Patient's Refusal To Consent To Psychiatric Examination Does Not Insulate Physician From Malpractice Liability

HUNTER v. AMIN (October 1, 2009)

Stanley Bell was sent to the St. Clair County Jail as a pretrial detainee. At the time, he was taking several medications, including an antidepressant and a sleep aid. The prison psychiatrist, Dr. Amin, met with Bell about a week later. Bell refused to speak with Amin with a jail officer present. Amin refused to meet with Bell without a jail officer present, a practice that was also required by state regulations. Bell became agitated -- Amin told him his medication would be discontinued without the examination -- Bell became more agitated and belligerent. Amin discontinued all of Bell's medications and planned to meet with him the following week. Bell committed suicide two days later. Bell's sister, Elisha Hunter, brought a claim pursuant to § 1983 against Amin, the County, and others. She also bought medical malpractice claims. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of all the defendants. Hunter appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Ripple and Sykes (dissenting) and District Judge Lawrence affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The Court first considered the argument that the policy requiring the presence of a corrections officer was a violation of Dell's right to mental health treatment. In order for a municipality to be liable under these circumstances, its policy must violate constitutional rights. Here, the Court stated that the policy did not violate Bell's rights. Bell had a constitutional right to adequate mental health treatment but nothing in the County's policy affected that right. In fact, the Court noted that the fact that the communications would be privileged from disclosure supported their conclusion. With respect to the medical malpractice claim, however, the Court reversed. Although it is true that no physician duty arises if a patient refuses treatment, Bell did not refuse treatment -- he only refused to be examined. The Court found no evidence in the record supporting Amin's position that the examination was necessary in order for him to continue the prescription medications. The Court medical remanded the malpractice claim for further proceedings. Finally, given the affirmance on the only federal claim in the case, the Court instructed the district court to determine whether it should continue to exercise jurisdiction.

Judge Sykes dissented from the majority's reversal of the medical malpractice claim. Judge Sykes concluded that Bell's refusal to consent to the examination meant that Amin had no right to render any treatment. Amin testified that he needed the examination before any treatment. Judge Sykes noted the lack of support in the record for the majority's conclusion that the examination was required.

Insufficient Details Of Work Restrictions And Job Duties Fails "Similarly Situated" Requirement

MCGOWAN v. DEERE & CO. (September 11, 2009)

William McGowan, an African-American male, had over 20 years of employment at Deere & Company when he injured his back. He eventually underwent surgery. He returned to work with a 25-pound weight restriction imposed by the company doctor. His surgeon and physical therapist both cleared him, on separate occasions, to return to work with less onerous restrictions. The weight restriction prevented him from returning to his prior job and also disqualified him from two other positions. McGowan brought an action under Title VII and § 1981, complaining of Deere's refusal to reinstate him and refusal to select him for the other positions. The district court granted summary judgment to Deere. McGowan appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum and Williams and District Judge Lawrence affirmed. The Court first noted that the elements and proof necessary for Title VII and § 1981 are essentially identical. McGowan proceeded under the indirect approach, in which he had to prove, among other things, that other persons similarly situated but not in his protected class were treated more favorably. The similarly situated test, said the Court, is a flexible test. The purpose is to identify a sufficient number of common factors between the claimant and others in order that a meaningful comparison can be made. The critical comparators here are job duties and weight restrictions. The court concluded that McGowan did not provide sufficient evidentiary basis for either job duties or weight restrictions on the employees that the proffered as similarly situated. He therefore failed to make a prima facie case. Alternatively, the Court concluded that McGowan failed to produce any evidence that Deere's stated reasons for its decisions were discriminatory.

Sexual-Harassment Plaintiff Cannot Establish A Tangible Employment Action When She Simply Stopped Reporting For Work

ROBY v. CWI, INC. (August 27, 2009)

Misty Roby was a cashier at a CWI retail store. For months, she experienced sexual-harassment by a store supervisor, Joe Schiavone. Notwithstanding the fairly frequent and offensive behavior, she did not report it. Only after another supervisor overheard a comment she made to a coworker and specifically asked her about it did she report the conduct. The store manager immediately reported it to Human Resources, which conducted an investigation. The company reorganized the store schedule so as to minimize the times Roby and Schiavone worked together. As a result of the investigation, Schiavone received a written warning. Roby was informed of the results of the investigation. Several weeks later, when Roby complained about having to close the store with Schiavone, she was allowed to go home and stay home until the store manager returned from vacation. Although the company told her that they could not accommodate her desire to never be scheduled at the same time as Schiavone, they kept her on the schedule and expected her to come to work. She simply never returned. Instead, she brought an action under Title VII alleging the sexual harassment and also alleging that she was retaliated against for her complaints. The district court granted summary judgment to CWI. Roby appeals.

In their opinion, Judges Flaum, Williams and Lawrence affirmed. In order to prevail on a hostile work environment claim, the Court noted that Roby had to demonstrate employer liability. Here, because Schiavone is a supervisor, the company is strictly liable if there was a tangible adverse employment action. If not, however, the company may assert an affirmative defense that they used reasonable care in trying to prevent the harassment and that Roby failed to take advantage of corrective opportunities. The Court found no tangible employment action. The record presented insufficient support for an actual discharge or for the degree of intolerable working conditions necessary to establish a constructive discharge. Although Roby continued to have to work with Schiavone, CWI made an effort to minimize their contact. Without a tangible employment action, the Court found that the company met its burden on the affirmative defense. It conducted an effective investigation and disciplined Schiavone. Roby, on the other hand, failed to report the behavior when it first occurred and did not take advantage of the company’s anti-harassment policy. With respect to Roby's retaliation claim, she must establish the presence of a material adverse employment action. The Court found no such evidence in the record.