves plan participants, were left with a 97% interest in the land. While Klein was winding up the plans, unbeknownst to the participants, he was negotiating the sale of the property. He used a property value of $1.7 million in calculating the participants' shares, even though he had already rejected a $2.3 million purchase offer. The Department of Labor found out about these negotiations and returned to court. The court concluded that Klein had breached his duty of loyalty to the participants and removed him as trustee. The court also appointed an independent fiduciary, who soon sold the property for $2.6 million. The independent fiduciary concluded, after a review of CDC's books and records, that Klein owed the plan another $170,000. The court ordered Klein to repay the money, with prejudgment interest. The independent fiduciary then calculated the final asset distribution figures, which the court adopted. Klein appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Rovner and Evans dismissed in part and affirmed in part. The Court first addressed the jurisdictional issue. Klein filed two notices of appeal -- one after the court's denial of his motion to reconsider the order of prejudgment interest, and one after the court’s final payment determination. The Court noted that the consent decree itself was a final order. All orders after that were post-judgment orders. The Court compared a post-judgment proceeding to a freestanding lawsuit. In determining its scope of appeal, an appellate court will look for the nature of the proceeding and a final determination of the issues. Here, the Department of Labor began the proceedings when it filed its motion seeking Klein's removal as trustee and disgorgement of his gains. Thus, the proceeding was not final until both those issues were decided. The Court concluded that the post-judgment proceedings were final upon the court's determination of the distribution amounts. Since Klein filed a timely notice of appeal from that decision, the Court concluded that it had appellate jurisdiction of the matters presented during the proceedings. The Court dismissed Klein’s first appeal. The Court then addressed the standard of proof. Klein attempted to characterize the proceeding as one for civil contempt – with an accompanying clear and convincing standard of proof. The Court rejected that conclusion, holding that the proceeding was merely one for violation of the consent order. On the merits, the Court had little difficulty dismissing Klein's arguments: a) he waived his right to evidentiary hearing, b.) he should have disclosed the ongoing negotiations for the sale of the property to the plan's participants, c.) the court authorized the investigation into his operation of the plan, and d) the lower court's order for Klein to return money he took from the plan's assets in violation of ERISA and the final determination order were not clearly erroneous.

Debt Collector's Inclusion of Principal and Interest Owed to Original Card Issuer As "Principal Balance" In Letter To Debtor Is Neither False Nor Confusing

WAHL v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC. (February 23, 2009)

Barbara Wahl accumulated a small balance on her credit card. When she stopped using it, the balance was less than $100. Unfortunately, Wahl incurred some huge medical bills and never paid off the credit card. By the time the card issuer turned it over to Midland Credit Management, Inc. (“Midland”) in 2005 for collection, the balance (with interest and late fees) had risen to $1149.09. In February 2005, Midland sent a letter to Wahl and offered to settle for a 25% discount. When Wahl did not accept the offer, Midland sent letters again in April and August. In each of those letters, Midland included an itemization of the amount owed. In each, it referred to the $1149.09 as the “principal balance” and the rest as “accrued interest.” Wahl filed a class action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). She alleged that Midland’s inclusion of interest charged by the card issuer before the debt was purchased by Midland as part of the stated “principal balance” was false and a violation of the FDCPA. The district court certified the class and granted summary judgment to Midland. Wahl appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Bauer, Evans and Williams affirmed. The Court first took issue with Wahl’s assertion of law that a collection letter which is false, even if not deceptive, is a FDCPA violation. The Court stated that a collection letter does not violate the FDCPA unless it would confuse the unsophisticated consumer – even if is false. The Court went further, though. It determined that the letters were not false. Since Midland had acquired the debt from the issuer, the Court decided that the $1140.09 was all “principal” from Midland’s perspective. Finally, the Court applied the unsophisticated consumer test and found that there was “no way” that the language of the letter could be confusing.

Statements Susceptible Of Innocent Construction, Given Natural Meaning of Words in Their Context, Are Not Actionable As Defamation Per Se

LOTT v. LEVITT (February 11, 2009)

Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner authored the off-beat and best-selling Freakonomics. In it, the authors used economic theory to address many “freakish curiosities,’ such as the similarities between nylon stockings and crack cocaine. In one chapter, they addressed the drop in the crime rate in the 1990s. They rejected several theories before concluding that the legalization of abortion accounted for the drop. In one paragraph in that chapter, they commented on John Lott’s theory that allowing more guns into the hands of law-abiding citizens led to the reduction in crime. In addition to noting a “troubling allegation” that Lott fabricated survey data, the authors stated that other scholars tried to “replicate” his results without success. Lott brought a defamation action against Levitt, alleging that “replicate” has a specific meaning within the academic community. Applying that meaning, the statement really means Lott fabricated his results. Lott amended his complaint to add a count of defamation based on an e-mail sent by Levitt. The district court dismissed the count based on the book, holding that it could reasonably be read as not an accusation of dishonesty. Several months later, the parties settled the count based on the e-mail and Lott moved to reconsider the earlier dismissal, claiming that Virginia instead of Illinois law should have been applied. The district court concluded that Lott waived the choice-of-law argument. Lott appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Evans and Sykes affirmed. The Court first addressed the choice-of-law issue and held that Lott waived it. The Court rejected Lott’s argument that he agreed only that Illinois’ choice-of-law principles, not substantive law, applied. Lott relied on Illinois law throughout the proceedings below – he doesn’t get a mulligan. Moving on to the substantive Illinois law of defamation, the Court noted that even statements that amount to per se defamation are not necessarily actionable. A statement is not actionable if, giving the words their natural meaning, it is reasonably capable of an innocent construction. The fact that a court must accept as true the facts alleged in plaintiff’s complaint does not alter the analysis. The determination of the meaning of a statement and whether it is susceptible of an innocent construction is a question of law. Here, although Lott makes out a case for a defamatory meaning by giving “replicate” an academic definition, the Court looked at the context of the statement and a natural definition of replicate in finding that an innocent construction was reasonable. Finally, the Court rejected Lott’s argument that he had a claim for per quod defamation, that is, defamation in which damages must be alleged and proved. Lott failed to allege special damages with enough specificity in either his original or amended complaint.

Congress' Explicit Intent To Alter Reservation Boundaries Can Be Found in the Circumstances Surrounding the Act and in Subsequent Events

WISCONSIN v. THE STOCKBRIDGE-MUNEE COMMUNITY (January 20, 2009)

The Mohican ancestors of the Stockbridge-Munee Indians (“Tribe”) moved from western Massachusetts to New York and, eventually, to Wisconsin early in the 1800s. Additional pressure to move yet again produced two factions within the Tribe – those that wanted to move farther west and those that wanted to eliminate the tribal structure, remain in Wisconsin, and become full U.S. citizens (more history here). A treaty was eventually entered into in 1856. The Tribe gave up the land it had in return for the creation of a reservation consisting of the Bartelme and Red Springs townships, also in Wisconsin. Problems with the land – it was heavily forested and hard to farm but the Tribe was not allowed to sell the timber – and continued internal conflicts led to further Congressional intervention. Pursuant to acts passed in 1871, 1893 and 1906, much of the land was sold, proceeds were divided among tribal members, some members were ousted from the Tribe, and some were later reinstated. Finally, tribal members agreed to accept land or cash in lieu in full settlement of their rights, including those arising under the 1856 treaty. Years later, the Department of the Interior helped the Tribe reacquire some, but not all, of the original two townships. Why does all of this matter? Because the Tribe is now allowed to operate gaming activities within the boundaries of its reservation. The Tribe bought the Pine Hills golf club in 1993 and operates slot machines there. Wisconsin thinks Pine Hills is not within the current boundaries of the reservation. It sued to enjoin the gambling and for a declaration setting forth the boundaries of the reservation. The district court granted summary judgment to Wisconsin. The Tribe appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Ripple and Evans affirmed. The Court made the “unremarkable” observation that a reservation, once established, must remain intact unless and until Congress explicitly alters it. An intent by Congress to do so cannot be inferred lightly. A court should first look at the language of a statute. In the absence of a clear intent, a court can look at the circumstances surrounding the act, and even subsequent events. The Court addressed the 1871 act and found, based on the language of the Act and surrounding circumstances, that Congress meant to reduce the size of the reservation. The Court noted that Congress was addressing the internal conflict in the Tribe. It expected many members of the Tribe to accept a share of the proceeds of the sale of the property and sever ties with the Tribe. A smaller Tribe needed less land. The Court also pointed out that the 1871 Act was consistently interpreted afterward as having reduced the size of the reservation. The Court next addressed the 1906 Act. It, too, lacked an explicit statement of Congressional intent. Again, the Court considered the circumstances. It concluded that all parties – Congress, the Department of Interior, the Tribe – all expected the 1871 Act to complete the allotment of land to the Tribe and extinguish the 1856 reservation in its entirety. One key fact, in the Court’s opinion, was that the land was allotted in fee simple, a requirement for the abolition of the reservation. Again, the Court noted that subsequent events supported the conclusion that the reservation had been eliminated by the Act. By 1910, all the original reservation property had been sold or was held by members of the Tribe in fee simple. The Court concluded that the current extent of the reservation is only that which has been reacquired with the assistance of the Department of the Interior – and it does not include the Pine Hills property.

Judge Ripple concurred, only to emphasize the point that the Court did not in any way depart from the general rule that Congress must be explicit in any attempt to alter or disestablish a reservation.

Under Ledbetter, Past Discrimination in Training Opportunities Cannot Be Used To Support Current Claim of Non-Discriminatory Act

JACKSON v. CITY OF CHICAGO (January 13, 2009)

George Jackson was a carpenter in the Public Works Department in the City of Chicago from 1987 until 2003, when he was promoted to foreman. In 2004, the City announced the availability of two jobs as general foreman of general trades – one each in the Departments of Transportation and General Services. Jackson applied for both jobs. He was offered neither. The City promoted Michael Blake to the Department of Transportation job. Blake had more experience as a carpenter, had more experience estimating the material and manpower needs of a project, and significantly outscored Jackson on a written test of communication skills. The City promoted Kevin O’Gorman to the Department of General Services job. O’Gorman received the highest combined score for the interview and work sample. Jackson did not even submit a work sample. Jackson brought an action against the City. He alleged race and age discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The court granted summary judgment to the City. Jackson appeals the Title VII race discrimination judgment.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Evans and Sykes affirmed. The Court noted that Jackson was proceeding under the indirect method of proof. The first requirement of that indirect method is to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The Court recited the elements of the prima facie case: a) he is a member of a protected class, b) he is qualified for the position, c) he was rejected, and d) the position was given to a person not in the protected class who was less or similarly qualified. Thus, if a job is given to a better qualified individual, the plaintiff’s case must fail. The Court concluded that both promotions were awarded to better qualified individuals. Jackson argued that his qualifications suffered in comparison to the others because the City had discriminated against him in the past by denying him training opportunities. The Court rejected Jackson’s approach. First, Jackson never filed an EEOC charge involving training opportunity discrimination, a prerequisite to a Title VII action. Second, to the extent Jackson argued that the discrimination in training opportunities was not an independent claim but merely support for his primary claim, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear disposes of that theory. The 2004 acts were not discriminatory. Under Ledbetter, a new violation does not occur at the time of later non-discriminatory acts, even if they have adverse effects resulting from past discrimination.

Whistle-Blower is Not Entitled to Exception to Employment-At-Will Doctrine in Indiana

BREGIN v. LIQUIDEBT SYSTEMS, INC. (November 19, 2008)

Donald Bregin was employed as an accounts receivable collector for North American Van Lines, Inc. (“NAVLI”) until the late 1990s. Later, he was a consultant for SIRVA , NAVLI’s parent. In this role, Bregin was involved in NAVLI’s efforts to outsource its collection services. In fact, Bregin took part in negotiations that resulted in a contract between NAVLI and Liquidebt Systems, Inc. (“LSI”), under which LSI would perform those collection services. Bregin was also instrumental in determining the standards under which LSI’s performance would be measured. The parties agreed that SIRVA would evaluate LSI’s performance on how quickly receivables were collected. LSI stood to gain or lose $150,000 depending on whether it was able to show a 10% increase compared to prior years.  LSI hired Bregin away from SIRVA to head up LSI’s delivery of services to NAVLI. Before Bregin left SIRVA, he authored a report that concluded that SIRVA’s accounts receivable were overstated because they included amounts that should be refunded to customers. LSI was not able to meet the agreed performance goal. Bregin believed that SIRVA’s accounting practices were to blame. He reported his concerns to LSI’s management. LSI’s president had Bregin’s complaints evaluated to determine their validity. He discovered that LSI was performing so poorly that it would be subject to the penalty even if SIRVA changed its accounting practices. Bregin was removed from the SIRVA account but initially kept on at LSI. He was eventually fired in December of 2003. Bregin brought suit under Indiana law against LSI and SIRVA, alleging that LSI fired him in retaliation for his reporting the SIRVA accounting practices and that SIRVA tortiously interfered with his employment. The district court granted summary judgment to LSI and SIRVA. Bregin appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Posner, Flaum, and Evans affirmed. The Court noted that the Indiana Supreme Court has recently affirmed its adherence to the employment-at-will doctrine. Under the employment-at-will doctrine, an employer and employee can each terminate an employment relationship for any (or no) reason. The Court observed that Indiana did recognize some narrow exceptions. Bregin relied on the McClanahan exception, based on a case in which the Indiana Supreme Court allowed a cause of action for a truck driver who was fired when he refused to haul an illegal load. The act would have subjected him to personal criminal liability. The Court concluded that Bregin’s claim did not fit the exception. Bregin did not identify any criminal act he was asked to perform. Bregin also asked the Court to recognize a new exception for “whistle-blowers.” The Court rejected his request, noting that an Indiana appellate court had rejected the exception in 1980 in a case in which a “vigorous dissent” raised the same argument for the exception.

With respect to Bregin’s allegation that SIRVA tortiously interfered with his employment, the Court was critical of Bregin’s vague articulation of his claim. The Court conceded that SIRVA complained to LSI about Bregin. It also noted, however, that LSI was not meeting its performance goals and was unresponsive to SIRVA’s requests for information. SIRVA’s complaints to LSI were therefore justified and did not support a claim of tortious interference. In addition, LSI’s president testified that he alone made the decisions to remove Bregin from the SIRVA account and to fire him. Bregin cannot make out a case of tortious interference.

Public Employee's Report of Her "Concerns" Fit Within Her Job Responsibilities and Was Not Protected Speech Under Garcetti

TRIGILLO v. SNYDER (October 31, 2008)

The Illinois Department of Corrections (“Department”) created a new position in 1999 dedicated to procurement matters. The Department hired Tracy Trigillo, an attorney, into the position. Her responsibilities included managing the Department’s contracting, purchasing, leasing, and inventories. She advised department officials on legal matters. She also was responsible for ensuring that contracts were properly bid and in compliance with the Illinois Procurement Act. From early in her employment, Trigillo had concerns about the Department’s procurement practices. She frequently advised her superiors of her concerns, with little effect. In late 2000, she drafted a report that summarized many of her concerns. The report was addressed to the Department of Central Management Services (“CMS”), an agency that provided procurement support to other state agencies. Trigillo also sent the report to the state Attorney General (“AG”). The report contained some allegations of misconduct, although it was principally addressed to policy disputes. Also in 2000, one of Trigillo’s staff members told her that Department officials had rigged the bid of a contract to benefit a friend of the governor. Although the incident predated Trigillo’s tenure in the Department, she was responsible for monitoring an extension of the contract. She reported the information to the FBI but did not advise her superiors that she had done so. When her term of employment was up for renewal in late 2001, the Department chose not to renew. Although she had received acceptable performance reviews during her tenure, her supervisor stated that her approach to procurement principles was “over-zealous” and that she was not a team player. Trigillo brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that she was non-renewed in retaliation for her reports of misconduct. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court separated her speech into three categories. The court held that: a) her routine communications with her superiors were part of her normal job duties and not as a citizen speaking out on matters of public interest, b) her CMS report referred principally to policy disputes and, to the extent it did raise matters of public interest, the Department’s interest in effective operations outweighed Trigillo’s interest as a citizen, and c) her report of misconduct to the FBI was constitutionally protected but there was no evidence that the person who decided not to renew her contract knew about it. Trigillo appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Rovner, Evans, and Williams affirmed. The Court first observed that the district court entered judgment just prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos. Garcetti reaffirmed the limitations imposed by the First Amendment on a public employer’s ability to restrict the “liberties employees enjoy in their capacities as private citizens.” The role of the Court is to determine whether the speech is that of an employee doing her job or that of a private citizen reporting on a matter of public interest. Garcetti requires an inquiry into whether the speech in question relates to the employee’s official obligations, even the more general ones. Trigillo conceded on appeal that her routine communications did not meet the Garcetti standard. The Court addressed the other two categories. The Court rejected defendants’ argument that the CMS report was per se “official” because it was required by statute. The Court noted that the statutory duty was very broad and applied to all employees. Instead of looking at a broad duty, the Court looked at the speech at issue and the responsibilities of the employee. The Court held that the CMS report did not meet the Garcetti standard. The report: a) made no “accusations”, b) sought “guidance” on procurement issues, c) was written on Department letterhead, d) was signed by Trigillo in her official capacity, and e) offered her group’s resources to any investigation. The Court held that the report fit squarely within Trigillo’s responsibilities of managing the procurement practices of the Department. With respect to the FBI report, the Court agreed with the district court that Trigillo had presented no evidence that the decision-maker even knew that she made the report. It could not have been the reason for her non-renewal.

Insurer's Duty to Settle in Good Faith Does Not Extend to an Uninsured Policyholder in Illinois

IOWA PHYSICIANS’ CLINIC MEDICAL FOUND. V. PHYSICIANS INSURANCE CO. (October 31, 2008)

Dr. Randall Mullin worked at a clinic in Geneseo, Illinois operated by the Iowa Physicians’ Clinic Medical Foundation under the name Iowa Health Physicians (“IHP”). Dr. Mullin provided anti-malarial therapy to his patient Dennis Goetz. Unfortunately, the treatment was not effective. Goetz contracted malaria and died. Goetz’ wife brought suit against Mullin and IHP. IHP provided malpractice insurance for Mullin through Physicians Insurance Company (“PIC”). PIC covered Mullin’s liability and defense up to $1 million. PIC did not insure IHP, however. Goetz’ widow offered to settle the case for $900,000 on more than one occasion before trial. When the defense’s own expert admitted in a deposition that Mullin’s treatment did not meet the standard of care, Goetz’ widow retracted the offer. At trial, the jury awarded Goetz’ widow $3.5 million in damages. PIC paid $1 million. IHP, under an agreement with Mullin, paid the rest. Mullin and IHP sued PIC in state court. They alleged that PIC breached its duty to settle in good faith. PIC removed the claim to federal court. The district court entered final judgment against IHP on the ground that PIC owed no duty to IHP. Mullin’s case remained pending. IHP appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Kanne, Evans, and Williams affirmed. The Court started with the “well-settled” recognition in Illinois of an insurer’s duty to settle in good faith. The duty arises from the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance contract. It arises when the insurer controls the litigation and the plaintiff seeks a settlement near the upper limits of the policy. The situation creates a conflict of interest for the insurer. Proceeding to trial presents little risk to the insurer and much risk to the insured. In fact, the Court observed that Mullin made out a good case for PIC’s breach of its duty. The Court had to consider, however, whether the Illinois Supreme Court would extend the duty of good faith to an uninsured policyholder, in addition to the insured himself. IHP argued that its contractual relationship with PIC supported such a duty. The Court pointed out that the Illinois Supreme Court has refused on numerous occasions to extend the insurer’s duty of good faith to contracts in general. Here, IHP could have purchased its own coverage. It chose not to. In addition, PIC did not control IHP’s defense. IHP could have settled the case before trial and limited its liability to Goetz’ widow. The Court concluded that the Illinois Supreme Court would not extend the good faith duty to settle to an uninsured policyholder.

Customer is Not a Third-Party Beneficiary of Bank Employee's Agreement to Be Bound By Bank's Code of Ethics

INTERACTIVE INTELLIGENCE, INC. v. KEYCORP (October 24, 2008) 

For seven years, KeyBank provided foreign exchange currency conversion services to Interactive Intelligence, Inc. (“Interactive”). The parties operated without a written contract for three years. They signed a written agreement in 2001, but the agreement was silent on how Interactive was going to compensate KeyBank. Apparently, Interactive believed it paid a service fee on each transaction. In fact, KeyBank charged Interactive a percentage mark-up on each transaction. The amount of the mark-up increased over time. Adam Ravens was the KeyBank employee who managed the Interactive account. Ravens never told Interactive that he was applying a spread. Interactive, on a couple of occasions, was troubled by the difference between the market rates for the transactions and what they were paying KeyBank. They inquired but never received an adequate response. Interactive brought this action against KeyBank to recover more than $2 million in alleged overcharges. The district court granted summary judgment to KeyBank. Interactive appeals. 

In their opinion, Judges Ripple, Rovner, and Evans affirmed. The Court first addressed Interactive’s principal argument that it was a third-party beneficiary of a contract between Raven and KeyBank. There was no employment contract between Raven and KeyBank of which Interactive could be a beneficiary. Although Raven did sign a Code of Ethics, which he allegedly breached, the Court observed that it would be against public policy for customers to be considered a third-party beneficiary of an ethics code. The Court was concerned that such an approach would encourage companies to weaken or eliminate codes of conduct. Thus, the district court properly granted summary judgment on this claim. Next, the Court upheld the court below on the negligent supervision, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract claims. The Court held that: a) since Ravens had no duty to Interactive, KeyBank could not have been negligent, b) Ravens had no fiduciary duty to Interactive, and c) the oral contract that left the price term to be negotiated was too vague to be enforceable.